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PART II:
Herder and the History of Science:
his own Theories, and his Knowledge
of the Science of his Age.
2.
Introduction.
The evolutionary process involves a development from purely physical
forms to new forms possessing life, and ultimately to others equipped with
mind. The modern sciences emerged, from the Renaissance to the present, in
broadly the same order: the basic principles of the physical sciences were
laid down first, then the biological sciences made their greatest advances,
and finally, the sciences of man took on their present form. Similarly,
any scientific problem which involves moire than one of these levels must
usually be approached first of all in its fundamental, i.e. physical aspects,
and only later can the more involved biological or psychological phenomena
be clearly understood.
Herder rightly follows this sequence of investigation in his „Ideen".
Unfortunately, however, if we disregard his early grounding in mathematics
and physical science during his university and teaching years (as well as his
sporadic encounters with information from all the sciences in the course of
his multifarious reading), we find that his scientific studies, so far as
they aire directed by a specialised interest which finds detailed expression
in his works, follow exactly the reverse order. First arose his interest in
the psychology of art and the phases of human society; then he set out to
establish psychology upon a physiological, i.e. biological basis. While
preparing his „Ideen", which again treat of human society, he embarked upon
a wider study of general biology and natural history, although the physical
sciences are also represented in this work, in a subordinate position.
/
Finally, in the nAdrastea", we find his scientific interest confined entirely
to the physical disciplines, such as astronomy, light, and colour.
This reversed order of study helped to produce the anthropomorphic and
3.
anthropocentric presentations we have already encountered in his biological
thought, as well as animistic and organismic doctrines in his final theories
of the physical world.
While we shall try not to lose sight of this unusual feature of Herder's
development, we shall examine his knowledge of the sciences in the normal
sequence; this should help us to prevent earlier conceptions from influencing
our attitude to later ones, as happened with Herder himself, and, secondly,
it should make it easier for us to assess his ideas impartially as contribu¬
tions to the scientific tradition.
CHAPTER I
The Physical Sciences.
Herder obtained some knowledge of the physical sciences from Kant's
lectures, which dealt, among other things, with the classification of the
physico-mathematieal sciences, and with physical geography. He also read
Kant's „Allgetaeine Naturgesehichte" at an early date. Caroline Herder
tells us that he further attended Teske's lectures, devoted entirely to
physics, at Konig3berg."^ His library included physical treatises by
J. Clauberg, J.A. Comenius, the French Acaddmie des Sciences, J. Keill,
2)
S. Majolus, H. Regius, J.C. Stock, and Chr. Wolff; ' in the „Jouraal", he
mentions various writers upon physics, such as Mariotte, Nollet, Toricelli,
and Tsirnhausen,^ although he did not subsequently study them all in detail
as he had intended. All this, apart from the numerous writers upon all
branches of physical science whose influence upon Herder we shall shortly
discuss, amply shows that, from an early date, he showed interest in a wide
selection of authorities on the physical sciences, and physics in particular,
although this interest reached its height only in his later years. (We
have already examined Herder's knowledge of exact mathematical disciplines
in our section on mathematics.) A telling remark he made to Hamarm may
prepare us in advance to understand the shortcomings of his own physical
3a)
theories: '
Ich traue mir nicht im Kleinsten ein Mechanisches Genie su, und
vielleicht sind im Physischen und Politischen Verstand meine
Augen dazu zu kurzsichtig.
But before we begin a full discussion of Herder's knowledge of the
various physical sciences, we must first decide what his opinions were
concerning the basic elements of the physical world.
1. The nature of the physical world.
a) The nature of_»atter,_and_atomic_theories.
The earliest physical theories, such as those of the pre-Socratic
philosophers and those of ancient China, usually postulate not one, but
several basic kinds of matter - such was the long-lived theory of the "four
elements". Yet even in some pre-Socratic thinkers we can detect a monistic
tendency to select one element as the most powerful, or even as the
progenitor of the others: this happened in Thales' theory of water,
Heraclitus' theory of fire, and so on.
With the later Greek philosophers, and, more particularly, with the
influx of Judaeo-Christian ideas into European thought, there arose dualistic
theories which distinguished physical matter (collectively) from the
spiritual category of mind.
Much of later philosophy and psychology is dominated by the problems
resulting from this dualism. Monistic thinkers rejected the dualism either
by denying that one or other of the two poles had any separate identity, or
by seeking some higher common factor supposed to lie behind both. Herder,
as we know, tended to favour monism. Thus, in discussing his theory of
matter, we cannot disregard his beliefs concerning mind, as we could with
any thoroughly dualistic thinker; conversely, we cannot deal with his theory
of mind as a purely psychological question without referring to his concep¬
tion of matter. For, in all monistic philosophies, mind and matter are
each defined in relation to the other, which is either negated, or accommo¬
dated in some way to its opposite. Herder, as we know, usually adopts the
latter solution. We shall therefore proceed to discuss Herder's theories
6.
of matter, referring, where necessary, to his theories of mind, but reserving
our separate exposition of his views on mind for our chapter on psychology.
R.T. Clark Jnr. maintains:^
In Herder's epistemology there is no science of matter. At
no time does ha devote any attention to the conception of matter.
He does not, like Bishop Berkeley, deny its existence; he simply
ignores it.
This is not strictly true, as we shall see; for although Herder's works
yield no science of matter in the physicist's sense, they do present us with
several divergent solutions to the philosophical problem of matter.
We noticed in our discussions of Herder's „Kraft" that this idea was
used to reconcile mind and matter. Let us examine this rdle of „Kraft" in
further detail.
Some critics maintain that Herder's „Krafte" are purely spiritual. This
implies that he denies the existence of any non-spiritual or inanimate
matter, independent of the ..Krafte" themselves. Thus Siegel conceives of
- 5}
Herder's „Krafte" as basically idealistic, as n&eist", ' and later says that
Herder is ultimately a „Spiritualist",^ despite his occasional utterances
of an almost materialistic tenor. Caroline, in her memoirs, indeed says
that Herder believed that physics would come to recognise more and more
„geistige Krafte". " He says himself, on one occasion, that all „Rrafte"
are „von geistiger Art"; but in the latter case, he is referring in parti¬
cular to the soul and its immortality.^ However, Richter also describes
Herder's monism as a form of ..Spiritualismus"and Gotz, quoting passages
to illustrate how Herder uses „Krafte" to define mind, concludes that he
7.
10)
affords no place whatsoever to materialism in his ideas. ' Hoffart is
just as uncompromising, saying that, for Herder, „Auck die Materia besteht
aus Kraften", which ar6 purely immaterial; this writer thereby denies that
matter has any distinct reality for Herder.3"1"^ Herder does, in fact, state
(in his „Crott"): „ auch das Organ selbst ist ein System von Kraf ten", and
«• 12)
he speaks of „dieas die Materie ausmachenden Krafte", thus lending support
to Hoffart's contention. Most critics agree that Leibniz's influence
13)
encouraged him in these more "spiritualistic" statements.
However, statements of a completely different kind appear elsewhere in
Herder's writings. The following passage appears in the compilation ^Herders
Lebensbild",3"^ and is there said to date from the Riga period; it was
republished by Suphan, who on one occasion dates it in 1769, on another in
15)
1771- From our earlier conclusions, we can assert that this utterance
seems typical of Herder's views in 1769:
Wenn alle klare Ideen aus dunkeln werden: so auch Gedanken
aus Bewegung der Materie.
Haym quotes the passage, noting how close it is to materialism,3"^ and
Siegel refers to it, alluding to it, however, as thoroughly untypical.3"^
We must also add, in justice, that Herder continues with the qualification
that his statement would still be true — wenn endliche Materien doch nur
nichts als Vorstellungen einfacher Wesen sind, die nicht Materie sind";
these „einfache Wesen", as Haym observes,3"®^ are Leibniz's monads, and
Herder introduces them in order to leave the way open to his alternative
theory of ,,Krafte", which so often replace matter in his philosophy.
However, again in 1769, he writes to Mendelssohn of the „&rundstoff der
Krafte", thus apparently implying that „Stoff" is more basic than „Kraft"
We earlier noticed that Herder, in the fourth wKritisches Waldchen", al3o of
1769, speaks of man's „materielle Seele";2"^ in examining his various
approaches to the problem of perception, we saw that his more sensationalis-
tic theories carried strong materialistic overtones. Again, in the „Ideen"
and after, Herder often reduces the various „Krafte" of the physical world
to material agencies (e.g. nWarm<3stoff", „Lichtteile", „magnetische Materia",
„Aether", etc.); we shall encounter such reductions of „Krafte" to matter
in the appropriate sections, and note meanwhile that, since he frequently
employs these ttKrafte" to describe the vital „Krafte" behind organic life,
he cannot avoid implying that life, and therefore also the soul which mani¬
fests itself in life, are of a subtle but material nature. Such an
inference recalls the "pneuma" of the Stoics, and Swedenborg's belief in a
subtle, material soul.21J Kuhnemann rightly speaks of Herder's „spiritualis
tische und doch auch materialistische Gedanken von der Lebenswarme" in a
similar context.22'' Lange, in his monumental history of materialism,
rightly notices that significant elements of materialism are present in
23)
Herder's philosophy. ' Critics such a3 the Marxist Reimann go too far, as
we have already seen, in claiming that Herder was a complete (dialectical)
materialist.
We earlier noticed that Herder, in his theory of a universal "type", and
in various descriptions of the growth of organisms, at times maintains that
the complete organic form is nothing more than a configuration of inter¬
acting „Krafte". On the other hand, he often says, as in his „Gott", that
these nKraftew must operate within a material „Organ".2^ In these latter
utterances, he clearly accepts that both nKrafte" and inanimate matter exist;
this at once recalls the traditional dualism of matter and mind or spirit.
9.
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Thus he likewise declares in the „Ideen": '
Es ist organische Materi®, zu der lebendige Krafts kommen
mussen, sie erst sur Gestalt des kunftigen Geschopfs zu
bilden.
On this occasion, Herder is arguing in favour of the soul's immortality.
It is on such occasions that the latent dualism within his „Kraft" theory
becomes most apparent. In such cases, it is no longer a question of a
dualism of „Rrafte" and forms which arise out of their interaction, but of
„Krafte" and traditional inert matter, i.e. two separate entities.
But even in a completely naturalistic context Herder says, in the same
work, of his organic „Kraft" „ da£> sie organische Teile sich aus dem
Chaos einer homogenen Materie zueigneHere, he unmistakably concedes
that an inert matter, divisible into „TeileM, has a separate existence. On
the other hand, he again affirms in the „Adrastea", that no matter exists
apart from indwelling „Krafte".2^ This recalls Leibniz's statement:2^
—- il y a ua Monde de Creatures, de Vivans, d'Animaux,
d'Entelechies, d'Ames dans la moindre partie de la matilre.
Thus, McEachran's remark that Herder believes in a "dead" matter imbued with
vitalising forces,2"^ and a similar contention of Posadzy's,"^ would indeed
apply to the mora dualistic passages we have cited, but not to the others
which define even matter as consisting of „Krafte".
The dualistic statements involving both matter and „Kraft" recall the
"active and passive principles", force and matter, of Stoic philosophy,^
and, on a more strictly physical level, the force and matter of classical
physics; on the biological and psychological levels, they remind us of the
dualistic vitalism associated with more religiously inclined biologists up to
10.
the first quarter of the present century. As for individuals whose ideas
were known to Herder, Schmidt points out that Shaftesbury believed in both
xo)
matter and force, ' and we know from Herder's notes that Einsiedel did so
too»>
In the light of such conflicting ideas as all these, it is no wonder
that Herder declared in 1774 of the soul and its ,,Krafte":^
Wir werden sie nie ganz ubersehen, wenn wir uns iiamer nur bei
einer Seite aufhalten, bei dam Idealismus ihrer Krafte, oder
bei den qualitatibus secundis korperlicher Ideen -— Auf der
Hohe des Meers ist freie grosse Fahrt.
He repeats this point in the more famous words which occur in the 1778 version
35)
of „Vom Erkennen und Empfinden":
Wei£ ich noch nicht, was Material oder Immaterial sei?
Thus, it should be clear that it is not enough to say that Herder was a
materialist or a spiritualist, or a dynamist, a believer that only „Kraft",
the common denominator of matter and mind, exists. He is all of these,
often with hints of traditional dualism, and it would probably be true to say
that he used his „Kraft" conception not only to paper over a concealed
dualism, but also as an ambiguous device by which he could employ purely
materialistic ideas on some occasions, and purely spiritualistic ones on
others. Though sometimes uneasily aware of the resultant difficulties,
which led him to take refuge in such statements as that „Krafte" are
intrinsically unknowable, or that the border between the material and the
non-material cannot be defined, he was probably not fully conscious that his
"synthesis" was really a means of believing in two conflicting opinions
simultaneously.
What is the scientific significance of all this? Boscovich resolved
matter entirely into purely relational, but mathematically delineable forces
in a way which anticipated much of modern physical theory. Classical
physics (i.e. Newtonian mechanics) operated with quantitative matter (mass)
and force, leaving mind as a category quite distinct from physical force,
and outside the purview of physics. Materialistic theorists of science
declared that physical matter and force, with their physical or mechanical
laws, applied to mind as well as to inert matter, but pursued their more
strictly physical investigations in the traditional way. All of these
theories are unambiguous, and each could provide a working basis for the
growth of physical science. Herder's theories of matter, however, are
incorrigibly ambiguous, and belong almost wholly to the realm of metaphysics,
and, taken together, have no place in any coherent theory of the physical
world. His later tendency to emphasise formal natural laws, which govern
units whose intrinsic quality or content is either unknown or irrelevant,
was a more auspicious beginning. But he always returned to the practice
which he recommended in his review of Thorild's „Maxiraum sive Archimetria"
in 1800:
so mochte Bacons Weg; ,was ist da? was giebts?' erst
strenge zu verfolgen seyn, ehe man an das Gefundene oder
Empfundene Maas legen und fragen kann: wie viel giebts? wie
vial muB es geben?
He was too preoccupied with the qualitative „Was?" to do justice to the
quantitative, and more scientific „Wie viel?"
Similar ambiguity arises when Herder discusses the ultimate structure
of matter. His first reference to atomic theories appears in an early
37)
extract from Leibniz*3 "Nouveaux E3sais": '
Ware die Materie aus vollig harten Theilen zusammengesetzt, so
ware die Bewegung im Vollen unmoglich. Vielmehr ist der Raum
voll von einer ursprunglich flilssigen Materie, die aller
Theilung fahig und auch alien Theilung ins Unendliche ausge=
setzt ist.
The density of this matter varies locally according to degrees of motion;
no part is either impenetrable or infinitely fluid.
In an early version of the „Ideen", Pt. IV, Herder says in passing that
- 38)
the world is composed of both „Krafte" and atoms. ' In his „Gott", he
39)
again affirms that atoms are the ultimate components of the universe, '
referring, however, to Leibniz's (ideal) monads and to Boscovich's atomic
theory. He calls atoms, as defined by Boscovich, ..untheilbare wirkende
Elemente , ohne welche sich die Natur der Korper selbst physisch nicht
erklaren lafit.^^ These "indivisible elements", however, are clearly at
variance with the infinitely divisible matter Herder had described in his
early extracts from Leibniz, and which Leibniz had again described in his
„Monadologie"In another version of his „Gott", Herder speaks of
„manches unphilosophischen Wahnes, da£ es z.B. Atomen, absolut=harte Korper
und dergleichen in der Natur gebe. ein unendlich kleiner Atom hemmte
•• ~ U2)
die Radar der gejazen Schopfung", ' repeating this objection in the
..Adrastea" of his last years.But if there are no infinitely hard (and
therefore indivisible) units, matter must be infinitely divisible; yet we
have just seen that Herder described Boscovich's atoms as „untheilbar", and
considered such units as necessary for any account of the physical world.
,It seems, therefore, that Herder had no certain views upon the atomic
theory of matter. Although chemists since the time of Boyle had used the
theory without worrying unduly about the intrinsic nature of the atoms,
philosophers such as Leibniz rejected them and considered that matter was
infinitely divisible, so that no ultimate, extended particles, such as
Lucretius, Gassendi, Huygens and Boyle had postulated, could exist.
Boscovich revised Leibniz's theory by identifying the ultimate units of
matter with mathematical points.^ These are, in a sense „untheilbar",
since a point is not extended. If this is what Herder meant in his
approving description of Boscovich's theory, he is freed from the charge of
inconsistency, and can thus be classed as a Leibnizian who accepted the
physically superior version of the Leibnizian theory of matter put forward by
Boscovich. But, since Boscovich's inter-atomic forces were purely rela-
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tional and mathematical, ' whereas Herder considered his own ,,Krafte" as
real and dynamistic, the parallel is far from complete. As in his theory
of matter and „Kraft", he seems to have been uncertain about the ultimate
nature of atoms, and put fonward no constructive or coherent physical theory
concerning them.
Lange, referring in his history of materialism to all who attempt to
describe the ultimate nature of matter and its constituents, sagely declares^"1
„dafi das ganze Problem von Kraft und Stoff in ain Problem der Erkeantnis=
theorie auslauft und da£ fur die Katurwissenschaften ein sicherer Boden nur
in den Relationen zu finden ist, wobei immerhin gewisse Trager dieser
Relationen, wie z.B. die Atome hypo the tisch eingefiihrt und wie wirkliche
Binge behandelt werden durfen; vorausgesetzt freilich, daB man aus diesen
.Realitaten' kein Bogma mache ". Gottfried Martin, in like vein, writes
in his work on Kant's theory of science: '
14.
This renunciation of the knowledge of essence and the limitation
to relations constitutes the peculiar pathos of modern natural
science and was also expressed convincingly by Kant [i.e. with
the „Ding an sich"j.
Bertrand Russell similarly rejects materialism so long as it claims that all
reality consists of "little hard lumps". True scientific materialism, he
says, simply declares that all reality, including mind, is subject to
48)
physical laws: '
The important question is not whether matter consists of little
hard lumps or of something else, but whether the course of
nature is determined by the laws of physics.
And Popper supports the "methodological nominalists", who ask how matter
behaves, and regard words only as useful means of description, against the
"methodological essentialists", who ask such questions as "What is matter?"
and "What is force?"^"^
All this goes to show that Herder's qualitative concepts such as „Xraft"
made it impossible for him to elaborate a theory of matter compatible either
with the classical physics of his age, or with the more progressive
hypotheses of contemporaries such as Boscovich, or with modern scientific
usage.
b) Force and energy in the ghysical world.
50)
Noll ' briefly denies that Herder's „Kraft" has any similarity to the
„Kraft" (i.e. force) of modern mechanics. F. Berger holds the same view,
rightly observing that Herder's „Kraft" is equivalent neither to the force
of acceleration nor to that of inertia.H. Schwarz,^^ followed by
Hoffart"^ and Rouch<5,also concurs in this opinion, alleging that
physical forces become exhausted, whereas Herder's forces contrive to
perform new tasks indefinitely. This, however, is not strictly accurate,
since the conservation of force, as well as of energy, has long been accepted
in physicsj on the other hand, Herder's „Krafte", lacking any definition in
terms of such quantities as mass, velocity and distance, and retaining, in
the doctrine of „Palingenesie", a quasi-personal individuality throughout
their transfcreations, are certainly very different from the forces of both
classical and modern physics. Berger further correctly points out that
Herder's „Kraft" cannot be compared with modern energy, since it is not
mathematically (quantitatively) measurable, but constitutes, in Herder's
•> 55)
words, the „Mafi der Realitat eines Daseins von innen". '
56)
Undeterred by such considerations, Clark ' shows how Herder borrowed the
word "Energy" from Harris, who distinguished it from Power, and quotes Kluge's
„Etymologisches lorterhuch" in claiming that Herder introduced the word
„Enargie" in its modern, scientific sense into German. But firstly, there
is no evidence to show that Herder had read the work ("Philosophical Arrange¬
ments") in which Harris made the distinction between Power (as potential
force) and Energy (as active force), although the word „Energie", without
this definition, appears in Harris' "Three Treatises", read and quoted by
Herder in the 1760's; besides, Harris made no attempt to relate his
conceptions to physics. Secondly, the reference to Herder's „Energie",
supported by Kluge, as the first example of the modern scientific usage of
the term, can scarcely be reconciled with Clark's subsequent statement that
Herder's „Kraft", not his „Energie", corresponds to our modern "energy".
And thirdly, Herder never uses the word „Energie" in the way in which it is
used in modern science, as Kluge infers, for it is never quantitative, but
16.
is employed, for example, to describe man's soul as an „Abdruck gottlicher
Energis""^ (in 1778), and to describe the natural divisions of the world as
arising „zufolge der ihm [i.e. jedeai Theil der Welt] einwohnanden Natur= oder
gottlichen Energiean""^ (in 1787). For Herder, like Harris, always uses
the word in an aesthetic (c.f. Schiller's „energische Schonheit"), religious
or metaphysical sense.
Clark soon drops the comparison between Herder's „Energie" and modern
59)
energy, and goes on to say: '
Above all, if we can equate Herder's „Kraft" with modern energy -
and to do so would be doing no violence to either - it is
startling to notice how he places energy at the center [sic] of
all physics, i.e. of all science.
He further says of Herder's „Kraft": "If it is purely metaphysical, then
6o)
most of modem physics is also metaphysical", ' and excuses Herder's
6l)
vagueness and his inability to define „Kraft" coherently by showing ' how
physicists in Herder's age could not decide whether the product of mass and
velocity (mv - our measure of simple mechanical motion) or of mass and the
square of velocity (mv^ - our measure of mechanical motion in its capacity
62)
to do work, i.e. of kinetic energy ') should be the measure of motion (or
of force, still not clearly distinguished from energy at this time).
In the passage quoted by Clark as an example of Herder's pardonable
vagueness, Herder says of the word „Kraft": „ wer weiB, was es, inwendig
der Sache selbst, bedeute?"^"^ But in this, as in all similar utterances,
Herder is not voicing doubts concerning the quantitative measure (whether mv
or mv^) by which physical force (not energy, for he nowhere mentions any
quantitative formulae comparable with those by which potential and kinetic
energy were defined in 19th century physics) could be defined; he is simply
echoing the current truism, which, as we noticed initially, he nevertheless
violates on other occasions by reducing „Kraft" to various animistic or even
material agencies, that the intrinsic quality of „Kraft" may be unknowable.
Thus, the cause of Herder's uncertainty is not to be found among the
disputes of contemporary physicists over mathematical formulae; his doubts
are purely metaphysical.
But Clark says that most of modern physics is just as metaphysical as
Herder's „Kraft". It is indeed true to say that physics makes no claim to
know the intrinsic nature of energy, or, for that matter, of force. But this
does not mean that they are metaphysical concepts as used in science, because
the aspects of them with which physics is exclusively concerned are the
measurable changes observed in the physical world; the metaphysical
reality, non-reality, or nature of energy as a „Ding an sich" is a matter of
total indifference to the physicist. In mechanics, terms such as "energy"
can be used not only quantitatively to describe observed changes, but can
even be used (more questionably, from the point of view of philosophy), to
describe the causes of these changes, without prejudicing the accuracy of
scientific results. But there is the risk that they may pass into other
sciences such as biology, where they tend to acquire a quasi-substantial
reality, distinct from the observed effects with which they were originally
associated. As Engels says of force: " in every natural science, even
in mechanics, it is always an advance if the word force can somehow be got
rid of ."6^
In conclusion, let us briefly review the stages through which the
conception of force has passed in physical science. (We can now leave the
modern conception of energy, since it had no unambiguous function in the
science of Herder's day, least of all in Herder's works.) This should help
us to judge whether Herder's versions were behind or in advance of those of
his age.
65)
Leonardo wrote in his notebooks: '
Weight is corporeal and force is incorporeal.
Weight is material and force is spiritual.
Jammer records of Newton's theory:
Force, for Newton, was a concept given a priori, intuitively,
and ultimately in analogy to human muscular force.
Nonetheless, though Newton engaged in private theological and metaphysical
speculations upon the intrinsic character of force, he allowed only its
quantitative aspects to enter into his scientific arguments. Not long
before Herder wrote, there were published various works by Boscovich, whom
Herder had studied to some degree. Boscovich, as we earlier saw, regarded
the intrinsic nature of force as irrelevant to physics, using the word to
67)
signify a mathematically determinable relation; ' his views have been
68)
inherited by modern science. On a more philosophical level, Berkeley '
had earlier supported the same view, and it was later proclaimed anew by
69)
such scientific theorists as Ernst Mach, Kirchhoff, and Hertz. 1
Theories like that of Leonardo concerning the spiritual nature of force
are merely instances of what Ihitahead calls "the fallacy of misplaced
concreteness" it is easy to allow what is merely a word, a model
describing a set of relations, to acquire a substantial content of its own.
Herder's theory is closer to that which Leonardo had inherited from the
Middle Ages than to those of modern physics. It is even inferior to that
of Newton, who used foroe only as a measurable quantity, unlike Herder, who,
when applying the term to the physical world, did not even begin to free it
from a mass of extraneous associations. In fact, it was this very wealth
of association which enabled him to use the idea as he did, as a great
unifying concept. Boscovich's advanced conceptions had been put forward in
1758, before Herder began to writs, but Herder does not appear to have
benefited from them either.
c) The conservation of energy, force and mass.
In the „Ideen", Herder argues that, since the „Kraft" of which the soul
- 7l)
consists, like all „Kraft8", is indestructible, the soul must be immortal. '
This idea inspired the critic Posadzy to speak of the „&esetz von der
72) 73)
Erhaltung der Kraft" in Herder's work. Hansen ' also alleges that
Herder attains to Mden Gedanken an eine Erhaltung der Kraft und des Stoffes",
referring to Herder's statement „[daf] die lebendigen Krafte mit Organisationen
beschrankt und wieder befreiet warden", and Vielhaber declares that he
reaches „das Gesetz von der Erhaltung der Kraft und des Stoffes" by
75)
intuition. ' Clark says that Herder observes the law of the conservation
76)
of force, 1 and Siegel declares that Herder's principle of Compensation"
77)
can be compared „mit unserem modemen Energieprinzip." '''
How we have seen that Herder's force is nowhere equivalent to the force
whose conservation was proved in 19th century mechanical physics by mathe¬
matical theory and experiment, in the work of Robert Mayer, Helmholtz and
others. His theory that the individual „Krafts" behind all organisms are
conserved is never extended to include all forces in the universe, physical
as well as biological ones. The "proof" of the theory is that we can never
see a. „Kraft" perish;^ we might add that we can never see a ,(Kraft" at all.
All this is in no way comparable with modem scientific theories, as several
critics have claimed. The same objections render void any comparison of
Herder's ideas with the law of the conservation of energy. And, so far as
the notion of the conservation of mass (or matter) is concerned, we may
recall that Herder's theory of matter is completely vague and imperfectly
resolved; furthermore, he rejected Kant's theory „von einem allgemeinen,
nie vermehrten, nie verminda i>tan Quanto aller Subst&nzen" in his .Metakritik",
79)
on the grounds that such a principle can never be verified. '
What then do early non-mathematical, non-experimental conservation
theories such as Herder's signify? Above all, they do not adumbrate modern
scientific theories in a marvellous or inspired fashion. They are ultimately
derived from the holistic premise that since the universe, the organism, etc.
are all complete wholes, the quantity of their constituents must be constant
overall, and changes to them can only take place by rearrangement of their
parts. Such are Herder's principle of „Kompensation", Spinoza's "suum esse
conservare"and Leibniz's principle of plenitude.
On a more scientific and empirical level this a priori deduction is
expressed in the dictum of Lucretius, noted by Herder in the 1760's, that
nothing can be completely destroyed, since something new must always arise
81N
out of it. • The same assumption lies behind man's use of (presumably
constant) weights from the earliest times. All this implies that matter, or
rather mass, is conserved throughout all changes. Bacon enunciated this
principle,and it soon became an axLom of the new, quantitative chemistry
83)of Boyle, Black and others. As Singer remarks, a belief in the conserva¬
tion of matter, and even of energy, had already been at least implicit in
gl \
Galileo's quantitative mechanics. ' Newton's laws of motion entail the
law of the conservation of momentum, as a writer on Newton's science
85)
observes. ' Descartes enunciated the principle of the conservation of
motion,which leads directly to that of the conservation of force.
Leibniz's physical theory of vis viva (our kinetic energy) even implied the
21.
law of the conservation of energy, as Sir James Jeans points out. ' Kant,
in his early essay on physical „Kraft", also notes that Leibniz accepted the
Cartesian principle „da£ sich in der Welt immer einerlei GroBe der Kraft
erhalte."^
Thus, although the more philosophical conservation theories were based
only upon a priori reasoning, or religious guarantees of permanence (which
could be construed as heretical, since they imply that the universe is
eternal), and although, in science, they were proved®^'' to be valid as
universal laws only in the 19th century, by Mayer, Joule and others, they
had already been applied in a much more practical, empirical and quantitative
way than they are in Herder's works, from a time long before Herder began to
write. Once more, attempts to prove that Herder's scientific results were
strikingly modem are seen to be completely misguided; they indicate a
wholesale disregard for the way in which scientific methods have developed.
The true ancestors of our modern scientists are those who discovered and
practised their methods.
d) Mech8nism_and_dynamism.
In his „Erlauterungen zum Neuen Testament" (1774-75)> Herder declares:
Die unsichtbare Welt ist uns endlich ganz verschlossen, weil
wir Mechanisch denken.
This is but one of numerous similar utterances. We noticed how Herder, in
his fourth „Kritisches Waldchen" of 1769> Had already begun to doubt whether
"mechanical" physics can inform us, for example, about our subjective
sensations of sound, although he put forward other more or less mechanistic
theories himself in the same year. From this time onwards, however, the
psychology of feeling tends to replace mechanical analysis for Herder, and
„Krafte" increasingly supplant "dead" matter as the subjective and objective
poles of the world studied by science; thenceforth, he repeatedly attacks
"mechanistic" theories of nature.
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One modern theorist enumerates seven meanings of the term "mechanism".
We have already discussed one of these senses in evaluating the place of
"mechanistic" as opposed to teleological ideas in Herder's works. A second
sense, whereby "mechanism" is opposed to dynamism, the belief that omnipresent
forces exist throughout the physical world in their own right, not merely as
functions of the mechanics of motion, will now be examined.
We have seen how Herder, like the early Kant, replaced Lucretius' moving
atoms by dynamic „Krafte" in his cosmogony, even in the 1769 manuscript
recently published by Irmscher. Nonetheless, his „Krafte" create orderly
forms by an interaction which can, in itself, be described as mechanical
(i.e. not teleological). Similarly, in retaining the concept of matter, as
well as that of „Kraft", Herder often combines mechanism and dynamism,
adopting an intermediate position, as usual.
But the term "mechanism", as used in the present section, denotes the
belief that the laws of motion, operating within an inert matter, can fully
explain how all observed nature is created and sustained. How then do
Herder's dynamistic „Krafte" alter such a picture of the universe? In
attempting to answer this question, we hope to bring out the remaining few
implications of the „Kraft" conception for Herder's views on the physical
world.
Firstly, „Krafte" often simply add a dimension of inwardness to an
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otherwise "dead" universe, as F. Berger ' and Bruntsch' have realised.
The forces of simple mechanical motion are assumed to produce all movements
from outside, by external impact, in elementary mechanics. But the search
for an internal cause of motion in the physical world, by analogy with the
"spontaneous" motions of man, helped to produce emotionally conceived,
dynamistic theories such as that of Herder, who could not by nature accept
the inert and passive universe of mechanistic materialism.
The second feature we observe in Herder's physical dynamism is that it
introduces an ever-present principle of development whereby ,,Krafte" operate,
as hypothetical motive impulses, from within an ever-changing universe.
This is that philosophical dynamism which Boucke, in his excellent work on
n» ^
Goethe, traces from Heraclitus down to the eighteenth century. ' It reminds
us of Herder's so-called „Sntwicklungsgedanke", which we have already
discussed. Such ideas had appeared, usually in idealistic forms, with
increasing frequency from the Renaissance onwards, but were becoming more
naturalistic around the time of Herder. However, he still clung to many of
95)their metaphysical associations. As P.M. Barnard rightly says:
Die Quelle des Wirkens ist mit Herders Konzeption von Kraft identisch.
But, as w® earlier remarked, the value of Herder's dynamistic idea of
universal development lay not in the „Krafte" which provided the theoretical
impulse, but in the formal aspects of natural changes which he described by
the dialectical formula, his theory of natural law, etc.
Thirdly, this doctrine of development could be implemented upon a more
concrete, physical level, giving the conception that everything in the
physical world is in a state of perpetual motion. Herder quotes the
96)
following sentence from Leibniz's writings, which in turn refer to Boyle: '
Eine Substanz kann nie ohne Handlung, ein Korper nie ohne Bewegung aeyn.
Leibniz believed that rest was only a particular, infinitesimally small degree
of motion.^ Kant, more empirically, had said that everything is in
98)
motion, in gravitational orbits, in the astronomical universe. ' We know
from his „Allgemeine Naturgeschichte" that he believed, at that time, that
such motion was caused by dynamistic „Kraf te", just as Leibniz had done.
But Kant soon overcame Leibniz's rather contrived theory that rest is a form
of motion, even before his critical period. Already in 1758, three years
after writing the „Allgemeine Naturgeschichte", he called „Kraft" „das
Gesetz einer durch die Erfahrung erkannten allgeraeinen Erscheinung, wovon man
99)
die Ursache nicht weiB", ' making its existence verifiable only in cases of
observed motions. Like Boscovich, Kant eventually succeeded in using the
conception of „Kraft" descriptively, without substantivising it as Herder so
often did. The idea of perpetual motion was forced upon Leibniz's scientific
thought by his metaphysical doctrines. Herder, who declared in his „Gott"
that even matter is a form of „Kraft", seems, unlike Kant, Boscovich and
others, never to have gone beyond the Leibnizian theory.
The fourth function of dynamism in the physical theory of Herder's age
was to provide, within science, an alternative to mechanistic theories of
impact or impetus. For the laws of motion, as phrased by Descartes and
other pre-Newtonian thinkers, meant that inert masses of matter could only be
moved by direct external impact. Newton realised, however, that gravitation
is proportional not to the surface, as required by a theory of direct impact,
but to the mass of a body.^^ Newton therefore propounded the theory that
a gravitational force, of unknown nature, is at work; completely breaking
with mechanistic impact theories, he dismissed Descartes' hypothesis that
space is filled with an ether, the swirling motion of which produces gravi¬
tational phenomena by direct pressure upon bodies. Newton's hotly disputed
theory of "action at a distance" admirably described the observed phenomena,
but created methodological difficulties, and opened the way for a more
extreme dynamism such as that of Herder, who supposed that unseen but
substantial forces, different from the forces of "impact" mechanics, governed
the physical world. It was Newton's theory of gravity which was to give to
much of eighteenth century physics a more mystical tone than that of the
apparently more down-to-earth mechanical physics of Galileo and Descartes.
However, in his theory of simple mechanical motion, Newton retained the
idea of impact. An initial impact could set a body into motion, which
persisted uniformly in a straight line until the body was acted upon by some
other force.(Newton did, however, reject the Aristotelian and
medieval notion that a mover [movens] must be in constant contact with the
moving body [mobile] throughout the duration of its motion.) Boscovich,
however, reduced all forces, including those of simple mechanical motion, to
"action at a distance" (between atoms consisting of mathematical points with
surrounding miniature "gravitational" fields), and thus used Newton's theory
of gravity to eliminate the concept of impact altogether from his mechanics.
The development of electromagnetism in the nineteenth century caused more and
more phenomena to be explained in such a "dynamistic" way, without the idea
of impact, thus extending Newton's method of explaining gravity.
But after all, as Dalberg said:"^^
Wissen die Herren wohl mehr, was Impulsion ist, als sie das
wissen, was Attraction ist?
This view is shared by a present-day historian of the concept of force
It is pure prejudice to assume that action at contiguity is
more intelligible than action at a distance.
26.
No doubt this prejudice arises because we associate the tactile sensation of
contact with applying our muscular force to any external body. But this
does not justify us in carrying this experience beyond ourselves as an
analogy. Thus, it is a fallacy, but a common one, to believe that the
French materialists of Descartes' school were scientifically and methodologi¬
cally more correct than physicists who, like Newton and Boscovich, put
forward (albeit carefully qualified) dynaiai3tic views.
The only scientific argument which can justify dynamism is Newton's.
For Newton's gravitational force, or any electromagnetic force, can be used
as a hypothetical construction, so long as it does not lead to metaphysical
speculations on the inner nature of the forces. The three other senses in
which we have used the term - as "inwardness", as the „Bntwicklung3gedankB"
and as the doctrine of perpetual motion, have no place in recognised theories
of the physical world.
However, Herder found even Newton's theory of gravity, and Kant's early
(teleological) creative forces too mechanistic in his last years, as we
shall see, apparently preferring the archaic, animistic forces of Kepler.
In this, and in the three previous cases discussed, he went beyond the
qualified dynamism which uses „Kraft" only as a hypothesis. His dynamism
is predominantly intuitive and metaphysical, not scientific or even
pragmatic.
Nonetheless, traditional mechanism, as expounded by Descartes, had
proved inadequate in physics, especially in the theory of gravitation;
Herder's objections to Cartesian mechanism are largely justified for this
reason alone. Even the Lucretian Knebel did not accept Lucretius' crude
mechanism of endless impacts between solid, inert atoms.In Newton's
wake a whole wave of dynamism arose. Among the dynaraists of Herder's age
were Diderot, Reimarus, and his friend Binsiedel, as well as more mystical
exponents such as Swedenborg. From the first three names alone, it is
clear that dynamism was something more than a theological or even mystical
revolt against "materialistic" physics. It was also an attempt to build a
naturalistic picture of nature upon a theory which had successfully overcome
some of the \veaknesses of earlier mechanics, and which, stressing as it did
the all-pervading, immanent forces of movement and change, was emotionally
satisfying to a new generation whose temper was more progressive, revolu¬
tionary, and even romantic, than that of its predecessors.
e) Theories of_"©ther" and universaljaedia.
The propagation of sound as a disturbance within the medium of air, and
of light (according to Huygens and Euler) within the hypothetical medium of
ether, were ideas generally known in Herder's day. Since Herder himself
often treated sound and light as ,,Krafte" operating within a medium, it
followed for him that his many other „Krafte" likewise required some medium
within which to operate.
Accordingly, in his basic metaphysical triad of „Raum", „Zeit" and
ItKraft", ha considered that space and time were media within which „Krafts"
acted.He was led by the same considerations to suppose that organic
„Kraft©" must work within an ,,Organ" and thereby reinstated that inert
matter, with its concomitant dualism, which, as we have seen, he rejected
elsewhere. But the numerous physical „Krafte" act not only in matter; in
the „Ideen", Harder declares that air is „das all=verbindende Vehiculum der
Schopfung",10^-' within which many known and unknown forces work. He
borrowed this notion from J.F. Gmelin's work on airas well as from
that of the chemist Candido Pistoi, from whose work he had excerpted the
words: „ d[ ie 1 Luft dient d[en] andr[en] Elem[enten] z[um] Trager" (in his
unpublished notes).110^ However, the particular physical "force" of light
requires the special medium of ether, as Herder repeats after Euler and
Bode,"*"11^ whose theories he knew, in a letter of 1772 to Lavater.^"2^ In
the unpublished manuscript „Anfangsgrunde der Sternkunde" of 1765> he
already says that the stars move „im Aether herum", and that this ether can
even hinder the earth slightly in its motion. (This implies that the ether
is a material medium. in another passage quoted by Schmidt=Curtow, he
suggests more sweepingly that ether is „der himmlische Feusrstrom, durch
lessen Vehiculum vielleicht alle Krafte hienieden wirken."11^
However, the physical agencies of light and sound do not only act
within other media (ether and air). They are themselves the „Median"
within which our senses of sight and hearing function, Herder writes in his
1778 essay on psychology.11"^ And again in his „&ott", he says that all
„Krafte" must have a medium, and that the media for the basic physical
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forces are themselves ,,Krafte" (not subtle material ethers, etc.):
und welches konnte bei diesen die Materie ausmachenden
Kraften ein solches Medium seyn, als die Krafte der Substanzen
selbst, rait denen sie auf einander wirken?
By dispensing with inert matter, Herder is here forced to make ,.Krafte" the
medium of other ..Krafte". He ought to have realised at this point either
that he should discard the idea of a medium as redundant, reducing everything
to „Kraft", or that he should have kept the traditional idea of a subtle
material medium, within which „Krafte" could act. Candido Pistol's theory
of air as a universal medium ran into similar difficulties; his translator,
in a spirit of compromise which is as understandable as it is unscientific,
23.
added the note that air is „sowohl eines korperlichen als geistlichen [sic]
Wesens theilhaftig",11^ and subsequently identified air with ether.
Where „Kraft" and medium are of a like kind (in Herder's case, both are
„Krafte"), an indefinite number of media or ethers is required, each one
transmitting another; Euler boldly accepted this logical consequence, and
postulated "a series of fluids, one always more subtile than another, and
which are perfectly balanced together.
Herdsr also used the conception of a "medium" in biology and psychology,
and confusion again resulted. Many writers, as Haller remarks in his
119)
shorter manual of physiology, had used the idea of an imponderable
ethereal substance to explain phenomena in neurology, and even to define life
itself. Lamarck indeed later defined life as "ethereal fire"Herder,
in a well known passage from the „Ideen", likewise writes:"*"2^
In dan tiefsten Abgrunden das Wardens, wo wir keimendes Leben
sehen, warden wir das unerforschte und so wirksame Element
gewahr, das wir mit den unvollkommenen Namen Licht, Aether,
Lebenswarme benennen und das vielleicht das Sensorium des
Allsrschaffenden ist, dadurch er alles balebet, alles erwaraet.
Here, light (usually treated as a „Kraft" by Herder) and ether (traditionally,
a subtle material substance) are confused, and the words „Element" (implying
a substance) and „Sensorium" (a medium for sensation) merely add to the
obscurity of the passage. Physical and biological terms are not in any way
distinguished, nor are „Krafte" clearly separated from the media within
which they supposedly act. Herder had introduced the whole passage as a
„ „ 121)
description of „das Medium, -— in dem alle Krafte der Schopfung wirken." '
Life and mind, Herder already says in 1778, operate within, or are even
identical with this Protean "inner ether"
Diesar inner© Aether mufi nicht Licht, Schall, Duft seyn, aber
er muB alias empfangen und in sich verwandaln konnen. Er
kann dern Kopfe Licht, dam Herzen Reiz warden; er rauB also ihrer
Natur sayn, Oder zunachst an sie granzen. Ein Gedanke und
Flammenstrom giefit sich vom Kopf zum Heraen.
123)
In the nIdeen", he once calls it „der atherische oder elektrische Strom",
saying that it is the one common „Principiuia des Lebens" in plants, animals,
and, in more refined form, in the nerves and mind of man, where it becomes
„das Medium der Empfindung". Once again, it is unclear whether it
constitutes life in itself, whether it is merely a medium for some other
„Kraft", or whether it is itself material, hyper-physical, or both. In
fact, it oan be likened, not unfairly, to the Philosophers1 Stone.
The idea of a „Medium" is put to yet another use in the 1775 version of
the essay on psychology, in which language is called the „Medium" of
thought.^5) finally, the medium in which the soul (whose nature is
„Kraft") passes on to a new „Organ" in a higher existence, is once more
ether.126)
All this shows how multifarious and involved are Herder's applications
127)
of the medium and ether theories. Rouche ' claims that passages in
Shaftesbury, and such mystics as Bohme and Oetinger, were the sources of
Herder's conception. In fact, Shaftesbuiy, in the principal passage to
which Rouch£ alludes, speaks of an "invisible ethereal Substance", then
likens it to the "element" of Fire, mentioning light in the same context;12^)
129)
he does not distinguish it from the divine force he names elsewhere. '
But Herder, as we have seen, mentions ether as a substance permeating space
in the astronomy notes of 1765 for his classes in Riga (i.e. in a purely
scientific context), and repeats this idea, referring to the scientists
Euler and Boscovich, in his letter to Lavater in 1772. Later, he confuses
the medium within which „Krafte" operate with the „Krafte" themselves, as we
observed; it is probable that Shaftesbury, who regarded ether in itself as
a life-giving substance, may have influenced him here, so that he confused
Shaftesbury's vital ethereal substance with the scientific hypothesis of a
subtle material medium, and in turn, with his own conception of vital
„Krafte".
However, other sources were known to Herder, and they doubtless helped
to add to the confusion. Bonnet considered that ether provided a new
spiritual medium or body for the soul in the life hereafter, ju3t as Herder,
who knew Bonnet's writings, later did.^"^ Friedrich Hoffmann, the famous
physician of Halle whom Herder mentions in the „Journal" defined life as
a subtle substance, a „Nervenatherw (but not a "medium") which circulates in
the nerves;"*"''2^ Mesmer later adopted this idea. Besides, science had
used the idea to provide a medium for many forces, as in Huygens' and
Euler's theories of light, and had also, as Newton sometimes did, defined
various unknown forces as manifestations of subtle (presumably non-material)
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"aethereal spirits" within a common (presumably material), universal ether.
Ethers could thus be either mechanistic transmitters of motion, as also in
Hartley's and Condillac's theory that thoughts are "modifications of the
ether",or unknown, dynamistic and immaterial agents, as in Newton's
notion of "aethereal spirits", or even both, as in Pistoi's theory of
elemental air, and Herder's conception of ether. And finally, ether played
an important part in mystical, usually pantheistic philosophies, from the
Stoic idea of "pneuma" and the Pythagorean belief in moist, cold, etc.
ethers,to Lavater's"*"^''' and Bonnet's ethereal bodies of the afterlife,
and, of course, those other mystical applications such as Shaftesbury's, as
named by Rouch£.
32.
We conclude that Rouche names too limited a source for Herder's many-
sided idea, that he fails to distinguish Herder's „Krafte" from the
(originally distinct) idea of an ether or medium, and that he does not
indicate how full of different associations, both scientific and mystioal
(but not theological), this paradoxical conception was.
Thus, „Krafte", for Herder, can, by implication, be either material or
immaterial, they can be their own medium, they can act without a medium, or
they can have as a medium various forms of ether; this ether itself, by
implication, can be material or immaterial, or both, or of an unspecified
composition, and can perform functions usually reserved for physical,
biological, or psychological „Krafte". The whole idea, as used by Herder,
is therefore hopelessly confused. It mirrors, with added complexity, his
ambiguous conceptions of matter and force.
We have seen that the ether theory, although often used in physical
science until the late nineteenth century, is not so frequently used in
traditional scientific senses by Herder. Perhaps he conceived an antipathy
for such applications since they were associated with Descartes' mechanistic
theory of gravity. As in Hoffmann's writings, "ether" is more often simply
another guise for biological vitalism.
f ) Sgace__and_tim8.
For Herder, space and time are empirical conditions of existence, and
are therefore relative to our experience of the objective world. We acquire
our knowledge of space by observing that objects, including ourselves,
though existing separately, may be juxtaposed. We achieve our conception
of time by observing that movements and changes take place around us.*^
Time, however, is relative not only to the external objects from which we
abstract our idea of but also to our (presumably emotional)
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subjective state at any particular moment. ' Thus, in his „Metakritik8S,
Herder rejected Kant's theory, enunciated in the „Kritik der reinen
Vernunft", that space and time are absolute, a priori „.Anschauumgen",
imposed by the mind itself upon external reality. For Kant, they are
subjectively conditioned only in the sense that they are determined
universally by the constant attributes of the human understanding, not by
the subjective (i.e. emotional) state of the individual.
Yet it is interesting to compare the following two utterances, the
first from Herder's essay on Shakespeare, and the second from Kant's early
„Allgemeine Naturgeschichte":
Hast du nie gefuhlt -—, wie es bios an dieser Seele liege,
sich Raum, Welt und Zeitmaafi zu schaffen, wie und wo sie
will? 140)
Daher eben dieselbe Zeit, die fur eine Art der Geschopfe
gleichsam nur ein Augenblick ist, fur andere eine lange
Periods sain kann. 141)
In both cases, time (and also space for Herder, on this occasion) is seen as
relative to the subject. But already, Herder here believes that time is
relative to subjective emotions („gefuhlt", „Seele"), presumably of the
individual, whereas Kant declares, moire abstractly, that it is relative to
the constant mental equipment of each entire species.
In his wGott", however, Herder departs from his usual view, and
declares
Ist nicht der Raum, ist nicht die Zeit Endlos?
This implies that space and time have an absolute, independent existence in
themselves (and, incidentally, suggests the heretical doctrine that time is
infinite). Again, in his dialogue „Voraussicht und Zurucksicht" of 1795,
he calls time „die groBe Mutter der Dinge" ^us reminding us of Greek
mythology and of Goethe's poem „Prometheus". In a sermon of 1775,
however, he upholds the orthodox religious doctrine, calling time „ein
kleines spannenlanges Bild der Bwigkait" On another occasion in his
„Gott", he reaffirms his more usual idea that „Baum und Zeit sind nur
Phantome unsrer Einbildungskraft",^5) without, however, adding the comple¬
mentary statement, as he does in the „Metakritik", that they are also
relative to our objective, empirical experience.
In science, Herder's theory of space and time is the empirical one;
space and time are the media within which „Kraft" manifests itself, and
which we abstract from external objects as a means of measurement.^^ He
enters into no further attempts to define time and space as used in science,
but it seems, from his statement in his „Gott" that time and space are
"endless", that he did regard cosmic time and space as existing independently,
and as infinite in duration and extent. Since the age of Newton, cosmic
space had been regarded as infinite by most thinkers.^7) Theories of time
were more varied, since they were complicated by theological considerations.
But in Herder's thought, as Barnard remarks, both time and space are
secondary in importance to the idea of „Kraft"
Conclusion.
Herder's views on the general nature and structure of the physical
world are incorrigibly vague and ambiguous. This ambiguity, we shall
shortly see, prejudiced the value of many of his theories within the parti¬
cular branches of physical science. Once again, we conclude that the
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conception of „Kraft" was responsible for most of the deficiencies in his
scientific thought.
2. Astronomy and the theory of gravity,
a) Astronomy.
The forerunner of astronomy was astrology, of which there are traces in
Herder's „Ideen" . He writes, for example
Unsre Erde ist im Conflict mehrerer himmlischen Sterne.
This could refer simply to conflicting gravitational attractions, but the
mode of expression is suspiciously reminiscent of that found in astrological
literature. Herder also believes that meteorological changes, like the
oceanic tides, are caused by extra-terrestrial influences, and he says that
the progress of meteorology will reinstate „die Astrologie aufs neue in der
„ 150)
ruhmwurdigsten nutzlichsten Gestalt unter unsern Wissenschaften". ' He
even declares that important changes in history may have been produced by
151)
the influences of similar unknown „Krafta" working within the atmosphere. '
No critics, it seems, have remarked upon these statements; Goethe's condem¬
nation of all astrology, especially in meteorology, may possibly have been
written (in 1825) with Herder's words in mind."*""^'
Herder was interested in astronomy throughout his life. He mentions
153)
over thirty writers on the subject in his works, and his library
contained further works which he does not cite."*""^ He often writes
155)
rhapsodically of the stars, ' thus showing that the motives behind his
love of astronomy, as with many actual astronomers, included aesthetic and
mystical admiration for the vastness and harmony of the stellar universe.
G. Muller wrote, after Herder's death, that his spirit was perhaps „bei den
Sternen, wo sein Auge und Gemut so gerne weilte.
But the unpublished manuscript ,,Anfangsgrunde der Sternkunde"' ,*^7)
based on notes made by a pupil in Herder's classes at Riga in 1765» shows
that he had a full and accurate knowledge of scientific astronomy from an
early date. The notes, 48 pages in length, contain a detailed description
of the constellations with their main stars, systems of astronomical
measurement, the numbers of stars according to contemporary catalogues and
computations, the structure of the nebulae and the Milky lay, the planets
and their satellites, the sun and sunspots, the moon and its surface, and
eclipses; further statistics are added concerning the shape, size and
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structure of the earth. The remarks about the structure of our galaxy
clearly reflect Kant's „Allgemeine Naturgeschichte", to which, although it
was withdrawn before publication and remained unknown for many years, Herder
must have had access, perhaps through Kant's own assistance.
One interesting inaccuracy in the manuscript requires elucidating.
The writer says: fl es sind ihrer bishero 10 Trabanten der Venus." This
is merely an error of dictation, because the sentence is incoherent through-
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out. But it is subsequently stated that Venus has one satellite.
Paradoxically, this statement, now known to be false, shows that Herder had
paid careful attention to contemporary sources. For, among others in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, James Short in England and Cassini in
Paris, both of whom Herder names, thought they had discerned a satellite of
Venus. It is now thought to have been a "ghost" produced by refraction in
the lenses of tele scope
Herder's interest in astronomy led to no further writings until 1776,
when he wrote an essay, in the best Storm and Stress style, on Copernicus,
for Wieland's „Teutsche Merkur". It is of little scientific interest,
however, eulogising Copernicus rather as an inspired artist, a „Genie" of
the kind so esteemed in the 1770's, than as an astronomer as such. Although
there is much to be said for this view of the great theorist, Herder's whole
treatment shows that his purely scientific interest in astronomy has waned.
When he wrote his „Idaentt, Herder was more preoccupied with biology and
the study of man than with the physical sciences. His words on astronomy
are stereotyped, and bear witness rather to his aesthetic pleasure at the
harmony of the universe and the symmetry of the earth's mean position in the
solar system than to his earlier scientific knowledge. Kant's influence is
still apparent, and Rouche^^' enumerates several parallels, as Grundmann
had previously doneThe influences of Bode, Kastner and Lambert are
also apparent in some details of the text. We shall see in a later examina¬
tion of the belief in planetary habitation how the idea that the galaxy, or
even the universe, must revolve around some central body1^' comes originally
from Kant and Wright, and how Herder and others use it to speculate, after
the manner of Plotinus, upon the ultimate centre on which spiritual creation
is focussed.
In 1787) Herder writes to Gottingen for a work on astronomy from the
library there.His unpublished notes contain excerpts from two articles
by Herschel,"^"^ published late in 1784? i*e. after the part of the „Ideen"
dealing with astronomy had been -written. This indicates that his interest
in the data of astronomy was increasing at this time; it reaches its height
in the MAdrast3a". But his aesthetic and mystical emotions also grow more
intense as, older and disappointed, he turns away from the world around him
to contemplate the eternal. In the remarkable account of a supposed dream
or vision of the universe, entitled nKalligenia", Herder says: „ mir wars,
als empfande ich hier Gottes=Gedanken, die Regel der Schopfung, die Kepler
mir in Harmonieen erklarte."1^ At this time, he had conceived a great
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admiration for Kepler, as the prototype of the misunderstood German genius.
No doubt he unconsciously identified himself with the great astronomer and
mystic.
We shall examine Herder's late studies of the astronomical universe in
the sections on the theory of gravity and the other branches of physics; for
the present, we may note that he devoted a long section, in his „AdrasteaM,
to the progress of physical science, and especially of astronomy, during the
previous two centuries.
Finally, it is worth noting that Herder, as Rouche points out, followed
Kant in accepting the idea of stellar or cosmic evolution. He writes in
1792:167^
hat der allweite Raum sich zu Sternen und Sonnen aufgeklart,
und was Chaos war nach Gesetzen in daurende Balinen geregelt.
In 1802, he again declares
Auch diese Sterne altera; —- Dagegen 8ieh9 jenen hellauf=
glanzenden Brand, die Morgenrothe einer neuen Schopfung, Orion.
Besides, we have earlier seen how Herder accepted Kant's "dialectical"
theory of creation by gravitational forces. Similar statements, as we shall
see in our section on cosmogony, appear in the „Idaen". But, in the
„Adrastea", it is no longer to Kant that Herder refers for this idea, but to
the works of practical astronomers such as Schrotar"^^ and Herschel,'*'70^
which he had read in the 1790's in Bode's „Astronomische Jahrbucher".
We conclude that, while Herder had considerable knowledge of astronomy
from an early date, he took the greatest interest in it, and thought most
independently about it, in the last years of his life. His early knowledge
was confined to exact scientific facts and to Kant's theory of cosmogony;
39.
his later, more emotional interest is largely mystical and aesthetic. His
later ideas, especially on gravity, as we shall see, are tainted by the
animistic doctrines he had learnt through his earlier studies of biology.
He contributed nothing of scientific value to the subject himself.
b) i^5_^aory_of_gravity.
171)
Newton wrote of his gravitational force in a letter to Bentley: '
whether this agent be material or immaterial, I have left to
the consideration of my readers.
In his scientific writings, he wisely did not attempt to define its inner
nature. Similarly, present-day theories of gravity are purely mathematical,
172)
and do not refer to intrinsic qualities. '
Herder, like many post-Newtonian thinkers, was not content with this;
he frequently speculated on the intrinsic nature of gravitational attraction.
But first of all, let us note that, although Herder at some time or
other acquired a copy of Newton's "Principia", and at least two works on the
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Newtonian theory of gravity, he took his earliest formulation of the law
from Kant's MAllgemeine Naturgeschichte", not directly from Newton. Compare
the following two passages, the first from Herder's unpublished dictated
notes on astronomy of 1765, the second from Kant's „Allgemeine Naturgeschichte":
Die Bewegung der Erde um die Sonne setzt zwei Krafte voraus:
fortschiessend© Kraft dadurch sie in jedem Punkt ihres
Lauffs [sic] die gerade Richtung fortsetzen und sich ins
Un[s]endliche entfernsn wurden [sic], 2 sine sinkenda Kraft,
die die vorige in jedem Punkt schwachet, und —- den
Korper in einer krummen Gleise [sic] erhalt. 174)
Die Bewegung dieser Korper [i.e. the planets] setzt zwei
Krafte voraus namlich eine schiefiende Kraft, dadurch sie
in jedam Punkte ihros krummliniehten Laufes die gerade Richtung
fortsetsen und sich ins Unendliche entfernen warden, wenn nicht
eine andere Kraft sie bestandig nothigte diese zu verlassen
und in einem krummen Gleise zu laufen. 175)
We have earlier seen how Herder often used the gravitational orbit as
an analogy in social and ethical questions. This involves the "dialectical"
idea that gravitation consists of two equally important components, the
centrifugal force and the force of attraction, as in Kant's formulation of
the law. Newton admitted that a centrifugal force existed (Herder's
Mfortschiessende Kraft"), but disregarded its origin, and treated it as
governed by inertia, going on to state his law of gravity purely in terms of
the one attracting, radial force. Earlier theories, such as the first of
Kepler's various explanations of gravity, had stated that the centrifugal
component of gravity is of great importance; it was seen as a tangential
force, constantly impressed upon the orbiting planets as if by the invisible
spokes of a wheel whose centre was the sun. This earlier theory was more
"dialectical" than Newton's, therefore. Herder, as we know, was always fond
of dialectical formulations. However, his late admiration for Kepler's
animistic theory (which Kepler adopted as an alternative to the "spoke" or
vortice theory), perhaps coupled with his aversion to Kant, led him to
abandon not only Kant's "dialectical" theory, but even the Newtonian one,
which had merely stated that a (relatively unimportant) centrifugal component
is present in gravitation. Herder asks of the centrifugal force
Und woher ware sie kenntlich?
But what of the inner nature of gravitational attraction? Einsiedel
believed that it might be a composite force,Herder, as Rouche^^''
observes, used this idea in an early version of the „Ideen",^^ but
omitted it in the final version. However, he had himself earlier declared,
in an empirical and Baconian spirit, that the law of gravity might simply
be a very abstract, inductive generalisation, and that the reality of the
"law" may lie entirely in individual, distinct phenomena.1^0'' This may be
what Einsiedel meant with his "composite" force.
Hints of an animistic interpretation of gravity appear even in Herder's
early writings. We have seen that he spoke of planetary souls in the 17&9
manuscript which Irmscher recently published. This metaphysical, Leibnizian
idea takes on a quasi-psychological colouring in the 1775 version of Herder's
essay on psychology
Selbst der Stein, wenn er durch innern Trieb fiele, muste seinen
Trieb zum llittelpunkt auf die dunkelste Weise erkennen, d.i.
empfinden.
Similarly, in 1777, he says that the force of gravitational attraction may
partake of the nature of „geistiger Kraft"And in the „Ideen", he
observes that the motion of a pendulum varies as gravitational attraction
decreases at higher altitudes, then compares this known fact to the bene¬
ficial effects of mountain life upon man;^^ this implies that man may be
constitutionally affected by small variations in gravity, so that the whole
statement reminds us of occultist doctrines of animal magnetism, galvanism,
and the like. However, the idea is perhaps only an echo of Kant's early
theory that the inhabitants of the various planets are physically and
mentally "lighter", and more highly developed, if they live on a planet more
distant from the sun, the centre of gravity.
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, it is probable that Herder,
like Aristotle"^"^ and Linribus,^^ allowed his earlier biological studies
to affect his later theories of physical science. Thus, in 1797, in the
,,Humanitats=Briefe", Herder calls the earth „ein organisches Wesen", likening
it to an orange („Pomeranze")jn preparing his „Adrastea", he studied
Kepler's ideas, and there found support for his own animistic theories of
gravity. Kepler had put forward various hypotheses on the nature of
gravitational force at different times, but it was his archaic, animistic
theory which appealed to the older Herder. He describes Kepler's doctrine,
and contrasts it with the more guarded, purely mathematical formulation of
Newton.He calls Newton a „Gluckessohn" who reaped the harvest sown by
Kepler, and says that Kepler had discovered all the significant elements of
the law of gravity himself And, elsewhere in the same work, he quotes
a passage from Kastner's history of mathematics which alleges that Newton
attempted, by a deception, to steal the laurels of Leibniz as discoverer of
the differential calculus.
Let us pause to consider the history of the animistic theory of gravity.
Plato believed that the stars were animated,as did Plotinus."*"^2'
Gilbert's magnetic theory "de tellure sententia""'"'^ has much in common with
Plato's, as have those of the other Renaissance thinkers Campanella
Bruno,^5/ and Montaigne.Kepler early adopted the magnetic theory of
gravity, saying that the tangential forces acted like a whirlpool or vortice,
pushing round the planets as if by the spokes of an invisible wheel. But
he also used the alternative, archaic theory that animating principles are
active within each cosmic body, regulating its motions, before he elaborated
197)
the scientifically superior, mathematical conceptions of his later years, '
and repudiated his earlier animistic theory.
Herder, doubtless thinking of Kant, whose cosmogony he now (in the
„Adrastea") unjustly rejected as thoroughly mechanistic and non-teleological'^'^
denied that gravity could be a (dialectical) process of "blind" forces,
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creating and sustaining the heavenly orbs. He does not dare to reject
Newton's theory directly, but points out that Newton, though a teleologist,
never defines the inner nature of gravitational attraction (as if this were
a fault!). Formulae such as Newton's „in jedem Moment wesentlich behinderte
Anziehung" are „nur Hulfsbrucken, Denkbilder des menschlichen G-eistes", he
maintains.He further portrays the misfortunes of Kepler in a
sympathetic light, contrasting his position with that of the ^luckessohn"
Newton, as we have seen. He cites Kepler's animistic ideas in some
detail,concluding with the observation:
Er nahrn also zu einer animalischen Kraft seine Zuflucht, mit der
er Sonne, Erde und alle Planeten beseelte, wovon kunftig die
Rede seyn wird.
It seems probable, from these words, that he intended to try to justify
Kepler's theories on some later occasion, but his promise is not fulfilled:
they are never mentioned again.
Herder's half-concealed preference for Kepler's theory as against that
of Newton can be seen as a milder version of the antipathy with which Goethe
regarded Newton's theory of light. As we shall see, Goethe and Herder
corresponded on theories of light and colour even at a time when they were
becoming increasingly estranged from one another, and Goethe's colour theory
influences certain passages in the .(Adrastea".
The predilection for Kepler's archaic and mystical ideas is typical of
the older, disillusioned Herder, and also of the new „Naturphilosophie"
which was arising in those same years. Even the title („Weltseele") of one
of Schelling's works recalls Kepler's early doctrine. We can perhaps
detect Herder's influence when Goethe, in 1825, speaks of the „lebendigen
Erdkorper"20 whose "breathing" causes meteorological changes. Ihen
Goethe, around 1829, suggests that mountain-masses may once have exerted a
strong quasi-gravitational attraction, which caused stratified rocks to be
uplifted, he seems to echo Herder's earlier belief that the Asian mountain
massif attracted the most powerful, generative „Krafte" in the early phases
of the earth's development.20^
We conclude that Herder's theories of gravity were closer to those of
the „Naturphilosophen" than to the mathematical theories found in both
Newtonian and present-day science. Like so many other ideas of his, this
one was impaired by his metaphysical conception of „Kraft".
3. General physics.
a) Electricity_and magnetism.
Although Herder once suggested that the „Krafte" of life, electricity,
motion and gravity may be reducible to some common origin,20^ we shall try
to discover what distinct characteristics, if any, he attributed to
electricity and magnetism in particular.
Hopeless confusion confronts us from the start. In the „Journal", the
„elektrischer Funke, der das Schiff umflieBt"20^ (identified by A. Gillies,
probably correctly, as St. Elmo's fire20^) is compared both to the aurora
borealis and the earth's magnetic field. Similarly, in a note added to a
poem he sends to Caroline in 1772, Herder says that the phosphorescence of
the glow-worm is electrical in nature.20^ In a letter of the same year to
Lavater, he identifies electricity with „Lichtather", the medium of light.20*^
In 1778 Herder mentions „der elektrische Strom" as a species of heat („Strom"
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is an unwittingly prophetic word, since current electricity was still unknown
at this time), and calls it „diese sonderbare Erscheinung des grofien, all=
gegenwartigen Lebensgeistes".2"^ As we noticed in our discussion of
"ether" theories, Herder was by this time freely using physical „Krafte",
such as electricity and light, to describe biological phenomena. So it is
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with nervous reaotions; he speaks of „der Elektrische Nervenstrom" ' in
1775. (We now know, curiously enough, that nervous impulses are, in fact,
electrical; but the doctrine of Herder's age was fanciful, and probably
% °-
originated with Linneus, many of whose works were known to Herder - Linrieus
asserted that our nerves obtain their energy from "an electrical principle
inhaled by the lungs",212^ and Bonnet similarly likened his hypothetical
nervous „Lebensgeister" to electricity and light.2*2a))
In the „Ideen", Herder no longer speaks of an electrical MStrom", but
of an „elektrische Materie" xn the same work, light is likened to
electricity, as when „die elektrische Sonneis mentioned. (The
astronomer Bode, in a work which Herder had read, called the sun „eine
feuerlose electrische Kugel".) In the next part of the „Idean", Herder
calls electricity „der elektrische Feuerstrom",2'^ again bringing heat or
fire into his description. The elemental, creative „Krafte" which operated
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in the atmosphere of the early earth included electrical ones, he believes. '
Volcanic activity, with its associated explosions and conflagrations, may be
connected with electricity, he likewise suggests around this time.2"^ In
an essay of 1785, the generative function of sexual union is likened to the
electric spark.2^"^
It is interesting to note that Herder underwent electrical treatment,
which was very fashionable in that age, on at least two occasions in his
life - in 1771 for toothache,22^ and in 1792 for pains in his leg.22"*"^ The
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treatment would consist of mild electric shocks.
It is seldom clear whether Herder is employing such ill-defined physical
„Krafte" as electricity merely as metaphors to describe unknown biological
principles, or whether, in such contexts, he intends us to accept them
literally. But we may blame the ignorance of science at that time concer¬
ning the nature and workings of electricity for much of the vagueness which
surrounds the subject. For example, as late as in 1798, Herschel speaks of
the „elektrischen Ausstrahlungen des Nordlichts", perhaps by analogy with
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lightning; ' Herder, as we know, had made a similar observation.
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Franklin spoke of "electrical fire", calling it an "element". Hauksbee,
in the seventaenth century, had maintained that light is electrical.22^
225)
Nollet, whom Herder mentions in the „Journal", ' considered that heat and
electricity were identical.22^ Sometimes electricity was called an
"imponderable substance", at other times a fluid (hence Herder's „Strom"),
and so on.22^ Since Herder possessed at least four works on electricity,22*^
including Priestley's celebrated history of the subject, he probably met many
such groping attempts to identify heat, light and electricity in the course
of his reading. But his own desire to bring together many disparates under
the common title of „Krafte" must also be held responsible for much of his
vagueness. However, in his „Gott", by way of exception, he very rightly
says that we are not justified in equating electricity and magnetism just
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because they often appear to obey similar laws. ' Schelling, however, was
not deterred by such reflections, and later identified them, even making them
responsible for the production of heat.2^
Like the science of his age, Herder knew more about magnetism than
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electricity. Long extracts devoted to magnetism, especially from Euler,
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survive among his unpublished notes. ' He had read works by Cassini, '
Halley,2^ and Tobias Mayer2"^ on the subject, and even sent (unsuccess¬
fully) for the latter physicist's unpublished manuscripts on magnetism from
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Gottingen. But, as with electricity, he is not content simply to
record observed regularities and to try to arrange them under formal laws;
he again speculates upon the inner nature of the phenomenon. (in extenua¬
tion, it must be said that most scientists of that age did the same.) Thus,
he speaks of „der magnetischs Strom" in the „Ideen"This suggests
Euler's influence.2^' Magnetic forces, he believes (doubtless by analogy
with Kant's gravitational forces), may be the agents which create basic
physical bodies,2*^ and may even cause certain meteorological phenomena.2^
In a discarded sketch for the „Ideen" on the cataclysms of the early earth,
he displays considerable knowledge of the earth's magnetic field and of
magnetic variation, declination and deviation, but uses such facts
unwarrantably to "prove" that the earth's axis has altered.2^-' We have
already seen that he had studied Brugmans' works on magnetism and magnetic
polarity, and based some of his dialectical pseudo-laws upon them. Even in
1794, his interest in magnetism is still strong or even increasing, as a
letter to Knebel, in which he asks for all available works on magnetism,
proves.2^/ We shall later see how he took a keen interest in galvanism
and animal magnetism when these topics became current. The occultism
endemic in such subjects would naturally appeal to him, since he regarded
magnetism rather as another mysterious ,.Kraft" than as a series of observed
regularities in the physical world.
b) Light.
Light, with its manifold associations, is a conception of paramount
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importance throughout Herder's thought - and not only in scientific contexts.
He names the triad of ,,Leben, Licht, Liebe" as „ursprungliche Krafte in der
Welt",and, like so many of his favourite ,,Krafte", these are considered
as both physical and spiritual realities. The same three words were engraved
upon Herder's signet ring, and, after his death, upon his tombstone. (They may
have had some connection with Freemasonry or the Illuminati, we may further
conjecture.)
We noticed, while discussing the "genetic method", that the beginning of
St. John's Gospel (together with the opening of Genesis) was Herder's
favourite passage in the Bible. The apotheosis of light in those verses
„ $
appealed to him profoundly. In his Buckburg years, he again and again refers
to the light-religion of Zoroaster as a commentary upon the New Testament.
In the 1769 manuscript published by Irmscher, Herder, as we know, speaks of
planetary souls. He adds:2^'
Und also Gott, der die Sonne ist. Hat also Perser [sic] so
unrecht, dafi er die Sonne verehrt hat?
It is interesting that Kepler, whom Herder admired and resembled in many
ways, especially in his later years, at one time seriously considered sun-
worship as a form of religion. Herder, like many Platonic mystics,
frequently alludes to the idea that God is the centre of the universe, or in
some way related to the sun, as we shall later see. In a letter to Lavater
in 1772, he calls light „ein Organ der Gottheit",2^"' making it clear,
however, that he is using the words figuratively.
Before examining the more scientific applications of the idea, we must
first review the mass of half-scientific, half-symbolical uses to which the
word "light" is put in the „Ideen".
Already in 1780, the young Georg Muller writes in his diary while
staying at Herder's house (and presumably under Herder's influence):
Luft-Licht-Warme - diese drei sind Sines, vde der Geist, der
Sohn, der Vater.
A similar mystical (if less theological) tone is sounded throughout the
„Ide9nn whenever light is mentioned. As we have seen, it is equated to
electricity on one occasion.It also acted as a purifying and creative
"elemental fire", working within the other "elements", in the early, chaotic
phases of earth history, when all the "elements" retained their pristine
potency.
We may here recall that the narrative of creation in the Book of Genesis
included the words "Let there he light" before sun, moon and stars were
created; this fostered the belief that there existed a subtle, "elemental"
form of light, distinct from that of the sun, and that this perhaps acted as
a secondary agent in the process of creation. This belief probably influ¬
enced Herder; for the conception of light as a creative "elemental fire"
recurs several times in the „Ideen",and one of these passages, in which
,tdas Licht oder das Elementarfeuer" is named, illustrates our point particu¬
larly clearly. This "fire" supposedly purified the other, coarser elements,
acting as „Auswirker der Schopfung" .^9) ^ propos of this "elemental"
variety of light, we may note that the Ptolemaic cosmology envisaged a zone
of invisible "elemental fire", which existed beyond the sphere of air.
At other times light is confused with ether,as we earlier saw. In
more scientific texts, ether, of course, appears only as a medium within
which light is propagated as a disturbance. In other passages, light is
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related, or even equated to the principle which produces heat. ' Like
"ether", it is also used, in the same work, to desoribe the life-principle.
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Indeed, as early as 1773 or 1774* Herder declared, in a sermon on the
opening verses of St. John's Gospel: „das innigste Leben des Menschen ist
Licht."This theory is further worked out in the „Ideen", where he
says of this life-giving light that it is: „kein Licht, das aus der Sonne
kommt; ein Licht, das aus dem Innern dieser organischen Masse hervor=
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bricht." ' The same "light" plays an integral part in animal
reproduction.
Thus, light appears in the „Ideen" not as an observed physical phenomenon,
but as a mystical, even symbolic conception which, like "ether", often simply
ministers to biological vitalism. Let us now pass on to the more scientific
applications of light-theory.
It is only in his later period that Herder shows real interest in the
theory of light as a distinct branch of physics, for as we have said, physics
was the last branch of science to which he devoted his concentrated attention.
However, he had acquired much general knowledge of the subject in his youth,
and we shall first consider his early utterances on light and its nature.
The first informative statement appears in the unpublished manuscript
on astronomy of 1765* The sun is described as follows:
Sie ist vermuthlich ein ausserst erhitzter Korper dessen Theile
in schwingender Bewegung sind und der also entweder bestandig
auf das Licht wirket oder selbst einem gluenden [sic] Schmeltz=
ofen voll dichter und flussiger Theile daS [sic] Liecht
ausschiesset.
(The pupil who wrote these notes from dictation, not Herder, is responsible
for the bizarre orthography and syntax.) Here, both wave (undulatory) and
emission (corpuscular) theories of light are suggested, and Herder does not
discriminate in favour of either. The letter to Lavater in 1772 which we
have often quoted contains a long statement concerning light. (Herder
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is criticising Lavater's use of light to describe the „Organ" of the
immortal soul, and suggests that magnetism or some other „Kraft" might be a
better symbol.) First, he says:
Das Licht z.E. ist durchaus Korper, derm - es springt ja zuruck.
Here, he seems to support the emission theory. However, he next names Euler
(among others) as a reliable authority on the subject, and says:
Das Licht namlich [ist] ein groBer, uberall ausgebreiteter
Aether, den bloB die Sonne in Bewegung setzt
This is in accordance with Euler's wave hypothesis. Herder adds that such
an inference does not follow „nach der alten Newtonischen [i.e. emission]
Theorie." Thus, just as in 1765» Herder cites both theories, committing
himself to neither of them.
We should note, however, that Herder was fond of wave theories in
general, whether applied to water, air, or light, or to the "media" of the
senses taken together, or even when used simply as an image. He says of
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man in his „Vom Goist der ebraischen Poesie": '
Er stehet in einem Meer lebendiger Wellen, und die Lebensquelle
in ihrn stromt und wirkt jenen entgegen.
Besides, he uses the theory of a universal "medium" or "ether" so frequently
that he could not avoid the notion of waves. In the „Ideen" he speaks of
„Lichttheile, die die Sonne nur anregt",^-*8) therefore seems to have
preferred the wave theory of light around this time. A letter from
Einsiedel in 1778 > in which Einsiedel claims that Euler's theory is freer
from contradictions than Newtonmay perhaps have influenced his views
at this time.
In the course of his astronomical studies for the „Adrastea", Herder
encountered a new theory of light which especially attracted him, since it
combined elements both of Newton's corpuscular theory and of the wave theory
of Euler. He eagerly grasped at the idea, which, he says, was suggested by
Herschel's and his own friend von Hahn's observations of the nebulae. These
observations indicated that space might be filled with a kind of invisible
light-ether which becomes visible as light whenever it comes into contact
with a suitable surface, such as that of the sun or of the nebulae. It
might even become visible to a lesser degree, through some sort of reflection,
or, as yellow light, through contact with air, on the surface of dark bodies
like the earth. Herder sums up the theory in 1802, in his „Adrastea"
1st die Sonne der groBe Lichterreger unsres Planetensysterns, so
kommt naturlich das Licht von ihr; an ihr wird es in groBtem
Glanz siehtbar. Sie dart' aber es weder in Cartesischen Kugeln,
noch in Cylindern herunterschiessen, die feine Materia, deren
Zartheit nichts ubertrift; diese kann sich nicht anders als
Pfeilschnell in Linian uns offenbaren. Gegenseits: ist sie
auflosend aus dem feinsten Aether gewonnen, so darf dieser nicht
von der Sonne, als einer Glocke angeschlagen, vibriren und
zittera. In sanften Stromen floBet das Licht sich fort, und
findet allenthalben seinen homogenen Trager, die himmlische
Aura, bis es in Nahe [sic] unsrer Erde sich mit Feuerkraften
waffnet.
Thus, light is generated as a subtle material substance (as in the emission
or corpuscular theory) derived from the universal ether, in which it is
present in invisible form, and with which it is homogeneous. It is then
transmitted by this ether (as in the wave theory).
We should observe that Herder believes that light and its medium are
similar in nature. He ignores the difficulty which this presents, and which
Euler had boldly faced, namely that if light requires a medium which is like
itself, this medium, in turn, requires a further medium, and so on. (We
discussed this problem in our section on "ether".) Besides, while rejecting
the theory that light is propagated as a vibratory wave disturbance
(„vibriren und zittern"), he leaves it unclear exactly how light can pass
„Pfeilschnell in Linien" or „in sanften Stromen" as a uniform disturbance
through the ether. He thus seems to accept the wave theory, but without
the waves.
Beneath the surrounding light-substance, the sun (presumably along with
the stars and perhaps the nebulae) has a dark, "planetary" surface.2ol/
This is connected with the idea of stellar habitation, as we shall later see.
In the eighteenth century, the emission or corpuscular theory of light
enjoyed far greater prestige than the wave theory. This was largely because
scientists believed that the great authority of Newton was on the side of the
emission theory. In actual fact, Newton never finally decided between the
rival theories, and, according to Sir James Jeans, "he usually wrote as
though it began as corpuscles and ended as vibrations which the corpuscles
had excited in an ether."2o2*^ Herder, unlike most of his contemporaries,
was therefore unwittingly supporting a theory similar to that of Newton
himself but, of course, not comparable with Newton's in mathematical exacti¬
tude and careful observation. Herder's theory is scientifically worthless,
because it does not explain how light reaches us, in waves or in lines, as a
material substance "transmitted" by another substance, or as a disturbance
in a medium. His failure to resolve the relationship between „Krafte" and
their media, earlier discussed, is responsible for this ambiguity.
The wave theory had been held by Leonardo,but was first formulated
more scientifically by Huygens and Euler; early in the nineteenth century,
it was at last almost generally accepted, but, early in the present century,
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both wave and emission theories were used, the one being found convenient
for explaining certain phenomena, the other serving in the remaining cases.
A new epoch began when the quantum theory replaced both.
It would be erroneous to say that Herder anticipated the dual theory
used early in this century. He did not use the two theories alternately as
working hypotheses, as happened in modern practice, but amalgamated the two
into one. His innate desire for synthesis is again responsible. His final
theory of light, suggested, as he says, by the observations of Herschel, von
Hahn, Schroter and Bode2^*^ on luminous nebulae which could not be resolved
into stars, should be seen as a scientific curiosity, an imaginative and
ephemeral synthesis which, at first, seems to foreshadow the later pragmatic
rapprochement which took place between the two theories.
However, it is remarkable that Schelling, as Haym remarks2^' (without
giving sources, however), had also tried to reconcile the theories of Newton
and Euler. In 1798, Herder had read Schelling's „Ideen zu einer Philosophic
der Natur" and „Von der Weltseele", as a letter to Knebel testifies; „Sie
m'ussen sie lesen", he writes to Knebel.2*^ In his „Ideen" of 1797,
Schelling regards the emission and wave theories as alike unsatisfactory, but
seems to prefer the former. 2^^ But in his „Welt3eele" of the following
year, he writes:2^'
Ich meinte, ob man die Newtonsche und Eulersche Theorie vom
Licht nicht vereinigen konnte . Wer kann beweisen, da£
nicht zwischen Erd' und Sonne eine Materie ausgegossen ist,
die durch Wirkung der Sonne decomponirt wird, und konnten
nicht diese Decompositionen bis in unsre Atmosphere sich
fortpflanzen, da in ihr selbst eine Quelle des Lichts ist?
He combines the idea of „eine eigenthumliche Lichtmaterie" with that of
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„Er3chutterung sines zersetzbaren Mediums." ' Like Herder, he mentions
Herschel in support of his views; the article in which Herschel suggested
his theory of light-accretion around the nebulaeappeared in the same
year as Schelling's work.
Herder's theory, propounded in 1802, is too similar to Schelling's not
to have been influenced by it. Herder did not acknowledge his debt to the
younger thinker, however, probably because he had come to detest him as a
Romantic and follower of Kant (although Schelling, in fact, had been much
influenced by Herder himself).
On the other hand, the idea that the sun has a dark "planetary" body
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surrounded by an extraneous „Lichtmaterie" appears in a work of Bode's
272)
which Herder had read before he wrote the „Ideen". ' Bode, whose work
first appeared in 1768, postulated a light-substance „dessen feuerlose
Stralen sich durch dsn Aether fortpflanzen", thus implicitly combining the
corpuscular and emission theories in a way which distinctly foreshadows the
theories of Schelling and Herder. Von Hahn, acknowledging Bode's precedent,
also suggests, in a work written in 1792 and referred to by Herder in the
„Adrastea"^^'' in 1802, that light may collect round the sun, and speaks of
„die Entwicklung der Lichtmaterie aus dem Raum",just as Herder does.
As early as 1610, Harriot had stated that the sun's light is merely a luminous
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envelope surrounding the sun's dark interior. Herschel, in an article
referred to by Herder in 1802,had spoken (in 1798) of light as a
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„leuchtender Stoff" which accumulates around the sun and stars. '
From all this, we conclude that Herder probably first met the idea in
Bode's book. He was greatly stimulated, however, by Schelling's theory
which agrees with his own more closely than those of any other writers. The
theories of Herschel and von Hahn, although much more empirical, probably
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further strengthened Herder's conviotion that the light emanated by the sun
originates as a material substance. He cited the latter works rather than
that of Schelling, perhaps assuring himself that his own views were suffici¬
ently confirmed by the facts adduced by the astronomers. All of the writers
named wrote in indefinite term3 about the exact mode in which light, once
produced, is transmitted, so that Herder's own vague theories of ether were
not improved by their influence. But Schelling's influence proved really
decisive, because he alone, before Herder, had explicitly attempted to
reconcile the theories of Newton and Euler, whereas the astronomers had
merely used an ad hoc hypothesis to explain their particular observations,
without referring to established and comprehensive theories of light. At
any rate, all this shows that Herder, like many physicists of his age, was
uneasily aware that light theory was in an unsatisfactory state, and wished
to bring the two rival theories, each of which had proved valuable in
explaining certain phenomena, into some positive relation with one another.
But, along with the relatively "scientific" theories in the „Adrastea",
there are echoes of the more mystical ideas on light which Herder had already
recorded in his „Ideen". For example, light is called the „unversiegbare
Quelle Alles Lebens".^8) rfhi3 phrase recalls the earlier mystical
theories, but probably rests ultimately upon the age-old observation that
the increasing light of spring brings new life to the earth each year.
Herder again refers to the mysterious "inner" light, calling it „das Edelste,
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was in uns denkt, unser Licht", ' and again „das Licht in dir, dein
Gedanke" The belief that light can act as a purifying agent in
creation, as an awakener of life, also recurs
Licht ist der stille Wirker der uberall gegenwartigen Gottheit,
der iminer erneuet. Der flussige Aether wird einst auch
dem Monde Leben geben und Gedeihen und Y/achsthum.
He introduces a quotation from the Orphic poems at this point, showing us
the mystical source of his inspiration. His poem „Orion", dedicated to his
old friend, the astronomer von Hahn, is of the same quality:2*^
Was regt und treibt und beseelet,
Wodurch sich Alles bewegt,
Und lebt und fuhlt und genieBet,
Und denies t und strebet, ist - Licht!
Perhaps we can explain why light, more than any of his various „Krafte",
appealed to Herder so much. „Krafte" could, on the one hand, be treated as
natural, and even at times material agencies, as when light, electricity,
heat, ether, etc. are referred to as „Materie", „Stoff", „Theilchen", and so
on; on the other hand, they enabled Herder to introduce metaphysical, or
even mystical ideas, at will. But they all had the great disadvantage of
being invisible, intangible, elusive, and amorphous - with one exception.
For light, which Herder regarded as a „Kraft",2®"^ combined all the
advantages of the „Krafte", yet was also in the unique position of being
visible. Like all true symbols, it is „anschaulichH. It includes
undifferentiated white and all the colours, thus comprehending both general
and particular kinds of content; as rays, or as waves, it can also be
described in terms of form. And finally, there clings around it an
abundance of traditions and associations, reaching back to the earliest
religions, in which it repeatedly figured as the perennial symbol of eternal
life and perfect goodness.
The short sketch „Kalligenia", written in Herder's last years, and
already briefly referred to, contains a singular description of a mystical
dream or vision. (it has been quite undeservedly ignored by critics, even
by those who discuss Herder's mysticism.) Faced with a cosmic view of
change and transformation, the initiate calls out:2®^
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„LaS mich ein Symbol sehen dieses sanften Strebens, dieses
unendlichea Werdens, du unsichtbare Kraft!" rief ich in
innigster Bewegung -
Und siehe da! Lioht glanzte vor mir, ein Stral des reinsten
Lichts. Da er sich theilte, wars, als sake ich in ihm alle
Gestalten der Binge in der ganzen Eintracht ihrer VerhaltniBe
und Foraen. Punct, Linie, Kreis, Saule, Wurfel, jede Schwebung
und Schwingung der Natur, Bluaenke tten in allerlei Farban, jede
auf dem kurzesten Wege zu ihrem 2iel eilend, dann sich hebend
zur sanftesten Flsmme aufstrebend zu Einsm Punct harmonischen
Lebens.
The One and the Many, form and content, permanence and change - all the
disparates which Herder's complex nature unceasingly sought to combine -
find reconciliation in this apotheosis of light, this remarkable product of
pure mysticism.
d) Ogtics and the theory of colour.
In his early writings on aesthetics, Herder rightly contended that the
empirical psychology of the senses had hitherto been too much neglected, and
that theorists had been excessively preoccupied with a priori definitions of
beauty and other traditional aesthetic concepts. When we now proceed to
examine his views on visual perception, and their relation to the theory of
optics, we shall find that he himself approached the subject from the psycho¬
logical angle. We shall therefore be compelled to devote as much attention
to the psychology of visual perception as to physical theories of optics.
We noticed in our discussion of mathematics that Herder, in his fourth
„Kritisches Waldohen" of 1769, proposed that the science of optics should be
made the basis of a new system of aesthetics of vision. The corollaries to
this statement were that the psychology and physiology of hearing should pave
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the way for a new system of musical aesthetics, and that the psychology and
physiology of the sense of touch should transform the aesthetics of plastic
art.
Accordingly, the fir3t problem which Herder encountered in optics was
that of distinguishing between visual and tactile sensations; this can be
reduced to the more particular problem of explaining which senses we use to
judge distance (and magnitude and shape). The solution to this celebrated
problem is reached, of course, when we recognise that what is now called
"blending", or "complication", or "fusion" takes placethis means that
we first learn to judge distances etc. by touch, and these tactile sensations,
through habit, gradually becoms "blended" with our sensations of seeing, so
that we eventually appear to "see" distances, and we correlate visual shapes
and apparent magnitudes with our earlier experiences of touch.
It is generally believed that Herder reached this solution in his fourth
„Kritisches Waldchen" of 1769.Actually, the unpublished manuscript
„Anfangsgrunde der Sternkunde" of 1765 shows that he knew that our judgements
of distance are acquired by habit, not directly by vision, at least four
years earlier. His words are as follows
Alle Sterne scheinen gleich entfernt zu seyn und auf einer Flache
zu stehen: dieses kommt daher, weil aller ihrer Bilder [sic]
sich im Auge auf einer Flache mahlen und wir von der Entfernung
der Dinge nicht unmittelbar aus dan Sinnen sondern durch
G-ewohnheit urtheilen.
However, he does not yet specify the rble of touch in this passage.
In the fourth „Kritisches Waldchen", he mentions Diderot, whose "Lettre
sur les aveugles", as Clark^^'' points out, recorded the observations of the
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0. whose,
surgeon Cheselden upon boy -&tiuni.tcr.totxsight had been
restored by a historic operation of "couching" for cataract in the early
pqq\
eighteenth century. Herder mentions Cheselden by name in the same work.
In his 1770 essay on language,2"*0' he also refers to Robert Smith's "Compleat
System of Opticks", which, as Clark notices, also mentioned Cheselden's
conclusions. This surgeon's report, in fact, showed an understanding of
"blending", and it is to be supposed that Herder acquired his knowledge of
it from this source.
On the other hand, Suphan also names Diderot's "Lettre sur les sourds et
les muets" as one of Herder's sources, as well as Berkeley's "New Theory of
Vision" (1709).But while there is proof that he used this work of
Diderot, he does not name Berkeley's work until after he had put forward his
own theory concerning "blending". However, Cheselden's report does not
dwell on the cardinal importance of touch in our judgements of distance so
exclusively as Herder does. For Cheselden, as quoted by Robert Smith, also
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says that "the apparent magnitude of the object in view" ' i3 of great
importance as a guide to distance, and adds that "the ideas of distance are
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suggested to the mind by the ideas of magnitudes of objects." But
Berkeley is much more concerned with tactile sensations, and he stresses the
need for exact distinctions between sight and touch, just as Herder does;2"*^
lik8 Herder, he treats the problem theoretically and deductively (but not
mathematically) as wall as inductively, whereas Cheselden had dealt only
with its empirical, inductive aspects.
It is therefore possible that Herder had read Berkeley's work earlier
than it appears from his later references to it. This becomes more
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probable when we read sentences such as the following in Berkeley's work: '
those lines and angles have no real existence in nature,
being only a hypothesis framed by mathematicians, and by them
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introduced into optics, that they might treat of that science
in a geometrical way.
He thus considers that mathematical optics can tall us nothing about the
subjective aspects of vision, in the same way as Herder, in 1769, says of
our sense of hearing: „abstrahirend von Verhaltnifien, weIB der Mathematiker
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also von dem, was Ton ist, so wenig als der Naturlehrer." " ' Herder, like
Berkeley, tended to dwell upon the subjective aspects of perception more than
upon its objective conditions, so that exact physical optics plays little
part in his theories. Altogether, the influence of Berkeley upon Herder has
been much underrated, perhaps because Berkeley's name is associated with the
subjectivism which Herder later criticised so virulently in the Kantians.
Nonetheless, there survives, unpublished, an entire notebook, devoted by
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Herder to excerpts from Berkeley. '
Herder's real claim to originality in his treatment of this whole topic
is, of course, that he applied the study of tactile sensations to aesthetics,
to plastic art. The influence upon him of the various writers named above
in no way detracts from this independent achievement.
Let us now examine Herder's more general views concerning visual percep¬
tion and optics. In 1770, in an early version of his „Plastik", he again
emphasises the subjective side of perception, and even says that visual
perception is relative to the individual organism or human being with its own
peculiarities:
So wie jedes Thier nach einer andern Gestaltung seines Auges
auch eine andre Vtelt sieht: so werden auch irn Menschlichen
Sinne diese mancherlei innere Vorstellungen fuhlbar.
Again and again he insists that the structure of the eye conditions our
perception, and writes in 1799: „ eine Logik des Sehens ist dem Verstande
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durch die Form seines Werkzeuges selbst gegeben." '
But the objective counterpart of these ocular studies, the theory of
300)
light, must not be neglected either; he says in 1787: '
Fur die Philosophie der Empfindung ist eine Theorie des Lichts
und des Bildes von gleich mannichfaltigem Nutzen.
The eye and the light, the image the eye perceives, are complementary in
Herder's opinion, as the following famous words from the psychology essay of
1778 show:^01)
Ware in diesem Korper kein Licht, kein Schall: so hattan wir
auf aller weiten Welt von nicht3, was Schall und Licht ist,
Empfindung
As Koch realises, this sentence introduces the old mystical doctrine of an
inner and outer light, which was later adopted by Goethe, who wrote
-— so bildet sich das Auge am Lichte furs Licht, damit das
innere Licht dem auBeren entgegentrete.
(From our study of Herder's theories of light, we can guess at the nature of
the mystical "inner light" he speaks of.) But while Goethe's words suggest
that some natural process of adaptation takes place as the organism develops,
it is clear from a passage in the „Ideen" that Herder envisaged a moire
teleological preadaptation of eye and light. The eye finds „sogleich den
goldnen Lichtstral vor sich, der fur dasselbe, wie das Auge fur den Licht=
stral, erschaffen ist und die Weisheit seiner Anlage vollendet."^0^
As we noticed in considering the problem of perception, Herder also put
forward a more particular and highly subjectivistic theory of vision. It
is the theory of „Bilder". The subjective image („Bild") we create in the
act of seeing, not its objective, external origin, is the most important
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factor in perception
Wir sehen nicht, sondem wir erschaffen uns Bilder.
However, this „Bild", as Schutze observes, is "the work of the creative
305)
artist, which is our 'soul' or integral individual self." It must not
be confused with the optical image produced within the eye itself. Nonethe¬
less, it is probable that this concrete, optical image gave Herder his later
idea of a spontaneously created inward „Bild", for, in the „Joumal", he
suggests that the act of vision produces an actual nGemaide" within the eye
and within the brain; the inward, cerebral image might even be traced by
dissection, he conjectures with Maupertuis. 50^) In the 1770 version of his
„Plastik" (the version read by Goethe in StraEburg), he again 3ays:
—- da ist auf der Netzhaut ein kleines Gemalde. Die
grosse, allweite Gegend, die ich vor mir sehe, was ist
sie ? Bild!
Such ideas were perhaps suggested to him by Euler, who declared in a work
published in 1768-1772 and read by Herder (although Herder first quotes it
in 180050^) - yet he may have read it, or a similar work, at an earlier
date):509)
As often as we see an object, the image of it is painted on the
bottom of our eyes; and this is produced by the rays which
proceed from the object to us.
(The work is quoted in translation, the original edition in French not being
available.) Euler even suggests that this image can be found in visible
form, at the bottom of a dissected eye.5"'"0)
Thus, in his earlier works, before he wrote the essay „0ber Bild,
Dichtung und Fabe'l" in 1787, Herder still uses the word „Bild" in a purely
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optical, not a psychological sense. It was the concrete, physical usage of
the word which Goethe adopted. He says that, in the study of light, „nicht
von einem unbegranzten, bedingenden, sondarn von einern begranzten bedingten
Licht, von einem Lichtbilde, ja von Bildern uberhaupt, hellen Oder dunkeln,
die Rede sei."511'
It is interesting that while Herder, especially in his early years,
preferred the senses of hearing and touch, and rebuked the young Goethe (the
,tSpecht"^~^) because of his natural preference for vision, the "superficial"
sense, he became mora interested in vision as time went on, even devoting an
essay to colour and vision in his last years, as we shall see. He had read
various works on optics, as, for example, his history of the telescope in the
„Adrastea" shows, and consulted Priestley's classical history of the sub-
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ject. ' His increased interest in this topic must be explained partly by
his general preoccupation with physical science in his last years, but also,
in large measure, by Goethe's influence.
Next, we shall review Herder's ideas on colour and on the composition of
light. In a letter to Hamann in 1773, he says of the younger Hemsterhuis:
Er ist, dunkt mich, mehr als Diderot der Philosoph, soil eben
so stark in der Mathematik seyn und unter andren ganz Anti=
Newtonische Offenbar[ungen] in dar Optik unter der Hand haben,
die diese ganzs Wissenschaft varandern (was mir Futter fur die
Seele ware).
The final parenthesis seems to anticipate, in a striking way, not only Herder's
own later criticisms of Newton's theories of gravity and of light, but also
the controversial attitude which Goethe adopted in his „Farbenlehre".
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However, no anti-Newtonian theories on optios or colour appear in
Hemstarhuis* published works, and Herder himself did not put forward any
detailed views on colour until Goethe commenced his optical studies in the
1790's.
It is probable that Herder, perhaps influenced by Berkeley, had, by the
time he wrote to Hamann in 1773> extended his belief that objective mathemati¬
cal analysis is inadequate for explaining musical euphony so as to doubt, in
turn, whether it can explain our perception of colour either. His only
mention of colour during this period, in the „Plastik" of 1769, confirms
this suspicion; for it is what Goethe called the „sinnlich=sittliche
Wirkung" of colour, not the objective constitution of light, which Herder
315)
discusses here:
Es ist zu beweisen, dafi die grune Farbe die fuhlbare Parbe sei,
gleichsam der Ton unseres Auges, wo es mit den Fuhlnerven
zusammanhangt die grune und blaue Mittelfarben [wirken]
auf Gefuhl, blaue des Erhabenen, grune des Angenehmen,
weifirothe des Schonen.
The word „Ton" shows how close the link was between Herder's ideas on colour
and on sound.
It was in January 1790, that Goethe, examining Buttner's prisms,
suddenly saw the way open for his own anti-Newtonian colour theory.
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And in the following year, he wrote to Karl August: '
Noch kann ich mit lsbhafter Preude melden, dafi ich seit gestem
die Phanomene der Parben wie sie das Prisma, der Regenbogen, die
VergroSerungsglaser pp. zeigen auf das einfachste Principium
reducirt habe. Vorzuglich bin ich durch einen Widerspruch
Herders dazu animirt worden der diesen Funcken herausschlug.
Clearly, some important development had taken place. Since his first
intuitions had come to him, he had conducted many experiments, and we know
that around this very time he succeeded in formulating his results and
convictions in a unified pattern. But, in the absence of more detailed
information, we can only conclude that Herder, as his earlier words to
Hamann also suggest, may have had more influence upon Goethe's colour theory
than is generally supposed. Besides, Caroline mentions Goethe's early
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optical experiments in a letter to Gleim in 1791. Herder, around the
same time, attended a meeting of the „Freitagsgesellschaft" at which Goethe
delivered a lecture on the prism,and he refers himself to Goethe's
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optical pursuits in a letter to Heyne in the following year. ' In 1928,
a fragmentary letter from Herder to Goethe on the subject of colour was
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discovered and published. ' This document probably dates from late in
1793, or from 1794. In it, Herder criticises Goethe's „Versuoh, die
Elements der Farbenlehre zu entdacken", and observes that black and white,
mixed together, produce grey, which is also produced by the mixing of all
the colours. (¥/e know that this applies only when pigments, which are never
quite pure, are mixed, for the pure colours, when mixed, should produce
white, as Newton realised.) Upon this observation, Herder bases the
supposedly "Newtonian" objection to Goethe's theory that all the colours
must therefore be actually present „in Licht, duroh Schwarz modificirt",
adding „Du wirst dem Zweifel leicht begegnen." Indeed, Herder's "objection"
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is closer to Goethe's, or even Aristotle's point of view than to that of
Newton, who, of course, derived the colours from white light alone, without
referring to "darkness" at all. However, all this further confirms our
contention that more exchanges took place between Herder and Goethe on the
subject of colour and optics than is commonly supposed.
Herder began to enunciate his own more or less "anti-Newtonian" views
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on colour in his „Kalligone" of 1800, when he wrote the following words, in
dialogue form:"*2^
Sie glauben also nicht an Newtons siehen einfache Parben?
Tobias Mayer hat aus Misohungen der drei Hauptfarben 819
Farben deduciret.
The belief which led Herder to assert that light is transmitted „in sanften
Stroraen" rather than in (presumably abrupt and "mechanical") waves, a belief
in gradual transitions, originally inspired by the Leibnizian principle of
continuity, is again at work here.
Like Goethe, Herder also declares that darkness, as well as light, is
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essential for producing colour. He says of black:
Es [i.e. das Schwarze] scheinet mir, wenn das Licht der glanzende
Vater des ganzen Farbensystems ist, die Mutter der Farben. Als
Lieht die Finsternis bestrahlte, ging jenes tiefe Blau aus ihm
hervor -—
Suphan, in a note to the text,^2^ rightly notices Goethe's influence here.
Herder wrote an essay on colour for the nAdrastea"; it remained
unpublished, however, during his own lifetime. This essay is parallel to,
and arises out of his earlier disquisition upon light, since it likewise
sets out to reconcile the rival theories of Newton and Euler, this time with
reference to colour.
He begins, in a way which recalls his attitude to musical euphony in
1769, by affirming that the objective study of light is not in itself enough
to explain the origin of colour; the eye and its workings must also be
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investigated. For, like Euler, Herder says that the ultimate cause of
colour production is unknown; it may just as well be determined by the
nature of the eye as by the nature of light.^2^ In insisting that the
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ultimate physical cause of colour production remains unknown, Herder also
involuntarily reminds us of Goethe's belief in an irreducible BUrphSnomen"
of colour.529^
He again rejects Newton's seven colours, saying that the transitions
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between them must be gradual, and declares:
wie Schwingungen des Lichts zeigen sich die Farben.
This recalls Goethe's description of colours as „Taten des Lichts", as well
as Herder's own dislike for abrupt and mechanistic transitions as implied by
Newton's „Brechung" (refraction) of light.
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His next words on the colours take us by surprise:
Polartiges ist in ihnen nichts.
This remark is obviously directed against Goethe, who was now thoroughly
estranged from Herder. Herder probably considered, despite his usual liking
for "dialectical" formulations, that the diametrical polarity of light and
darkness, like Newton's seven distinct colours, Implied too harsh a distinc¬
tion, and that it failed to do justice to the nuances of shading which appear
between all colours. He calls yellow a „Maximum", again employing Lambert's
phrase as he had done in the „Ideen". Vie may remember that Herder
considered that a „Maximum" is produced by the interaction of many forces,
not just by two poles. Thus, yellow arises amidst many colours, so that
Goethe's "polarity" theory of colour must be rejected.
Herder here treats yellow as the central colour. (We may remember
that, in the „Plastik" of 1769, he had called green and blue the „Mittel=
332)\ „
farben". ') It is also the „irdlscher Reprasentant" of invisible, pure
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white light.But we know from the colour spectrum that yellow is the
third colour from the lower extreme of the scale. He later adds the rather
forced explanation that the lower "half" of the spectrum seems longer than
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the other, although the true centre of the series, the "invisible" white,
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cannot be seen by the human eye. He also speaks of yellow Hdas oben in
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der dichtesten Spitze zum Roth aufsteigt": ' thus red, at the end of the
spectrum, now becomes the apex of the colour series, just as in Goethe's
colour pyramid.
Herder's criticisms of Newton's theory are much less virulent than
Goethe's. It is Newton's "mechanistic" treatment of light („die zarte
Materie", as Herder calls it33^) which he resents, not his supposition that
it is material (i.e. corpuscular), or even his description of it in terms of
mathematics; for Herder is never hostile towards mathematics per se, but
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only when it is allied to mechanics:
so ist mit Sto.fi und Hieb, mit Auf- und Abprallen hier nicht
Alles ausgerichtet.
For Herder's emotional attitude towards light led him to believe that it must
flow gently, and that the colours must intermingle smoothly; Newton's
mechanics offended his poetic sensitivity.
In the „Kalligone", he 3ays of the eye: 33^'
so entstand in ihm die Scala der Farben naturlich.
This is parallel to a statement in Goethe's „Farbenlehre":33"^
Das Auge verlangt dabei ganz eigentlich Totalitat und schliefit
in sich selbst den Farbenkreis ab.
Herder says, however, in the essay on colour, two years later than the
„Kalligone":340'
Der Chemie mufi es uberlassen bleiben, in die Bestandtheile der
Farben und des Lichts einzudringen
He now implies that colour has some objective, intrinsic reality, indepen¬
dently of the human eye. Thus, as usual, he employs both subjectivistic
and objectivistic theories at different times. But, after his words on
chemistry (which, incidentally, remind us of Goethe's investigations into
,,chamische Farben"), he reaffirms the subjectivistic theory:
ist uberhaupt nicht alles, was wir sehen, ein unsichtbares Bild
der Seele?
(The word „Bild" is used psychologically here, not optically. This is true
of all its applications after the 1787 essay „tJber Bild, Dichtung und Fabel'i)
Thus, in the last resort, he prefers subjectivistic, or ocular theories of
vision and colour perception to those based purely upon the physics of
light.
Finally, Herder attempts to reconcile the colour theories of Newton and
Euler, as he had done with their theories of light. He declares
—- warum sollte man die zarte FluBlgkeit der Liehtmaterie sich
nicht eben sowohl in Schwingungen bewegen lassen, als in
schieBenden Pfeilen?
On this occasion, he retains the corpuscular theory associated with Newton,
but rejects his mechanics, substituting for them the wave theory of Euler.
The colours are not broken-off parts of the light, but modifications of it.
As before, he seems to imply that light waves are of a gentle, not an
abrupt kind, for he subsequently uses the word „Stromung" instead of
„Schwingung". As in his essay on light, he still seems uncertain about
precisely how light is transmitted.
Once again, he adds a physiological definition to these external
nriae.343)ones:
Das Licht reizt; Theile des Nervs schwingen sichj die
Empfindung erfolgt - wir konnen kaum weiter.
This recalls his early attempts to apply the neurological theories of
Haller, Burke and others to the psychology of perception.
He further makes use of Euler's analogy between the colour spectrum and
the musical scale; we shall examine this question in the following section.
Goethe links the colour red with heat or fire, but only symbolically.
3UU)
Herder, however, makes this comparison a literal one:
Offenbar brennet der zusammengespitzte rothe Stral heftiger,
als der blaue ; wir kennen kein Licht, ohne mit Feuer=
stof [sic] verbunden.
Herder was right, although he did not know of infra-red rays as such. We
shall return to this question in our later section on theories of heat.
However, all this is again vague and unscientific. As Haym says:^**5)
Er nannte Theorie, was nur eine Surame poetischer Aperjus war.
But although Haym's criticism is true, there is, nevertheless, a certain
system behind Herder's so-called "theory" of colour. The logic of this is
not that of mathematics, nor of empirical observation, but of certain fixed
associations within Herder's peculiar intellect. The desire for synthesis,
the counterbalancing remarks on subject and object, and rejection of
"mechanistic" theories, the appeals to psychology and physiology, the belief
in gradual transitions - all these are familiar and interconnected features
of Herder's mind, and they cannot be treated either as piecemeal fancies, or
ascribed entirely to Goethe's influence. The whole disquisition upon
colour is inferior to Herder's early writings on hearing and touch, because,
as Haym observes,his senses were musically rather than visually attuned,
and because he lacked Goethe's powers of graphic and painstaking observation.
He did not study the theory and practical workings of colour nearly carefully
enough, but simply fell back upon a priori criticism of existing theories.
He thus committed the very error he so stridently condemned in Kantian
philosophy.
d) Sound, andmthe _analogy between colour_undjoitch.
We have already discussed Herder's early views on acoustics and hearing
in our section on mathematics. To this we now add that Herder, in condem¬
ning those who analyse musical euphony purely in terms of harmonic intervals,
is supported to some extent by the physicist Euler, who wrote in 1768:
But the sentiment of pleasure excited by fine music, must not
be confounded with the knowledge [i.e. of harmonic and rhythmic
intervals] of which I have been speaking something mors is
wanting, which no-one hitherto has unfolded.
While there is no evidence that Herder read this work before the 1790's, we
cannot help feeling that his classing of Euler, in 1769,.^U/ among the mere
analysers of harmonic intervals, is not entirely justified.
Herder was not interested in the theory of sound except in relation to
musical acoustics. He mentions d'Alembert, Diderot, Euler, Cravesande,
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Mersenne, Sauveur, J and Chladni' as writers on the subject. But no
further mention of the aesthetics of music is required in our study, since
we have already examined this topic from the scientific angle, which alone
calls for our attention. We have found that Herder thought that physics
was not enough, but that psychology and physiology must be invoked to
explain our pleasurable sensations at musical sounds.
Characteristically, Herder was fond of the analogy between the musical
scale and the colour spectrum. Even Aristotle had noticed the correspon¬
dence between pitch and colour, and between musical harmony and pleasing
73.
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colour combinations. ^ ' But it was Euler who, in Herder's age, gave new
life to this old theory, by employing the analogy of sound waves in his
undulatory theory of light, which explained the colours as produced by
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varying frequencies of light-waves. ' He declared:
The parallel between sound and light is so perfect, that it
fits even in the minutest circumstances.
Thus, the musical octave and the colour spectrum correspond exactly.
Already in 1769, Herder calls the ocular nerves „Saitenspiele fur die
in \
Farben". ' We have earlier seen how, in the same year, he describes the
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colour green as „gleichsam der Ton unseres Auges". ' Thus, he appears to
have related colour and sound from an early date, probably under Euler's
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influence. Chladni, whose work Herder mentions in his „Kalligone", in
1800, and who himself visited Herder in 1803,^"^ had devised a means of
making sound patterns visible by spreading sand over vibrating plates - the
famous "Chladni's figures". Chladni may thus also have encouraged the older
Herder to use the analogy of eye and ear. An extreme case of interrelations
between colour and sound was that of the celebrated „Farbenklavier", an
experiment in synaesthesia. Herder did not approve of it, however,
declaring in 1773, in the „Plastik", that colours, appealing solely to the
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eye, can provide only „das flachste Gedankenloseste Vergnugen." '
Already in the „Kalligone", Herder draws several parallels between
musioal sound and colour, but it is in the later essay on colour that he
presents his fullest exposition of the analogy. Some of the parallels are
contrived, as, for example, the idea that both the musical scale and the
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colour spectrum have no perceptible central unit; ' but most of them do
not contradict the scientific knowledge of the times. Herder now
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acknowledges at last that Euler is Ms authority and source for the whole
analogy, although Newton too had compared the scale and the spectrum as both
consisting of seven units'^'' (disregarding the eighth note of the octave).
Goethe, however, does not fully accept this scientific theory of
Herder's. His views on this analogy are much more circumspect (as well as
more metaphysical and obscure) than Herder's or Euler's:^1^
Vergleichen lassen sich Farbe und Ton unter einander auf keine
Weisej aber beide lassen sich auf eine hohere Formal bringen,
aus einer hohern Formel beide, jedoch jedes fur sich, ableiten.
Beide sind allgemeine elementare Wirkungen, nach dem
allgemeinen Gesetz des Trennens und Susammenstrebens, des Auf=
und Abschwankens, des Hin= und Widerwagens wirkend
For Goethe, the analogy is only indirect, through a higher common factor
from which both may be derived.
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Knebel hailed Herder's use of the analogy with the words:
Welch schones Concert zwischen Himmel und Erde! So entsteht
die Musik der Sphare!
These words express Herder's feelings as well as Enebel's. Hayxn realises
that it was the aesthetic quality of the analogy which appealed to Herder,
and says on another occasion that it provided him with evidence for his
belief in universal harmony.Such motives are scarcely those of the
strict physical scientist.
e) Heat.
Scientific theories of heat in Herder's age were in an uncertain state.
Heat was at times considered to be a material substance,^"^ which was iden¬
tified by Nollet and others with electricity,and was widely believed to
be imponderable.^7) in the seventeenth century many had supported the true
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theory that heat is a kind of motion,but this remained for long a
disputed hypothesis. Lavoisier thought that it was a measurable fluid,
calling it "oalorique" but Benjamin Thompson revived and proved the
time theory in 1798,though his achievement was not universally accepted
for a considerable time.
Newton, however, had associated heat closely vdth light, declaring that
light (which was seen as material or corpuscular), on striking material
371)bodies, sets up vibrations within them; we perceive this effect as heat. '
Although Herder had linked heat with electricity, as we earlier
remarked, he more often relates it to light, just as Newton had done. In
the „Adrastea", he appears at first to support the Newtonian theory, saying
that light flows „in sanften Stromen" through space „bis es in Nahe unsrer
Erde sich mit Feuerkraften waffnet."*^2^ Bode, in a work known to Herder,
had likewise spoken of light, „dessen feuerlose Stralen sich durch den
Aether fortpflanzen, aber er3t an der Erdoberflache mehr oder weniger
Warme hervorbringen und bewirken."
374)In his essay on colour, Herder is more specific: '
Wir kennen den Sonnenstral nur, wie er zu uns kommt, mit Warme=
stoff gerustet; seine sanfteren Schwingungen und Directionen
in der dephlogisierten Luft kennen wir kaum, im Aether noch
minder.
Like Newton, he associates heat with light, but also introduces the current
eighteenth century doctrine that heat is a substance. Thus, light becomes
associated with the heat-substance upon the earth's surface. The whole
375)conception is further complicated when Herder introduces Stahl's ' theory
of "phlogiston", a hypothetical substance thought to be liberated during
combustion, and therefore also associated with heat. In the passage quoted
above, Herder seems to imply that the heat-substance („Warmestoff") and
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phlogiston are identical (since the action of light is „3anfter" in air
which contains no phlogiston). We shall return to the phlogiston theory in
our section on chemistry.
But in 1800, Herschel discovered "that rays of ordinary light transmit
a certain amount of heat, that this effect is more marked for light at the
red end of the spectrum —-, and that beyond the red end there are rays which
transmit heat but do not affect the human sense of vision. Herder
wrote in 1802 of „Herschels Entdeekung, fla£ die Sonne uns aufier dec. Licht
auch unsichtbare Warmestralen zusende'", quoting an article by von Hahn in
377)Bode's „Astronomisches Jahrbuch". ' This shows that Herder's scientific
knowledge could be extremely up to date in an age of slower communications.
But since neither Herder himself, nor von Hahn in the article Herder
cites,mentions either red or infra-red rays in particular, and both
speak only of „unsichtbare Warmestrahlen", we conclude that Herder, in
associating the colour red with heat, as we earlier noticed, was simply
placing a literal interpretation upon the traditional symbolism which used
red, the colour of fire, to represent heat or warmth.
We conclude that Herder's views on heat reflect the materialistic
theories current in his age, as well as the general uncertainty which
prevailed throughout the subject at that time. They are probably influenced
by Newton's theory, as well as by the phlogiston hypothesis. Herder
acclaimed Herschel's discovery of radiant heat when he first met a short
notice on it. He himself added nothing to existing scientific observations
or theories on the subject.
4« Chemistry.
Herder writes in the „Ideen":"^^
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Die Chemie, die in den neuen Zeiten so eifrig geubt wird,
ofnet [sic] dem Liebhaber hier im unterirdischen Reich der
Natur eine mannichfaltige zweite Schopfung; and vielleicht
enthalt diese nicht bios die Materie, sondern auch die Grund=
gesetze und den Schlussel zu alle dem, was uber der Erde
gebildet worden.
But although he here avows that chemistry is a highly significant science,
he broadly neglects the subject throughout his works. Again, in 1798, he
says of his hopes to attend classes on chemistry:
ich wunsche sehr, da£ es zu Stande komme, indem ich nach
dieser Wissenschaft eigentlich durste.
It appears that he at least discussed the subject with the chemist Scherer,
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who visited him in the following year, but whatever new knowledge he
acquired had no repercussions upon his own writings.
Let us, however, discuss what knowledge of chemistry Herder did possess.
Firstly, the reader of Herder's works soon encounters the archaic notion of
the "four elements" - earth, water, air and fire. In the unpublished
dialogue on water, written in Konigsberg, the chemistry of water is discussed
only in terms of the "elements". It is curious that Herder even uses the
old symbols for them - e.g.^/ for water, for air, and so on.^^ In
a notebook of around 1766, quoted by Suphan, Herder enumerates the supposed
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agents of universal change as follows: '
Elemente, Feuer [„Erde" scored out], Meer, Luft, Aether.
These terms reappear throughout the first two parts of the „Ideen". They
constitute, for Herder, the crudest forms of matter, within which the subtler
„Krafte" work. But fire, particularly in the form of "elemental fire", has
something of the status of a creative „Kraft", as we noticed in our discussion
of light. The other "elements" are simply media, as the presence of „Aether"
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in the above list indicates.
On one occasion in the „Id8en", these archaic concepts are used to lend
support to the Mosaic narrative of creation:
Im Tode wird unser kunstliches Gebau in Erde, Wasser und Luft
aufgeloset, die in ihsi organisch gebunden sind.
This is one of the rarer occasions in this work where orthodox theology
directly influences Herder's scientific views. The passage also recalls the
old doctrine of the microcosm, which was thought to be compounded of the
elements found in the macrocosm.
Usually, Herder contends that the "elements" (apart from earth) were
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creative agents in the earlier phases of our planet's existence:
Drei maehtige Wesen wirkten in diesen groBen Seitraumen, Wasser,
Luft, Feuer.
Water and fire raged within the primitive atmosphere, and, through precipi¬
tation, gradually purified the air and shaped the earth's surface.
The scientific standing of the "elements" in Herder's day was already
extremely low. Boyle had condemned these Aristotelian concepts in 1661.
Nonetheless, they kept reappearing in the works of several reputable
scientists for some time, but usually only in looser descriptions where the
a
strictest chemical accuracy was not deemed imperative. Linrieus, in a work
referred to and read by Herder,even defined climate in terms of these
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categories: '
Unter dem Worte Clima werden hier alle vier Elements verstanden.
The chemist Candido Pistoi, in a work from which Herder had made excerpts,
clung to the old conception, and, like Herder, regarded fire as the most
active of the four:
so ist es doch so' zu sagen die Seele von den andern.
G-oethe named the "elements" a3 the effective agents behind environmental
determinism as late as in 1824, in an essay dealing with the anatomy of
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rodents. ' This recalls Linribus' similar belief.
However, quantitative chemistry had begun to appear by 1740, with the
work of Joseph Black in particular, and Herder's use of these archaic,
qualitative notions can only be described as outdated. Similarly, when he
mentions "elective affinities" (which we discussed in our section on
dialectics), Herder says;*9^
Der Chymiker veranstaltet nichts als Hochseiten und Trennungen.
Metaphorical though the words may be, they were favourites of the medieval
alchemists.
b
In Herder's lifetime modern chemistry finally emerged with the work of
Priestley and Lavoisier. The last great battle with the older school was
fought over the traditional "phlogiston" theory of combustion, which had
originally been propounded in the l670'a by Becher (then Stahl). The property
of combustibility was substantivised as the hypothetical, imponderable
substance "phlogiston", and a complex chemical nomenclature was evolved in
accordance with it. Thus, modern oxygen was called "dephlogisticated air",
nitrogen was "phlogisticated air", and hydrogen, although usually called
"inflammable air", was sometimes identified with the elusive phlogiston
itself.*91^
Herder never seems to have questioned the merits of the phlogiston
392)
theory, although Lavoisier had more or less disproved it by 1784.
Accordingly, Herder, in a rejected manuscript for part of the „Ideen", uses
ttPhlogiston" and „das Brennbare in der Luft" (presumably the "inflammable
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air", hydrogen) as synonyms, as the older school of chemists did. He
takes note of Ingsnhoufi's important and recent discovery that plants extract
an unbreathable gas from the air, and uses the phlogistic terminology to
describe the process, just as IngenhouB himself had originally done. The
gas which the plants extract, he calls „das Brennbare", which is now there¬
fore used to denote carbon dioxide.(We have seen that „das Brennbare"
is elsewhere equated to phlogiston, which usually meant hydrogen when applied
to gases.) He also refers to the observation made by the climatologist
Wilson, and widely accredited in Herder's day, that the presence of phlogiston
in the air promotes organic putrefaction and hinders respiration, and that
the Arctic air, because it is deficient in phlogiston (i.e. because it is
colder), is purer than air elsewhere."^"'' (Kant used the same theory to
explain why Europeans find Africa unhealthy; the negroes, he said, are
adapted to resist the noxious effects of phlogiston.^6)) %'e have also seen
that Herder described how heat is produced by saying that light associates
itself, on striking the earth, with atmospheric phlogiston; on this occasion,
like many writers of the time, Herder in turn identifies phlogiston with
„Warmestoff", the hypothetical heat-substance.It is possible that he
first studied the phlogiston theory in Priestley's "Observations upon several
different kinds of air", a work which he requested from Heyne in 1774 for the
Count of Schaumburg=Lippe.Besides, the chemist Pistoi, in the work
Herder had read, fully accepted the theory.
However, the phlogiston theory was already passing out of currency in
the 1780's. The shrewd Knebel, in a letter to Herder in 1789> observes
that the idea creates confusion^' ^ (in a work on electricity he has just
read). But Herder cannot be blamed entirely for his confused ideas on the
subject. Like many educated men of the time, he was compelled to use a
theory which was quite inadequate, for no alternative theory was as yet
known to him. He simply used the phlogiston theory as hest he could.
Herder's knowledge of chemistry was, in the long run, somewhat greater
than the reader of his works would at first suspect. Among the notes he
copied from Einsiedel's manuscripts were several passages on chemistry,
unfortunately omitted in Dobbek's recent edition of Einsiedel's previously
unpublished rtIdeen"(Einsiedel was a keen student of chemistry and
mineralogy.) Herder possessed or read works on chemistry by Oetinger,1*02^
Mann,^"^ Scherer and FourcrQix,^i*v Jordan,and others. Lavoisier,
however, is mentioned only once, in 1801, in passing:it seems that
Herder failed to recognise his outstanding importance. Herder's late
interest in chemistry, which was no doubt part of that general reawakening of
his interest in all branches of physical science in his last years, yielded
no productive result in his works. He did suggest, however, as we earlier
saw, that chemistry might provide new information about the objective origins
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of colour, but it was Goethe, not Herder, who proceeded to investigate
the chemistry of colours. Such ideas on chemistry as do appear in the
„Ideen", even apart from mentions of the "elements" and phlogiston, are
usually vague and uninformative, as when Herder says that „Kalke und Salze,
so wie Kieselerde und Luftsaure" are necessary agents in the natural evolu¬
tion of „Halbraetalle" His interest in chemistry awoke too late for him
to remedy these earlier deficiencies. But the real reason why he could
never have appreciated exact, quantitative chemistry is that his views on
matter and its structure were far too indeterminate, as we discovered at the
beginning of this chapter; he never finally succeeded in distinguishing
between material substances and the qualitative „Krafte" which bedevilled
his entire scientific thought.
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5. The geological sciences and cosmogony.
a) Mineralogy.
„ 409)
Although Goethej Knebel, Einsiedel, Merck, Schroter ' and August
Herder were all persons with whom Herder was in close contact at various
times, and all possessed a considerable knowledge of practical mineralogy,
Herder himself never evinced any real interest in empirical observations of
the minerals and rocks of which the earth is composed. Largely through
discussions with his son August, and probably with Einsiedel, he does seem
to have acquired some knowledge of mineralogical and mining terms,440 ^ but
thi3 did not lead him to write anything on the subject himself.
We thus commence our study of Herder's geological ideas with the
realisation that he lacked that training in concrete observation without
which the theorist in geology must rely largely upon speculation.
b) Palaeontology.
We shall discuss Herder's knowledge of palaeontology in our section on
the evolution of life.
c) Chronology:_ the age_of thejsarth.
Herder says in an earlier version of his „Xlteste Urkunde", around 1771
or 1772:411^
Aber so wifien wir ja nicht das Alter der Welt!
The Book of Genesis, he says, can give us no information on this subject.
But in 1774, in the final version of his „Urkunde", he says that „die Welt
fast sechstausend Jahr alt ist."43"2' In a sermon of the same year, he
says of the three Magi:4*^
viertausend oder Eins oder Zwei wars, da die Weisen ankamen.
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Thus, it appears that during his religious phase, he came to accept the
Biblical chronology he had rejected two or three years previously.
In the „Ideen", he rejects Buffon's longer chronology as arbitrary
(which it is), and dismisses the "aeons" of various ancient mythologies for
the same reason.But he does not accept the "days" of creation
literally either, and concludes:
Der Fels unsrer Erde ist sehr alt und die Bekleidung desselben
hat lange Revolutionen erfodert, uber die kein Streit statt
findet. Hier lafit Moses einem jeden Freiheit, Epochen zu
dichten, wie er will.
Moses' "days" are only an abbreviated and figurative description, Herder
claimsj he thereby anticipates a favourite compromise of nineteenth century
chronologists. Again in an essay of 1792 he says that Moses' "days" tell
the geologist nothing.
Kant's exceptional chronology, in his „Allgemeine Naturgeschichte",
involving Mvielleicht eine Reihe von Millionen Jahren und Jahrhunderten",^"^
may have been responsible for Herder's caution. Another of Kant's remarks,
in the lectux-es on physical geography attended by Herder, may have led him to
suppose that Moses' "days" are symbolic
Bei Gott ist eine Zeit wie der Tag zum Schaffen zu viel und
zur Ausbildung der Erde zu wenig.
Alternatively, Whiston, whom Herder mentions on several occasions,had
declared that Moses' "days" were really yearsthis may also have
influenced Herder's ideas.
However, it is clear that his mature views on chronology were fairly
liberal for his time. Bruntsch^0^ lists several of his contemporaries,
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most of whom doubted Archbishop Ussher's scriptural chronology, but often
named arbitrary figures which are still vastly too short by modern reckoning.
Herder was wise to leave the question open, since no detailed evidence
became available until well on in the following century. On the other hand,
his remark that the „Revolutionen" of the primeval earth must have lasted for
t,Jah^tausende"if21/, indicates that he too greatly underestimated the earth's
age. Besides, as we shall soon see, he believed that some of these vast
geological changes took place within the time covered by human records;
this again implies that his own computation was only a fraction as large as
present-day estimates of the geological time-scale.
d) The composition of the earth's core and the_earliest_mountains.
Suphan was the first to point out that Herder, like Goethe, believed in
an „Urgebirge", and thought that this, as well as the earth's core, was
composed of granite.^2'' Suphan believes that Goethe gave Herder this idea,
but that Herder was the first to put it on paper.
Mentions of an „Urgeburge", an t,Hrdrucken", or „der Kern unsrer Erde,
der Granit" are so frequent in the nIdeen" that only a list of page-references
can be given here.^"^ One characteristic passage may show how close Herder's
views are to those expressed by Goethe in his essay „{Jber den Granit"
Der alte Granit, der innere Kern unsres Planeten, zeigt soweit
wir ihn kennen, keine Spur von untergegangenen organisehen Wesen
Wahrscheinlich ragte er in seinen hoehsten Spitzen uber die
Wasser der Schopfung empor, da sich auf denselben keine Spur
einer Meerwirkung findet
Let us for the moment ignore the problem of how the granite core was
first formed, and try to ascertain the sources behind Herder's and Goethe's
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theory.
Maro (17¥)), Arduino (1759), Lehmann (1759 ©t seq.) arid Delius (1770)
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all distinguished "primitive mountains" from later "secondary" ones.
Herder nowhere mentions these writers, however. Werner, in a geognostic
table published in 1777 for limited circulation, speaks of „uranfangliche
Gebirge", and mentions granite first in his list of the rocks which form
these mountains.^0'' De Saussure, in the first volume of his great work on
the Alps (1779), says he has devoted most attention to the primitive
mountains, particularly those composed of granite, since he believes they
contain the secret of the origin of things.But it was Pallas, in
1777, who first declared unequivocally that the primitive mountains and the
earth's core were composed of graniteSauter,^"^ followed by
Rouchd,^0/ says that Buffon also believed that the earth's core consists of
a
granite. Linneus postulated an „Urberg der Schopfung", situated near the
equator;^*'' this may in turn have been influenced by the Book of Isaiah,
which mentions a "mountain of God", situated, however, towards the North.^2)
a
But Linneus does not say whether this mountain was made of granite or not.
Suphan is wrong in saying that Herder recorded the granite theory
before Goethe, who, in fact, writes to Merck in 1782:
Wegen des Granits, ob ich gleich uberzeugt bin, da£ er die Basis
unsrer bekannten Oberflache ist, werden wir aber doch wohl
nachgeben und einen granit secondaire statuiren mussen.
The French words, and a mention of the Abbe Soulavie in the same letter
indicate that it was this writer who gave Goethe his idea. Goethe already
seems to distinguish between a primitive mountain system (his later
„Urgebirge") and a secondary one.
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Herder may have acquired the idea from any of several sources. Goethe
himself may have introduced it to him, or the ideas of Werner may have
reached him in the early 1780's through students of the Freiberg geologist.
He was also familiar with the mineralogical writings of Buffon, of course.
In the „Ideen", he also refers to de Saussure and Soulavie and to
^
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Linneus1 „Urberg der Schopfung" J (which may have suggested the word
„Urgeburge"). Finally, he refers at least four times in the „Ideen" to the
very work of Pallas which said that the primitive mountains, and the earth's
core, were made of granite.Grundmann concludes, probably correctly,
that Herder took the granite theory from Pallasbut we cannot mile out
the possibility that some of the other writers named above may also have
helped to shape his views.
However, Pallas says of granite
rien n'est plus vraisemblable que de prendre cette roche
pour le principal ingredient de l'int^rieur de notre globe.
He distinguishes between "montagnes primitives" and "montagnes secondaires",
saying that the latter are built up from sediments deposited in the oceans.^
This is very similar to the view of Herder, who distinguishes the „Urgeburge"
from „herangeschwemmte Berge".^0^
We conclude that the granite theory was very much in the air in Herder's
day, and that, by adopting it, Herder was indeed „auf der Hohe seiner Zeit",
as Grundmann^^"^ maintains.
One other branch of the „Urgebirge" hypothesis has a more ancient
pedigree. In 1775, Herder calls the great mountain systems „der Rucken der
Erde".^2^ In an early sketch for the „Ideen" he calls them the „Knochen
der Erde".^^ Seneca had also likened the earth's rocks to its bones,
Leonardo too called the mountains the bones of the earth,**^5) and Rouc'ne
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says that Leibniz refers to the "skeleton" of the earth.Thus Herder
combined the granite theory with another idea of much greater antiquity,
and less scientific standing.
But the granite theory itself was rejected in the nineteenth century.
Before his death in 1797, James Hutton discovered that granites are of
igneous origin and differ greatly in age, some being of comparatively recent
origin. (His discovery, however, was published only in 1899.) Lyell
too, in 1833, realised that granites vary in age.^*'' At the present time,
geologists are usually unwilling to commit themselves to any exact definition
of the rocks which formed the earliest solid surface of the earth, for both
sedimentary and igneous varieties are found amongst the oldest rocks known.
The nature of the earth's interior is still little known, but seismological
tests show that it is certainly not uniform, and consists of several
distinct layers. It is interesting, however, that the contemporary earth-
historian, G. Gamow, does not say that the earth's core is made of granite,
but he does declare:
The outer crust of the earth consists of a layer of granite —
extending to a depth of from 50 to 100 kilometers.
He notices that granite is absent only in the Pacific basin, from which it
was removed, he believes, when the moon became detached from that side of
the earth. Gamow thus seems to have returned to the old theory that the
original crust of the earth was of granitic composition.^^
e) Cosmogony.
Herder's views on cosmogony are ambiguous and at times contradictory;
they have to be pieced together from many scattered utterances, most of
which, however, appear in the various versions of the „Ideen", Part I. Like
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all such theories of that age, they are almost entirely speculative.
Descartes Leibniz*1""^ and BufforA"'^' had declared that the earth
first arose as a molten body, having become detached in some way from the
sun. Herder writes, in a poem of 1769, referring to the various cosmic
bodies
Wann in unendlichen/Ruh ewigkeiten [sic] riB ihr Had sich /
feurigen Schwungs in den wusten Sther?
lie thus seems to have accepted the theory that they all passed through an
initial glowing or molten state, at this time. But in the „Ideen", Part II,
he shows that he has altered his opinion, saying of the granite JDrfels"
Da£ dieser Fels gluhend aus der Sonne geschleudert sei, ist
ein riesenhafter Gedanke, der aber weder in der Analogic der
Katur noch in der fortgehenden Entwicklung unsrer Erde Grund
findet Vial wahrscheinlicher ist, daB dieser wunderbare
Urfels durch innere Krafte sich selbst gebildet d.i. aus dem
schwangern Chaos, daraus unsre Erde werden sollte, verdichtend
niedergesetzt habe.
(For he says that a molten state would have prevented any water from
appearing on our planet.) However, in an earlier, rejected manuscript, he
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says: 1
Hat unsre Erde sich unlaugbar aus einem fluBigen Zustande
gebildet.
Despite their apparent contradiction, the last two passages can be
reconciled. Kant, in his „Aligemeine Naturgeschichte", had stated that
matter, in the form of small particles, was more or less evenly distributed
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throughout space before our universe emerged in its present condition; '
he does not specify the size, shape, or composition of these particles, but
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it is obvious from his subsequent descriptions of how the stellar and planetary
bodies grew by accretion, under gravitational attraction, that they obeyed
the laws of rotating fluid masses. For example, he says that the highest
mountains on the earth ought to be at the equator.^^'' (Herder, as we shall
see, later uses the same argument.^-^)) Thus, collections of fine particles
behaved like rotating fluid spheres, without having been molten, or, in the
case of the planets, „aus der Sonne geschleudert". All this tallies
precisely with Herder's opinions.
An interesting passage, occurring in Part III of the „Ideen", has
completely escaped the attention of critics, perhaps because it appears in a
A58)
chapter written much later than the geological sections of the work: '
Als einst im UneraeBlichen der Werkstoff kunftiger Weiten
ausgebreitet schwamm, gefiel es dam Schopfer dieser Welten, die
Materie sich bilden zu lassen nach den ihnen anerschaffenen
inneren Kraften. Zum Mittelpunkt des Ganzen, der Sonne, floB
nieder [N.B. „floBw - the particles behave like a fluid] was
nirgend eigne Bahn finden konnte —- Was einen andern Mittel=
punkt der Anziehung fand, ballte sich gleichartig zu ihm
This, in essence, is a restatement of the cosmogony of Kant.
Unlike Kant, Herder goes on to describe in detail how the diffuse,
rotating mass of the earth developed towards its present state. The
components of the earth, as we noticed above, became „verdichtend niedsrge=
setzt" ' Herder further explains in the „Ideen":
In periodischen Zeitraumen entwickelte sich aus geistigen und
korperlichen staminibus die Luft, da3 Feuer, das Wasser, die
Erde.
The order givsn here can scarcely be meant to be chronological, for, while
air may have arisen first, it seems from other passages that Herder believed
a solid core had formed at an early stage, and that the other "elements" sub¬
sequently acted upon it. He says, for instance, in an earlier manuscript
for the „Ideen", that the granite core „wahrscheinlich durch Feuer in seine
[„jetzige" scored out] Masse uberging."^J/' This implies that fire appeared
after earth, which it then consolidated into its present granitic form.
Another passage confirms this order:
Die Luft, die diesen Kluoipen umgab, war von Wasser und Feuer
noeh nicht gesondert: beschwangert mit den mancherlei Materien,
die sich erst in vielfaltigsn Verbindungen und Perioden an die
G-rundlage cler Erde setzten und ihr allgemach Form gaben (etc.)
The primitive atmosphere was charged with water, fire, diverse kinds of
matter, and the various „Krafte" we earlier noticed. (Compare the above
phrase „aus geistigen und korperlichen staminibus".) Thus, from a small
nucleus,^2' arose our earth, ttderen erste Bestandtheile vielleicht alle aus
der Luft niedergesehlagen wurden" As we earlier noticed, fire (or
rather "elemental fire") played a prime part in purifying this dense atmos¬
phere. (No doubt it was this same "fire" which consolidated the granite.)
The granite eventually became weathered, producing the sand which now covers
much of the earth's surface.
It is interesting that Burnet, whose work Harder had read, claimed that
the primeval air was full of dust particles,^"*' and Buffon, like Herder,
believed that water first appeared on the earth by condensation or precipita¬
tion from the atmosphere The physicist Rudiger, early in the
eighteenth century, had also put forward a theory of creation by precipita¬
tion; he went so far as to say that the other "elements" evolved out of the
air itself / However, Herder does not seem to have read his work. The
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illustrious Werner claimed that granite was a precipitate; but it was pre¬
cipitated within the ocean, not within the atmosphere, and had originally
I /O \
existed in suspension within the waters which once covered the earth. '
Herder, however, believed (more correctly, as it happens) that fire had
assisted in the development of granite, as we have seen.
From all this, we conclude that Herder took over Kant's cosmogony,
extending it by adding the theory of precipitation of "elements". The idea
of precipitation was really implicit in Kant's work already. The granite
theory of Pallas and Goethe was then introduced in turn. The whole inspira¬
tion behind this composite theory remains the „Allgemeine Naturgeschichte"
of Kant.
f) Earth history.
Herder once says, in the „Ideen", „dafi manche Umstande, die jetzt
weniger wirken, in fruhern Zeitaltern, da alle Elemente noch in ihrer ersten
— mm — U69)
rohen Starke waren, auch starker gewirkt haben mussen." The plastic
power of these "elements" was especially great around the mountain massif of
ancient Asia.^f^/ Climatic determinants, which first caused the human races
to become differentiated, were likewise stronger.^1) Even in the modern
age, Herder says, the tropical zone, where the "elements" are stronger,
abounds in the largest and most powerful animals, and vegetable growth is
most prolific in the same area.^^ Kohlbrugge wrongly says that Herder
imagined „die Plastizitat der organischen Materia" to have been greater in
primeval times we have seen, however, that Herder believed that the
active "elements", not the passive material they act upon, have changed
since the earliest times.
The first exponent of this theory was possibly Lucretius, who declared
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that the early earth produced larger animals:^^
And what in former Times with Ease she bore,
Grown feeble now, and weak, she bears no more.
Buffon, in his "Histoire des Mineraux" (1783-88), is of the same opinion, as
Sauter observes.Kant put forward the same theory in an early essay,
and Goethe, in a late study of stratification, declares „da£ in den ersten
Epochen unserer Erdbildung alles Chemische und uberhaupt alles Dynamisehe
kraftiger und starker gewesen."^^
However, the potent primeval elements, according to Herder, were not
always constructive. Living organisms were often annihilated by „neue
Absatze der Luft und des Wassers."^^ This idea is doubtless designed to
explain why large layers of fossils are found.
Let us now consider what changes Herder believed had taken place in this
more eventful era of the earth's past. He distinguishes two types of
„Revolutionen": those which helped to shape the earth at its origin (and
which we discussed in our section on cosmogony), and those which the planet
has undergone in later ages, even since man inhabited it. We shall now
examine this second variety of change.
In 1797, de la M^therie, in his "Theorie de la terre", was able to
enumerate over 30 different theories hitherto advanced to explain earth-
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history. ' Herder's age, which witnessed the birth of truly modern
geology, was fertile in speculative hypotheses too. Since Herder, with his
habitual love of synthesis, believed, like the eclectic geologist Pallas,
that: "II faut reunir plusieurs hypotheses modernes, mais non pas s'attacher
& une seule cause",we must first decide how all his various ideas should
be classified.
Firstly, the so-called "diluvial" theories, which held that all major
convulsions undergone by the earth could be explained as effects of the
Noachian Deluge, had long been current. Secondly, there arose the "Keptunist"
school of Werner, which maintained that water, above all, had shaped the
earth, but over long periods, and not in one universal inundation; this
school was soon impugned by the followers of Button and Playfair, who, under
the name of "Vulcanists", or "Plutonists", declared that "fire" (i.e.
volcanic activity) was a greater formative agent in the earth's history.
Thirdly, there later began the famous controversy between the schools of
Lyell and Cuvier, known respectively as "Uniformitarians" and "Catastro-
phists"; for, while they might both agree that water and "fire" alike were
powerful agents of geological change, the former maintained that changes were
gradual, involving similar agencies to those now at work, the latter that
they were cataclysmic. These two schools, flourishing from the early to
mid nineteenth century, are often confused with the late eighteenth century
schools of Neptunism and Vulcanism; but while the ideas of the two groups
are often parallel (especially the Vulcanists and the Catastrophists), their
similarity is by no means without exception, since, for example, the
diluvial theory, the ancestor of Neptunism, might sooner be called Catastro-
phist than Uniformitarian. We shall use all of these names, without capital
letters, as generic terms for certain types of theory, bearing in mind that
Herder himself had no part in either of the famous controversies, which both
reached their height many years after he had expounded his personal theories
of earth-history. First, we shall discuss catastrophist and uniformitarian
ideas.
(i) Catastrophism and uniformitarianism.
In one of the rejected manuscripts for the geological portion of the
„Ideen", Herder puts forward the theory that the earth, in its early stages,
may have had a more eccentric orbit, not unlike that of a comet. It must
later have moved into its present orbit, whose shape is that of a less
elongated ellipse. The earlier orbit, Herder Infers, took only 360 days
for one revolution, as is proved by certain ancient calendars which fixed
the year at this length.This, of course, implies that some catastro¬
phic change took place, and that it even happened within the times of
recorded human traditions. For, although Herder explicitly rejects the
hypotheses of writers such as Buffon and Whiston^"^ that the planets were
torn forth from the sun, in a molten state (or subjected to some tremendous
cataclysm) by the close approach or impact of a comet, he adapts the comet
theory to his own purpose, and applies it to the earth itself. His purpose
is to suggest that some cataclysmic change befell the earth, and to explain
by it, in one comprehensive theory, how many of the planet's present
features originated. All other changes, including that in the earth's
orbit, are to be explained as the results of one great event: this was a
change in the angle of the earth's axis to the plane of the ecliptic.
We must, however, realise that it was not simply the angle of the
present axis which supposedly changed in relation to the ecliptic (as if the
earth, like a spinning top, had tilted as it spun); Herder thought that the
axis of rotation itself had altered - i.e. he supposed that the axial poles
themselves had changed (as if a top suddenly began to spin on a new base).
The anomalies in the angles of the planets' axes to the solar ecliptic
long troubled certain thinkers, whose aesthetic feelings told them, as with
Burnet,that the planets must originally have rotated in a "right
posture". The changes they presumed had taken place since then could also
95.
be conveniently used, in the case of the earth, to explain how there came
about all the other cataclysms thought necessary to produce the seemingly
disorderly and ruinous condition of the planet as it is at present. Surely,
the eighteenth century mind felt, the divine architect must originally have
designed the earth in more classical style.
Herder was likewise puzzled by the different angles of the planets'
axes; he remarks, early in the „Ideen", that no universal law explaining
the anomalies has yet been discovered.While his aesthetic sense
revolted against the obvious irregularity of the earth's axis, he soon called
in teleology to show how beneficial the present angle is for man, since it
makes the seasonal changes possible.^"''' Soon afterwards he points out the
other apparent discrepancy that the earth's highest mountains do not lie
round the equator, as they would do if their formation had been governed by
the laws of a rotating fluid sphere; in this case again, he justifies the
anomaly teleologically. '
Rouch£ singles out the first of these teleological passages, that on the
earth's axis and seasonal change. We now cite Herder's German version,
followed by Rouche's translation:
so sehen wir abermals, mit welchem feinen Zuge der Finger
der Allmacht alle Umwalzungen und Schattierungen auf der Erde
umschrieben und bezirkt hat. Nur eine kleine andre Richtung
der Erde zur Sonne und alles auf ihr ware anders. 487)
il edit suffi que Dieu modifilit 1'inclinaison de l'orbite
terrestre sur 1'^cliptique, et toute l'histoire eftt et3
changee. 488)
Rouche, over-anxious to discover religious orthodoxy in Herder's thought,
has personified Herder's „Allmachtn, which is an impersonal term. In his
„Gott", he says „Wir sind mit Allmacht umgeben, wir sehwimmen in einem
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Ozean der Allmacht."^"^ The word should not be translated by the personal
"Dieu" on this occasion either. Herder uses his „Allmacht" in a way
typical of his usual immanent teleology, which assumes that the higher
purpose and natural causes work together in harmony. Incidentally, the
phrase „der Finger der Allmacht" comes straight from Kant's HAllgemeine
Naturgeschichte" .^9^)
But it is clear from the rejected „Ideen" manuscript mentioned above
that teleology alone did not satisfy Herder's desire to explain convulsive
geological changes. He says of their unknown cause
Warum bedorften wir auch eines unbekannten Maschienengottes, da
im Bau und in den Lebensaltern der Erde selbst Revolutionen der
Art mit alien ihren Folgen nothwendig liegen.
In this manuscript, published by Suphan, Herder attempts to show that both
the asymmetry of the earth's axis and the supposedly incongruous situation of
the earth's highest mountains can be traced to natural causes. Other incon¬
gruities which offended his aesthetic sense, such as the great irregularities
in the world's coastlines, and ths situation of the magnetic poles at a
considerable distance from the axial poles, are explained by the same
comprehensive hypothesis.
He first confesses „[da6] freilich mit der Veranderung unsrer Erdachse
bisher sehr gespielt worden.For example, Burnet, whom Herder several
times mentions, had suggested that the earth was originally symmetrical in
all respects, but that a change in the angle of the axis had caused a great
upheaval. **93) Whiston and Cluver believed that a comet had caused a
similar change, while Whitehurst said that it was brought about by outbursts
of "subterranean fire".^"47 Sturm was of a similar opinion.The
renowned experimentalist Hooke had explained how supposed climatic changes
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came about by the same theory, 1 and Pluche, whose work is cited by Herder
(as Rouchd remarks^^'), had contended that the change was caused directly
by God in order to bring on the Deluge as a universal retribution.
Scheuchzer, however, whom Herder also quotes (in 1774) held the teleo-
logical view that the axis is best the way it is."4*^' But even Kant had
said that the angles of the planetary axes ought to be regular, at right
angles to the plane of the ecliptic, and had attempted to explain the
supposed changes by natural causes, saying:
Maine wahre Meinung geht dahin, daS die Umdrehung der Planeten
um die Axe in dem ursprunglichen Zustand dar ersten Bildung
mit der Flache ihrer jahrlichen Bahn ziemlich genau einge=
troffen habe, und dafi Ursacnen vorhanden gewesen, diese Axe
aus ihrer sr3ten Stellung zu verschieben.
Once again, it was Kant1a early scientific thought which inspired Herder
directly; it was Kant's approach which encouraged him to explain the change
by natural causes. Proa another remark of Kant's he also realised that the
earth's highest mountains could lie near the equator if the axial poles were
different. ^
Kant had even suggested one particular natural cause which could have
produced the change. Variations in density caused parts of the earth's
crust to collapse
-— so hat sie [i.e. die Erde] nicht das Gleichgewicht des
Umschwunges in ihrer Axendrehung mehr auf alien Seitan
laisten konnen.
But it is time to examine Herder's theory in more detail. In 1772, he
already suggested, in a rough sketch for tutorial purposes, that the Biblical
Flood may have caused the axial changeIn 1782, he observes more
simply that the earth's axis may have altered.But in the rejected
manuscript for the „Ideen", now under discussion, it is no longer the Flood
which causes the axial change, hut the axial change which causes the Flood;
this shows a turning away from the Biblical to a more naturalistic mode of
explanation. Besides, it is not the mandate of an irate God, but „ungleich=
artige Eintrocknung" of the earth's crust, with ensuing subsidences, which
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render the axis unstable, ' just as in Kant's theory.
Bruntsch correctly notices that Herder's approach is quite different
from the Scriptural one, which was adopted by such theorists as Lulof,"^)
and he observes that Herder's hypothesis is scientifically better founded
than similar, earlier ones of Whiston and others, with their comets and
arbitrary deities.-^) Nonetheless, most of the credit, which is deserved
only by the naturalistic method, not by the speculative, scientifically
unverified hypothesis itself, should go to Kant rather than to Herder; for
Herder simply tried to combine eclectically all the possible agents of
geological change, and to explain away every aesthetically displeasing
asymmetry, and finally produced an involved and drastic theory.
However, the theory is not only involved; it is also ambiguous and even
at times self-contradictory. For example, Herder remarks that a magnetic
field, like that of the earth, with its magnetic poles, is very susceptible
to changes, especially from around its equator;this, he believes, is
added evidence that the rotational axis of the earth actually did alter.
But he had previously assumed that the earth's magnetic poles remained
constant, while the poles of rotation altered?^Ihis is exactly the reverse
of his later statement. Furthermore, the argument that the earth's highest
mountains ought to lie near its equator is groundless, because the earth's
oblate spheroidal shape, bulging at the equator and flattened at the poles,
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neatly conforms to the present axis of rotation, and indicates that the earth
solidified with its axis the same as it is now. Herder knew this, a3 his
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references to the earth as a spheroid ' and to Bouguer, Condamine and
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Maupertuis, ' the men whose expeditions proved that the earth is an oblate
spheroid, indicate; he seems simply to have ignored the implications of this
fact, and, undaunted, reapplied the theory of rotating fluid spheres to the
Asian „Erdrucken" rather than to the equatorial bulge, just as Kant had done
in 1755-
He shall now briefly discuss the further catastrophes which Hex'der
believed had occurred in the earth's past. He rejects all theories which
maintain that earlier worlds, with their lost civilisations, have been
totally destroyed (presumably because he could not accept historical catas¬
trophes so readily as geological ones). He declares:
Die Systems also, die von zehnfacher Veranderung der Weltgegenden
und Pole, von hundertfaltiger Umsturzung eines bewohnten und
cultivirten Bodens, von Vertreibungen der Menschen aus Gegend in
G-egend oder von ihren Grabmalern unter Pelsen und Meeren reden
und in der ganzen altesten Geschichte nur Graus und Entsetzen
schildem, sie sind, trotz aller unleugbaren Revolutionen der
Erde dem Bau derselben entgegen oder von ihm wenigstens
unbegrundet.
Probably Herder has in mind the cataclysmic theory of Bonnet, who believed
that all life, except the "germs" of new and superior forms, is periodically
destroyed. But, as we have seen, the hypothesis in his own discarded manu¬
script on the earth's axis is almost as catastrophic as the theories he
attacks, for it assumes that the axial change occurred after man had appeared
on the earth. However, he had rolled all his cataclysms into one in this
version, and had associated them with the teleologically justifiable Noachian
Deluge. But, on other occasions in the „Ideenn, his own catastrophist
views become quite fantastic, as when, carried away by his imagination, he
depicts a geological holocaust, a primeval ocean which boiled („siedetn)
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„von jenen Vitriolgussen und andern Materien."
The notion that huge caverns arose within the earth as it consolidated
appears early in the „Ideen".As we have seen, he also used the same
theory, with the corollary that the caverns cause huge subsidences, to explain
how the earth's axis was shifted. The opening of these „Klufte und Holen"
[sic]"^""^ caused earthquakes, tidal waves and other convulsions, as we shall
shortly see.
Bruntsch lists some earlier examples of the theory of subterranean
caverns, naming Aristotle, Leibniz, Whiston, Woodward, Scheuchzer, Pluche,
de Luc and Kant as previous exponents of it."*^' To these we may add
Anaxagoras,Ovld,"^"®/ Lucretius,"^""^ Seneca,1 and Albertu3 Magnus;^^^
in fact, it was used throughout antiquity as an explanation of earthquakes.
522)Pallas had also used the theory to explain supposed cataclysms," * and
Du Bos, whose work Herder knew, had suggested, perhaps basing his hypothesis
upon a fanciful etymology of the word "Holland", that that country, now flat,
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once boasted numerous hills, which unhappily proved to be hollow. '
Nearly all of Herder's more catastrophic theories of geology appear in
rejected manuscripts for the „Ideen". As Suphan notes, red lines appear
against several such passages, and are probably Goethe's work.**^ (We
shall discuss Goethe's influence later.) But we have seen enough to show
us that Herder, in the early 1780's, was spontaneously inclined to interpret
geology catastrophically, and that uniformitarian ideas have no place in the
writings hitherto discussed. We shall discuss his more uniformitarian
arguments in our section on neptunism.
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(ii) Diluvial_theories.
In an early sketch entitled „Zur Geschichte der Wissenachaften aus
Boulanger" dated by Suphan at around 1766,'>20/ Herder repudiates the
ideas of Boulanger, who, in a work published in 1766, claimed that he could
detect vestiges of the Noachian Deluge in topography and human customs
throughout the world. Herder concludes that this theory is the product of
a mania which had developed out of Boulanger's constant ?/ork with water as
an overseer of dykes,527^ and writes:528^
Wer sagt es ihm, daB, wenn auch in alien Landern Spuren von
Sundfluth seyn sollten, diese Ueberschwemmungen alle auf
einmal gewesen?
In 1769 he says that, as natural historians have proved, fossil beds were
often deposited when tracts of land were submerged for „Jahrhunderte", not
529)
just for a few days, and that Noah's Flood is of merely national character. '
He next says of the Flood in 1782, „so gehorte sie gewiB zu den Naturgesetzen
der sich bildenden Erde", adding that much of the earth was submerged for
prolonged periods, and that isolated inundations occurred frequently^''0'' (no
doubt because the primeval "elements" were more active). In the „Ideen", he
calls the account of Noah „eine Nationalerzahlung", and says that, although
natural history records traces of a great inundation, especially in Asia, a
plurality of Noahs may have survived in various lands.In the earliest
manuscripts for the geological parts of the „Ideen", he reinstates the one
near-universal deluge, but also invokes vulcanistic agencies in explaining
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it, as we shall see. ' And he next decides, in the slightly later manu¬
script on the earth's axis, that a great deluge was produced when the
planet's axis became unbalanced. In evidence for this he mentions the
irregularity of the southern coastlines of the great land massesj this
physical feature, as well as the observation that southern capes and inlets
often run parallel, had already puzzled such travellers as Reinhold Forster,
533)
as Herder points out. ' He still regards the Noah story as a „National=
53h)
sage", however.
Thus, we see that Herder never accepted the Biblical narrative on the
Deluge literally, but, after first saying that the inundations indicated by
marine fossils were protracted events in the earth's development (the uni-
formitarian view), he later proceeded to integrate the diluvial hypothesis
into a composite, thoroughly catastrophist theory of geological development
in the earlier manuscripts for the „Ideen". On this evidence alone, we
must greatly qualify the critic Wells' comparison between Herder's and
534a)Button's views on geology. Wells writes as follows:
— Herder's views seem more akin to the Scottish writer's
uniformitarian hypothesis — than to the hypothesis which
attributed all past change to sudden and violent convulsions
such as the Mosaic flood.
On the contrary, Herder did invoke just such convulsions, as well as others
such as the supposed change in the earth's axis, although he also believed
that more gradual and familiar forms of change have contributed to the
earth's formation.
Zockler, in his history of theology and science, remarks of the period
1650-1780
Diluvialismus ist der Grundcharakter der schopfungsgeschicht-
lichen Theorien unsres Zeitraums.
No thinkers seriously doubted that one or more widespread floods had occurred
at some time or another, as fossil beds suggested.They differed only
in the degrees to which they accredited the Scriptural narrative. Already
in the seventeenth century, a few bolder thinkers said that Noah's Flood may
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have been local or national, ' just as Herder and others later did.
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Leonardo, earlier still, was perhaps the first to put forward this idea.
Unlike those, such as Reyher in 1679"^^ and Scheuchzer in 1731,who
invoked a direct miracle as the cause of the Deluge, Herder relied upon
natural causes. These, however, were also part of a higher, teleological
system, and Herder regards the Mosaic account as valid evidence that the
5^1)
Flood took place ; on the other hand, he regards the myths of other
ancient peoples as evidence of equal value.
Once again, we may recall that Kant had entertained a very similar
opinion to Herder's; both at some time employed the idea that the earth's
cru3t, undermined by vast caverns, had subsided, thereby causing the planet's
axis to alter, and thus in turn causing a great inundation.The
eclectic geologist Pallas, like Herder, incorporated one or more near-
universal floods into his theory;but Pallas postulated volcanic
outbreaks as the cause, just as Herder had done in his earliest manuscript
for the „Ideen", before he gave preference to Kant's subsidence theory.
We conclude that, in amalgamating the diluvial hypothesis with his
piecemeal theory of geological catastrophe, Herder was not subordinating
science to theology, but was bending both kinds of argument in order to
reconcile them. Diluvial theories, furthermore, had been typical of
geological thought throughout the century, and were only beginning to pass
out of currency when Herder wrote his „Ideen".
(iii) Vuloanism.
Herder believed that the "elemental fire" which helped to form the earth
in its earliest stages still lay dormant, in fairly large quantities, in the
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interior of the earth:
Welche unendliche Menge groben Feuers a.B. riB die Steinmasse
unsrer Erde an sich, die nooh in ihr schlaft.
He sometimes equated this archaic "fire" to electricity, as we have seen.
It is therefore not surprising that, since volcanic activity is likewise
caused by "elemental fire", Herder says that it too is of an electrical
nature.But this view was fairly current at the time. Karl August
enquires in a letter to Merck in 1780 what effects electricity has upon men
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during volcanic eruptions. ' Similarly Du Bos believed that thunder and
lightning are ultimately produced by the earth"^^ (no doubt by exhalations),
and W. Stukeley, whose works Herder does not seem to have known, claimed
549)
that earthquakes are caused by electricity. ' Probably volcanic
lightning, which is often produced by the friction of erupted particles in
the atmosphere above volcanoes, gave rise to such beliefs.
As we remarked in our previous section, Herder's earliest manuscript
for the geological portion of the HIdeen", written before 1784, explains the
Deluge by vulcanistic agencies. It is interesting to compare this with one
of Kant's ideas, advanced in his „Kritik der Urteilskraft" in 1790; Kant
here considers that the world's irregular coastlines are the product of
„ 550)
(,wilder, allgewaltiger Krafte". 1 Herder had said of the great inundation
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which helped to carve out the great inlets:
die nahere Ursache, die sie vollstandig erklart, liegt uns vor
Augen wo tiefe Meerbusen sind, finden sich jedesmal ausge=
brannte oder feuerspeiende Berge in der Nahe.
Similarly, Pallas thought that convulsions around the Indian Ocean had been
caused by earthquakes and volcanoes,but his pseudo-vulcanistic idea
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that volcanic eruptions result from the combustion of subterranean organic
deposits finds no echo in Herder's belief that "elemental fire" is the
source of volcanic activity.
In his later manuscript on the earth's axis, Herder uses Kant's subsi¬
dence theory to explain the initial change of the earth's axis and the
resultant inundation. Nonetheless, even in this later version, he still
invokes volcanic activity, for good measure, saying that it assisted the work
of the flood by fortifying certain coastlines with lava, and weakening
others by explosive eruptions. 553)
Herder was too fascinated by volcanoes to omit them from his dramatic
theory of earth-history. He had read the Furstin Esterhazy's descriptions
of Vesuvius, and made copious excerpts from the notable accounts of volcanoes
in general by Hamilton and Soulavie, published in German in 1784- At
least three other works of this kind, on Etna, Vesuvius, and the earth's
interior respectively, found a place in his library.
Thus, to his general catastrophist theories, Herder added diluvial and
vulcanistic ones; we shall next see that neptunian theories also play a
part in his complicated conception of earth-history.
(iv) Neptunlsm.
Herder's interest in the sea is especially conspicuous in his „Journal"
of 1769, but it lasted on throughout his life. Not surprisingly, therefore,
he thought that the sea had fulfilled an important task in the shaping of the
earth. We shall now ignore his diluvial theories, which have already been
discussed, and pass on to examine the less spectacular and more constructive
functions of the sea in the earth's history as he envisaged it.
Already in 1782, in his „Vom Geist der ebraischen Poesie", Herder says
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of the earth:
Aus Wafiern hat sioh diese langsam gebildet: WaBer haben lange
und in verschiedenen Perioden uber ihr gestanden.
Even in 1780, he had considered writing a prize essay for the Academie des
Inscriptions on the topic: "Rechercher ce que las monuments historiques
nous apprenent des changemens arrives sur la surface du globe par le
deplacement des eaux de la mer."^"^/ In his classified notes for the
„Ideen", there appears the reference ttBildung der Erde aus Wasser", as Suphan
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notices. ' The first „Ideen" manuscript on geology, with Goethe's red
lines against the more catastrophist passages, contains the phrase „der
Aufbau der Erde aus dem Wasser",and in the „Ideen", Part II, Herder
says that America „einem groBen Theil nach wahrscheinlich spater aus dem
Schoos des Meers gestiegen war, als die andem Welttheile Earlier in
the same work he says that lands near the sea are always of later origin
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than are central highlands. And finally, we should remember Goethe's
remark, quoted by Suphan, concerning discussions with Herder while he was
writing Part I of the „Ideen":
Unser tagliohes Gesprach beschaftigte sich mit den Uranfangen
der Wasser=Erde und der darauf von altersher sich entwickelnden
organischen Geschopfe,
Thus, by 1782, Herder had come to the conclusion that the continents
(apart perhaps from their granite peaks) originally emerged from the sea.
This was before his old friendship with Goethe was renewed in the following
year. And the reference „Bildung der Erde aus Wasser" in his classified
notes, giving a volume and page number in the „Abhandlungen der koniglichen
schwedischen Akademie der Wissenschaften", shows that he had independent
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sources for his belief. The article in question, written in 1743 by
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A. Celsius, begins as follows: '
Man hat schon viele Beweise, welche einhellig darthun, dafl
Schweden sowol [sic] als andere Lander aaf deia Erdbodsn,
vorzeiten Boden der See gewesen ist.
Curiously enough, the writer goes on to suggest that Northern Europe was
suddenly inundated from East to West, just as Herder does in his manuscript
on the earth's axis, and later adds that the flood waters may have drained
away into cavities within the earth. This article exhibits the same
blend of neptunian (and uniformitarian) ideas of continental growth and the
more archaic diluvial (and catastrophist) hypothesis as we find in Herder's
nIdeen". It is therefore almost certain that this article of Celsius* had
a greater influence upon Herder than had doe the's more exclusively
neptunian ideas.
We have already seen that Herder, like Pallas, believed that the
continents arose from the seas through the gradual accumulation of detritus
eroded from oentral granite massifs. Thus it was inevitable that he should
believe that the earth had undergone a neptunian phase, as many writers, such
as Buffon, Linneus^^^ and de Maillet,^^ all of whom Herder mentions
at various times, had previously maintained. Such neptunian theories, often
combined with diluvial, or even vulcanistic ideas, mark the transition, which
took place around the time of Herder, from the earlier, purely diluvial phase
of geological thought to the ideas of Werner and the resultant controversies
which were the birth-pangs of modern scientific geology.
One further remark on early neptunian theories seems necessary. The
a
Swedes, for example Celsius and Linneus, were particularly convinced that the
continents had risen from the waters, since Sweden, then as now, was seen to
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be rising quite perceptibly. It is now known, however, that this country
has been rising only since it was released from the weight of the last
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quaternary ice-sheet, which began to melt some 20,000 years ago. '
We have seen that Goethe encouraged Herder's more neptunian theories,
and censured his catastrophist and vulcanistic ones; this was, as he wrote
to Zelter, because he believed that nature employed „e.infachere und
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grandiosere Mittel" than Herder thought, as Suphan appropriately observes. '
But Herder was later to hear the Neptunian doctrine from the mouth of its
ablest exponent - Werner of Freiberg. Caroline writes in her memoirs:
In Aachen, 1802, wo auch Werner au gleicher Zeit ait uns da war,
hatte derselbe die Gilts, Herders Wiflbegierde au befriedigen, und
ihm mundlich in mehrern Stunden einen AbriB seines Systems
mitautheilen. Herder hatte eine ausnehmende Freude dariiber.
It would thus seem probable that Herder was finally converted to the
Neptunist school of geological thought. We shall return to this question
in our conclusion.
(v) Conclusion.
R. Noll writes: „die Katastrophentheorie [of Cuvier] findet in Herder
einen wankellosen Vorkaapfer."* This statement, like all one-sided
interpretations of Herder's works, cannot be accepted without great qualifi¬
cation. We have seen that Herder supported all the important geological
hypotheses elaborated or inherited by his age, combining them all together
in his early manuscripts for the „Idaen", and placing varying emphasis upon
the separate ingredients of his composite theory at different times; later
he apparently became more or less converted to Werner's views, under the
personal influence of that gifted lecturer. But at that transitional period
in geology during which he wrote his „Idean", diluvial theories were still in
use, and vulcanism and neptunism, catastrophism and uniform!tarianism had
not yet crystallised into the mutually exclusive, self-sufficient systems
they later became; it was still possible for Herder to believe to some
extent in each way of thinking, just as every geologist of today is prepared
to use any of the four last-named theories as the evidence before him demands.
Herder once said that the study of earth-history should prepare us for
„die Hinfalligkeit mid Abwechslung aller Menschengeschicht9."^2/ But this
does not explain why his theories, which can all be traced separately to the
works of various scientific thinkers, are so complex in their composite form.
We have already seen too often how Herder would find where the opposite
extremes of a subject lay, then try to reconcile its disparate implications,
rarely adopting a one-sided view, especially in his mature period. This
tendency, inherent in his nature, in conjunction with his reading, determined
the character of his purely speculative geological theories.
Herder's reading on geology, as should now be obvious, was very
extensive. Besides the very numerous works of the writers we have here
mentioned, his library contained at least ten more volumes dealing exclusively
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with earth-history. ' As so often, we have again seen that his greatest
debt was to his old teacher, Kant. It is no wonder that, so soon after he
had written these passages on geology, often under Kant's influence, he felt
deeply wounded when Kant's scathing review of the „Ideen" Part I appeared.
Probably Kant felt particularly impatient with Herder's ideas, as we have
said before, because they embodied so much of his own precritical thought,
from which he had now resolved to dissociate himself. Individually, Herder's
theories can all be traced to various earlier authors. What originality
they possess, they have by virtue only of their unusually complex combination.
The most interesting and characteristic of Herder's geological writings
remained unpublished during his own lifetime. We know that Goethe's influ¬
ence , perhaps seconded by that of Einsiedel, a pupil of Werner's, was
responsible for their suppression. It is noteworthy that Caroline mentions
an essay „Revolutionen der Erde" in a letter of 1807 to Johannes von Muller,
who was helping to edit Herder's complete works.K. Hoffmann, the
editor of the recent volume in which Caroline's letter is published, says
that this reference is to „ein verlorener Aufsatz Herders, der von Alexander
von Humboldt gelesen und beachtet wurde, von August Herder aber fur die
Aufnahme in die Samtlichen Werke abgelehnt wurde." -^5) This information
seems to be based upon unpublished letters in the Schaffhausen Ministerial^
bibliothek. If we did not know that Herder's manuscript on the earth's
axis was published in the edition of his works supervised by Caroline and
Georg Muller, -*7^) wa should be tempted to suppose that this was the "lost"
essay. However, the lost work was almost certainly yet another version of
the geological parts of the „Ideen", and probably advanced some other
drastic theory of earth-history. For August Herder, himself a pupil and
protegd of Werner, probably felt that his father's earlier catastrophist and
vulcanistio ideas deserved to pass into oblivion, particularly since Herder
himself had eventually come to admire Werner, and, already in 1792, had
written in his „Tithon und Aurora": ^7)
Nicht Revolutionen, sondern Evolutionen sind der stille Gang
dieser grossen Mutter [i.e. nature], dadurch sie schlummernde
Krafte erweckt, Keime entwickelt, das zu fruhe Alter verjunget,
und oft den scheinbaren Tod in neues Leben verwandelt.
Though not referring to geology, Herder here expresses the more classicistic
views of his post-Italian years. This, no doubt, made it easier for him to
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agree with Werner; but, unfortunately, he left no statement of his final
opinions on the history of the earth.
Herder lived at a time when geology was entering its most crucial phase.
Already in the „Ideen", he had said that a unified theory of cosmogony, with
comprehensive laws, could soon be expected to follow after the beginnings
had been made by such men as Buffon. (Such a theory did appear with
the work of Laplace in 1796.) With the extensive field studies of strati¬
fication pioneered by Werner and others, and the great work of William Smith,
who determined the sequence of the rocks with unprecedented thoroughness,
geology became a truly empirical science; the new understanding of the
enormous time-scale, of the gradual changes and astonishingly varied
developments in the earth's past, raised the geology of the middle and late
nineteenth century far above the circumscribed speculative doctrines of the
previous age.
Perhaps Herder realised that his own theories belonged to a more archaic
phase, in which discovery had not kept pace with imagination. Caroline
say,=579)
In den letzten Jahren so mannichfaltiger Entdeckungen, unter
welchen er Werners geognostisches System vorzuglich schatzte,
wunschte er manchmal, erst jetzt geboren zu seyn, um die
Resultate, die sie herbeifuhren, zu erleben.
g) ?^®_£!iiuEe_o£_£j}e_earth_and_the_solar_system.
We now come to the chronological antithesis of the problems of origins
and cosmogony; it is the problem of how our part of the universe, and the
earth in particular, will eventually end. For Herder, unlike Goethe, was
equally ready to contemplate first and last things.
Grundmann says of Herder's theory that the earth may one day fall into
the sun:580^
Diese Ausfuhrungen erinnern an Kants und Eulers MutmaBungen
uber das Altwerden unseres Planeten.
A passage in Herder's unpublished nAnfangsgrunde der Sternkunde" of 1765
strikingly confirms the ftest half of Grundraann1 s conjecture:
Da die Erde in dem feinen Aether worin sie sich fortstost [sic]
immer eine kleine Hinderung hat: die Laufbahn der Erde muft
sich also immer etwas mehr der Sonne nahern und eine feine
Spirallinie machen. Euler ist der [sic] diese Annaherung zur
Sonne durch Beobachtungen zu bemerken gesucht hat.
582]
On the other hand, Herder says in the „Ideen": '
Die sehone Schopfung arbeitet sich zum Chaos, wie sie aus einem
Chaos sich herausarbeitete.
Similarly, Kant declared in his f,Allgemeine Naturgesehichte" that the chaos
out of which the universe progressively emerged will once again engulf it
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„durch einen allmahlichen Verfall der Bewegungen", ' and then spoke of the
increasing „Mattigkeit" of the planets,just as Herder speaks of „die
alternde Kraft der Erde, die sich nicht mehr zu halten und fortzutreiben
veraag."^8^'' (This recalls the animistic theory of gravity.) The other
half of Grundmann's statement is thus also corroborated.
Herder seems to have believed all his life that the earth will eventually
be destroyed by approaching the sun too closely. This idea appears again
in the 1769 manuscript recently published by Irmscher,";88; and also in a
sermon on the afterlife, probably delivered late in the previous year,'*8'^
As we have seen, it recurs in the „Ideen*.
This doctrine has a long history. The Stoics declared: "All things
588)
began with fire and will end in it.""^ ' Burnet, whom Herder mentions at
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various times, believed that the earth will eventually be destroyed by
fire,"*^ and the idea received some support from Christian eschatology.
Euler (and to a lesser extent Kant) tried to base his theory of the future
of the solar system upon more scientific premises, but it was not until
1824, when Carnot formulated the second law of thermodynamics, that the
notion of a gradual "running down" of the universe became a physical law.
When Michelson and Morley, in the late nineteenth century, found that "ether
resistance" to the earth's movement is impossible to detect, the older
theories of a gradual approach to the sun became obsolete. But the "heat-
death" theory survives in the less spectacular conception of entropy, and
some astronomers believe that the sun may eventually expand so as to engulf
the earth.
Herder realised that scientific theories of doom conflicted with that
belief in progress which he came to support increasingly in his mature and
later years. In the „Ideen", he apologises rather lamely for the earth's
descent into the sun:"'*^''
was geschahe anders, als was nach ewigen Gesetzen der
Weisheit und Ordnung geschehen muBte?
Some years later, he adds the observation that the earth will end only after
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man's r5le is fulfilled, ' thus returning to the teleology he had meanwhile
repudiated.
Unlike Pallas, Bonnet and others, Herder does not suggest that great
geological cataclysms may again overwhelm the earth. No doubt he felt that
the earth, now lacking its pristine vigour, has become incapable of producing
further convulsions on a large scale.
6. Meteorology.
As we shall see when we come to examine Herder's conception of environ¬
mental determinism, his definitions of climate correspond approximately to
modern definitions of the whole natural environment in relation to man.
Thus, we look in vain in his works for any theory of climatology in the
narrower sense.
Herder's thoughts on meteorology in particular are equally imprecise.
Instead of attempting to describe and classify the known phenomena governing
atmospheric changes, he prefers to speculate upon unknown „Krafte" which may
be at work in the air. In the „Ideen", for example, as we have already
noticed, he suggests that magnetism, as well as the other "elements" which
act in the atmosphere, may influence climate."'^2' Unseen „Himmelskrafte"
operating in the aerial „Medium" may, when discovered, provide material for
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„eine geographische Aerologie". Herder even adds: '
Die Bildung der Menschen an Korper und Geist wird sich mit
daraus erklaren.
Close upon this audacious claim, there follows the remarkable passage on
astrology which we mentioned in a previous section:
Das ganze Himmelssystem ist ein Streben gleich= oder ungleich=
artiger aber mit groBer Starke getriebner Kugeln gegen einander
Werden einst alle diese Bemerkungen und ihre Resultate auf
die Veranderungen unsrer Luftkugel angewandt werden, wie sie bei
der Sbbe und Fluth schon angewandt sind: so wird, dunkt mich,
die Astrologie aufs neue in der ruhmwurdigsten Gestalt unter
unsern Wissenschaften erscheinen.
Thus, unlike Goethe, who insisted upon a purely "tellurial" theory of
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meteorology. Herder believes that unseen virtues inherent in other cosmic
bodies may influence the earth's weather. Kepler had likewise thought that
astrological "aspects" can influence the earth's "intelligent soul", so that
"strong aspects" cause thunderstorms, and so on.596J
It is curious that Herder should mention the tides in this connection.
In the „Journal" he writesj-^7)
Wie sich Welle in Welle bricht: so flieBen die Luftundulationen
und Schalle in einander.
In fact, he frequently compares water and air, water-waves and atmospheric
waves (and, as we have seen, fishes and birds). Similarly, Goethe believed
that effects analogous to tides are manifest in the atmosphere, but are
caused by the "breathing of the earth".(Leonardo had said that the
oceanic tides follow the "breathing of the world",and Kepler too saw
them as a symptom of the "breathing of the earth body" } jt would surely
have interested both Goethe and Herder to learn that, for the past 40 years,
actual tides have been observed by scientists in the earth's atmosphere.
These are caused by the moon's attraction, and have recently been found to
influence rainfall on the earth.
Herder had read works by several writers who discussed meteorological
phenomena. But nearly all of these treated climate only as an environmental
determinant acting upon man, not as an object of scientific study in itself.
For example, in a review dating from 1765, Herder draws attention to Du Bos'
theory that „Ausdunstungen der Erde" can influence man. We shall return
to such ideas in our section on environmental determinism.
However, it is typical of Herder that he is more interested in the
„Krafte" which work in the atmosphere than in quantitative criteria such as
temperature, air-pressure, rainfall, etc. Meteorology is one of the
sciences about which he has least to say. Admittedly, it had scarcely
emerged as an autonomous discipline in his day. However, what he did say
was already archaic, and simply confirms our contention that only ill
consequences could result for his scientific ideas when he failed to realise
the importance of quantitative methods and the worthlessness of his unseen
„Krafte".
7. Geography.
It has not seemed advisable to devote a detailed chapter to geography
as a whole, for Herder did not treat the subject systematically and in
isolation, and since, by its very nature, it encompasses so many diverse
branches of science. We may note, however, that Herder was keenly interested
in it from the time when he attended Kant's lectures on physical geography in
Konigsberg onwards. He also appears to have taught it, in schools at
Konigsberg or Riga, or as a private tutor, since he later declares „[da£]
ich sie [i.e. die GeographieJ selbst in den besten Jahren meines Lebens mit
dem auBersten Vergnugen gelernt und mit eben so viel Vergnugen andre gelehrt
habe."^^ His library contained at least 1+3 volumes on geography, and 1+6
atlases and maps,^"^ as well as numerous travelogues. Furthermore, he
delivered an excellent „Schulrede" on geography in Weimar, probably in 1784;
it was entitled „Von der Annehmlichkeit, Hutzlichkeit und Nothwendigkait der
Geographie" Although the main purpose of this address was to demon¬
strate the educational value of the subject, it also reveals several charac¬
teristic features of Herder's attitude to it. For example, it is clear that
he believes it to be fundamentally a scientific subject, since he names
physical geography as the necessary foundation upon which all else must
rsst.^0^'' Geography teaches us that the earth is governed by natural laws,
he contends, and he describes the student's delight .^enn er einsehen lernt,
dafi was ihm in aer Gestalt der Erde sonst Chaos war, auoh seine Gesetze und
Ordnung hat."^^0'' He completely rejects the time-honoured fallacy that it
is simply a dry catalogue of countries, rivers, frontiers and towns,and
it is the Herder of the „Ideen" who exclaims that geography is inseparable
from the history of the earth's peoples.^0^) He concludes
—- ich darf sagen, d&6 die Geschichte ohne Geographie so wie
ohne Zeitrechnung grossentheils ein wahres Luftgebaude werde.
— Kurz die Geographie ist die Basis der Geschichte und die
Geschichte ist nichts als eine in Bewegung gesetzte Geographie.
Indeed, we have already seen how large a part the whole subject occupies
in Herder's greatest work. We have dealt with most of his views on physical
geography in our section on the geological or earth sciences, and examined
his attitude to landscape at the beginning of our chapter on scientific
methods. We shall further discuss his theory of climate and environmental
determinism (already briefly mentioned in connection with meteorology) in
the following chapter, which will be devoted to biology, and human geography
will receive our attention in the section on human races. As for Herder's
general knowledge of the countries and peoples of the earth (i.e. of general
descriptive geography), a critical appraisal of most of the travelogues and
general geographical descriptions he read and used will be found in
Grundmann's commendable work on the „Ideen".^"^
We need only add that, apart from a few errors arising out of the
limited knowledge of his age (e.g. he says: „Die Cordilleras sind die
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hochsten Geburge der Welt" '), Herder had an accurate and diversified
knowledge of nearly all aspects of geography, and he used it as an explana¬
tory commentary on universal history to a much greater extant than most





Herder's knowledge of natural history wa3 considerable. le know from
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a memoir submitted by the Oberamtmann Cruger to Caroline, ' and utilised for
her own nErinnerungen", ' that the youthful Herder, about to become a student
of medicine at Konigsberg, embarked upon studies of botany with the help of
his patron, the army surgeon Schwarz=Erla. He came to possess many of
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Linneu3' works, and frequently mentions this authority, along with other
botanists, throughout his works, although, as we know, he disagreed with his
system. In the „Journal", he rightly exclaims that the sea holds a new
world for the botanist,^ and, in the ttIdeen", he expresses the wish that
Heine allgemeine botanische Geographie fur die Menschengeschichte" will be
5)
elaborated. '
In our section on classification, we noticed that Herder was likewise
interested in general zoology. For example, he devoted parts of his
language essay of 1770 to the problems of animal instinct. The „Ideen",
and Herder's preparatory notes for that work, abound in references to the
natural history of animals, and numerous zoologists are mentioned throughout
his writings. The author of the newspaper article „Herder und die Tier=
seele" has collected nearly all the references to animals in Herder's works
this article should be consulted for proof that his factual knowledge of
natural history was indeed extensive.
However, it is not our purpose to discuss natural history, or to
enumerate Herder's citations of purely descriptive facts. These are
mentioned only where they throw light on his knowledge of texts of scientific
interest, or on his use of some scientific method or principle. We shall
thus pass on to study his thoughts on scientific or functional biology,
bearing in mind that, in Herder's day, botany and zoology were still largely
occupied with taxonomy and natural history. Nonetheless, although the
word "biology" was not coined until after 1800, the all-embracing study of
life and its functions had already begun, and we shall now examine some of
these more comprehensive theories of life as they appear in Herder's works.
1. The nature of the biological world: definitions of life.
a) Specific_definitions of life.
In our sections on a universal "medium" or ether, on electricity, light,
heat and on the chemical "elements", we found that Herder uses every one of
these supposed ,,Krafte" to describe the elusive "life-force" itself. It
was never completely clear whether these „Krafte" (which he often reduces to
subtle material substances) are the "life-force" or whether we should consider
them only as imperfect and approximate analogies, which is what he himself
sometimes calls them. We shall now examine some of his further attempts to
reduce the "life-force" to some specific agency.
Firstly, he often says that our breath, the air, or 3ome vital ingredi¬
ent of the air, is essential to lifa:^
die innere Oekonomie des aniraalisohen Lebens aber hangt (sic]
von dem verborgnen Reiz oder Balsam im Element der Luft ab
und so wird wirklich der Mensch durch den lebendigen Othern zur
regsamen Seele. Durch ihn erhalt und auBert er die Kraft,
Lebenswarme zu verarbeiten.
On the one hand, this notion, as Herder uses it, looks back to such ancient
ideas as the "pneuma" of the Stoics, the divine afflatus, and, as Rouche
points out,^ to the divine logos of St. John; we discussed such ideas in
our introductory chapter as religious applications of the „Kraft" principle.
On the other hand, the same notion received a new scientific stimulus from
the experiments which Priestley and others, in Herder's lifetime, carried
out upon oxygen, a recently discovered gas already known to be essential to
most living organisms. Similarly, Boyle had earlier entertained "a great
suspicion of some vital substance, if I may so call it, diffused thro' the
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air." ' It would accordingly be wrong to emphasise only the religious or
mystical affinities of Herder'3 ideas on breathing.
Secondly, his mention of „Lebenswarme" reminds us of those theories of
"animal heat", so often used in that age to explain the nature of animal
vitality. "Animal heat" first became interpreted in a genuinely scientific
way when Joseph Black put forward the theory that body-heat is produced by
combustion which takes place during respiration; this theory was improved
upon by Crawford's experiments, published in the Transactions of the Royal
Society in 1781."^ Herder cites this (then recent) article, along with a
similar work by the chemist Crsll;"^ this shows once more how up to date
his scientific knowledge often was, and that his notion of ,,Lebenswarme" had
some scientific support. But along with the cautious experimental conclu¬
sions of Crawford upon the maintenance of body-heat in animals, there appear,
in the „Ideen", those more archaic theories of animal heat, "elemental fire",
light and "inner ether", already examined in the appropriate sections.
Such attempts to describe life in terms of heat or "fire" go back to
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Aristotle, Democritus, 1 and even Heraclitus. ' Linneus, like Herder,
preferred to use several of these ancient pseudo-chemical theories of life in
an eclectic combination, saying that the living body is a machine kept going
by an "ethereal electric fire maintained by breathing"."'"^
But apart from these vacillating attempts, still common in the late
eighteenth century, to compare or even to identify life with imperfectly
understood chemical processes or physical "forces", there existed other
theories which defined life in purely biological terras. Popular tradition,
probably inspired by the words "the blood is the life" as set forth in
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Deuteronomy 12, 23, held that the vital principle resides within the
blood. Thus the young Georg Muller, staying with Herder in 1780, writes in
16)his diary, probably after a conversation with Herder: 1
Im Blut steckt ein besonderes thierisches Leben.
A more modern, bio-chemical conception of the vital composition of living
forms is that of "protoplasm". It has been much valued by materialistic
thinkers, and is widely used, even today, in elementary biology. Now in the
„Ideen", Herder once calls his general animal "type" a „Prototyp"; on the
following page, in Suphan's edition, he calls it a „Hauptplasma der 0rganisa=
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tion". " Barenbach, the first of that line of one-sided critics who hailed
Herder as a precursor of Darwin, seized upon the word „Hauptplasma", ' and
identified it not only with Haeckel's evolutionary „Urzelle", but also, as
SchiuidtaCurtow'^ and Rouch^^tjyl point out, with the modern "protoplasm", but
he forgot that Herder's ,,Hauptplasma" is a form or pattern of organisation,
not a fundamental organic substance like the modern protoplasm. Barenbach's
absurd and hasty inference merits no further attention in itself, but it does
raise an interesting question in the history of scientific terminology. For
no critic has yet noticed that Herder, in his „Zerstreute Blatter" of 1785,
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uses the actual word „Protoplasms" to describe his universal "type". '
Although his term and the modern equivalent, on this occasion again, have quite
different meanings, there is no denying that he uses this significant word
long before the conception with which later biologists associated it had
been even tentatively formulated.
The process by which Herder arrived at this striking word is simple.
He combined the words „Prototyp" and „Hauptplasma", which he had used in
juxtaposition in the „Ideen", perhaps following the model of the old term
"protoplast", often used by theologians to describe Adam, the first-made
man. Elsewhere, he uses similar words himself, such as „Protevangelium"
[sie]22^ and „Protoapostel"2^ in theological contexts in 1797; on one
occasion, in 1799, he actually describes the first men as „Protoplasten".2^
The „Deutsches Fremdworterbuch" of Schulz and Basler states that the
word „Protoplasma" (as distinct from „Protoplast") was first used in I846 by
25)
the botanist Hugo von Mohl, ' and a similar reference work by Darmstaedter,
referred to in Schulz and Basler, claims that Purkinje first coined the word
in 1840.2^ The Oxford Dictionary first records the word in English in
I848. But while it is true that nineteenth century scientists first gave
the word its modern meaning, Herder had used it, in a biological context,
over half a century before them, probably for the first time. It is quite
possible that von Mohl or Purkinje originally encountered it in Herder's
works.
The last of Herder's many attempts to describe life in terms of some
specific agency is his neurological theory, borrowed chiefly from Haller.
Since it is of great importance for his psychological ideas, we shall
discuss it in our chapter on psychology and human physiology, ignoring it
for the present.
b) Vibalxs b±c_ bljeori.© e.
As we have often observed, Herder usually classes his ethereal "medium",
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electricity, light, heat (or "elemental fire"), and all the other nebulous
terms he uses in describing life, as „Krafte" (although he reduces them at
times to material substances). He likewise assimilated Haller's three
physiological reaction-processes - „Elasticitat", „Reizbarkeit" and „Emp=
findung", as Herder calls them - into his own philosophy of „organische
Krafte", and even suggested that they were basically manifestations of one
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and the same ,.Kraft". ' Thus, the one common factor behind all his many
conceptions of life is „Kraft", that same unknown "force" which is encoun¬
tered in all vitalistic theories of biology, even in the present century.
His pseudo-chemical definitions of life are simply variants upon, or more
materialistic deviations from the fundamental vitalism in his entire
biological thought.
Sources for his vitalistic ideas are not far to seek. In the „Ideen",
he himself lists Hippocrates, Aristotle, Galen, Harvey, Boyle, Stahl, Glisson,
Gaubius and Albin as earlier exponents of an unknown vital principle.2^
Clark names Aristotle, Boerhaave, Haller and Leibniz as men who held vitalis¬
tic ideas similar to Herder's.2"^ Galen had actually named over 60 kinds of
30)vital force or "dynamis" residing in the human body; ' other like theories
suggested by thinkers known to Herder were Hoffmann's "vis vitalis solidi",
Huarte's "vitall spirits",Hufeland's „Lebenskraft"Kielmeyer's
„organische Krafte",Needham's "force vegetative",Blumenbach's "nisus
formativus"^^'' and C.F. Wolff's "vis essentialis";^ however, he did not
encounter the ideas of a few of these writers until after he had written the
biological chapters of the „Ideen", as the notes to this section will show.
We may add that his vitalistic „Krafte" are not always clearly separated
from the „Kraft" of the soul itself: both share the name „Kraft", and both
are imperishable, as we noticed apropos of early conservation theories.
This confusion recalls that which is likewise inherent in the animistic
doctrines of Stahl, that pioneer of modern vitalism, who expounded his
theories in 1737
Thus, a vigorous tradition of vitalism had existed in biology since
antiquity; it attained new vigour in Herder's century, and culminated in
the biological „Katurphilosophie" of the Romantics. Kven Goethe speaks of
„geistige Anastomose" and „geistige Krafte" in his „Metamorphose der
M 39)
Pflanzen", as Nordenskiold observes. '
Having now examined nearly all of Herder's vitalistic theories, we are
in a position to evaluate the words of other critics. Hansen declares
Wie viel scharfer sind die Vorstellungen Herders von Krafte=
wirkungen, wie der damals verbreitete dumpfe Glaube an eine
Lebenskraft, wie fain seine Kritik der BegriffeS
Another critic, Rudiger, even claims, in 1948, that Herder's vitalism is in
keeping with modern sciences'^
Die moderne Biologie, insbesondere der Vitalismus, hat sich nach
dem Scheitern der materialistischen Naturbetraehtung - man
raochte meinen: wohl oder ubel zu der bei Herder vorgebildeten
Anschauung bekehren mussen Die Annahme von wirksnden
Naturkraften ist unumganglich, auch wenn wir sie nicht sehen.
Let us first ask whether Herder's vitalism was in advance of the biology
of his own age, as Hansen claims, and then proceed to compare it with modern
vitalism, as Rudiger does. It will be of help if we bear in mind the
distinction which a modern historian of physiology draws between two types
of vitalism - descriptive and explanatory.^' The latter sort introduces
unknown vital agencies of a non-physico-chemical kind, whereas the former,
more modern vitalism maintains that "the doctrine of the vital principle
should be recognised as simply descriptive" (i.e. of observed events), and
that "the question of whether the mechanisms behind these activities involve
43)
unique substances, or forces, or agencies is quite a different one."
This problem, we may recall, is exactly parallel to that of "relational" and
"explanatory" uses of "force" in physics.
Herder, as we have seen, had multiplied his vitalistic unknowns, and
attempted, on various occasions, to reduce them to specific agencies, whose
properties (for example his "ether" and "elemental fire") were more than
simply physico-chemical. But earlier thinkers, such as C.F. Wolff, had been
content with only one such unknown (the "vis essentialis", in this case).
The vitalistic theory of Blumenbach appeared in his „{fber den Bildungstrieb"
as early a3 1781.^^ Herder wrote to Knebel in 1784, requesting a copy of
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this work, and received it two days later. ' This was before he wrote his
chapter on embryology and growth for the Jdeen", Part II, in which he shows
signs of favouring only one vitalistic unknown, as in Blumenbach's and Wolff's
theories, but it was too late to remedy that proliferation of unknowns we
meet in the „Ideen", Part I. However, Blumenbach's "nisus formativus" or
„Bildungstrieb" is recognisable only by its effects.Its cause and
nature are unknown, and Blumenbaoh compares it with gravitational force.
He thus uses it only descriptively or relationally, and makes no attempt to
define its inner nature, as Herder had repeatedly done with his „Krafte" in
Part I of the „Ideen". (At other times, as we know, he says that the
nature of „Kraft" is unknowable} but this should not be taken too seriously,
since it was a commonplace of the age, and conflicts with his own practice.)
But even before he wrote Part I of the „Ideen", Herder had met and used
Holler's three physiological „Krafte", which Haller, like Blumenbach, had
used only to describe observed natural functions.
Thus, Herder's confused vitalism was not scientifically modern even by
the standards of his own age. It is more often explanatory than descrip¬
tive, and the equivalent theories of Haller and Blumenbach have far more
relation to empirical observation than his does. Similarly, we noticed
that Boscovich's "relational" conception of physical force was scientifically
superior to Herder's qualitative physical „Kraft".
The last great exponent of vitalism in modem times was Hans Driesch,
whose "History and Theory of Vitalism" first appeared in English in 1914-
I Q\
He was an opponent of Darwinism, ' we may observe, and had no misgivings
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about citing Plotinus and Leibniz in support of his views on modem biology; '
he wrote works on telepathy in his later years. Such a thinker was scarcely
typical of scientists even in his own age. However, even Driesch's ideas
are free from most of the confusion we find in Herder's, for he does not
multiply unknowns, or attempt to reduce them in turn to imperfectly known
physical or chemical forces or subtle and elusive substances, or personify
them, as Herder does. His vitalism is descriptive compared with Herder's
explanatory system.
We therefore conclude that the claims of Hansen and Rudiger concerning
Herder's vitalism are without foundation, and now proceed to ask what the
philosophical implications of vitalism are in relation to present-day theories
of science.
As Dessoir observes in his history of psychology, the conception of
"life" is merely an abstraction from actual, observed processes, such as
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nutrition, growth, reproduction, etc. ' But used in an explanatory sense,
as in Herder's personifications of natural (including biological) agencies
which we noticed in our introductory chapter, and in his attempts to reduce
vital ttKrafte'' (at other times said to he irreducible) to physical and
pseudo-chemical "forces" and substances, "life" takes on a reality of its
own, quite apart from actual observed phenomena. Such vitalism simply
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explains ignotum per ignotius, as Sertalanffy remarks. ' They cannot be
compared with modern biochemical reductions, since the "chemical" agents
Herder names are more often qualitative than quantitative, and the science
of biochemistry was virtually non-existent in his day. Bertalanffy points
out that this kind of vitalism is emotional rather than intellectual in
origin, that it bars the way to scientific progress, and that it "means
nothing less than a renunciation of a scientific explanation of biological
data."52^
However, we must not confuse vitalism, which declares that an unknown
agency is really and objectively at work within organisms, with the Kantian
doctrine, based on Kant's analysis of the subjective limitations of the
humai reason, that we can never know the „Ding an sich". In fact, this
Kantian thesis is comparable only with descriptive vitalism, whereas fully
fledged vitalism always falls back ultimately upon explanation in terms of
various mysterious agencies, usually of a semi-spiritual kind. As
Bertalanffy says in another of his works:
The history of biology is the refutation of vitalism, for it
shows that always it was just those phenomena vrtiich appeared
inexplicable at the time that seemed the domain of vitalistic
factors.
c ) Mech^ismi_vitalism_and_origani£i52 •
In our ohapter on physical science, we discovered that Herder sets up a
"dynamistic" picture of the physical world in opposition to the "mechanistic"
one. We now encounter the parallel antithesis between "vitalistic" and
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"mechanistic" theories of life; Herder., of course, supports the former.
In biological contexts, the word "mechanism" has two principal
meanings. Firstly, it can mean that the phenomena of life can be explained,
at least in principle, by the universal causal laws of physical science
alone, without any special factors such as hyper-physical "forces" or
(anthropocentric) teleology. Secondly, it can involve the more specific
theory that the living organism should bo treated as closely analogous to
the machine.^'' Let us discuss the first of these connotations now, before
dealing with the machine analogy.
We have already examined the problem of teleology in relation to bio¬
logical theory. Therefore it only remains for us to consider Herder's
opinion of mechanistic theories in contrast to his belief in vitalism.
Driesch, the greatest modern exponent of vitalism, uses vitalism in
conjunction with mechanism, as Bertalanffy points out. Bertalanffy even
55)
says: '
The defect of mechanism is that it cannot do without elements
of vitalism, and vice verse.
This applies to Herder too. Schutze says that Herder advocates "the organic
56)
unity of soul and machine". ' If we do not interpret this loose use of
the word "machine" (which we shall examine later) too narrowly, we can agree
with Schutze's proposition. For Herder introduces his vitalistic "forces"
by which the soul manifests itself (and, for that matter, his teleological
arguments) alongside causal explanations of life. In fact, it is
exceedingly difficult to say where the one begins and the other ends, for
his theories of animal heat, electricity, etc. can usually be construed
either as groping attempts to define life, in principle, by physical or
naturalistic criteria, or as a means of introducing traditional vitalism
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under more novel guises. It is characteristic of Herder that his ideas can
often be interpreted in two distinct ways, and it would be wrong to insist
on only one interpretation to the exclusion of the other. Bertalanffy
describes the age-old conflict in terms too clear-cut to apply without
57)
qualification to Herder: '
The real difference is one between scientific explanation and
anthropomorphic "understanding".
For in Herder's scientific thought as a whole, we have seen that both modes
of explanation are present, although our study of his vitalistic "forces"
has shown that, in his biological theories, vitalism usually takes precedence
over mechanism.
The second major use of "mechanism" in biology is found in the analogy
between the organism and the machine, first consistently formulated in the
modern era by Descartes. As Bartalanffy says, this analogy well expresses
the feelings "of an epoch which, proud of its technological mastery of
58)inanimate nature, also regarded living beings as machines", ' for Descartes
lived in the Golden Age of mechanics. Now we have seen that Herder cate¬
gorically denied that mechanics can explain all phenomena even in the
physical world (as in his ideas on gravitation, etc.). It is not therefore
surprising that he execrated the machine model of the organism, which was
still current in his day, especially with the French school of materialists
whose intellectual progenitor was Descartes. Thus, in 1769, he exclaims:
0 Mensch, die grausa© vornehme Naturlehre ist nicht immer
gewesen, daB die Thiere nichts als Empfindungslose
Maschienen [sindj.
In fact, it was primarily as a reaction against the machine analogy, not
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against causal explanation in itself, that he adopted a vitalistic theory of
life. He rightly believed - and his belief was emotional - that the machine
analogy is an over-simplification, and he frequently rejected it as inade¬
quate, especially in the „Ideen".^ Lehwalder realisethat he
impugned the claim of mechanics (as used by Hobbes, Descartes, and others) to
explain psychological processes, rejecting it in his psychology essay of
1778 with equal vehemenceC.F. Wolff had already explicitly dismissed
the machine analogy before Herder,but Herder did not read his work until
he was preparing Part II of the „Ideen". However, all vitalistic theories,
by implication at least, repudiate the unmediated use of mechanics in biology.
The machine analogy as an interpretation of life is indeed inadequate.
Newtonian mechanics alone were not enough to explain the phenomena of life,
for, although the attempt was scientifically correct in principle, it was
premature and grossly over-simplified in Herder's day, since it ignored many
of the complex and distinctive processes by which we recognise life. This
is what even the materialist Engels means when he 3ays:^^
Motion is not merely change of place; in fields higher than
mechanics it is also change of quality.
The word "quality" here should not be understood in the non-seientific sense
of "intrinsic nature". It simply means that life, for example, is different
from inanimate substance in some fundamental way, ultimately in the enor¬
mously greater complexity of the physical and chemical processes which take
place within the organism. The laws of motion are indeed basic for all
branches of science, as Whitehead remarks,6^ but the machine analogy in
biology assumes that they alone are enough to explain without mediation
everything with which science is concerned, that is, the entire observable
universe, including life and mind.
But the machine analogy is more than this. As we earlier noticed, it
fails to eliminate teleology, since every machine requires a designer.
(This was why the school of Descartes long adhered to a deistic theology.)
If, using this analogy, we do not accept traditional teleology, we are thrown
back upon an immanent one, which, in biology, always assumes the form of
vitalism. Thus, as Bertalanffy observes:^
If we begin with the machine analogy, we shall wander eternally
between the two poles of vitalism and mechanism. We must
therefore avoid this fiction and begin with a plain statement
of the actual biological data for whose explanation a theory
is to be sought.
Herder's vitalism thus had some merit as an antidote to the crude and
inadequate machine analogy, then still rampant in biology, especially in
France. With scientific knowledge as it then was, Lamettrie and others had
grossly to over-simplify their biological theories in order to maintain the
consistent materialism in which they believed. However, Herder's vitalism
was too near the opposite extreme, and even prejudiced the principle of
natural causation itself, and led directly to a speculative metaphysics of
„Krafte".
Finally, we may recall that those of Herder's ideas which resemble what
are now called the theories of "organicism" and of "levels of organisation"
present a much more acceptable alternative to both mechanism (in the sense of
biological "mechanics") and vitalism. We have seen, however, that he failed,
in biology as elsewhere, to emancipate himself finally from his „Krafta",
despite these more auspicious steps towards a formal rather than a qualita¬
tive demarcation of animate and inanimate. As in his theory of physical
science, his „Krafte" are the greatest weakness in his ideas concerning the
nature of the biological world and the ultimate definition of life.
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2. Ontogeny.
In this section, we shall discuss Herder's ideas on the generation and
growth of the individual organism.
a) Embryology
Three earlier versions of Chapter IV, Book VII, of the „Ideen!', Part II,
the chapter in which Herder deals most fully with embryology, survive among
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his manuscripts. This shows how great his interest in the subject was,
as well as how unsettled his ideas on it were, at the time when he wrote his
masterpiece. He also expresses opinions on embryology on many other
occasions in his works, and we 3hall try to take them all into consideration
in the present section.
As ?re noticed in relation to dialectics and theories of natural law,
Herder often maintains that processes of development are produced by a
dialectical conflict between two, or sometimes several „Kraften. Accordingly,
he adopted Kant's theory that the stars and planets are formed by the con¬
flict of two gravitational forces. Similarly, it is through the resistance
offered by the many „Krafte" of the external world to the „Kraft" within our
body, a resistance which the child first experiences through its sense of
touch, that our mind, by means of the senses, first begins to develop, as
68)
Irmscher points out. Irmscher writes: '
Unter diesem Aspekt ist der menschliehe Leib sozu3agen die
Grenze, bis zu der die Kraft der Seele sich gegen die
zudringenden Krafts des Universums zu behaupten vermag,
innerhalb deren sie noch ganz bei sich selbst ist. Jenseits
diaser Grenze beginnt fur sie mit dar Erfahrung des Widerstandes
die Welt der Objekte.
In both the oases we have cited, those of astronomical and psychological
processes of development, one „Kraft" attracts to itself, or assimilates,
elements from its environment; hence the stars and planets grow by the
gradual accretion of matter, and the mind develops by accumulating tactile
sensations of the objective world. But Herder also applies the latter
(psychological) principle on a biological level. The body itself is formed
by the „Kraft" of the soul, which assimilates and organises the raw materials
constituting the body by means of contact or conflict with the „Krafte" it
encounters in its environment. He says of the body, in a passage already
quoted and also cited by Irmscher,^' from the early sketches (c. 1769) for
the „Plastik":7°)
Er [i.e. der Leib] ist also von ihr [i.e. der Seele] durch eine
Art von fuhlbarer Anziehung gebildet.
As we earlier pointed out, a basic ,,Kraft" („Seelew), a process of assimila¬
tion („Anziehung") and a (sensory) contact with the environment („fuhlbar")
are all essential elements in Herder's dialectical theory of growth. But
he continues the above sentence as follows:71''
—- diese Attraktion ist aber noch vollig zu berechnen, so wie
das Fuhlbare in ihr aus der Bildung des Fotus noch zu axperi=
mentiren.
Irmscher, who examines only the astronomical and psychological applications
of this theory, does not quote this final passage; but it is of especial
importance for our purposes, because it shows that Herder's psychological
theory of development by touch is paralleled, on a more basic, biological
level, by an embryological conception of growth through dialectical conflict
or opposition. (The other levels on which dialectical relationships of the
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same kind recur in Herder's thought are listed in our section on dialectics.)
Now we observed while studying the problem of dialectics that Herder
encountered a dialectical theory of embryology early in his Riga period:
this was the theory of John Turberville Needham, from whose works Herder had
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excerpted the following words in 1765'.
eine vegetativische Kraft sey der G-rund aller Erzeugung: diese
befindet sich in jedem Mikroscopischen Punkt und ist aus der
sich ausdehnenden und wiederstehenden [sic] zusammengesezt.
Sie besteht aus Ausdehnung; diese haben Thiere und Pflanzen,
indefi ist iia Aether auch eine wiederstehende Kraft, sonst
wurden sie ins unendliche zerstieben.
But Needham applied this theory to generation and growth of all kinds: as
Herder later notes:^
Needham beweist nur, daS es hervorbringende Krafte gebe.
But it could easily be applied to animal embryology in particular. In fact,
we can explain how Herder came to apply the dialectical principle to embryo¬
logy simply by postulating the direct influence of Needham, without having to
suggest that he did it by extrapolating either from Kant's dialectical
cosmogony or from his own (and Berkeley's) theory of psychological develop¬
ment by touch. No doubt when he read the work of C.F. Wolff in 1784 he
regarded it as confirmation of Needham's theory. For Wolff, although he
contemptuously dismissed Needham's work as „ein unertraglich confuses Buch"
was undoubtedly influenced by it himself. He merely applied Needham's
dialectical theory in a more specific manner, saying that growth takes place
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by assimilation, expansion and resistance: '
Es ist daher die wesentliche Kraft mit der Erstarrungsfahigkeit
des Nahrsaftes [not the vague „wiederstehende Kraft im Aether"
13$.
which Herder encountered in Needham's work] ain hinreichendes
Prinzip jeder Sntwicklung sowohl bei Pflanzen, als auch bei
Thieren.
Similarly Treviranus, early in the nineteenth century, said that an expanding
inner force is resisted by the rigidity of the (material) organic body it
builds up around itself:^
The organ is a restriction, not the cause, of the activity of
the formative impulse.
In Part I of the „Ideen", Herder still adheres to the theory that embryo-
logical growth takes place by dialectical conflict. But, just as he defines
the "type" and the organism, in the same work, as composed of many „Krafts",
he is now no longer sure whether only one „Kraft" (as in his earlier idea
that the one „Seele" constructs its body), or perhaps several, may be
responsible for the growing embryo's inner expansion. Accordingly, he says
of development in the bird's egg:^^
Die organische Kraft muB zerrutten, in dem sie ordnet: sie
zieht Theile zusammen und treibt sie auseinander; ja es
scheint, als ob mehrere Krafts im Wettstreit waren und zuerst
eine MiBgeburt bilden wollten, bis sie in ihr Gleichgewicht
treten und das Gesehopf das wird, was es seiner Gattung nach
seyn soil.
On the whole, he abides in the BIdeen" by the conception that only one
„Kraft" within the embryo, opposed from without by various environmental
„Krafte", provides the inward pole in the dialectical conflict of growth.
Nonetheless, this one ruling „Kraft" may assimilate and govern other lesser
„Krafte" which it draws into the embryo from outside („ sie, die uber
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tausend Krafte, die sie ansog, in dieser Organisation herrschte" ). As we
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have seen, however, he does fall back, on one occasion in the „Ideen", upon
79)
the notion of a single, purely teleological „Kraft": '
Sie hiuB den Typus ihrer Erscheinung in ihr selbst haben.
In this statement, he has abandoned the less teleological idea of growth by
dialectical conflict, and even declares, in a truly Platonic vein;8^
Das neue Geaehopf ist nichts als sine wirklich gewordena Idee
der schaffenden Natur, die immar nur thatig denket.
However, it is the influence of Harvey, whose classic work on embryology
Herder read in the 1780's, which has here supplanted the dialectical theory
of Needham in his mind. Herder himself had noted while preparing his
„Ideen":81)
Harvei [sic] nimmt impressio idealis an, wie im Kopf" des Kunstlers.
This is clearly the source for his surprisingly teleological statement quoted
above. But 0. Temkin, in the article to which we have already had occasion
to refer, overemphasises this teleological or Platonic element in Herder's
writings on ontogeny, and does not mention that it is only one among several
different interpretations of embryologieal development which Herder puts
forward at various times.
We have now discussed Herder's earlier and more general views on
embryology. Let us next evaluate his more specific ideas on the subject,
especially as they appear in the „Idsen".
Embryology was still a very imperfectly developed subject, largely given
over to speculation, in Herder's age. Herder himself realises the prevailing
lack of knowledge, and says in 1783 of the human embryo in particular:8^
Die Art der Bildung des Menschen im Mutterleibe war den Morgenlandern
das unerforschbarste Wunder, das tiefste Rathsel; und ist sie es
nicht alien Naturweisen noch bis auf diese Stunde?
Like many of his contemporaries, he used the idea of „Krafte" in embryology,
as in so many other areas of his thought, to make up for the prevailing lack
of exact knowledge. Having discussed the dialectical conception of embryo-
logical „Krafte", we shall now examine the other applications of vitalistic
„Krafte" in Herder's writings on the subject, and in eighteenth century
embryology in general. This brings us first of all to that great contro¬
versy between "epigeneticists" and "preformations ts".
Many modern writers, including Driesch, the historian of vitalism, have
assumed that the theory of epigenesis, which maintained that the embryo
develops by acquiring its parts and its characteristic conformation
successively, is always coupled with vitalism, whereas vitalism and preforma¬
tion! sm are seen as incompatible. Joseph Needham, in his history of embryo¬
logy, has shown, however, that the connection between epigenesis and vitalism
83)
is by no means necessary. ' Now Herder, as we know, held vitalistic
opinions in biology from his earliest period as a thinker. Nonetheless, his
first utterances upon the epigenesis-preformation question seem to indicate
that he favoured the hypothesis of preformation, also known as the "capsule",
"emboltement" or "evolution" theory (i.e. the theory that the embryo
develops only by expanding, and that the parts and conformation of the adult
organism are present in miniature, preformed or predelineated, from the time
of generation, and that the earliest members of every species contain all
future members, in the form of microscopic "seeds", within them). He
writes in 1768, in his „Fragmente"
In dem Saamenkom liegt die Pflanze mit ihren Theilen; im
Saamenthier das Geschopf mit alien Gliedern.
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In the language essay of 1770, he again writes: "
ist also nicht im Keiiae der ganze Bauin enthalten?
And in a sermon of 1773> he speaks of the initial state „wo der Baum im Keime
und tausend Keime in Einem und die ganze Schopfung in Einem Keime liegt, und
og\
nur auf stille Entwicklung wartet." 1 However, this last statement
obviously refers not just to embryology, but to development in general; it
is probably only a renewed affirmation of that "genetic method" which Herder
cultivated in his earlier years. But just as he abandoned his early notion
that, by the "genetic method", we can discover or predict all subsequent
developments simply by studying the origin of a phenomenon, and decided
instead that the successive sequence of development itself must be studied in
all its stages (in accordance with the so-called „Entwicklungsgedanke"), he
soon gave up his early allegiance to a loosely "preformationist" conception
of embryology, and, as we shall see, eventually came to accept the main
teachings of the rival epigenetic school. Perhaps he also realised that
preformationism was incompatible with that dialectical theory of successive
growth which he had borrowed from Needham and Kant. However, his early
combination of general vitalism and a loose preformationism shows that, as
Joseph Needham maintains, the two ideas need not be mutually exclusive.
It appears then that Herder, in his earlier years, used both vitalism
and preformationism, just as Bonnet did. But, at this time, he had not yet
studied biology, or embryology, in any detail. He seems to have known of
the preformation hypothesis, and used it as a metaphor for describing his
"genetic method". But as soon as he had begun, in the 1770's, to study
physiology and biology in detail in the works of Haller and others, he found
Bonnet's theory of preformation inadequate. For example, in the „Slteste
Urkunde" in 1776, he scathingly rejects the idea of a „Limbus praformirter
Seelen"^^ - presumably it is Bonnet whom he here has in Blind. Already in
the 1774 version of his essay on psychology, he had rejected the theory of
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preformed „Keime" as „machftnisch": '
Die Mechanische Philosophie betr&chtet die Natur als abgestorben,
todt, die bios aus alten, abgelebten Keimen wlirke.
And in the „Ide9n", he says:^;
Die Theorie der Keime erklart eigentlich nichts: denn der
Keim ist schon ein Gebilde und wo dieses ist, muB eine organische
Kraft seyn, die es bildet. Im ersten Saamenkorn der Schopfung
hat kein Zergliederer alle kunftige Keime entdeckt
Later in the same work, he again repudiates the preformation hypothesis,"^
91\
having explicitly named Bonnet a few pages earlier ' as the source of this
untenable theory.
However, Bouchd"^' and Pamp^*^ both quote a surprising sentence in which
Herder goes on to reject not only preformation, but epigenesis as well:^
so, dunkt rnich, spricht man uneigentlich, wenn man von
Keimen, die nur entwickelt wurden, oder von einer Epigenesis
redet, nach der die Glieder von auBen zuwuchsen. Bildung
(genesis) ists, eine Wirkung innerer Krafts, denen die Natur
eine Masse vorbereitet hatte, die sie sich zubilden, in der sie
sich sichtbar machen soilten.
In an earlier version of the „Ideen", he even speaks of „die sinnlose
95)
Epigenese".
It is clear from these words that he is, as usual, more interested in
his qualitative, vitalistic „Kraft" in embryology, than in the formal
patterns of development which were described in both the preformation and
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epigenesis theories. As we earlier noticed, even the more formal dialecti¬
cal theory of growth becomes confused in the „Ideen", and Herder introduces
a teleological, even Platonic theory later in the same work. This becomes
specially evident in Part II of the „Ideen", where a whole chapter is devoted
to the vitalistic theory of growth (which is treated in turn in relation to
the environmental determinants which act from outside upon the organism).
At the beginning of the chapter in question, the development of the
animal embryo is described in concrete detail. Temkin quotes the following
96)
words from this passage: '
Aus Kugelchen, zwischen welche Safte schiefien, wird ein lebender
Punkt das Herz erzeuge sich nicht anders, als durch eine
Zusammenstromung der Kanale, die schon vor ihm da waren
Temkin says that these notions seem to be derived from C.F. Wolff. This is
97)
quite correct, for Wolff writes in his "Theoria generationis": ''
Die Nahrsafte bewegen sich, durch diese Kraft [i.e. Wolff's
"vis essentialis"] getrieben, durch jene aus Kugelchen
gebildete Substanz hindurch, lagern sich zwischen diesen
Kugelchen ab, und vermehren auf diese Art das Volumen das
Embryos
Besides, in declaring that the heart is formed successively from,Kanale" which
gradually converge, Herder is employing in practice the very epigenesis he had
rejected in theory, along with preformation, in Part I of the same work.
The reason for this change is that Herder, since writing Part I of the
wIdeen", had read three works on embryology, each of which put forward a
theory of embryological growth, classifiable both as vitalistic and epi-
genetic: these were Harvey's "Exercitationes de generatione animalium"
(1651), Blumenbach's „tfber den Bildungstrieb" (1781)"^ and C.F. Wolff's
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"Theoria generationis" (1759, 1764 and 1774)"^.
But before we proceed further, we must digress in order to examine how
Herder came to know the work of C.P. Wolff, since critics have hitherto
failed to agree on this important question.
Firstly, we can dismiss as completely unfounded the following words of
Clark,100'
I find no evidence that Herder ever read Caspar Friedrich Wolff.
On the contrary, Herder refers to Wolff on four occasions in the „Ideen",
even mentioning him twice in Part Three of these references are to
Wolff's principal work, the "Theoria generationis". Furthermore, Suphan,
in his edition of Herder's „Ideen", says that a long extract from this work
appears in Herder's notebooks
Other critics, however, have realised that Herder did read Wolff's work;
but they disagree over several chronological details. The controversy dates
from Haym's assertion
Durch Herder ist Goethe mit K.F. Wolffs theoria generationis
bekannt gemacht worden.
Now Hansen, in his well known work on Goethe's ..Metamorphose der Pflanzen"
notes that Goethe himself said that F.A. Wolf drew his attention to C.F.
Wolff's work after 1790 for the first timeThe question of date is an
important one, because Wolff's ideas have significant similarities with
Goethe's theory of plant metamorphosis, yet Goethe claims that he did not
meet Wolff's writings until after he had composed his own work. Hansen
accepts Goethe's word, and is therefore compelled to disagree with Haym.1"''^
But Haym quotes two letters from Herder to Knebel, and gives them the dates
of 15th and 19th December, 1784, although they were published in nKnebels
Literarischer NachlaB" without dates. In these letters, Herder asks Knebel
to procure the work of lolff, which Herder intends to give to Goethe as a
present. Hansen, who is aware that the letters were published without
dates, concludes that Haym's dates can only be arbitrary, and declares
Ich halte diese ganze Verschiebung der Geschichte fur sehr
mangelhaft begrundet.
But Hansen, who is bent upon minimising Goethe's debt to others, is not
justified in doubting Haym's scholarly integrity. For the letters written
by Khebel in reply to Herder's are printed by Duntzer, with dates from
Knebel's original manuscripts (because Duntzer always brackets conjectural
dates, and these are not in parentheses), in the collection of letters „Von
und an Herder". In a footnote, Duntzer refers to the two letters from
Herder, whose dates, as given by Hayrn, Hansen has questioned, and dates them
just as Haym does; for although Herder had not dated them himself, the known
discrepancies between the dates of Knebel's letters and the time of postal
deliveries in Weimar from Jena provide the dates of Herder's letters with
tolerable accuracy, and Duntzer undoubtedly used this method of dating them.
Thus, Haym had quite correctly cited the dates given by Duntzer, whose work
Hansen apparently omitted to consult, or of whose existence he was perhaps
unaware.
Suphan, in his edition of the „Ideen", unfortunately accepts the word
of Hansen, not that of Haym, and also adds that Goethe first obtained a copy
of Wolff's work from Loder at a later date."*"0^ But Gillies1^)
Harich,^"^ no doubt following Haym, declare that Goethe came to know the
work of Wolff through Herder.
The true sequence of events was, in fact, as follows. (Exact sources
are given in the notes to each statement.) Herder writes to Knebel on or
around the 15th December, 1784, asking for Wolff's „Theorie der Generation"
[sic] among other works on biology.Knebel replies on 17th December,
1784, apparently sending the Latin edition of Wolff with the other works.
(Since, in this letter, Knebel says that he looks forward to Part II „Ihres
trefflichen Buchs", i.e. of the ,,Ideen", we have added proof that these
letters date from late in 1784, not from after 1790, as Hansen claims.)
Herder replies on or around the 19th December, 1784, saying that he has in
the meantime read the Latin version of Wolff, but now wishes to obtain the
German edition of 1764-'1''''2^ Knebel writes back on 28th December, 1784,
saying that he is trying to obtain this edition.Shortly afterwards,
in a letter given the conjectural but erroneous dating "1795?" by the
editors of „Knebels Literarischer NachlaS", Herder renews his request, and
says that he intends to make a present of the German edition of Wolff's work
to Goethe, to vjhom he is also about to show his newly finished chapter on
embryology for the „Ideen", Part II.However, Knebel replies on 7th
January, 1785, announcing that he has finally failed to obtain a copy of the
required edition.
All this, along with the references to Wolff's work in the „Ideen",
shows that Herder read the work, in the Latin edition, in the winter of
1784-85, contrary to what Hansen says. But have we any proof that he showed
this edition to Goethe at this time? The chances are that, having failed
to obtain the German one, he did. As Clark, who wrongly believes that even
Herder had not read Wolff, declares:
We can be sure that, had Herder known Wolff's work in the 1770's
or 1780's, he would have directed Goethe's attention to it at
the time of their biological discussions in 1783 or 1784-
Besides, Herder tells Knebel that he is about to show Goethe his chapter on
embryology for the „Ideen", in which he twice refers to Wolff. And Wolff
is mentioned even in Part I of the „Ideen", as we earlier remarked. Goethe
undoubtedly read the complete „Id99n", the greatest work of Herder, his
closest friend in those years, thus he must have encountered at least some
of Wolff's ideas at that time, if only through the mediation of Herder's own
theories.
But how could Herder refer in Part I of the „Ideen" to the work of
Wolff which, as we know from his letters, he read only while preparing
Part II?
The great opponent of the epigeneticist Wolff was the preformationist
Haller. Herder read Haller's writings in the early 1770's, and often
refers, at that time, to his great work on physiology, especially to Volume
8, which deals with embryology and reproduction. Now Haller, in this
volume, describes, discusses and criticises the ideas of Wolff, his subse-
quently successful opponent, in considerable detail. 1 Besides, we know
that Herder came to reject preformation at the very time when he was reading
and quoting from the preformationist Haller, and early gave preference to a
vitalistic theory of embryology. It is therefore probable that he acquired
some knowledge and appreciation of Wolff's ideas from Haller's work. This
would explain why ha could mention Wolff in Part I of the „Ideen", before
reading his "Theoria" himself. It also seems probable that Goethe
encountered some of Wolff's ideas before he wrote his ^Metamorphose der
Pflansen", even if he did not read the work, and the more particularly
botanical theories expounded in it, until later. But since it is not our
task to discuss in detail the influence of Wolff on Goethe, we may now return
to Herder's ideas on embryology.
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In Part II of the „Ideen", as we have seen, Herder ended up by employing
in practice the very epigenesis, with its doctrine of successive growth by
convergence upon a centre, which he had rejected in theory in Part I before
reading Harvey, Blumenbach and Wolff. It was, of course, inevitable that
he should accept epigenesis to some degree, since it accorded with his old
belief in successive dialectical development, whereas the preformation
hypothesis is basically static.This is why he had already rejected
preformationism in the 1770's. Indeed, he may also have rejected it because
it fails to explain the phenomenon of regeneration, which, as we noticed in
our section on classification, he used as a means of distinguishing between
lower and higher forms of life. Appeals to the regeneration of lost animal
parts were one of the most telling arguments ever advanced against preforma¬
tionism,although Herder never uses this argument explicitly.
However, Clark says that Herder never accepted epigenesis fully either,
because of the "extreme environmentalist!!" associated with it, and that he
accepted preformationism in so far as it taught that developments take place
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from within. ' But most epigeneticists believed in inner, more or less
teleologieally controlled developments rather than in environmentally
determined ones, as Temkin points out."^2^ We have also seen that the
pronouncedly teleological, even Platonic element in Herder's embryological
chapter in the „Ideen" can be explained by the influence of Harvey, who, as
Norden3kiold observes, was himself an early supporter of epigenesis."*"2^
Thus epigenesis, as well as preformation, could describe developments from
within, without any reference to environment. Clark was doubtless misled
by the title of the chapter from the „Ideen" under discussion. It is:'*"22^
Die genetische Kraft ist die Mutter aller Bildungen auf der Erde,
der das KLima feindlich oder freundlich nur zuwirket.
Herder believes, in fact, as we shall see, that the same „Kraft" which
governs the formation and growth of the embryo later continues to sustain the
organism after its birth. But only then does the question of environmental
determinism become relevant. The theories of preformation and epigenesis,
however, both accounted only for embryological development in the strictest
sense - i.e. for the growth of the unborn embryo, whose environment is the
parent organism, not Herder's external „Klima". Thus, Clark's statement
that the epigenetic theory involved the doctrine of "extreme environmentalism"
has no relation to the actual theory of epigenesis, which concerned only
embryology.
We may conclude, therefore, that Herder came to accept epigenesis in
practice, introducing strong teleological overtones, in Part II of the
„Ideen". Previously, in Part I of the same work, he had been unwilling to
commit himself either to preformation or to epigenesis, and had rejected both
f
in favour of a general and unspecific vitalistic theory. He had also,
especially in earlier years, used the dialectical theory of Needham (which
was itself really epigenetic), and had even toyed with the preformation
hypothesis, in a general way, in his first pronouncements on embryology.
His approach was therefore typically vague and eclectic throughout.
Before we leave this question, we must devote some attention to sources.
Both preformation and epigenesis had religious affiliations (corresponding
respectively to the doctrines of simultaneous and successive creation), as
Clark points out.^"^ We may add that the „Limbus praformirter Seelen"
which Herder rejected in the 1770's does indeed suggest a theological source;
in fact, it recalls the doctrine of traducianism, found in some of the
Patristic writings, which declared that all souls were created at the earth's
creation.However, the latter doctrine involves a subsequent trans¬
migration of the original souls rather than the emergence of new ones from
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preformed "germs", as in the preformation theory. But, as one historian of
theology and science shows the doctrine may well have been suggested by
Hebrews, 7, 10:
For he was yet in the loins of his father, when Melchidesec
met him.
But although preformation and epigenesis both had theological equivalents or
sources, we need not assume that Herder, in using either of them, was applying
theology to science. These two theories were the principal ones current in
Herder's day in embryology, and it was in the writings of earlier scientists,
not theologians, that Herder encountered them. For preformation had been
taught by Swammerdam, Malpighi, Bonnet, Haller, Spallanzani, Hartsoeker and
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others. ' Herder himself had encountered it chiefly in the writings of
Bonnet and Haller, and, in a less specifically erabryological form, in Kant's
theory, already mentioned, that racial changes are brought about when
climatic influences evoke certain preformed "germs" of potential racial
differentiation which are present in all men since the creation of man. (in
his „Kritik der Urteilskraft", however, Kant supported Blumenbach's epigenetic
theory in the narrower field of embryology ^or 0pigenesis> it had
been supported by Harvey,*2^ Descartes, Maupertuis,^"2"^ Needham, Wolff and
Blumenbach,^^-' among others. Herder had met the theory, as we have seen,
chiefly in the works of Harvey, Blumenbach and Wolff, although he had early
encountered the less specific theory of Needham, and perhaps also Maupertuis'
non-vitalistic version, which does not seem, however, to have influenced him,
probably because it was too mechanistic.
Finally, we may note that Herder, in supporting epigenesis, was following
the most progressive current of embryological thought in his age, but that
his own vitalistic theory, unlike the qualified vitalism of Blumenbach and
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even of Wolff, was too unspecific to be of much value as a working hypo¬
thesis. Truly scientific embryology arose only in the following century,
with the exact studies of W. Roux,"^1'' and a priori speculations were
finally banished. Joseph Needham, in his history of embryology, neatly
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sums up the modern position in relation to eighteenth century ideas: '
Whitman distinguished between Predetermination, a physiological
or potential preformation not capable of microscopic resolution,
and Predelineation, which is the old morphological or visible
preformation. Modern embryology might therefore be called
Predetermined Epigenesis.
A few concluding remarks may cover some remaining questions in embryo¬
logy. Ovism and animalculism, the two rival theories which maintained
respectively that the embryonic organism originates from the female and from
the male parent, play no part in our discussion, since they were usually
associated with preformationism, which Herder never advocated in detail, and
since he himself never mentions them. Nor does Buffon's curious theory of
"molecules organiques" and the "moule intdrieur"^^^-' play any part in his
thought; he actually derides „Lowenhocks und Buffons Romane der Thierer=
zeugung" in 1776.(Leeuwenhoek, as his name should be spelt, was an
"animalculist" We shall return to the question of spontaneous
generation, which has some bearing on embryology, when we examine Herder's
beliefs concerning the (phylogenetic) origin of life on earth.
All in all, we have seen that Herder's utterances on embryology are
never sufficiently exact or detailed to do justice to the finer points of the
subject. He usually contented himself with applying his own biological
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vitalism* in a general way, to erabryological theories which various
practising scientists had already expounded.
b) Growth and regeneration of animal organs.
We noticed in our discussion of anthropomorphism that Herder compares
the structure of the human organism with that of the tree. He also employs
a dynamic version of this static, morphological comparison in describing
growth in the „Ideen". On this latter occasion, however, the growth of the
individual human organism is compared with that of the flowering plant, and,
in keeping with Herder's usual belief in successive or epigenetic growth,
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the brain is said to develop out of, and after, the spinal cord. * He
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says of the developing brain: '
So ward, wenn ich in einem Bilde reden darf, die Blume gebildet,
die auf dem verlangerten Ruckenmark nur empor sproBte
«• «• 138)
He also speaks of „das kleinere Gehirn, die sprossende Blute des Ruckens", '
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and extends the same image to describe less advanced creatures: '
In Geschopfen, bei denen das Gehirn kaum anfangt, erscheinet
es noch sehr einfach: es ist wie eine Knospe Oder ein paar
Knospen des fortspriefienden Ruckenmarkes, die nur den nothigsten
Sinnen Nerven ertheilen.
In this last sentence especially, the archaic notion that the brain, situated
at the highest point of the body, is the most refined product of the upward-
striving creative force (which is in turn related to the idea that the juices
of a plant become more refined with sublimation, finally producing the
flower), is combined with the correct embryological observation that the
brain sends out nerve-connections, as it grows, so as to establish links
with the various senses.
The notion that the brain is simply an extension of the spinal medulla
reminds us of a comparable and better known theory put forward some years
later by Goethe and first mentioned by him in a latter to Herder from
Veniceit is the so-called „¥irbeltheorie des Schadels", the theory
that the skull or cranium is simply an extension and modification of the upper
few vertebrae. Goethe's theory is simply the morphological, osteological
equivalent of Herder's dynamic, physiological conception of cerebral develop¬
ment, and it is quite conceivable that one may have influenced the other.
Herder's remarks upon the growth of the brain and the nerves bring us
to another problem, that of how the nerves are distributed and how this
distribution is related to the regeneration of severed organs in the animal.
On several occasions we have noted that Herder, in his „Ideen", distin¬
guished between lower and higher organisms by supposing that a progressively
more complex arrangement of constant basic elements can be observed from
lower to higher forms. This now well-attested phenomenon, we saw, is known
today as "progressive integration". Thus, in lower organisms, nerve-centres
are more independent of each other, i.e. they are less integrated. „Jeder
Nervenknote [sic]" of a lower organism, Herder declares, is „ein kleineres
Gehirn".^^^ In such creatures, an „organische Allmacht" prevails through¬
out the separate organs, and „bei einigen Thieren kominen nicht einmal die
Kerven beider Augen zusammen. He also says of the insect
Die Seele des kleinen Kunstgesehopfs war also in sein ganzes
Wesen verbreitet.
It is this idea of greater independence of less specialised parts in
lower organisms which Herder correctly uses to explain how they have greater
powers of regenerating lost parts. But the term „Seele", instead even of
,,Kraft", reveals on this occasion the archaic roots of the idea, which
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experimenters such as Spallanzani,^^^ even before Herder's time, were
already correlating more closely with the observed processes of regeneration.
Even Aristotle had said that all parts of the organism possess some kind of
"soul", although usually only a "vegetative" soul in the case of elementary
creatures. ("Sentient" and "rational" souls are found only in more advanced
species, and are situated only in certain more specialised areas of their
bodies.^-^) Robert Whytt (1714-1766), a follower of the vitalist Stahl,
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had also said that the souls of all organisms pervade their entire bodies. '
Thus, Herder's conception of regeneration lies between the older, animistic
beliefs and the modern idea of "progressive integration".
Goethe takes up this notion in his essay „Fossiler Stier" of 1822:^^
Alle einzelnen Glieder der wildesten, rohsten vollig unge=
bildeten Thiere haben eine kraftige vita propria; besonders
kann man dieses von den Sinneswerkzeugen sagen: sie sind
weniger abhangig vom Gehirn, sie bringen gleichsam ihr Gehirn
mit sich und sind sich selbst genug.
But whereas Herder had used the idea of varying degrees of integration of the
nervous system as a means of classification, and of explaining the regenera¬
tion of lost parts in extant species, Goethe (and other writers read or
mentioned by Goethe) began, in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, to
relate it to palaeontology and phylogeny. It was soon applied to the
evolutionary series as a means of distinguishing between more primitive and
more advanced organisms, and became related to the modern theory of evolution
by descent.
c) grocess_ofa the individual organism and the effects of age.
In the chapter of the „Idaen", Part II, which contains Herder's fullest
account of embryology, the vitalistic force supposedly responsible for the
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growth of the foetus is called the „genetische Kraft". Herder says further
of it nda8 diese lebendige Kraft das ausgebildete Geschopf nicht verlasse
sondern sich in ihm thatig zu offenbaren fortfahre; zwar nicht mehr
schaffend, denn es ist erschaffen, aber erhaltend, belebend, nahrend."^"^''
As Temkin observes, the „genetische Kraft" sustains the adult organism until
it weakens with age.1^; Thus, the development of the embryo and the
further life-processes of the independent organism are continuous for Herder
and, as on so many occasions, it is a constant ,,Kraft" which provides the
continuity. (it is this same „Kraft" which causes the regeneration of lost
parts, as described above.) Wolff likewise says of his own "vis essentialis"
„daS diese Kraft ebenso auch im erwachsenen Menschen vorhanden ist, davon
kann man sich leicht uberzeugen"and Blumenbach says of his "nisus
formativus" that it "continues to act through the whole life of the animal,
and by it the first form of the animal, or plant is not only determined, but
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afterwards preserved, and when deranged, is again restored."
In the 1769 manuscript published by Irmscher, Herder explains the
process of ageing as caused by a supposed decline in the strength of the
sustaining „Kraft":152^
meine Seele kann sich nicht mehr vervollkommnen: sia kann
nicht mehr im Raum und Zeit [sic] wurken: ihre vitale Kraft
also kann nicht mehr dem Allen entgegenwurken, was auf sie
sturmt - ich sterbe.
Similarly, Haller had written of the process of ageing:*^3)
Es nimmt die angebohrne und nervige Kraft ab.
Blumenbach likewise declared later:
The activity of the nisus is in an inverse ratio to the age
of the organised body.
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And, around the beginning of the nineteenth century, Bichat said:
Life is the sum total of the funotions which resist death.
However, it is more likely that Herder first found his theory of ageing
as a decline in the inner „Kraft" of the organism in the face of opposing
„Krafte" in the writings of Needham, since he did not know the works of the
other writers named (with the possible exception of Haller) in 1769.
Needham maintains that "la force expansive, qui d'abord predominait, perd
son empire peu & peu, et cede a la resistance, qui & son tour prend le
dessus ainsi on peut dire que nous portons au-dsdans de nous les principes
de la vie et de la mort."1*^ But if Needham's ill-defined "resistance" were
an internal force, that of the increasing rigidity of the body itself acting
against the expansive life-forces which work within it, as in Wolff's version
of the same theory, and not a set of external forces as in Herder's theory
of 1769, Herder might be said merely to be applying Kant's theory of conflict
between gravitational forces to the organism.
On the other hand, he goes on in the 1769 manuscript already cited to
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say that the soul itself is nonetheless immortal in man:
Mein Tod ist nur ein Vertreiben, aus Zeit, und Raum: Keine
Schwache meiner Kraft.
This, of course, conflicts with his previous description of ageing as a
decline in resistance to outside forces. But perhaps he considered the
„vitale Kraft" which weakens with age as different from the transcendental
„Kraft" of the soul itself, which remains unaffected by age or even by death.
Yet he says in the „Ideen" of the soul:"*""^
Lasset es seyn, daB sie nur als eine organische Kraft
wirke; sie soil auch nicht anders wiirken dorfen.
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And in the chapter which deals with embryology, he says of the „Lebenskraft":
sie ermattet endlich im Alter
He distinguishes it at least from the higher faculties of the soul on this
160)occasions '
Das Vemunftvermogen unsrer Seele ist sie nicht.
Yet in Part I of the „Ideen" he ascribes a permanence or quasi-immortality
to the purely organic „Kraft" of plants and trees, and denies „da£ die Kraft,
die diese Theile belebte, die vegetiren und sich so machtig fortpflanzen
konnte, mit dieser Decomposition gestorben sei."^^'
Thus, the organic „Kraft" which creates and sustains the individual
organism, like the immortal soul, can never be destroyed, according to the
mature Herder, although his later words „sie ermattet endlich im Alter" seem
to imply that some change takes place. But he fails to make any clear
distinction between the two kinds of „Kraft", for to do so would have meant
reopening that dualistic gap between soul and body which the very conception
of „Kraft" was designed to bridge. The same weaknesses we have observed in
all his applications of the „Kraft" principle thus also render his ideas on
the life-process of the individual organism obscure and unscientific.
3. Ontogeny and phylogeny.
The following words from Herder's „Ideen" have given rise to a good deal
of comment
Das Kind in [sic] Mutterleibe scheint alle Zustande durchgehen
zu raussen, die einea Erdegeschopf zukommen konnen. Es schwimmt
im Wasser: es liegt mit offnem Munde: sein Kiefer ist groB, eh
eine Lippe ihn bedecken kann, die sich nur spat bildetj so bald
es auf die Welt kommt, schnappt es nach Luft und Saugen ist
seine ungelernte erste Verrichtung.
Siegel quotes the passage,as aoa3 Rouchd, who asks of it:^^
Et ne semble-t-il pas entrevoir la cel&bre loi de Haeckel sur
les rapports entre 1'embryog^nie et la phylogdnie ?
He soon adds, however, that Herder, unlike Haeckel, does not say that the
developing embryo repeats all the main stages found in the evolution of
species by descent.1^ Kohlbrugge likewise declares that, although Herder
supported epigenetic views on the development of the embryo, he nowhere says
that this development repeats the phylogenetic evolution of life:^-^
Epigenese und Phylogenese hatten damals noch nichts miteinander
gemein.
The Marxist Reimann, however, acclaims Herder's statement as an exact antici¬
pation of the materialist Haeckel's „biogenetisches Grundgesets" that ontogeny
repeats phylogeny."^^ And Temkin, in his excellent article on ontogenetic
theories in Germany around 1800, points out that Herder considers the same
„Kraft" to be responsible both for the development of the individual organism
and for the successive creation of species in the history of life on earth.
(Temkin no doubt thinks of Herder's creative „2ther" or ,tLebenswanri8", or
perhaps only of the more general „organische Krafte".) He adds:1*^
This being the case, it was not far fetched to assume, on the
basis of an identical genetic force, the existence of a
parallelism between ontogenetic development and the scale [i.e.
the successive 3cale of creation in time] of beings.
K.F. Kielmeyer, the teacher of Cuvier, drew a similar inference, saying that
the main physiological functions in the growing embryo appear in a sequence
commensurate with their relative distribution in the existing scale of
natural organisms; Kielmeyer was here directly influenced by Herder's
„Idean", Temkin maintains, and Schelling, following Herder and Kielmeyer, has
a similar idea."*"^''
However, we shall shortly see that Herder did not believe in the evolu¬
tion of species by descent, so that we can agree with Rouche, and disagree
with Reimann, since Herder cannot therefore have anticipated Haackel's
purely evolutionary formula. But there is no reason why Temkin should not
be correct in saying that Herder believed that the successive emergence of
species in time, through other means than evolution by descent, followed the
same order of phases as the growing embryo, except that Herder himself only
says that the growing embryo undergoes „alle Zustande , die einem Erde=
geschopf zukommen konnen", and does not specifically refer to the consecutive
phases in the emergence of species in time. He could easily have made this
comparison, which readily suggests itself from his own premises (for he
believed in the successive emergence of progressively higher species in the
earth's past, as we shall see, without suggesting that they are descended
from one another), but he did not do so; it was left to later writers,
perhaps under his influence, to draw this conclusion.
Thus, Herder draws a parallel between temporal developments on the
ontogenetic level and the static, observed differences between extant
organisms on earth. But we noticed in our section on cyclic theories of
change that, in his „Auch sine Philosophie", he also compares the development
of all individual organisms with the cultural „Lebensalter" of human history.
We have also seen that he believed that the vision of primitive peoples is
parallel to that of the young child, for both see t)Riesenfiguren", while the
civilised or adult sense of vision, mediated by the sense of touch, reduces
objects to their correct relative siaes."^"^'' Indeed, it is almost a
biological evolution which is here implied - i.e. the idea that man's senses
have progressively developed in history. Tonkin thus correctly observes
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that history and biology are also parallel for Herder. But we noticed
in our sections on holism and the "levels of organisation" that such
parallels between different levels of development are usually derived rather
from a priori holistic premises than directly from the data of embryology,
biology, and so on (although Herder, especially in the „Ideen", reinforces
them to a considerable extent with empirical evidence). He believed that
parallel, dynamic wholes exist on different levels, from embryology to
history; the later consequences of such basically a priori beliefs have
indeed been momentous in biology, but we must beware of exaggerating the
function of biology and of empirical observation in Herder's original formu¬
lations of these ideas.
The theory of which Rouche, Reimann and others name Haeckel as the
originator, that ontogeny repeats phylogeny, is technically known as the
"recapitulation theory". Aristotle, as Needham's history of embryology
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shows, ' had already suggested a similar theory, in a concrete (but non-
evolutionary) way. Only in the eighteenth century were such ideas revived
on a relatively empirical basis. Needham observes that hints of the theory
appear in Goethe's works, and in those of John Hunter, but he does not
mention Herder. He says that it was von Baer (not Haeckel) who first
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formulated it, and White, in his history of science and theology, shows
that Darwin and Agassiz also stated it perfectly clearly, before Haeckel
publicised it in Germany.1^
But Herder himself did not arrive at his much debated statement on
ontogeny out of nowhere. Bonnet had contended that, with each periodic
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cataclysm of the earth, the "germs" of new living forms begin to develop,
all earlier forms having been destroyed; the new "germs" produce more
advanced species than those destroyed, but, as they develop, they recapitu-
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late those phases found in the earlier, extinct organisms. Dobbek also
declares that Einsiedel, in the notes which Herder copied, hinted at a
similar „biogenetisches Grundgesetz" But the notes in question date
from 1791-1796, after Herder had written his „Ideen", so it is probable that
Herder, perhaps influenced by Bonnet, in turn influenced Einsiedel, rather
than vice versa.
We conclude that, although we have disagreed with Temkin on some
details, we can accept his contention that Herder is a notable member of a
sequence of thinkers who gradually came to realise that there are significant
similarities between ontogeny and phylogeny. The train of ideas to which
he contributed eventually led, with new palaeontological evidence and the
evolutionary theory of Darwin and others, to the now well-attested principle
that ontogeny repeats phylogeny.
We shall next examine Herder's beliefs concerning phylogeny itself.
4- Phylogeny; the problem of evolution.
In this section, we shall discuss Herder's theories of the origin and
development of living species, along with various associated topics. Since
considerably more has been written about this than about any other division
of his scientific thought, we shall in many cases confine ourselves to
reviewing the results of other critics' work, particularly in dealing with
the theory of evolution by descent, about which there can no longer be any
major disagreement as far as Herder is concerned, largely because Rouche has
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treated it so thoroughly in his authoritative work on Herder and Darwinism. '
But we cannot ignore the problem of evolution altogether, since no account
of Herder's scientific ideas would be complete without some mention of it.
We shall find that, as in most areas of Herder's scientific thought,
there are two sides to his beliefs concerning the history of life on earth -
a naturalistic, and a metaphysical or even religious one; these two sides,
as usual, are difficult to distinguish, mainly because of his habitual and
sometimes intentional vagueness. Too many critics have emphasised either
the one or the other, as when certain propagandists of militant materialism,
whose dogmatic and uncritical pretensions Rouchd exposes so well, attempted
in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to portray Herder as a
thorough-going Darwinist, and, conversely, when other critics (with Rouche
himself not least among them) tried to show that his theories of life and
its emergence are firmly based upon religious premises, even upon those of
Christian orthodoxy.
But first of all, we should realise that pre-Darwinian theories of
evolution by descent are not necessarily either scientific (or Darwinistic)
or anti-religious. For example, Sir James Frazer, in his essay "Creation
and Evolution in Primitive Cosmogonies", finds that the idea that man evolved
from animal ancestors or from elementary forms of life is just as common, in
the religions of primitive peoples, as the belief that man was created by a
higher being.Besides, as we shall see, naturalistic theories of
creation by "spontaneous generation" find a certain amount of support even in
the Book of Genesis, and various Christians, from the Middle Ages onwards,
put forward theories of creation which included more or less evolutionary
elements. For example, Franciscus Rueus, in 1566, declared that "the earth
and all that therein is was [not] brought into existence in its completed
form in an instant of time, but rather this edict [the divine fiat]
constituted 'Creation'. Some things at once appeared in their final and
perfect form; others in their principles and beginnings, these to reach
their completed growth as time went on through the action of secondary
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causes, which were also put into operation by the creative act." ' Thus,
pre-Darwinian beliefs in some form of natural evolution were not necessarily
anti-religious; and conversely, those who did not support the theory of
evolution by descent before Darwin's evidence gave it overwhelming support
cannot be infallibly branded as men who sought to impose religious orthodoxy
upon science, or as opponents of science out of theological prejudice.
Their prejudices, where they existed, were just as often metaphysical as
theological, and, since no clear palaaontological and genetic evidence had
as yet been adduced in support of the evolutionary hypothesis, earlier
theories of evolution by descent, for example those of the eighteenth
century, were scientific only in a qualified sense. They were scientific
only in that they extended the principle of natural causation to cover every
known phenomenon, including the origin of man and of the animals on earth.
But to do so they had to theorise far in advance of available empirical
evidence. This meant that the average scientific thinker, in the almost
complete absence of empirical evidence, was not prepared to adopt such
theories, even although they were methodologically sound. Thus, declared
opponents of evolutionism and non-evolutionists in general in the eighteenth
century numbered not only the champions of religious orthodoxy, but also the
great majority of educated men. The embittered conflict which raged in the
later nineteenth century between anti-Darwinian theologians and certain
militant and atheistic adherents of Darwin's ideas mads the whole issue
appear much clearer-cut than it had previously been, and than it has again
become within the last few decades.
Secondly, in examining the problems of the history of life on earth and
the classification of existing organisms, Herder and most of his contempo¬
raries were much less influenced by the orthodox Christian tradition than by
the metaphysical doctrine of a "Chain", "Ladder" or "Scale of Being". As
A.O. Lovejoy points out in his classic history of thi3 doctrine, it is
derived, like so many other conceptions common to both scientific and mystical
thought, from the Platonic tradition, and ultimately from the "Timaeus" of
Plato himself a. Thienemanh*"^^ and Basil Willey*"^' have also made
excellent contributions to the history of this ancient conception. Compre¬
hending both real and ideal entities in one symmetrical, unifying series,
gratifying the aesthetic sensibility, and influencing both science and
mysticism throughout many centuries, this basically a priori and metaphysical
conception dominated European thought concerning the sequence of forms in
biology and the relation of the earthly hierarchy to that of the transcen¬
dental plane until the late eighteenth century. In this latter century, as
Lovejoy shows, it began to assume a dynamic significance, and became
"temporalised", in an ideal and metaphysical sense at first, and was finally
superseded in science by the empirical theory of evolution by descent. It
was Leibniz, above all others, who inaugurated this "temporalisation" of the
Chain of Being.
All this tends to show that, in the eighteenth century, theories of the
compass and succession of life were usually set in the framework of an
ancient metaphysical scheme, which had a much greater influence upon biolo¬
gical thought (and especially upon Herder's, as we shall later see) than had
either the Scriptures or the empirical data of palaeontology, genetics, etc.
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concerning the history of life on earth. As we shall shortly see, the
doctrine of a Chain of Being could be and was applied in so many ways by
Herder and his contemporaries that we should consider the theory of trans-
formism or evolution by descent only as one possible consequence of a much
wider and basically a priori scheme. To discuss the ideas of thinkers of
that age only in relation to the Darwinian theory, for example, is to do them
an injustice; it serves only as a test of their modernity by the standards
of a later age, and it is valueless unless it is complemented by a compara¬
tive study of scientific methods in their age and Darwin's; such a more
limited approach must fail to reveal the full extent of their ideas in
relation to the knowledge and beliefs of their age.
With these considerations in mind, we shall proceed to examine Herder's
ideas on the various problems of phylogeny, beginning with that of the
origin of life.
a) The 5£igi£_o£_lii*e •
(i) The origin of living organisms other than man.
Unlike the problem of evolution by descent, that of the origin of life
as Herder deals with it has been generally ignored by critics. Since it
involves a choice between creation by a higher being and natural emergence,
it implicates theological issues more than most of his other biological ideas.
The clearest statement in the „Ideen" on the origin of life is as
follows:183^
Und siehe da, alles dies fafit unser Naturweise [i.e. Moses] in
eine Stimme des Weltschopfers zusammen, die, wie sie das Licht
hervorrief und damit der Luft sich zu lautern, dem Meer zu
sinken, der Erde allmalich hervorzugehen befahl, d.i. lauter
wirksame Krafte des Naturkreises in Bewegung setzte, so auch
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der Erde, den Wassern, dem Staube befiehlt, daB jedes derselben
organische Wesen nach seiner Art hervorbringe und sich die
Schopfung also durch eigne diesen Elementen eingepflanzte
Krafte selbst belebe.
As usual, Herder avoids making a direct choice between extremes and combines
them. Creation does take place, but only through the mediation of natural
causes. Similarly, Matthew Hale, in a work which Herder possessed,1^ said
in 1660 that the earth itself, when life first appeared upon it, „als ein
Werkzeug mit der obersten wurckenden Ursache concurriret und das Ihrige zu
solcher Wurckung beigetragen habe"
As Herder makes clear in his „Gott", the creation and sustenance of the
universe is effected by „Krafte", which are ultimately of a divine nature,
yet which can perform physical functions (and, as we have seen, are often
actually identified with known physical agencies). In a remarkable passage
recently published by Dobbek as an appendix to Einsiedel's „Ideen", Herder
1861
(for he i3 the author of the passage in question, according to Dobbek )
writes
Die Urkraft war so lange dem Ohngefahr unterworfen, bi3 sie die
schwer zu erobernden und mit vielen leidenden Erfahrungen
verknupften KenntniBe der Ur [lacuna in text] bewuBtseins=
loser Substanzen erwerben und sich selber unterwerfen konnte.
—- Jetzt hat Gott die Natur kennen gelernt.
The dating of this passage is uncertain, but its unorthodoxy is beyond
question. We can thus so far conclude that Herder's theory of creation was
by no means orthodox, and that he envisaged a protracted process of creation
in time, not a short-lived creative activity on the part of the divinity.
This is confirmed by our earlier study of his cosmogony.
We also noticed in our section on cosmogony that the "elements" acted,
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for Herder, as subordinate agents or secondary causes in the creation of the
earth. We can now add that they performed a similar function in the
creation of life itself, in conjunction with the organic „Krafte" at work
within them. Thus, he says that the largest and most powerful animals are
still found in areas „wo die Krafte der Natur am wirksamsten sind."1^"^ He
also says of the prolific species found in certain parts of Asia:^^
sie treffen am me is ten auf die Gegenden, wo die elektrische
Kraft der Sonne, der Luft, der Erde im grofiesten Strom ist.
This recalls the Lucretian theory that the stronger "elements" of the early
earth produced the first living organisms, although, in Herder's case, the
theory is tempered by those „Krafte" which, as we know, permit of either a
physical or a hyper-physical construction. But conversely, he writes of the
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colder, inclement regions of the earth: '
-— da scheinen sich auch nimmer jene Geschopfe zu entwiekeln,
zu deren Bildung das ganze Spiel der Elektricitat gehoret.
(We should recall at this point that "electricity", in such contexts, is
equivalent for Herder to heat or "elemental fire".) On another occasion in
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the „Ideen", he says of the earth: '
—- hatten sich die Erdharze, die Schwefel in der Henge auf ihr
gefunden, in der sich jetzt der Sand, der Thon, und endlich die
gute fruchtbare Erde findet: welch andre Geschopfe hatten auf
ihr leben mussen!
Thus, life was produced by „Krafte", themselves at once divine and physically
efficient, through the medium of the "elements" and natural substances found
on the earth.
Although the creation of new forms has ceased on this planet, the same
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"elements" and „Krafte" which originally gave it life may still operate on
193)
other heavenly bodies. Herder declares in the „Adrastea":
Der flussige Aether wird einst auch dem Monde Leben geben und
Gedeihen und Wachsthum.
All this brings us to consider the theory of spontaneous generation,
which we did not mention in our discussion of embryology, since it is more
closely bound up with theories of the origin of life as a whole. In the
form in which it was current in Herder's day, the theory taught that living
organisms, particularly lower and even microscopic ones, may be generated
spontaneously from inanimate substances, under certain conditions, without
being reproduced from previously existing parent organisms.
In Herder's day, the embryologies! theory of epigenesis was nearly
always associated with spontaneous generation. In fact, it was largely
to avoid accepting the theory of spontaneous generation that some scientists,
such as Swainmerdam, rejected epigenesis in favour of the preformation hypo¬
thesis. But throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages, it was almost
universally believed that lower organisms at least could be generated
spontaneously, and this belief was not deemed heretical by the Christian
Church, since even St. Augustine had accepted it.^"^ Indeed, as Zockler
observes, certain passages of the Book of Genesis can be construed in terms
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of spontaneous generation. ' Such a verse as the following may serve as
an example
And God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature
after his kind
And Genesis 1, 20 suggested to some exegetes that birds were first created
in, or by the waters of the oceans.
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However, such ideas were much in dispute in the eighteenth century.
On the one hand, notable epigeneticists such as Neectham believed in the
ancient theory,^9) whereas all preformation!sts rejected it, as did various
experimenters such as Spallanzani200^ in 1766. Already in 1668, Redi had
disproved by experiment many supposed instances of spontaneous generation.201^
But even in the early nineteenth century before Pasteur finally disproved all
the cases hitherto suggested, Lamarck and others, many of whom were influ¬
enced by the current predilection for epi genesis among the ,}Katurphilosophen'',
202
still believed that the phenomenon can, and does, take place all around us.
Herder may well have accepted this theory in his Riga years, as when he
says that the ideal art-critic arises spontaneously amidst inferior artistic
productions „als sich nach der altesten und neuesten Philosophie das Lebendige
gebiert, aus einer gahrenden Fettigkeit: es sei diese der Nilschlamm oder
Chaldaens rothe Erde, das Chaos des Epikurs, Oder Needhams faulender
Tropfen."20^ But although he never applies the hypothesis directly to
embryology (i.e. ontogeny), hints of it appear in the .jldeen", applied in
this case to the phylogenetic emergence of animal species on the early earth.
He says of the smaller fauna of the Americas:20^
Mit Muhe haben sich diese gleichsam aus dem warmen Schlamm
losgewunden.
He likewise calls the sloth „ein Klumpe des Schlamraes, der sich zur thieri=:
schen Organisation erhoben."20^ However, the „gleichsam" of the first
quotation shows that he did not mean such statements to be accepted without
reservation. He uses the theory of spontaneous generation only to explain
how life was originally created, but never applies it to the origin of man,
as we shall see. He describes the original creation of life in vague terms,
and „Krafte", with all their associations, are introduced alongside the more
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overtly materialistic conception of the "elements" and generation by matter
and heat. His final words on spontaneous generation by the animating power
of heat are as follows:20^
Noch jetzt scheint die Sonne, wie sie im Anfange der Schopfung
schien; sie erweckt und organisirt aber keine neuen Geschlechter:
denn auch aus der Faulnis wurde die Warms nicht das kleinste
Lebendige entwickeln, v/exrn die Kraft seiner Schopfung nicht sohon
zum nachsten Uebergange daselbst bereit lage.
Besides, as he often reiterates, the "elements" themselves have now lost much
of their early vigour.
However, he leaves us in no doubt that he believed that organisms were
created successively, as Rouchd points out;20^ the lowest forms arose first,
and the higher forms later. In fact, even the Book of Genesis names such a
sequence, but without the longer time-scale and the palaeontological evidence
adduced by Herder and various of his contemporaries. He first says in the
„Ideen" that many plants must have flourished and perished before the first
„Thierorganisation" appeared.21^ Later, he is more explicit
Das Brennbare in der Luft beforderte vielleicht den Kiesel zur
Kalkerde, und in dieser organisirten sich die ersten Lebendigen
des Meers, die Schalengeschopfe.
He goes on to speak of „die Muschelform, in die der Kiesel 3pringt"s2^"'j' thus
again suggesting that the first living forms were generated spontaneously.
After the sea-creatures, the plants arose.21"*; And in the „Ideen", Part II,
he again declares that shellfish arose first, followed by plants, and then
the larger animals, such as the elephants and rhinoceroses now found as
212)fossils. ' But in another passage from the same work he allows the Mosaic
narrative, which he here mentions (not Buffon, as Sauter2"^' supposes), to
modify his earlier conclusions, and suggests another order of succession,
thus contradicting his earlier statements, as the critic observes
Die Vegetation geht voraus Der fruchtbare Schoos des
Meers folgte mit seinen Geburten.
These two views need not be mutually contradictory, however, if we assume
that Herder meant that land-plants arose before the more advanced sea-
creatures, while the shellfish etc. emerged even before the plants. But
partly because of his own unwillingness to commit himself to any exclusive
explanation, and perhaps partly because palaeontologies! evidence was as yet
scant and ambiguous, he does not enter into such details.
However, he usually says that life first arose in the oceans,2"*"^ and
justifies his belief by the "precipitation" theory of the earth's origin,
already discussed, which states that the primeval air, laden with various
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extraneous materials, could not at first support life on land. " The
o|Q\
theory of the marine origin of life had previously been held by Anaximander, ''
de Maillet,2^"*^ Pallas22^ and others; Herder had read works by the two
latter writers. Goethe, of course, shared this belief, and Knebel, in a
letter to Herder in 1789, later (no doubt under the influence of Herder and
Goethe) put forward a more detailed "chemical" theory according to which
early life was spontaneously generated in the oceans by the aid of marine
salt.221^
Thus, it appears that Herder supported a broadly naturalistic theory of
the origin of non-human life, and, like most epigeneticists, believed in some
form of spontaneous generation, in which his „Krafte" played an important
part. This aspect of his biological thought has been almost completely
ignored by the critics hitherto. But, since his „Krafte" can be interpreted
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in so many ways, we cannot finally say that he held a materialistic theory
of the origin of life in the same way as Lucretius, for example. Living
organisms arose in a natural succession, in which ill-defined „Krafts" acted
in an unspecified manner: 222>
f m ■
die Gattungen der Geschopfe folgten einander, wie sie ihrer
Natur und ihrem Medium nach wirklioh warden konnten.
(ii) |b|=2gisia_gC=iig*
Christian theology, in Herder's day, could in no way be reconciled with
naturalistic theories of the creation of man. In this question, there was
no room for those "compromise" hypotheses of which Herder was so fond. Just
as he analysed the origins of human history in terms of divine first causes,
so also did he explain the actual creation of man. This section, therefore,
will provide the religious counterpart to the last, which covered Herder's
relatively naturalistic ideas on the origin of other forms of life.
In the „2lteste Urkunde", written during his most religious phase, he
rejects the naturalistic theory of man's origin which Maupertuis had put
forward ;22"^
War der Mensch das Geschopf Gottes, und nicht -— Ein Zufall
des Zufalls? ein Kothwerk des bildenden Nils
And in the same work, he says:22^
— alles wirst du in Adam finden, und in dem kleinen Umlauf,
der ihm ward.
Although he is less explicit in the „Ideen", he does not seem to have altered
his opinion, for he calls human beings the „Lieblinge der Natur", implying
that their lot is associated with a special providence.22"^
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In our section on diluvial theories and the Noachian Flood, we noticed
that Herder believed that not one, but many Noahs may have survived cata¬
clysms such as the Scriptural Deluge.22^ By the same logic, he ought to
have accepted the co-adamite or autochthon hypothesis, suggested by several
writers of his age. These thinkers maintained that a plurality of Adams
may have appeared in various parts of the earth, and they usually used this
theory to explain the origin of the human races, postulating black, red and
227)
yellow Adams for the respective races. ' But Herder never wavers from
the monophyletic Biblical account. He dismisses the autochthon hypothesis
as early as in 1770, in his famous essay on language,''2^ and in 1774, he
229)twice affirms that man arose from a single pair. Using his wit as well
as his acumen, he cites the celebrated case of the "porcupine man" in
England, who was born covered with bristles:2^0'
—- hatte der Stachelschweinmann, der schon einen Sohn nach
seinem Bilde zeugte, sein Geschlecht fortgesetzt, so hatte
gewifi ein Stachelschweinadam —- erdacht warden mussen.
His view is unaltered in the „Ideen".2^°'' We may here add that Blumenbach2^2''
Kant,2*^' Linneus,2^ and Zimmermana,2^*' among writers whose works were
known to Herder, also believed that the human species originated from a
single stock, while Boulanger, Voltaire and Home, as Rouche observes,2^ as
well as Georg Forster and Goethe, as Bruntsch notices,2*^; were thinkers
Herder knew who upheld the autochthon theory.
Herder likewise repudiated the pre-adamite hypothesis ,2^ according to
which men existed before Adam. Buffon had entertained this belief, as
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Sauter points out, ' and so had all those geological catastrophists, such
as Bonnet, who believed that periodic cataclysms overwhelm the earth,
destroying all life, which again emerges, in superior forms, from preformed
"germs" which remain unscathed during the upheaval. Here again, Herder
adheres to the Biblical narrative.
In the „Ideen", he says that the idyllic valley of Kashmir was probably
the earliest home of man, the Garden of Eden of the Old Testament.2^^ In
the „Journal" of 1769, he had already asked himself where man originated, as
he reflected upon the great migrations of peoples within historical times.
He weighed the various current hypotheses, without finally deciding between
them.241) In a sketch of 1772, he first names Asia as the homeland of
man.242' He further specifies the „Hohe Asiens" as the oldest seat of human
culture in his „Vom Geist der ebraischen Poesie" of 1782,24"^ and many times
in the „Ideen", he suggests that Asia, particularly its mountain massif, was
the site of man's creation,244^ finally naming Kashmir as the exact locality.
It is probable that he first encountered the latter idea in Kant's
lectures on physical geography in Konigsberg. In Herder's unpublished
notes on these lectures (but not in Rink's later published version of Kant's
lectures as it appears in complete editions of Kant's works), Kashmir is
called a „Parad[ies] zw[ischen] Gebirg[en]";2^"^ this, of course, immedi¬
ately suggests a connection with the Garden of Eden. However, Buffon24^)
had said that the area around Kashmir and Tibet witnessed man's first
appearance, and Pallas, in a work read by Herder, named the valleys to the
south of the Asian highlands in the same connection,2^'' while Zimmerraann,
less specifically, said that man first arose in the Asian mountains.24^)
(¥/e may observe in passing that it was from such beginnings that the "Aryan"
myth arose.)
But before Herder reached his final conviction that man first arose in
Asia, he deliberated on two alternative theories. In a „Schulrede" on
geography, probably delivered in 1784, he names the Caucasus mountains in
conjunction with the „Hohe Asiens" as the place from which human histoiy
began.His friend Einsiedel had written in notes copied by Herder that
the country around the (mythical) Mountains of the Moon in the unknown
interior of Africa is inhabited by "unmixed" races.2*>0/ Herder did not
himself suggest that man ever arose independently in this locality, but he
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does say that these mountains may be an flErd=£ucken", 'a term he usually
reserves for the Himalayas, and that „manche gluckliche und ruhige Nation",
as yet undiscovered, may dwell around them.^j2/ Perhaps Kinsiedel's belief
can ultimately be traced back to Genesis 2, 13, where it is said that the
second river flowing from Paradise encompasses Ethiopia, known before the
eighteenth century to be a mountainous country; but it was Ptolemy's map
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which first marked the legendary Mountains of the Moon, a name which
captured the imagination of the would-be African explorer Einsiedel, and
through him, his friend Herder.
One further feature of Herder's ideas on human origins deserves atten¬
tion. He accepted the Biblical statements concerning the unusual longevity
of the early patriarchs.Like Burnet, whose work he knew, he suggested
that this longevity was possible because more clement climatic conditions
prevailed before the earth's axis shifted.
Thus, we conclude that Herder accepted the Biblical narrative on the
creation of man, as did most thinkers of his age, and that he did not extend
the naturalistic explanations he had used in discussing the origins of other
forms of life to human origins. In determining the place in which man first
appeared, he followed the theories of certain contemporary writers whom we
have named above.
Before we proceed to examine theories of evolution, a word must be said
about the arrangement of topics within this chapter. The "Chain of Being"
conception, as we have already remarked, provides a convenient and appropri¬
ate frame of reference in relation to which all ideas on evolution (and
classification) in the eighteenth century, and Herder's ideas in particular,
can be assessed. Now this "Chain" can be considered basically in four
different ways in relation to biology. Firstly, it can be seen as a static
series of natural entities, arranged in the gradually ascending order of
their relative complexity; we have already studied this application in our
section on classificatioxi, but a few further remarks will be added in the
present chapter. Secondly, it can be seen as a dynamic series of natural
entities; this corresponds either to the theory of successive creation, in
time, of living species, from simple to complex (already discussed in our
last section), or, in its later equivalent, to the modern theory of the
evolution of species by descent (which we shall examine in the present
chapter). Thirdly, it can be applied as a static series of ideal entities,
a hierarchy comprising not only the known earthly forms of life, but also
transcendental beings such as angels and even the putative denizens of other
planets or stars: this application is also relevant to Herder's thought, and
we shall discuss it in this chapter. Fourthly, it can be envisaged as a
dynamic series of ideal entities; this corresponds to "dynamistic" theories
of developing „Krafte", to the ideas of metempsychosis and palingenesis, and
to other related conceptions, which we shall study as they appear in Herder's
works.
We shall begin by discussing the first of these applications of the
"Chain of Being" in the thought of Herder and his age; this is the static
series of natural entities, particularly animal species, on earth.
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b) Jhe,.static_series_of_natural_entiti83£ ^®_2£2^1®S_2C_SiM2i£i2§Si22*
In our sections on the universal "type", on the comparative and analo¬
gical methods, on classification, and on the "levels of organisation", we
saw that Herder treated the known and visible portion of the "Chain of Being",
which extends from formless, inanimate matter up to the human organism, in a
broadly naturalistic way, and that he advocated some relatively modem methods
of biological classification.
One of his major achievements in this connection was to realise that a
fundamental similarity obtains among all animal forms. As Siegel says, such
a realisation was a necessary precondition of the nineteenth century theory
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of evolution by descent, ' and Thienemann correctly relates this later
doctrine to the older belief in a natural "Chain of Being"
Der Gedanke der „naturlichea Stufenfolge" oder der „Kontinuitat
in der Natur" gab so eine Grundlage ab, auf und aus der der
Deszendenzgedanke mit hervorging.
Herder, in fact, already speaks of a natural ,sKette"2-^' or „Leiter der
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Wesen" ' in the HJournal" of 1769, and it appreciably influenced many of
his later ideas, as we have seen in various earlier sections. He describes
the same natural sequence in the MIdeen". As Siegel acutely observes,2*^'
some passages in which Herder appears to be describing a dynamic (i.e.
Darwinistic) succession of organisms are simply new enumerations of the
static series of forms in the natural "Chain". One such ambiguous passage
from the „Ideen", quoted by Siegel, should illustrate this:2^G^
So gehet's aus dem Staube der Wurmer, aus den Kalkhausern der
Muschelthiere, aus den Gespinnsten der Insekten allmalich in
mehr gegliederte, hohere Organisationen. Durch die Amphibien
gehets zu den Landthieren hinauf —- (etc.)
In another similar passage, which Siegel also quotes, Herder really only says
that organisms emerged or were created successively, not that they are
descended from one another.2^"^
However, the vary circumstance that descriptions of the static series
of natural forms, in accordance with the "Chain of Being" conception, can
seem so deceptively close to the dynamic Darwinian theory, corroborates our
initial contention that this ancient conception of a gradually ascending
natural hierarchy was a necessary step towards the modern theory of the
evolution of species by descent.
e) ?ha_dynMic_series_of_natural_9ntitie3£_ the groblem_of evolution,
(i) The theory of transformism, or evolution by descent.3rrs=r:=:rtt:s=:r!fc==::=s^=:sr2R5r=ts=rr:r=:=T£:K=22rr:~»:s=:22::s:r=:r::5=t!i::r5::=r::s:=:;2:r:
We can freely say from the outset that Herder did not believe that
extant plant and animal species have evolved by descent from each other or
from extinct common ancestors. The long and needless controversy which
raged among Herder critics over this question has been admirably analysed
by M. Rouche in his "Herder, prdcurseur de Darwin? Histoire d'un myths"
(19¥3). As Roueh^ points out, Herder did accept the idea of gradual
evolution in astronomy and geology, but he never applied it to the community
of living species.2^2^ In this section, we shall confine ourselves to a
brief summary of the evidence from Herder's works, with some reference to
earlier criticism and a few remarks on the ideas of Herder's contemporaries.
Herder uses the word „Svolutionen" in 1792, but not in connection with
biology; he uses it to describe gradual development, as opposed to more
violent „Revolutionen", in both history and geology. wor(j was aiso
used in biology in the eighteenth century, but only as a synonym for the
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"preformation" hypothesis of the embryo, and it only acquired its present
meaning at a later date.
Three sentences selected from the „Ideen" may show conclusively that
Herder did not believe that species have evolved by descent. The first is
as follows: ^
Kein Geschopf ist aus seiner ursprunglichen Organisation gegangen.
In the second, he says that man and the apes were never „Ein' und dieselbe
Gattung".And thirdly, he describes an ancient Tibetan evolutionary
myth as „diese entehrende Tradition, —— die den Menschen vom Affen her=
leitet".2^^ Besides, we noticed in our section on the origin of life and
of man that he believed the creation of new species to have ceased long ago,
whereas the modern theory of evolution teaches that the process continues
indefinitely.
Notwithstanding these unambiguous utterances of Herder's, numerous
critics, as Rouche shows, have attempted to prove that Herder was a precursor
of Darwin. We may add to those named by Rouchd the Marxist Reimann, who
declares in 1929 r,daB wir hier [i.e. in the HIdeen"], achtzig Jahre vor
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Darwin, nahezu glauben konnen Darwin zu lesen". ' Even after Rouche '3
work appeared, E. Neumann, in an article of 1941, contends;2^
Herders Verdiensta um die Entwicklungstheorie sind bisher nicht
gewurdigt worden Er ist unverstanden geblieben.
And, even in 1954, Harich declares, without sufficiently qualifying his
assertion:
Geologisch und biologisch nimrnt er [i.e. Herder] den entwick=
lungsgeschichtlichen Standpunkt von Lamarck, Lyell und Darwin
vorweg
A word must also be said about the ideas which prevailed in Herder's
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age concerning the history of living species. Lovejoy notices that Leibniz
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had briefly expounded a theory of evolution by descent in 1710; naming
Maupertuis, Diderot, Monboddo and others, he says in another work that the
decade 1745-1755 saw the first appearance of the modem evolutionary theory
in its basic elements,^^ and later adds that it wa3 "almost a commonplace"
in Herder's day.^(i' Houche more guardedly writes that vaguely evolutionary
ideas are to be found in the works of Buffon and de Maillet, both of which
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Herder knew, ' but Kohlbrugge lists 34 writers who, he claims, believed in
273)
some kind of evolution at or before Herder's time. '
However, as we earlier remarked, all of these earlier evolutionary
theories lacked that foundation of exact evidence from palaeontology and
genetics which the nineteenth century eventually accumulated, and some of
them, like those of the pre-Socratic philosophers and of primitive mythology,
were totally fantastic. Moreover, we cannot agree that the theory was a
"commonplace" in Herder's day, as Lovejoy claims. As Clark^^*" and several
other critics have noticed, Kant, when he realised in his review of Herder's
„Ideen", Part I, that the animal "type" and the numerous analogies between
species which Herder had so vehemently emphasised could be explained by a
relationship through descent, at once hastened to
Nur eine Verwandtschaft unter ihnen [i.e. animal species]
wurde auf Ideen fuhren, die aber so ungeheuer sind, daJ3 die
Vemunft von ihnen zuruekbebt, dergleichen man unserm Verfasser
[i.e. Herder] ohne ungerecht zu sein, nicht beimessen darf.
This is not a reaction we should expect in face of a "commonplace". Further¬
more, even although Kant later used the evolutionary theory as a working
("regulative") hypothesis in 1790, as Lovejoy also notices,it is clear
from his review of Herder's work that he considered it too extravagant an
idea to be taken literally for a single moment. Of other early theories
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of evolution, some, like that of the older Linneus, J were applied only to
a few species or varieties, and others, like those of Maupertuis and Diderot,
not only lacked detailed support, but, especially in France, arose within a
philosophical movement whose aim was as much to question nearly all tradi¬
tional values as to advance scientific knowledge. Besides, the shorter
geological time-scale in which nearly all thinkers then believed made it
hard to imagine that all known species could have evolved by descent in so
short a time.
Thus Herder, in denying the theory of evolution by descent, which he had
undoubtedly encountered in works of some of the above-named writers, most of
whom he mentions at some time or other, was quite typical of his age. Like
Kant, he doubtless found it impossible to accept such theories literally,
because of the difficulties we have named. His theological beliefs would
certainly never have allowed him to admit that man had evolved from other
*
less advanced species, as we saw in discussing human origins. But just as
he was quite prepared to admit that other forms of life could be generated
spontaneously, finding theology no obstacle here, so also had he no theolo¬
gical reason for denying that species other than man have evolved by natural
descent; here as before, he could easily have used a „Kraft" theory of
evolutionary change to leave the way open for more than one interpretation.
In fact, he raises no objection whatsoever to the notion of Pallas, whom he
quotes in this connection, that the dog is descended from the jackal.
We conclude that Herder's religious beliefs would always have made it
impossible for him to accept the idea that man evolved from lower creatures,
but that his reason for believing that other species did not evolve by
descent was not a theological one; it was rather because current evolutionary
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theories seemed extreme, ill-founded, and generally incredible to most men
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of his age. Yet as Lovejoy declares:
Herder's book [i.e. the „Ideen"] is certainly full of
apergus that come near to the evolution theory; and it
unquestionably helped to produce a state of mind favourable
to the acceptance of the theory.
This was not because Herder entertained any serious belief in evolution, but
because, along with certain other writei*s of his age, he drew important
naturalistic conclusions from the ancient conception of a static Chain of
Being, as we earlier saw, and because he helped to lend it a new temporal or
dynamic significance. We shall return to such temporal applications later.
(ii ) Palag2gtoio^_and_the _ theo^_of_natural_|ele ction.
The science of palaeontology was only in its infancy in Herder's age.
Such men as Camper and Merck had begun to suspect the great antiquity of
fossil remains, but they usually erred in relating them too closely to
existing species.Buffon had postulated a longer time-scale and
extensive climatic changes in order to account for the presence of fossil
tropical animals in the North, while Forster,^^ Blumenbaeh^*^ and a
few others were beginning to realise that such remains as the recently
discovered saurian petrefacts of Ohio were those of species long extinct.
Zimmermann tried to circumvent this problem by saying that such apparently
extinct fossiliferous species probably still survived on earth, but had not
yet been discovered; he further stressed the difficulty of correctly
reconstructing fossil skeletons.Woodward first put forward the sedi¬
mentation theory of fossils, but, like most others at that time, he linked
his theory too closely to the Koachi&n Deluge,and Goethe, in a much-
quoted letter to Merck in 1782, declared, probably under Buffon's inspira-
tion=2S6>
Es wird nun bald die Zeit kommen, wo man Versteinerungen nicht
mehr durch einander werfen, sondern verhaltniBmaBig zu den
Epochea der Welt rangiren wird.
But alongside such relatively enlightened views, more naive and fanciful
ideas survived. The noted scientist Sommering suggested to Merck in 1786
that the fossil mammoth might have been a cross-breed („Bastardw) between
the elephant and the rhinoceros,and another of Merck's correspondents
suggested in 1783 that the larger tropical animals found as fossils in
Northern Europe were the remains of circus animals imported for Roman enter¬
tainments.^^" Voltaire declared that fossil 3hells found at high altitudes
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on land were pious relics dropped by pilgrims returning from the Holy Land.
Herder had encountered the ideas of all these thinkers (with the
probable exception of the amateur palaeontologist who appealed to the Romans'
love of circuses). He realised in 1769 that marine fossils on land had been
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deposited during prolonged periods of sedimentation in the early oceans. '
Like Woodward, he came to associate the larger fossils in the North with a
sudden inundation, but, unlike some of the more fanciful writers, he did not
contend that they had been swept bodily from the tropics, and said, like
Buffon, that they tvere overwhelmed in their usual habitat while the Northern
291)climate was warmer. He cites both Buffon and Pallas on the tropical
remains in the North,and, like G-oetha (end probably under his influence),
he upholds the stratigraphic method, contending that different fossils occur
in different strata, which date from successive periods, and he correctly
says that the higher strata contain the remains of more advanced creatures
than the lower ones, adding that the supposed fossil "men" in lower strata
181.
are not authentic.2"^ On another occasion, he readily concedes that the
North American fossils may include those of extinct animals,2"^ and says
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elsewhere that the mammoth is now extinct.
Thus, Herder's views on palaeontology are representative of the more
advanced trends in that subject in his day, and (with the exception of the
diluvial hypothesis, common in contemporary geology) are in no way influenced
by theological considerations.
Since Herder believed that certain species have become extinct, we might
readily imagine that he had some inkling of the evolutionary principle now
known as "natural selection". We analysed the methodological implications
of this doctrine in our sections on dialectics and natural law, and discovered
that Herder often uses it as a method of describing natural processes and
dynamic equilibria. But he applies it to the history of life only in a
non-evolutionary sense. Some older species may disappear, he believes, but
no new ones are created. A new equilibrium is reached, and, while indi¬
viduals may perish, most species succeed in surviving. Several utterances
to this effect occur in the „Ideen",2^^ and, as we earlier noticed, the
theory of universal conflict enunciated in the 1769 manuscript published by
Irmscher is of a similar, but more general kind.
Kuhnemann has drawn attention to this idea of Herder's,2*^ and Lovejoy,
as we earlier saw, says that such insights undoubtedly influenced later
theories of natural selection, even if they did not fully anticipate Darwin's
evolutionary version.2*^ Gotz shows that Herder's idea of the "survival
of the fittest" does not imply that new species evolve, and rightly says
that this struggle helps only to preserve existing species.2^ Schmidt=
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Curtow is of the same opinion,which Rouchd also shares.
As we earlier remarked, Lucretius, Hobbas, and (in Herder's lifetime)
Maithus and Adam Smith put forward similar ideas, but, of these thinkers,
only Lucretius applied his version of the hypothesis to the whole community
of animal species, and said that some earlier species were less equipped
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for survival than others:
Thus, doomed by Chance, they liv'd an easy Prey
To all, and thus their Kinds did soon decay.
Einsiedel had similar ideas; this becomes specially clear from certain
passages in his „Ideen", which Dobbek recently published from Herder's
transcripts. Einsiedel says of animal species
Was vertilgt werden kann, ists langst worden.
In another passage, he says of them:^^
Sie vertilgen und werden vertilgt, doch nie ausgerottet.
But, like Herder and Lucretius, he does not suggest that new species emerge
in the process. Bonnet also had believed that a form of natural selection
takes place, as Rouche points out, but only in the form of progress towards
a superior natural equilibrium.*^"^ Ray, whom Herder also mentions, had
likewise mentioned such theories, but only to reject them as a "grand subter¬
fuge of the Atheists"Maupertuis revived Lucretius' theory that the
more poorly equipped species produced by fortuitous creation soon became
extinct, g^d Buffon declared:
Tout ce qui ne se nuit point assez pour se d^truire, tout
ce qui peut subsister ensemble, subsists —-
Such theories of struggle are also related to the Chain of Being conception,
for the Chain, between whose "links" transitions were thought to be gradual,
postulated a "full" universe, a plenum; Leibniz expressed this consequence
in his "principle of plenitude". But since a full universe involves beings
of all possible kinds, struggle is inevitable, yet the equilibrium of the
Chain is preserved. By Herder's time, palaeontological discoveries were
beginning to modify this doctrine, since some thinkers realised that whole
species could, and actually had become extinct. Thu3 the revised theory of
struggle meant that whole links in the Chain could drop out. This was half¬
way between the principle of plenitude and the theory of natural selection.
We conclude that Herder's theory of the "survival of the fittest" was
quite different from Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. It
was not peculiar to him either, but had been applied to biology, in a
similar way, by several earlier thinkers. The roots of Herder'3 theory of
struggle, as they are revealed in his 1769 manuscript on planetary souls,
were thoroughly Lucretian and non-teleological, although this theory became
blended with the teleological conception of increasing progress towards
eventual social equilibrium when Herder applied it to human history in the
„Ideen".
(iii) The. theor.y_of^evolution by adaptation^ the^_rSles of environmental
determinism and heredity; the evolution of the races of man.
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It can be shown that Herder's theory of environmental determinism has
four main connotations. The first is the idea that living organisms are
physically changed by the influence of their environment; we shall discuss
this idea in the present section. The second is the theory that the psycho¬
logical constitution of the human individual is shaped by its external
environment; we have already examined this conception while reviewing
Herder's attempts to solve the so-called "problem of perception". The
third application might be called the theory of sociological or cultural
determinism. This is the best knovm side of Herder's theory of environment,
and it is manifest in his writings from an early date. It is, in fact, the
famous theory of "milieu", which states that all social and cultural
phenomena, including works of art, can be understood only in relation to
their environment, in the widest possible sense of this term. We made some
reference to this idea in our earlier studies of Herder's "genetic method",
his sociological pseudo-laws, and the supposed „Analogie" between physical
and moral worlds. In the present section we shall add a few further remarks
upon it. Fourthly, the theory of environmental determinism, when applied
either to individual or to social psychology, raises the philosophical
problem of free will in its relation to determinism. We dealt briefly with
this topic when we analysed the problems of causality and of natural laws in
Herder's thought; some interesting observations upon it are to be found in
the article and book of &.A. Wells.
However, let us now pass on to the theory of physical determinism, since
it is directly relevant to the problem of evolution. How Herder suggested
several (basically three) different and contradictory answers to the
problem of perception - i.e. a deterministic or objectivistic one, a theory
of ,tAnalogie", which implied that subject and object are preadapted to one
another, and a subjectivistic one which emphasised the power of the subject
itself to shape its perceptions of the external world. He answered the
problem of natural law and the social world in the same complex way - i.e.
he sometimes adopted a deterministic approach, suggesting that objective
physical laws actually influence the mental or moral world, at other times
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he maintained that the two worlds are "analogical" or preadapted to one
another, and yet again, he attributed to natural laws such values as beauty
and wisdom, which are normally associated only with the (emotive) subject.
We shall now discover that he follows exactly the same procedure in dealing
with the problem of physical determinism, or of the relation between the
organism and its environment. (Such parallelisms between different levels
are a striking feature of Herder's thought; we have tried to explain how
they came about in our sections on holism and on parallel "levels of
organisation".) Firstly, he frequently suggests, after the manner of
Lamarck, that the organism can be physically changed by environmental
influences, and that such changes are inherited. At other times he seems
to suggest that the organism and its environment are teleologically pre-
adapted to one another. And thirdly, he often declares that the inward
influence of heredity is much more powerful than any external determinants.
In the „Ideen", as we shall see, he considers that, in the long run,
environment and heredity are almost equally important, just as he concluded,
in psychology and sociology respectively, that subject and object, and
natural law and moral order, perform equally important functions.
Firstly, we shall examine the ways in which organisms can be physically
influenced by their environment.
A. Animal adaptation.
Herder often says that the organism is adapted to its environment, as in
the following passage,which Siegel^11; also quotes:
Der Vogel fliegt in der Luft: jede Abweichung seiner Form vom
Bau der Landthiere lafit sich aus seinem Element erklaren; sobald
er die Erde beruhrt, wird er (wie in Fledermausen und Vampyrs)
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dem Gerippe des Menschen ahnlich. Der Fisch schwimmt im
Wasser; Sobald er die Erde beruhrt, wickelt er wie die
Manati wenigstens die VorderfuBe los, und das Weib bekommt
Bruste.
312)
As Siegel remarks, ' this passage does not imply that any evolutionary
change takes place in time. It simply describes, without explaining, the
adaptation of the organism to its environment, and shows how Herder, like
many of his contemporaries, was lad by the doctrine of the Chain of Being,
between whose links transitions were supposed to be gradual, to contemplate
"transitional" creatures like bats, the msnati, and (on other occasions) the
zoophytes, hydra, etc.
In other parts of the wIdeen", Herder is more explicit, and explains
adaptation by the direct influence of climate. A few examples may illus¬
trate this:
Mannichfaltigkeit des Erdreichs und der Luft macht Spielarten
an Pflanzan, vde an Thieren und Menschen. 313)
Auch die Gattungen, die fast uberall auf der Erde leben,
gestalten sich bainahe in je&em Clima anders. 314)
Die Bewohner kunftiger Klimate werden uns nicht gleichen. 315)
As Siegel^"^ and Rouche3"*"^ point out, he sometimes explains racial charac¬
teristics in mail as resulting from a Lamarckian process of adaptation. For
example, he considers that the Mongolian physique has been produced by
acquired characteristics which have become hereditary, just as Erasmus
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Darwin ' and Lamarck did in later years. However, the Epicureans and
other earlier thinkers had believed that organs develop with use and weaken
319)
with disuse, ' so that we cannot call Herder's "Lamarckian" views entirely
original. However, Goethe was probably influenced by Herder when he wrote
in 1795:320^
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— das Thier wird durch Umstande su Umstanden gebildet.
We have already seen that Herder did not believe in evolutionary trans-
formism. Nonetheless, Gotz,^21/ Siegel,^22^ and many others have realised
that he does believe that new varieties, if not new species, may be produced
by the influence of environment. A list of references to passages of this
kind in the „Ideen" should suffice here, since critics are now more or less
323)
agreed on this point.
Several writers whose works Herder had read, among them Hale^2^ and
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Pallas also believed that new varieties may be produced by environmental
influences, and, as we earlier remarked, Pallas even thought that the dog, a
distinct species, is descended from the jackal. Forster and Kant also
believed that limited variations may occur among species, as Bruntseh points
out.326)
Bruntsch was also the first to show that Herder regarded such limited
variations in species as degenerative, since each species is best suited to
the area in which it was originally created, so that variations take place
only when it leaves this area, or when the climate changes.^2^ Houche also
emphasises this aspect, and says that Herder's theory of adaptive degenera¬
tion comes originally from Buffon and Blumenbach, and that it cannot be
called Lamarckian in the evolutionary sense. Elsewhere in the same
work, Rouche notices that Zimmermann, whom Herder had also studied, had a
similar theory of adaptation.^2"^
B. Environmental determinism.
We may now ask exactly what Herder understood by "environment". Unfor¬
tunately, he never clearly distinguishes between the "environment" which can
bring about physical changes in the organism and that which influences the
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human mind and all cultural phenomena in particular. We may therefore
digress at this point in order to give a brief account of his theory of
"milieu" or of environmental determinism in the widest sense.
He uses the word „Klima" to describe both sides of his theory, and we
noticed in our section on meteorology that the idea of „Klima" is far too
vague, as he employs it, to provide any satisfactory theory of climatology.
His first list, in 1765, of determinants which act upon man in particular, is
borrowed from the anonymous author of the „&eschichte des menschlichen
Verstandes", and includes subjective ones such as „Genie", as well as physical
and climatic, social, religious, and fortuitous ones."^0^ In the „Ideen",
determinants acting upon man again include both inward or social ones and
external ones which we should today call "climatic". In fact, he enumerates
as the main influences heat and cold, electricity, air (or vapours in the
air), altitude, the nature of the soil and its products, food and drink,
„Lebensweise", type of work, dress, „gewohnte Stellungen", and pleasures and
arts.^"^ Roucha, Schwarz,^"^ and Steinborn"^'' remark upon this
composite "climate" of Herder's, and Schwind^^' rightly equates it to the
wider modern conception of "environment", a3 we also have done.
As Roueh^ points out,"^' Falconer's work on climate, which Herder had
read, lists temperature, air, situation, topography, population, food, and
way of life (c.f. Herder's HLebensweise") a3 components of "climate".-^7)
Einsiedel too considered that population exerts an important influence upon
338)
social development, ' although Herder did not. Hippocrates, whom Herder
called „fur mich der Hauptsehriftsteller uber das ELimatt,"*^ listed seasons,
winds, waters, direction of outlook, topography, and way of living as
determinants which work upon man,/ and Kant, as it appears from Herder's
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unpublished notes on his lectures on physical geography, included topography,
population and way of life in his list of "climatic" influences on man:^1''
Je mehr Ackerb[au] desto + [=mehr] Leute z.E. China kaum
Rama: also aus dem Clima und Lebensnot folgt [sic].
Herder himself names Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Galen, Huarte, Zimmermann
and linckelmann, in 1767* as writers on climatic determinism with whom he is
342)
familiar.-^' And in the „Ideen", as well as the writers already mentioned,
he names Wilson, a writer on climate, in a similar connection.'^' Gillies
observes that Blair and Blackwell influenced Herder's theory of milieu,
Keller cites Ibn Khaldun and Bodin as precedents, and Du Bos, Buffon,
Montesquieu and Hamann, apart from others already named, as thinkers who
345) «influenced Herder's theory, ' Schutze also compares Herder's theory with
those of Augustine, Vico, Buckle and Taine,and Rouche names Barclay,
Fontenelle, Temple and Chardin, besides some of those listed above, as other
exponents of a "milieu" theory.^"7) To this long list, Bruntsch adds the
name of Strabo,^^ and Regli that of Iselin.^^^
From all this, we may conclude that Herder's theory of physioal deter¬
minism in the „Ideen" is simply a more specialised version of his earlier
and wider theory of cultural and social determinism. In the case of plants
and animals, all the determinants he enumerates, such as heat and cold,
electricity (and other supposed aerial „Krafte"), air, altitude, soil, and
food and drink, but not the specifically human ones, such as „Lebensweise",
dress, „gewohnte Stellungen", pleasures and arts, may be expected to aid in
producing physical variations. Physical peculiarities in certain human
races are presumably produced by the same agencies which cause animal varia¬
tion, together with „Lebensweise", dress, and „gewohnte Stellungen", while
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purely abstract cultural phenomena, such as the arts, would not bring about
physical changes in man, but only mental ones.
However, we noticed in our discussion of the „Analogie" between physical
and moral worlds that Herder also believed that physical influences can act
at times upon mental and even moral states. He shares this belief with such
thinkers as the early Kant, who, according to Herder's unpublished notes,
observed in his lectures that the mountainous nature of parts of Britain
350)
induces a spirit of bravery in the inhabitants. ' Du Bos likewise said
351)that emotions and national character can be influenced by climate,
Einsiedel believed that it determines „die ersten Individuellen Vorstellungen
352)
einer Nation", ' and Hippocrates declared that the seasons influence human
"passions".
Herder's particular theory of animal adaptation was influenced mainly
by the writers whom we named in connection with it, while Kant, Hippocrates,
Winckelmann, Zimmermann, and Buffon probably had as great an influence on
his theory of both physical and cultural determinism, in the human sphere, as
had any other writers. As we have seen, Herder himself says that, in his
own opinion, Hippocrates is the chief writer on climate.
A word may now be said about sou® distinctive features of Herder's theory
of environment. Gillies speaks of the influence upon Herder of Buffon's
"more vitalistic" approach in contrast to Montesquieu's "merely mechanical"
354)
one, ' Steinborn observes that Herder's determinism is less crude than
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Montesquieu's, ' and Clark contrasts Herder's more moderate approach with
the "extreme environmentalism of Wolff, Blumenbach and others".^0'' In
fact, with the exception of a few rare oases of extreme determinism, when
Herder, for example, as Steinbore observes,declares that the Eskimos
have become smaller, just as a piece of metal contracts, through the effects
of cold, his theory of determinism is usually tempered by his vitalistic
„genetische Kraft", which resists and modifies climatic and environmental
influences. Even the instance named by Steinborn is simply taken from the
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work of the Greenland explorer Cranz, as Grundmann shows, 7 and is quite
untypical; Zimmermann too had said that the cold „pre£te zusammen" the
Eskimos' physique.Earlier writers such as Du Bos had put forward much
cruder and more mechanical views,leaving little room for an adequate
theory of heredity, and Montesquieu, as Herder himself remarks, had built his
whole theory of climate on some very unrefined observations upon the expansion
and contraction produced in the nFa3erngewebe" of the human body by changes
361) .,
in temperature, and upon „das trugliche Experiment einer Schops=Zunge"
which altered physically as it froze and thawed.
But Herder's theory of environment was tempered not only by that
vitalism which we shall shortly discuss in connection with his theory of
heredity. Falconer, as Gunther points out in his history of eighteenth
century anthropology, had declared that the combined influence of many
external causes produces a composite effect upon the human organism which
differs from the effects produced by each cause taken separately. Similarly,
Herder speaks of climatic MUmstande, die in ihrer lebendigen Verbindung viel
wirken; alle sie gehoren zum Gemahlde des vielverandernden Klima".
The words „lebendige Verbindung" and „Gemahlde" at once suggest a holistic,
or rather organicistic approach, similar to that of Falconer. This "organic"
action of external influences manifests itself physically in far-reaching
changes which are produced in the whole organism; this theory that the body
reacts holistically to external influences has already been discussed in our
section on holism and organicism, in relation to the later Darwinian theory
of "correlation of parts" and to Herder's own principle of „Kompensation".
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In the light of all this, we can agree with Rouche^"*^ that Herder's
theory of "climate" was relatively modem, and superior to most equivalent
theories of his own and of previous ages, although he never coupled it with
a theory of evolution by descent, as Lamarck did.
C. Teleological preadaptation of organism and environment.
We now come to the second aspect of Herder's solution to the problem of
the organism and its environment. This is the supposition that the two are
mutually preadapted. As Rouchd says:^^
Pour Herder la fonction ne cree pas l'organe, comma l'admettent
les 4volutionistes: tous deux sont donnes ensemble des la
Creation.
And Siegel draws attention to the following words from the „Ideen":^^
Sie [i.e. die Natur] dachte ihm [i.e. dam Geschopfe] vor, da sie
diese Krafte in solche und keine andre Organisation setzte
We may add to this the following words from Herder's language essay of i7?afs>
Nun ist offenbar der ganza Erdboden fur das Menschengeschlecht
und dies fur den ganzen Erdboden gemacht.
And fourthly, we noticed in our discussion of teleology that Herder once
says that nature mercifully leaves an organ dormant where it cannot be
satisfied.569^
However, this idea of teleological preadaptation does not really contra¬
dict Herder's other theory of adaptation and environmental determinism, since
the teleological explanation applies to animal species only as they were
initially created, whereas the theory of natural adaptation applies to them
only when they have left their original climate and habitat, or when the
climate itself has changed. Besides, even the teleological theory contains
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a more naturalistic element than critics have supposed. For the organism
and its environment were not preadapted simply by a miraculous act; the
organism is adapted to its environment simply because it was originally
produced by it, by some process of spontaneous generation in which undefined
„Krafte" played their part. Herder declares „[da8 die] Stimme des Welt=
schopfers lauter wirksame Krafte des Naturkreises in Bewegung setzte, so
auch der Erde, den Wassern, dem Staube befiehlt, da£ jedes derselben
organische Wesen nach seiner seiner Art hervorbringe «#370)
D. The relationship between heredity and environment.
Having discussed environmental and physical determinism, or the influ¬
ence of external factors upon the organism, and the idea of teleological
preadaptation, which implies that environment and organism are initially
matched, without any change taking place in either, we now come to the theory
that heredity, an internal characteristic of the organism, exerts just as
important an influence upon it as does the outside environment. This
theory of heredity, we may add, only modifies, but does not contradict the
theory of environmental determinism, which we have just discussed.
In the section on ontogeny, we saw that Herder believed that the same
„genetische Kraft" first forms the animal embryo and then sustains it as an
independent organism until age overcomes it. This „genetische Kraft", as he
calls it, represents the permanent, inherited characteristics of the organism,
and before the latter can be altered by outside influences, the „Kraft"
itself must be changed. (We remarked upon this in connection with the
principle of „Kompensation".) Thus, Herder makes the same „Kraft"
responsible for embryological, physiological and genetic functions in biology.
Let us now examine his ideas on genetics in further detail.
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Already in 1767, he believed that „Generation" is of greater importance
371)
than „Clima" in producing human beauty: '
wenn das Clima nichts als ein entfemtes Medium ist, so
ist die nahere Ursache der Schonheit Generation.
And in 1781 he disagrees with those who, like Locke, declare that the child's
mind is like a blank sheet yet to be written upon, and rightly says instead
372)
that certain psychological dispositions may be hereditary. ' In that same
year, Georg Muller, on a visit to Herder, writes in his diary (no doubt
recording Herder's words, as Suphan believes):-^3)
Klima giebt nie der Nation Schwung und Geist, der liegt in
dem Samen der Vater. Klima befordert, wie guter Boden eine
edle Rebe.
And again in 1707, Herder speaks of „die Gestalt der Heaschen, die mehr vom
Stamm als vom Himmelsstrich abhangt". 574)
375)
We noticed in our study of animal adaptation that, as Siegel ' and
Rouchd"^) had shown, Herder believed that certain acquired (racial) charac¬
teristics, such as the Mongolian physique, which was supposedly shaped by
their way of life, are inherited, just as Lamarck later said. Yet, as
Rouehe remarks in his work on Herder and Darwinism, Herder denies elsewhere
in the f,Ideen" that deformities produced by artificial means can be
inherited: -^7)
Jahrhunderte lang haben Nationen ihre Kopfe geformt, ihre
Nasen durchbohrt, ihre FuBe geswungen, ihre Ohren verlangert;
die Natur blieb auf ihrem lege Ganz anders, sobald die
Misbildung genetisch war und auf Wegen der Natur wirkte.
But W8 should add that, in the same work, he had already said of those
Orientals who deform their ears and feet;^8)
Man schaate sich seiner [i.e. original Mongolian] Bildung und
wollte verandern; traf aber auf Theile dies da sie der
Verandarung aachgaben, sich als die haBlichste Schonheit
zuletzt vererbten.
Here, rather in contradiction with the previous passage, he implies that
artificial changes to certain parts of the body, over a sufficiently long
period, may indeed become hereditary. This would be similar to his idea
that the Mongolian physique originally resulted from changes produced by
environmental influences, which were finally inherited, but this contra¬
diction shows that his views on the subject were not settled.
Before we leave Herder's own statements on heredity, we may point out
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that he knew of inherited illnesses, and of genetic atavisms. '
Siegel sums up Herder's theory of heredity as follows
es entsteht ein Konflikt zwischen genetischer Kraft und den
klimatisohen Kraften z.B., und nur in dem Mafia, als die genetische
Kraft in diesem Zwiste besiegt wird, konnen Modifikationen zu
stands kommen.
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Herder says himself of "climate" and heredity in the „Ideen": '
Beide StreitfiihrencLe Machte sind also von grofier Wirkung
Das Klima ist ein Chaos von Ursachen [N.B. this conflicts with
the "organicistic" approach to climatic determinism Herder
adopted elsewhere in this work], die einander sehr ungleich,
also auch langsam und verschiedenartig wirksn, bis sie etwa
zuletzt in das Innere eindringen und dieses durch Gewohnheit
und Genesis selbst andern; die lebendige Kraft widerstehet
lange —-
As an exact basis for genetics and the science of human heredity,
Herder's ill-defined, vitalistic „genetische Kraft" is, of course, quite
unsatisfactory. Nonetheless, it was this which, as we have seen, helped
him to overcome the crude mechanistic determinism postulated by Montesquieu,
Du Bos and others, and to leave the way open for a true understanding of how
important heredity actually is. We have often said before that his
,,Krafte" are of scientific value only when they are potentially reducible to
exact quantities. His „genetische Kraft" is of this kind, for it denotes
some internal characteristic of the organism which, if altered, can produce
inherited changes, while other, more superficial changes are not passed on.
Just such a factor exists, according to modern science. As Bertrand Russell
.ritesi382'
the evidence is now overwhelming that, with possible rare
exceptions, the only acquired characters that are inherited are
those which affect the germ cells, which are very few.
Herder's „Kraft" introduced an inward dimension to balance the outer factor
of environment; to use Claude Bernard's phrase, we can say that it consti¬
tuted a kind of "internal environment" which links together all those parts
which can be modified by outside influences. In itself, as a vitalistic
quality, it was unscientific, but it was sufficiently related to observed
phenomena to be interpreted quantitatively when genetics arose as an exact
science.
In conclusion, we must say something about Herder's sources, and the
ideas of his contemporaries on heredity. Hippocrates, writing on the
macrocephali who were supposed to elongate their infants' heads, maintained
that such artificial changes are inherited. Herder denies this on one
occasion, but, as we noticed, believes that it can occur under certain
circumstances. He thus adopts a position midway between that of Hippocrates
and that of Kant, who denied that any artificially acquired characteristics
can be inherited. Blumenbach, like Herder, said that artificial changes
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may produce a permanent effect over a period of time, and Camper said
that only "climate", but not artificial deformation, has caused racial
differentiation in man. As Clark observes, Thomas Abbt, with his
belief that genius is compounded of both genetic and environmental elements,
probably influenced Herder's ideas on heredity.These various writers
seem to have provided the major sources for his theory of heredity, although
the vitalism which goes with it is largely his own.
E. The origin of the human races.
One thing at once strikes us about Herder's ideas on heredity. They
concern only the human species. This is because, like most of his contem¬
poraries, although he did not believe in evolution, he still had to explain
how the different races of man have sprung from a common stock. As Rouche
suggests, it was this conflict between the (originally Biblical) doctrine of
a single human origin and the known reality of present racial differences
which produced Herder's "Lamarckian" theory of human adaptation.Since
the problem of racial differentiation is thus logically connected with that
of heredity, we shall examine it here.
Man first appeared in Asia, Herder believed. He tried to justify this
providential choice by teleology:
Wenn die Gottheit nicht unsre ganze Erde sum Sitz der Schonheit
machen konnte: so lieB sie wenigstens durch die Pforte der
Schonheit das Menschengeschlecht hinauftreten und mit lang
eingepragten Zugen derselben die Volker nur erst allmalich
andre Gegenden suchen.
For, unlike Winckelmann, he believed that the temperate zone of Asia, not
Greece, first produced the ideal human form. However, it was probably
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through the influence of Hippocrates, not of teleology, that he acquired his
predilection for the temperate Asian climate. For Hippocrates said that
390)
the men of temperate Asia were "fairer and larger" than others. '
We have seen that Herder thought that no new species were created after
the "elements" of the early earth had lost their original strength. He uses
this belief in more potent early "elements" to explain the origin of races.
This removes the apparent contradiction, which puzzled the critic May among
others,391'1 between Herder's remarks on the Mongols, who did inherit acquired
characteristics (while the climatic "elements" were still strong), and his
later remark that artificially acquired characteristics cannot be inherited
(because the "elements" are now weaker). Herder says explicitly that negroes
became black because the "elements" were more potent when they settled in
their present habitat.39^' says of the Mongols: 393^
sollte es nicht wahrscheinlich seyn, da£ vor Jahrtausenden
schon, da vielleicht einige dieser ["climatic"] Ursachen noch
viel starker wirkten, eben hieraus ihre Bildung entstanden und
zur erblichen Natur ubergegang8n ware?
Not only climatic agencies but human activity too was probably more vigorous
in that early era, he seems to imply, for he is speaking here, among other
things, of the Mongols* physical adaptation to horsemanship and other habits
of steppe-dwellers. He thus appears to believe that acquired characteris¬
tics were more easily inherited in the halcyon era of the earth's youth, when
the present races first arose out of one stock as they migrated to different
regions.
However, Herder denied that the present racial differences are well-
defined:39^
Kurz, weder vier Oder funf Racen, noch ausschlieBende
Varietaten giebt es auf der Erde. Die Farben verlieren
sich in einander
•• 395)
And in 1797, in the MHumanitats=Briefen, he writes: '
Das Urbild, der Prototyp der Mensohheit liegt also nicht in
Einer Nation Eines Erdstriches; ar ist der abgezogne Bagriff
von alien Exemplaren der Menschennatur in beiden Hemispharen.
He even says:^^'
Der Neger hat soviel Recht, den WeiBen fur eine Abart, einen
gebohrnen Kaclcerlacken zu halten, als wenn der WeiBe ihn fur
eine Bestie, fur ein schwarzes Thier halt.
Yet in 1766, in an essay on human beauty, he had himself called the negroes
„Bruder der Affen", ^97) in the „Ideen", he said that the Asians of the
temperate zone are the ideal human type. But these latter considerations
aire purely aesthetic, in the tradition of Winckelmann, Gun ther rightly
observes in his history of eighteenth century anthropology that all writers
on race at that time believed that some final anthropological classification
of races is possible, and adds:^"^
Die Menge der Einteilungen muB urn so mehr uberraschen, als man
gar nicht leugnete, daB ein wirklich zureiehender Einteilungs=
grund nicht vorhanden sei. Von denen, die sich eingehend mit
dieseai Stoffe beschaftigt haben, hat nur einer die Konsequenz
gezogen, unter solchen Urns tanden auf ©ine KLassifikation ganz
zu verzichten: Herder.
Thus, although Herder was prepared to classify races aesthetically, he
believed that they cannot be classified anthropologically, since he realised
(quite correctly, according to most present-day theorists) that racial
differences in man are only superficial. Thus, those who, during the Nazi
era,^"^ used Herder's aesthetic classification to suggest that he considered
certain races as anthropologically superior to others, were quite mistaken.
Even Rouche, who admits in one passage that Herder was no racist,else-
WQl)
where says: '
Herder utilise l'ethnologie pour fonder en nature l'orgueil
de la race blanche
This applies to some extent to his aesthetic tastes, which were fairly
classical, so far as human beauty wa3 concerned, as befitted an admirer of
Winckelmann and an eighteenth century man of letters, but not to his ideas
on ethnographical classification.
Herder probably refused to classify races exactly largely because he
distrusted all strict systems of classification. We earlier noticed how
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he disliked the exact Linnean taxonomy; this dislike was common among those
who believed in the Chain of Being, whose divisions were thought to be
gradual, and never abrupt. His theory of race was thus much more flexible
than Kant's "germ" theory of racial origins and of four clearly separate
racial groups.^2' In fact, he explicitly rejects the „Keime" theory of
race in his „Humanitats=Brieferi But it was almost certainly through
Kant's lectures on physical geography that Herder first became interested in
the problem of race,^^' and it was probably from Bluraenbach,^"^ Buffon and
Camper,^'"'and Pallas^^ that he borrowed his notion that the human races
have evolved over a period of time under "climatic" influences. Perhaps he
derived his idea that colour is not a basic ethnological characteristic from
Blumenbach, ' or from Georg Forster,^''/ who supported Herder's theory of
race against Kant's "germ" theory;^"'^ Zimmermann and Meiners, like Herder,
believed that white people can become black over a period of time, and vice
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versa.From Buffon^^ and Camper,he learnt that the negroes'
pigmentation is subcutaneous, and he was probably following Haller^"^ when
he said, in the „Ideen", of the action of heat upon the lower layers of the
negroes ' skin•
Es ist ein Oel, womit sie diese Netzhaut farbte.
Such theories at least bear some relation to physiological observations,
unlike that of Blumenbach, who said that the bodies of negroes contain
excessive carbon,or of those who used the mysterious "phlogiston" to
explain dark pigmentation. We may add that Camper, like Herder, held the
"organicistic" belief that genetic (or racial) changes to the part also
affect the whole of the body.^^
We conclude that Herder's ideas on race, apart from certain distortions
caused by aesthetic predilections, was superior to most contemporary theories,
and was founded upon a wide reading. His distrust of rigid classifications,
in this case, served him well.
Having completed our study of Herder's thoughts on the temporal series
of living organisms in the earth's past, we conclude that, like most thinkers
of his age, he was not an evolutionist. Theology hardly influenced his
ideas, except in the question of human origins, and he at times applied a
qualified teleology which does not rule out natural causes. His ideas are
broadly naturalistic, so much so that, in this section, the metaphysical
scheme of the Chain of Being has been little in evidence. He "temporalised"
this scheme in a concrete sense only in postulating that organisms were
created successively, hut not by putting forward a theory of evolution.
His ideas are firmly rooted in the empirical observations which were at his
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disposal, and his reading was wide and up to date. His beliefs clearly
reflect his age and his own personality, and they neither strikingly antici¬
pate those of nineteenth century evolutionists nor do they seem the work of
a theologian striving to impose his doctrines upon natural science.
d) The_static_series_of ideal_entities£ the_cosmic hierarchy.
While he did study the history of life in concrete and dynamic terms,
Herder continued to believe in the ancient doctrine of an ideal Chain of
Being which extends through the observable hierarchy of earthly forms and
culminates in transcendental beings. Already in a sermon at Riga he asserts
„da£ es also wahrscheinlicher Weise in der Reihe der Wesen noch weit mehrere
ClaSen die uns ubertreffen, geben musse, dafi in der Leiter der Vollkommenheit
weit mehrere Stuffen uber uns stehen, und daB wir eine Mittelgattung
zwischen Geist und Thier sind."^"^ Revelation confirms this with
descriptions of angels, he adds. In the 1769 manuscript on planetary souls,
as we have seen, he says that „viele Gotter" exist, although he adds:^"^
Der Gott, der endlich alles durch Raum und Zeit verbindet,
der ist Gott.
In a funeral sermon in 1772, he again calls man „das gewagte Mittelgeschopf
zwischen Engel und Thier", saying that many higher beings doubtless exist,^20^
and he restates the same doctrine in a poem of the following year.^21' But
the most famous utterance of this kind occurs in the „Ideen", where he refers
to man as a „Mittelglied", „Mittelring" „Mittelgeschopf"^'2'^ or „Mittel=
gattung",^2^ and further says:^"2-^
Wenn also der Mensch die Kette der Erdorganisation als ihr
hochstes und letztes Glied schlofi: so fangt er eben dadurch




Unsre Bruder der hohern Stufe lieben uns daher gewi6 mehr und
reiner, als wir sie suchen und lieben konnen.
Just as he had said in 1769 that one supreme God exists, apart from the
„viele Gotter" of planets and stars, he later writes in his „Gott" of 1787:^^
Gott ist nicht ein Hochstes auf einer Stuffenleiter von
Seinesgleichen.
Only on these occasions, and in his two explicit references to angels in
sermons in Riga and in 1772, does he allow Christian theology to modify what
is basically a mystical and metaphysical Platonic scheme, which had been
widely publicised by Leibniz and others.
Herder's name became particularly associated with this doctrine, which
he had merely borrowed from an earlier tradition; Tolstoy refers to it as
an idea of Herder's in his "War and Peace".
However, we are here discussing the ideal Chain of Being. And we know
that Herder always used „Krafte" to link real and ideal worlds. But
„Krafte" are dynamic, not static, so that we are now led to examine his more
usual application of the ideal series of forms, whereby he treats it no
longer as a static sequence of beings, but as a dynamic progression of
,,Krafte".
e) £he_dynanic_series of ideal entities:_ immortality, metemgsychosis,
galingenes± s _ancL_£2;ariQ ta.r^_liabi. ta.t.±°n.
The first chapter of Book V of Herder's „Ideen" carries the following
title
In der Schopfung unsrer Erde herrscht aire Reihe aufsteigender Formen
und Krafte.
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We have already seen, in examining Herder's writings on biology, how he
treats the "forms" he mentions. But like Leibniz, he introduced an ideal
and dynamic element into the Chain of Being by saying that a „Kraft" exists
behind every form. Thi3 scale of „Krafte" is thus exactly parallel to the
visible Chain of Being, although it stretches on into the transcendental
world as well. As Lovejoy remarks, Bonnet, and even Addison had put
forward similar interpretations of the Chain of Being, which are both ideal
and dynamic or "temporalised"
Kronenberg^1' and Kuhnemann^2^ maintain that Herder introduces this
series of „Krafte" simply in order to show that the visible Chain of Being is
not fortuitous, but can be justified teleologically. But this is only part
of his reason. He introduces this ideal, dynamic series above all in Book
V of his „Ideen", where he uses it chiefly in order to demonstrate that the
soul is immortal. To analyse this conception is therefore to find out his
answer (or rather answers, for he presents several different solutions, a3
usual) to the problem of immortality. But since all „Krafte", not only
those of human souls, are indestructible, it is immortality in the widest
sense, including that of animal "souls", which is at stake. For all visible
natural forms are merely „eine Leiterin derselben [i.e. „Krafte"] zu einer
hohern Bildung".^"^
As Haym points out, Herder was no longer satisfied with the orthodox
Christian teachings on the afterlife in his mature and more liberal period.
He set out to provide philosophical proofs of the afterlife, although, as
Haym observes, he had himself questioned Moses Mendelssohn's "proofs" of
immortality before he entered upon his religious phase in Buckeburg.^^
R. Unger has done much to elucidate these varied developments in Herder's
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theories of the afterlife,^^ and Pamp has recently added to the literature
on this subject.^^; More than any other critic, Unger has understood how
complex Herder's ideas on this question are, and he notes that science, the
philosophy of history, ethics, emotion, psychology and mystical speculation
all enter into them.'
But even in his mature period some of Herder's old scepticism remained.
He speaks with confidence about the various modes of immortality which all
„Krafte" enjoy, but he does sound a note of doubt at times. For example, he
says in the flIdeen"
Und wohin kehren diese geistigen Krafte, die allem Sinn der
Kenschen entgehen? Weise hat die Natur hier einen Vorhang
vorgezogen und laflt uns, die wir hiezu koine Sinne haben, in
das geistige Reich ihrer Vei*wandlungen und Uebergange nicht
hineinschauen.
He later admits in the same work:^*^^
Der Mensch also soil in seinen kunftigen Zustand nicht hinein=
schauen, sondern sich hineinglauben.
Kant, in his review of the MIdeen", Part I, was prepared, in accordance with
the old Platonic doctrine, to concede that a series of ideal beings may
exist.But, just as the young Herder had maintained when criticising
Mendelssohn's „PhaedonM, he says that we cannot prove that beings on one
level can ascend to a higher one. Even in his early and more sanguine
„Allgenuine Naturgeschichte", he had adhered to the old static conception of
the ideal Chain of Being, only adding that man may perhaps visit higher
worlds some day.itJf^^ At that time, he had indeed believed that progressively
more perfect ideal beings on other stars and planets are created successively,
but he never temporalised the ideal series in the way that Herder did in his
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"proofs" of immortality. As we shall see, Herder involved himself in
serious difficulties as soon as he said that beings on one level of the
Chain may ascend to higher levels. In answering this problem, he offered
basically three solutions. These were the theories that „Krafte" may ascend
by metempsychosis, by palingenesis, or by being assimilated by other higher
„Krafte". Let us review these three hypotheses in turn, as aspects of
Herder's ideal evolutionism, before we conclude this chapter with some
remarks on the idea of planetary and stellar habitation.
(i) I|||il|ich2|||.
Rouche declares that Herder's alleged "Darwinism" consists only in the
doctrine of metempsychosis, which many earlier critics had misinterpreted in
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concrete terms. ' linger, however, gives a list of men who believed in
true metempsychosis, including Leasing, Schlosser, the young Schiller, and
Goe the, but not Herder.
The disagreement between these two critics is really only over the use
of the word "metempsychosis", it would seem. Metempsychosis usually denotes
a belief that the souls of men, or of lower creatures, enter after death
into new bodies, of either higher, lower or the same living species, but
always on this earth.
It is well known, however, that Herder, in his „Gesprache uber die
Seelenwanderung" of 1785, rejects the idea that men may return to this earth
after death.And in 1797, he impugned the cyclic or regressive metem¬
psychosis of the Pythagoreans and Hindus, which taught that souls may return
to lower bodies on this earth for punishment; he calls this „ein haBlicher
und veraehtlicher G-edanke"Nevertheless, his belief that animal
„Krafte" may ascend to the human level when their former bodies are dissolved




Ich bin ein Thier gewesen.
The singular number „ein" implies that the identity of the animal soul is
conserved in its later existence, as in the doctrine of metempsychosisj yet
Herder's more usual theory that lower nKrafte" are assimilated by higher
ones, as we shall see, does not involve conservation of identity. Frau von
Stein, in a letter of 1784 to Knebel, quoted by Haym,'^3'' says that Herder
believes „[dafi] wir erst Pflanzen und Thiere waren". This is another
instance of Eietemp3ychosis, it seems, although Frau von Stein may simply have
misunderstood Herder's doctrine that plant and animal „Krafte" are assimilated
by higher „Krafte" such as those of man, as he propounds it in the „Ideen",
or perhaps as she had heard it in conversation with him. But he writes in
a similar tone of the bee in 1783 or 1784:^^
Vielleieht war sie einmal eine Blume in einer andern
Organisation wird sie auch eine andre Sphare zu wirken haben.
But such utterances are exceptional, and we cannot say that Herder was a
complete believer in metempsychosis, since he rejected it when applied to
man, and in its cyclic and regressive forms.
(ii) Palingenesis.
Herder and his critics usually apply the word „Palingene3ie" to the
development of the human soul in particular. Sometimes it involves the
regeneration of the soul in a new, higher body elsewhere in the universe (and
is therefore linked with theories of planetary habitation), and sometimes an
inward regeneration of the soul in this life, as in Goethe's idea of „Stirb
und werde". In both cases, the soul remains associated with a body, for
I
every dKraft" must have its „0rgan", as Herder so often maintains. (As
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Rouche shows, this doctrine differs from orthodox Christian teachings on
immortality in at least five important respects.
One of Herder's earliest utterances on palingenesis appears in the 1769
manuscript on planetary souls, where he asks with reference to death:
Was thut meine Seele? sie bleibt im Universum: sie fangt
gleich an, sich wieder einen Korper zu bauen. Wo? wie? in
welcher Zeit? von welcher Gestalt? Das ist die Prage?
He adds a little later:^2^
Menschliche Seele ist wesentlich von andern verschieden.
Mensch bleibt Mensch.
In the letter of that same year to Mendelssohn which Unger has published, he
says that the human soul must be reborn as a human soul, with a body, if it
is to be reborn at all.^*^ But it is not clear once again where this
regeneration takes place; if he means that it occurs on earth, he is clearly
advocating that very metempsychosis which he later rejected. Since there is
no evidence for the latter inference, we must assume that he believed that
the soul is regenerated on some other world within the universe. Thu3, he
suggests in the rtIdeen", as we shall see, that the human soul ascends after
death to a higher existence on some other cosmic world, but in a new
„Medium" (i.e. body). In his „&esprache uber die Seelenwanderung" of 1785,
he says more cautiously that true palingenesis is the regeneration of the
individual man in this life, and that a higher but unknown palingenesis
doubtless occurs after death too.And in 1797, when his religious
beliefs no longer included any seriously transcendental or supernatural
elements, but virtually coincided with his ethical ideal of „Humanitat'', he
writes
209.
In diesem Leben ist also den Menschen Palingenesie, ifotempsychose
unentbehrlich; Oder sie ist uberhaupt miBlich.
He does not even trouble to distinguish between the two words here, since he
is no longer concerned with their metaphysical significance.
From what sources did Herder derive such ideas? As Unger and Pamp have
shown, Bonnet, with his "palingenesis" and "ethereal" body of the afterlife,
was certainly a major source. Unger also points out that Leibniz believed
that the soul requires a new body in the future existence .^6) may also
conjecture that Needham's belief that polarised forces create and develop the
embryo perhaps influenced Herder's idea that the soul cannot exist without a
body, which it creates for itself by attraction and repulsion.
(iii) The_assimilation_of_lower_by_higher_ttKrafte".
We now come to the least discussed but most interesting of Herder's
theories of ideal development or evolution, the theory of progress by
assimilation.
While the few passages in Herder's works which suggest metempsychosis,
and all of those which deal with palingenesis, imply that the ascending soul
conserves its personal identity, the theory of assimilation does not. The
„Krafte" of organisms lower than man, he often shows in the ,,Ideen", can
ascend only through being assimilated by higher ones. He thus concludes
that njede Zerstorang ist Uebergang zum hohem Leben" ,^7) jje also 3ayS
more explicitly:^*^
Der einzige Elephant ist ein Grab von Millionen Krauternj aber
or ist ein lebendiges, auswirkendes Grab, er animalisirt sie zu
Theilen seiner selbst: die niedern Krafte gehn in feinere Formen
de3 Lebens uber.
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And, in the „Gesprache uber die Seelenwanderung" of 17855 he writes
Das Reich der Thiere, unsrer stummen Mitbewohner, zerstort
tausend Formen niedrigerer Art, urn seine hohere Formen zu
beseelen: der Mensch endlich, der grofite Ausarbeiter und
Zerstorer der Schopfung, er ist ohne daB ers weiB, das
Ziel seiner niedrigen Mitbrader, nach dem sie vielleicht alle
unvermerkt gefuhrt werden.
Similar utterances already appear in works of 1777^^ and 1778.^^
As Rouche says, beings lower than man can thus ascend only by becoming
the food of higher ones and Siegel remarks that this is one instance
where Herder does suggest that a real kind of animal "evolution" occurs.
But two things in particular strike us about this doctrine of Herder's.
Firstly, it necessarily involves the loss of individual identity with death,
and secondly, it is applied only to beings lower than man, who does retain
his identity in „Palingenesie". Now there is no way of logically justifying
this abrupt distinction between man and lower beings by the metaphysical
scheme of a gradual series of forms or „Krafte". The logical conclusion to
be drawn from the doctrine of assimilation would be that man too, and other
higher beings ascend and lose their identity through being assimilated by
beings whose nature is higher still than theirs. Dr. Johnson satirised
Soame Jenyns' interpretation of the Chain of Being since it implied, more
logically than Herder's, that the torments of lower beings minister to the
well-being of higher ones throughout the whole series.
It is not at all remarkable that Herder did clearly hint at this
sinister implication in another of his writings - in the 1769 manuscript on
planetary souls which Irmscher published. He says of the earth's
„Genius"
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—- der Genius hort auf mich so wenig als ieh auf das Schreien
eines Wurms! Er ist zu groB dazu: Er hat mit sich so zu
ich
thun, wie ich mit rair, ohne daft ich den VVurm hore wenn/gehn will
und ihn zertrete.
Nemo contra deum nisi deus ipse, Herder seems to imply here. The same idea
recurs in an early manuscript for the „Ideen", already quoted earlier, in
which he says that the human 30ul merges with the „Meer der Gottheit" after
death.
But another way of solving this problem is to suppose that individuals
of sufficient "greatness" may retain their identity after death. Herder
»jC~7\
hints at this idea, strangely enough, in a sermon of 1775:
- der Ruhm, der in mir ist, das Gefuhl thatiger Krafte, die ich
mir auch aus mifilungenen Versuchen gesammelt, muB mir, wenn
gleich mein Leib in Trummer versinckt, doch bleiben meine
Werke werden mir nachfolgen.
Goethe boldly accepted the consequences of this truly daemonic conception
War keinen Namen sich erwarb, noch Edles will,
Gehort den Elementen an;
Herder, in 1797, quotes a passage from Bow's "History of Hindostan" which, in
a more ethical setting, is parallel to Goethe's words:^^
Aber die Seelen derer, die Boses thun, werden im Tode von den
Elementen nicht befreiet.
A further implication of Herder's theory of progress by assimilation is
that the „Krafte" or souls of those animals which sire not eaten by higher
creatures or by man must surely also return to the "elements" or become
assimilated by lower creatures than themselves, such as worms. And those
of which only portions are eaten must surely ascend only in part. However,
he was either unaware of these difficulties, or did not choose to grapple
with them.
Let us add some notes on sources and on similar ideas in the works of
others. Needham had said of the polarised "forces" which create and sustain
animal organisms
elles assimilent ou sont assimil^es.
(We also noticed in an earlier chapter how important the idea of assimilation
was in mysticism, in magnetic theory, and in some other areas of biology.)
Unger observes that Christian Wolff distinguished between the "indestructi¬
bility" of animal souls and the "immortality" of the human soul.^"^ This
is precisely equivalent to Herder's distinction between animal "assimilation"
and human "palingenesis", although Herder avoids making the distinction
explicit. For although he declared on several occasions, as we noticed in
our section on teleology, that no link in the Chain of Being is less impor¬
tant than any other, a hidden difference between the lot of man and of the
animals is implied. That is, the „Krafte" which supposedly exist in all
beings are basically of two distinct kinds. Those of the animals, in the
theory of "assimilation", are not generically different from the traditional
concept of matter, although Herder would never have admitted this, and those
of human souls are really equal to the traditional concept of mind or spirit.
This latent dualism becomes apparent when Herder admits that man is a
„Mittelgeschopf", compounded of two natures. This is, in fact, a concession
to the traditional dualism which the „Kraft" idea was designed to circumvent.
Thus, all „Krafte" are immortal, but some are more immortal than others.
It is clear that the animals, with their humbler "immortality" reached only
through the digestive systems of higher creatures, are treated quite
differently from man, and really only minister to his needs. Herder did
not admit this teleological and anthropocentric consequence of his ambivalent
theory, which he had, in all fairness, avoided in his writings on pure
biology, but which comes out clearly in his attempts to "prove11 immortality.
Steering his way between the logical alternatives of avoiding teleology, as
he did in 1769j by suggesting that man may be destroyed or assimilated by
higher beings (or that he may lose his identity in the "elements"), and of
avoiding such grimmer conclusions by presenting the Chain of Being in terms
of anthropocentrism, teleology and theodicy, he pledged himself fully to
neither, and used elements of both, thus relapsing at times into traditional
dualism. Once again, the „Krafte" which are supposedly shared by the
animals, man, and the immortal souls of higher beings enabled him to bridge
over a hidden dichotomy, but only superficially.
All of these ambiguities arise not out of Herder's attempts to apply
orthodox theology to science, but out of his wish to prove his completely
unorthodox idea of personal immortality through "palingenesis" by means of
the old metaphysical and mystical doctrine of the Chain of Being, particu¬
larly in the dynamic form which Leibniz (and Bonnet) had given it. This, as
Lovejoy says, was the beginning of that "temporalisation" of the Chain of
Being, which, when related to the empirical data of palaeontology, etc.,
prepared the way for the modern theory of evolution by descent. It is not
surprising that many later critics, not sufficiently familiar with this time-
honoured and all-embracing scheme within which several kinds of "evolution",
empirical and ideal, could be conceived, should have mistaken many of
Herder's statements on dynamic but ideal processes for early formulations
of the Darwinian theory of evolution, although they cannot be excused for
ignoring Herder's clear rejection of the theory of evolution by descent in
other parts of his work.
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(iv) Theories of planetary or stellar habitation.
Already in the unpublished „Anfangsgrunde der Sternkunde" of 1765>
Herder says that the moon is probably a body like the earth, and adds:^2^
—- aber seine G-eschopfe konnen von gantz [sic] anderer
Art seyn als wir.
In the „Ideen", he returns to this theme, but first of all admits that the
speculations of Kircher, Swedenborg, Fontenelle, Huygens, Lambert and Kant
on the inhabitants of other worlds simply prove, „daB wir davon nichts wissen
konnen, nichts wissen sollen", because „wir haben kein Maas der Ver=
gleichung".^3) But such misgivings do not deter him from echoing Kant
shortly afterwards, and saying „da6 es endlich vielleicht gar unsre
Bestimmung ware, mit alien zur Reife gelangten Geschopfen so vieler und
verschiedener Schwesterwelten Umgang zu pflegen.*^ In the „Metakritik"
of 1799, he writes of „die allerdings wahrscheinlichen Eiriwohner" of some of
the other planets around the sun.^^; In 1802, in the „Adrastea", he still
believes that other worlds may be inhabited, but now qualifies this, mindful
of the observations recorded by Herschel, Schroter and others, concerning
the moon's barren surface, by saying that they may not all be equally
habitable.^0' He says that the moon may formerly have been habitable,^7)
but soon afterwards, as we have seen, he takes exactly the opposite view
that it may gradually be developing towards a state where life will emerge
upon it, under the influence of the vivifying „Xthar" .^8) This "evolu¬
tionary" approach to astronomy at once recalls Kant's „Allgemeine Natur=
geschichte", of course, but Herder no longer acknowledges his debt to his old
teacher.
Alongside this general conviction, 3hared by many thinkers (and indeed
astronomers) of that age, that other worlds are inhabited, there appears the
more particular and dynamic theory that beings from this world ascend, after
death, to higher worlds. More specifically still, Herder seems to have been
influenced by the ancient Platonic belief that increasingly perfect beings
are found towards some cosmic centre, whether the centre of the actual
universe or merely of the invisible universe of the spirit, and that all
creation aspires towards the central focus, the divinity. (in this old
mystical doctrine, we can already discern the germ of that "temporalisation"
of the Chain of Being which developed more fully in that progress-loving age,
the eighteenth century, after Leibniz had set it going again.) We have seen
how Herder employs this idea of a universal centre by applying the analogy
of gravitational fields to man's moral situation. Besides, we noticed that
he disagreed with Kant's early theory that perfection increases away from
the centre, and that he seems to have preferred the older, opposite idea that
perfection or progress converges upon a universal centre.
In the manuscript „Anfangsgrunde der Sternkunde", we already find him
speculating about the probable centre of our galaxy, the Milky Way.^*^ In
the „Ideen", he mentions Bode's hypothesis that the "planetary" surface of
the sun, beneath a surrounding envelope of light, may be habitable.
(In our section on light-theory, we noticed how much this idea interested
him in later years.) But in his „Gesprache uber die Seelenwanderung" of
1785, he enunciates his theory of progress towards a cosmic centre more
clearly than on any other occasion, and refers unambiguously to the actual
universe, and not to any invisible, symbolic world of the spirit:
Vielleicht sind uns auch Ruheorter, Gegenden der Zubereitung,
andre Welten bestimmt, auf denen wir, wie auf einer goldenen
HimmeIsleiter, immer leichter, thatiger, gluekseliger, zum
Quell alles Lichts emporklimmen, und den Mittelpunkt der
lallfahrt, den Schoos der Gottheit, immer suchan und nie erreichen.
He further conjectures, „da£ vom letzten Planeten bis zur Sonne hinauf es
Gradationen der Geschopfe, wie des Lichts, der Entfernung, der Massen, der
Krafte gebe, 3etzen Sie die Sonne nun als den grossen Versammlungsort aller
Wesen des Systems."^2'' Already in a sermon in 1781, he had referred to
the earth as „nur ein Ruheplatz, eine Wanderstate [sic]".^*^ And, in an
undated poem written sometime in the 1780's, he writes
Sieh umher, die sieben Sterne
sind Euhestaten fur den Wandrer nur
der in sein Vaterland, die Sonn* hinaufeilt!
From all this, it seems that he associated the sun with the highest cosmic
throne of the divinity (although we have seen elsewhere that he believed
the supreme God is superior to all the deities of planets, etc. Compare
the above passage where he says that ws "always seek" but "never reach" the
divinity.) Not surprisingly, he says that sun-worship is „begreiflich" in
the 1769 manuscript on planetary souls, as we earlier remarked.
As for the sources of these ideas, the belief that there is a divine
centre of the universe towards which creation strives is almost certainly
borrowed from Thomas Wright (ultimately from Platonism), whom Kant mentions
and refutes in his „Allgemeine Naturgeschichte". As Kant points out,
Wright believed that God acts from the centre of the universe, attracting
virtue and repelling vice.^*^ No doubt this also influenced Herder when
he U3ed the gravitational analogy to describe man's ethical position. He
actually writes to Lavater in 1772, recommending Kant's „Allgemeine Natur=
geschiehte", „wo Sie sogar Ihre Mittelsonne [Lavater had indulged in
similar mystical speculations J finden, die auch ein Englander [i.e. Wright]
ordentlich astronomisch behauptet hat."^^'' It was thus from Kant and
Wright that Herder derived the notion that the actual universe is the scene
of an ideal "evolution" towards higher worlds. To the more abstract and
ethical, but astronomical pattern of Wright, he added his own theory, in
turn influenced by Leibniz and Bonnet, that a dynamic progress by psycho¬
physical "palingenesis" occurs in the upper half of the Chain of Being.
Among the numerous writers Herder names throughout his works, there are
many who likewise believed that other worlds are inhabited (if not that we
actually ascend to some of them after death). Siegel names Kant, Lambert
and Fontenelle^^ among these, and Rouche names Bode, Bonnet and
Martinet.We may add to these Herschel,^"^ Campanella,^"1'^
Bruno,Kepler,Edward Young,Leibniz,Bentley, Whiston,
Derham and Burnst,^^ and even then this list is by no means complete.
Apart from Herder's personal belief in a dynamic inter-planetary
sequence of beings (which Kant had qualified even in his wAllgemeine Natur=
geschichte"), with ethereal bodies, progressing up a ladder of existence
towards a central sun, we can say that his ideas on this subject were
thoroughly typical of his age. Teleology, as we noticed when discussing
it, required that all celestial bodies must have a purpose, which is either
to give light to other (inhabited) bodies, or to sustain living inhabitants
on their own surface. The Chain of Being conception also posited a
plenary universe. Moreover, the eighteenth century was an age which
delighted in Utopias, whether they took the form of a past Golden Age, a
future raillenium, or of some unspoiled, undiscovered land peopled by noble
savages. (Such ideas also appear in Herder's writings, of course.) Thus
the belief that other worlds are inhabited, although fairly common even
around the Renaissance, became very widespread in Herder's age, since it
appealed enormously to the century's peculiar kind of imagination, even
although it had been anathematised by orthodox theologians as incompatible
with the dignity of man, who was created in God's image, with the Incarnation
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of Christ as the Son of God, and with the absolute and final validity of
His mission of Redemption.
Conclusion.
It has seemed necessary to give a comprehensive account of Herder's
views on the Chain of Being, because it is within this typically eighteenth
century context that his "evolutionary" ideas are set. It should now be
evident that he was neither a Darwinist nor a theologian who was bent upon
interpreting the phenomena of life in terms of religious orthodoxy. He
was a religious man, but his religion, at the time of the „Ideen", was a
liberal one, and it is only one element within his wide and varied learning
and thought. In his attitude to the hierarchy of living forms and their
development in time we encounter that characteristic blend of naturalistic
and metaphysical or idealistic modes of explanation which is so charac¬
teristic of Herder's thought, especially in his mature years. Both modes
coexist uneasily in his writings, and we again insist that it is wrong to
emphasise one at the expense of the other, since it was his very nature to
use them both, and to try to reconcile them, even distorting them both in
the process. It was this feature which made his thought rich and





In our chapter on biology, we touched upon certain aspects of the
human sciences, since they were closely bound up with the problem of
biological evolution in general. Such were the questions of the origin of
man, the evolution of the human races, and the relative influences of
heredity and environment upon the human constitution. We shall now deal
with the remaining branches of the human sciences as they are represented
in Herder's writings.
1. Physical anthropology; the physical characteristics of man in relation
to the other animals.
Since we have already examined Herder's ideas on the physical
differences between the human races, the only branch of physical anthropo¬
logy which remains to be studied is that which treats of the physical
differences between man and the other animals. Certain general aspects of
this problem have already been discussed, and need not be reviewed again
here. Such were Herder's relatively modern criteria, mentioned in our
sections on classification and the "levels of organisation", for distin¬
guishing between organisms according to degrees of physical complexity
rather than to qualitative or intrinsic differences (although he employed
qualitative „Krafte" as an alternative distinction, as we also observed).
In the present section, we shall be concerned with psychological
distinctions which Herder draws between man and the other animals only in so
far as they are related to observable physical differences. However, we
may here briefly review the other more or less psychological criteria which
he uses at various times. These include the human power to communicate by
language,"^ perfectibility2'' („das G-esetz der Vervollkommnung"), „Besonnen=
heit",^ and sociability or social altruism,^ all of which he names,
especially in his early essay on language, as peculiarly human characteristics.
With reference to these, we may note firstly that the criterion of language,
of course, still remains a perfectly valid distinction between man and the
animals, and the power of speech, as Herder also realised, is related to
certain characteristics of the vocal chords, etc., in man. Secondly, it is
worth mentioning that Rousseau had used the criterion of perfectibility
before Herder as a distinction between man and the apes, although he believed
that the orang-outan, unlike the other higher apes, is fundamentally the
5)
same as man. ' Perfectibility, or the ability of the human mind to develop
progressively, is a valid criterion if considered as a difference in the
degree of complexity of mental functions, and when related to man's power
of language, hence of rapid and cumulative learning. Thirdly, we 3hall
return to the idea of „Besonnenheit" or of a "sensorium commune" in man in
our section on faculty psychology, and fourthly, we may recall that human
sociability was mentioned in connection with the problem of perception, and
the supposedly social tendencies of insects etc. in our section on classi¬
fication.
Religious or metaphysical criteria, such as that of the immortal soul
or of a special human providence, have bean mentioned in our sections on
"ideal" evolution and on the problem of teleology. We also referred to
similar qualitative distinctions in terms of „Kraft" in our section on
classification, where we noticed that, in the t(Ideon", in which Herder's
theories of physical anthropology appear in their most developed form,
qualitative criteria such as „Kraft" play a smaller part than formal and
genuinely empirical distinctions. It is these empirical distinctions
between man and the other animals, as they appear in Herder's mature period,
which we shall now discuss.
Eighteenth century thinkers were particularly interested in the
differences between man and the other animals, especially the ap8s. This
interest was part of the current vogue of "primitivism", which was itself
encouraged by the discovery of various backward, but apparently idyllic
communities on Pacific islands and elsewhere. Rousseau's works further
helped to foster this interest, and Nature Utopias figured prominently in
the literature of the age. Besides, the Leibnizian principle of continuity
(itself derived from the ancient doctrine of the Chain of Being) taught, as
Lovejoy observes,^ that transitions between natural forms, including that
between man and the apes, are invariably gradual. Prom this premise, it
seemed likely that undiscovered "missing links" might exist somewhere
between the apes and man.^ Indeed, legends of ape-men, satyrs, boys
suckled by wolves, and the like, not uncommon in antiquity, show that such
beliefs were by no means new. But, for the reasons we have named, they
were particularly popular in Herder's age. All varieties of apes, "noble
savages" from distant and uncivilised lands, "porcupine men" (and similar
cases of genetic atavism), "wild boys" long separated from human society,
and other human freaks of all kinds, were studied by educated men with
zealous attention. Anyone patronising such prodigies was assured of
immediate oelebrity, until, with the advance of science and the decline of
primitivism, they eventually found their place in scientific textbooks for
the learned, and in fair-grounds for th9 curiosity of the vulgar.
Already in his essay on language in 1770, Herder discusses cases of
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"wild men" who, abandoned by society, had reverted to an animal state. But
here, as later in the MIdeen", he emphatically maintains that they are only
degenerate men, and that man can never completely lose the peculiar identity
of his species.^ Similarly, he is sceptical from the start about legends
of "tailed men" or ape-men, still widely accredited in his day. As early as
in 1766 he doubts the existence of the fabled "tailed men" of Borneo, and
remains incredulous regarding the theories of the eminent scientist Maupertuis,
who firmly believed that such creatures exist.^ Herder rightly exclaims
alle diese Nationen gehoren zu den Kaklogalliniern,
Liliputtern und Huynhuyms, in die Welt, die Swift erschaffen.
Among those writers known to Herder who did believe that "tailed men"
or ape-men existed, that apes could be taught speech and become like men, or
that men could revert to ape-like states, were Rousseau, Lamettrie and
Voltaire,11^ Linrieus,*2^ Moscati,*^ Bolingbroke,"^ Maupertuis,and
Monboddo;"^ even Kant, in his lectures on physical geography as they were
published in 1802, declared:
Die mit einem kleinen Ansatz von Affenschwanz versehenen Menschen
auf Formosa, im Innern von Borneo u.s.w. scheinen nicht ganz
erdiohtet.
Robinet, in the 1760's, went so far as to claim the existence of mermen.
On the other hand, such fanciful theories and legends were rejected by
others whose works Herder had read; such were Blumenbach, who rightly
19)
believed, on scientific grounds, that the "tailed men" were only apes, '
and Camper, who said on the strength of his dissections that negroes are
basically the same as Europeans, and that apes are physically incapable of
speech.Tyson, the noted British anatomist, whom Herder also cites,
had already maintained in 1699 that the fabled ape-men, satyrs, etc. of the
ancients were all merely apes;^^ he added the following telling
23)
observation: '
This Difference I cannot but remark, that the Ancients were
fond of making Brutes to be Men: on the contrary now, most
unphilosophically, the Humour is, to make Ken but meer [sic]
Brutes
In other words, Tyson had witnessed the beginnings of the modern fashion of
primitivism, possibly in the works of writers such as Hobbes, who portrayed
"natural man" as little better than a brute. It is clear from his words
that he realised that such theories are fashions, the offspring of the
temper of the age, rather than scientific hypotheses based upon genuine
observations. We may add that men like Rousseau and Monboddo, who believed
in the eighteenth century that orang-outans are capable of acquiring speech
and becoming civilised, and that our ancestors were orang-outans, should
hardly be regarded as scientific thinkers or as precursors of Darwin. They
r
were usually apostles of primitivism, led by their distaste for the Rational¬
istic worship of progress to mount far-reaching attacks upon modem civilisa¬
tion and to glorify the supposed "natural" or animal state of man.
However, Herder denied that man and the apes are fundamentally
identical, and that the one can become the same as the other. His grounds
for saying this were scientific, to judge by the writers, such as Blumeribaeh,
Camper, and Tyson, whom he cites in the „Ideen". His earlier doubts, in
1766, concerning "tailed men" etc., before he read these authors, were
probably inspired by that general scepticism regarding legends and miracles
which he exhibits throughout his first period as a writer.
We must now examine in detail how Herder differentiates between man and
the other animals, particularly the apes. In the „Ideen", he suggests
several criteria upon which such a distinction may be founded. For example,
he rightly says that a larger brain is a necessary condition, but not the
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only one, for a superior intelligence such as that enjoyed by man. ' But
we have already seen, in our sections on the animal "type" and on compara¬
tive and analogical methods, that he believed all animals, including man and
the apes, to be basically similar, especially in their anatomy. This
notion, as he elaborated it in the „Ideen", made it necessary for him to
show that whatever differences do exist between animal species, including
man and the apes, are rather differences of degree or form than of kind or
intrinsic quality (although we have seen that he also retained, to some
extent, his older metaphysical and qualitative distinctions in terms of
„Krafte", the immortal soul, etc.). However, the principal difference
between man and all the other animals is one of form, he contends in the
„Ideen". It is the difference between man's distinctive upright posture
and the horizontal posture natural to the quadrupeds. He believes that
all man's superiorities over the animals, including his freedom of will, his
ability to produce artifacts, his reason, his perfectibility, etc., can be
2b)
derived from this physical peculiarity. '
This idea is not original to Herder, however. Buffon had said that
26)
the ape is four-handed, and man two-handed. 1 Helvetius, whom Herder
mentions in connection with such theories, had emphasised the importance of
man's two hands for his rational abilities, since the upright human posture
leaves the hands free to perform purposeful tasks.^ (This is still a
favourite anthropological axiom.) Ziramermann also believed that man's gait
is naturally and characteristically upright,*^' and Daubenton, with whose
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contributions to Buffon's "Histoire naturelle" Herder was acquainted, showed
that various of man's anatomical peculiarities are related to his upright
29)
posture.
However, the Italian Moscati had declared (1770 and 1771) that man was
formerly and naturally a quadruped, but that he assumed the erect posture at
the time of Adam's Fall from Grace; Moscati regarded this as a curse, as the
root of all man's miseries and afflictions. Herder explicitly mentions
Moscati and his theory, with which he naturally disagrees, in the „Xlteste
30)
Urkunde", ' but Kant had earlier composed a favourable review of this
31)
unusual work. ' Rouche points out that J.C. Mayer, in a work of 1783 which
32)
Herder read, refuted Moscati's hypothesis. We may add that Blumenbach,
like Herder, also declared that any observer "will not but see that a
33)
bipedal brute and a quadrupedal man would equally pass for prodigies", '
and that the present gaits of man and the animals are perfectly natural.
It is strange that although Kant had favourably received Moscati's suggestion
that man's present ethical situation is linked to his upright posture, he
rejected Herder's much less fanciful theory that man's reason is linked to
his characteristic bearing, when he reviewed Part I of the „Ideen".We
can only conclude that Kant probably still sympathised with the Rousseauistic
belief that man has degenerated from some earlier "natural" state, and that
his present characteristics, such as his upright posture, should not be
regarded as unqualified advantages.
Georg Forster offered a more telling objection to Herder's explanation
- 35)of man's superiority. He writes of it to Sommering as follows: '
Das nenne ich aus menschlichen Begriffen allegorisirt.
Tragen denn nicht alle Vogel den Kopf in die Hohe; am meisten
die allerduramsten.
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However, Hansen has shown that Herder's theory of man's superior mental
ability can be reconciled with later scientific observations. He quotes an
36)
article on human evolution as follows:
Ss kann schon aus rein statischen Grunden kein Zweifel daruber
bestehen, dafi fur die mit zunehmender Hirnentwicklung parallel
laufende Vei'grofierung des auf der Wirbelsaule balancierenden
Schadels die Aneignung der dauernd aufrechten Korperhaltung die
naturliche Voraussetzung gebildet hat.
We can also reply to Forster's objection by pointing out that the erect
position of the bird's head does not leave free two limbs which can be adapted
to handling objects and tools as does the upright posture in the case of man.
Nonetheless, we can readily admit that Herder did tend to exaggerate
this particular feature of human anatomy, linking it to „Humanitat" and at
times displaying a thoroughly anthropocentric pride in man's superiority.
But his main fault was that he failed to include further evolutionary and
physiological preconditions of man's abilities in his theory. This occurred
firstly because he rejected the idea of evolution, and lacked an adequate
knowledge of man's evolutionary development, and secondly, because, as we
shall see, he did not make sufficient use of data concerning the physiology
of the brain.
Bouch£ admits that the ancients had generally considered man's upright
posture to be a distinguishing advantage, just as Herder does, yet he
contends that Herder's theory is really of Christian inspiration.^ To
this we would reply that Herder's view was shared not only by the pagans of
antiquity, but also by such freethinkers as Helvetius, and that he supported
it with evidence culled from the works of such eminent scientists as Buffon,
Daubenton and Blumenbach. Besides, Moscati's theory, which Herder denounced,
associated man's upright posture with the doctrine of original sin, and was
accordingly far more influenced by theology than was Herder's. For Herder'
pride in man's excellence is more typical of the humanism of antiquity, the
Renaissance and of eighteenth century rationalism than of orthodox Christi¬
anity, which tended to dwell upon man's shortcomings rather than upon his
38)
grandeur. As Lecky puts it: '
It is impossible to look upon the awful beauty of a Greek statue,
or to read a page of Plutarch, without perceiving how completely
the idea of excellence was blended with that of pride. It is
equally impossible to examine the life of a Christian saint, or
the painting of an early Christian artist, without perceiving
that the dominant conception was self-abnegation and self-distrust
Herder employs a further technique in distinguishing between man and
the animals. As Rouch£ notices, he borrows Camper's idea that the
craniological angle between two lines, one drawn from the ear to the base
of the nose, the other from the prominence of the forehead to the front of
39)the jaw, is greatest in man, especially in the European races. ' Herder
further suggests that angles between four lines, drawn from the uppermost
cervical vertebra to the rear of the head, the crown of the head, the front
of the forehead and the chin respectively, should also be compared in
different animal species and man. (These additional measurements of the
skull were probably suggested by some remarks of Blumenbaoh, Rouche
declares.) We may say that such methods can be useful as rough guides
to craniological types, but they are too subject to variables to be
accurate,and they can become dangerous if used as a basis for value
judgements, especially in the question of racial superiority, as indeed
occurred in more recent times. But, as A.C. Haddon notices in his history
of anthropology, Camper regarded it primarily as an aesthetic criterion, not
an anthropological one.^ Herder himself* does not use it to pass judge¬
ment on the intrinsic merits of racial types either. But it is of parti¬
cular interest to us, since it again shows that, in the „Ideen", he was
increasingly favouring formal rather than qualitative distinctions between
different species, in keeping with his growing interest in comparative
anatomy, and that methods involving verifiable measurements were supplanting
his earlier interest in physiognomy, with its divinations of intrinsic
qualities.
"We conclude that Herder's theories of physical anthropology were not
characterised by theological overtones, and that their limitations arose
rather from Herder's having no theory of evolution than from his not having
availed himself of such empirical evidence as was available at the time.
We have also seen that he increasingly used formal and visible criteria
rather than qualitative or "physiognomical" ones. His theories were, on
the whole, typical of the more advanced anthropological ideas of his day,
and they are particularly remarkable for their healthy scspticism regarding
both time-honoured legends and the myths of contemporary primitivisa.
2. Medicine.
A few words must be said on Herder's knowledge of medicine, since it was
in this subject that, with the encouragement of his early patron, the army-
surgeon Schwartz=J2rla, he at first intended to make his career, until,
overcome at the prospect of a dissection, he altered his plans.He
continued to show interest in the subject throughout his life, however, and
several of his associates were members of the medical profession, from the
student Pegelow in StraBburg, to J.&. Zimmerinann, physician in ordinary at
Hannover,and, at a later date, his own son Gottfried. His interest was
i
probably stj&aulated by his own frequent illnesses, and his letters, as well
as those of Caroline, contain unnumbered references to illnesses and states
of health. In his writings, he mentions such medical authorities as
Hoffmann of Halle,Boerhaave Sydenham,Gaubius^^ and Unzer.^"^
Caroline says that he read and admired the works of the physician Leiden=
frost,and excerpts from the medical writings of Metzger, J.C.A. Mayer,
Proohaska, Meier, Gruner, Sydenham and Caldani are found in his unpublished
52)
notebooks. ' His library also contained medical works by Baader, Heister
53)
and Culmus, ' as well as various works on human physiology, etc., mentioned
elsewhere in our present work.
However, all this is evidence of Herder's wide reading in all subjects,
including all of the sciences of his day, rather than of any exclusive
preoccupation with medicine in itself. He used the data of medicine chiefly
as an adjunct to his studies of biology, and of human psychology in
particular, which, as we shall shortly see, he set out to base firmly upon
physiology rather than upon the abstractions of metaphysics and epistemology.
3. Psychology.
A considerable amount has been written on Herder's psychological
theories. On the whole, the recent work of LehwalcLer"^ is the best indi¬
vidual contribution in this field, since it is thorough and well-informed,
although it deals only with the psychology essay of 1778, and with Herder's
theory of „Empfinden" in particular. The same writer prefixes his work with
a useful review of most earlier works written on this aspect of Herder's
thought.The main defect of Lehwalder's work from the point of view of
the historian of science is that he is as interested in certain metaphysical
doctrines as in the growth of scientific psychology, and compares some of
Herder's theories with those of Heidegger.Richtsr'^ gives an excellent
summary of Herder's psychological ideas at the beginning of his work, but
58}
the rest of it is largely concerned with educational theories. Probst '
tends to relate Herder's psychology too closely to the wider issue of
„Humanitat", a conception which is of little importance till the time of the
nldeen". The work of Gotz^ is good on the whole, but too often relates
Herder's theories to those of Wundt, whose ideas could appropriately serve as
a test of Herder's modernity towards the end of the nineteenth century, but
scarcely today. The American critics M. Schutze^ and R.T. Clark^ are
particularly interested in the scientific value of Herder's psychology, but,
as we have often had occasion to remark, they tend to portray Herder as much
more modern, as much more of an empiricist or positivist than he actually
was. Such, then, are the major appraisals of Herder's psychology.
The greatest difficulty which besets all critics of Herder's psycholo¬
gical ideas, even as they appear in the essay on psychology in 1778, is that
they are usually interwoven with notions from other areas of learning,
particularly aesthetics, the theory of language, pedagogics, ethics, meta¬
physics, epistemology, sociology (and so-called „Volkerpsychologie") and
history. In any case, psychology was usually regarded in Herder's day as a
branch of philosophy, and scarcely yet existed as an autonomous discipline,
far less as a fully-fledged science. It is therefore difficult to treat
the subject in itself without referring to several allied branches of
learning.
Herder himself first became interested in psychology through his early
studies of aesthetics, which led him to reject the prevailing abstractions of
Klotz, Riedel and others in favour of a new aesthetics of sense-experience.
Thus, at an early date, he began to favour a more empirical, physiological
and scientific kind of psychology, with special attention to the functions
of the senses, instead of the abstract, Wolffian theories of the Enlighten-
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ment. We have already evaluated some results of this approach when
discussing his use of experimental data, his interest in pathological cases,
and his theories of sound and musical euphony, optics, and the "blending" of
vision and touch. Thus, as Gotz notices,^ he did himself believe that
psychology should be an empirical and scientific study. He actually writes
in the „Journal"s**^
Die Psychologie, was ist sie anders, als eine reiche Physik
der Seele?
With these considerations in mind, it should not after all be impossible
to assess Herder's psychological theories in relation to science, especially
if we pay particular attention to the physiological foundation upon which he
sought to establish them. For after he had dealt, in the fourth „Kritisches
Waldchen" of 1769, with the scientific background to the individual senses of
sight, hearing and touch (already discussed in our sections on optics and
sound), he set out to elaborate a general physiological theory of psychology
as a whole. This aspiration culminated in the 1778 essay on psychology,
and in the chapters of the „Idaen" which he devoted to the human mind and
its relation to the body.
a) min£ body.
J.II. Baldwin, in his history of psychology, aptly sums up the development
65)
of the subject, in relation to the wider issues of philosophy, as follows: '
The philosophy of the Greeks marked out the separation of mind
and body; that of modern times seeks to bring them together again.
Judged in this light, Herder's psychology is typical of the modern movement.
Again and again, we have seen how he attempts to reconcile all traditional
dualisms, and that of mind and body is no exception to this rule. We have
already seen, in our chapter on scientific methods, how he resolved this
particular dualism in so far as it appears in the psychological problem of
subject and object, the "problem of perception". We saw how, as usual, he
offers several conflicting solutions, the chief of which were the sensation-
alistic one, which implies that the subject, the mind, is developed through
sense-experience, the subjectivistic one, which suggests that our experience
of the objective world, through the medium of the body, is conditioned by
the pre-determined subject, the perceiving mind itself, and the Leibnizian
theory that subject and object, mind and body, are parallel or mutually pre-
adapted. The other dualisms of matter and force, inanimate matter and life,
the raw materials of growth and the vitalistic "force" of the embryo, the
physical world and the moral world, and the decaying body and the immortal
soul, were each resolved in a similar equivocal fashion. However, they
frequently reappear, in their old dualistic form, from behind the veil of
„Krafte" in which Herder habitually enshrouds them. For while he tries to
overcome them by describing both dualistic poles as „Krafte", their origi¬
nally independent identities inevitably reassert themselves whenever he
applies his inadequate "monism" to questions which had usually been answered
dualistieally in traditional philosophy and religion. Striving to avoid
the truly monistic extremes of pure materialism and pure mysticism or
spiritualism, yet using elements of both, he often fails to satisfy the
requirements both of logic and of empirical science.
Thus, before we come to study Herder's more scientific, physiological
theories of psychology, we must remember that the relatively scientific
elements represent only one aspect of his wider philosophy of mind and body.
In themselves, especially in 1769, these ideas seem to imply that the mind
is conditioned and determined by sense-experience, by physical, or rather by
physiological functions of the body. In this way, he speaks of man's
„materielle Seele" in 1769.^ Yet in the wider, metaphysical problem of
the soul and the body, his ideas are matched at the opposite extreme by the
theoiy that the body is merely the product (as we also noticed in our section
on embryology), the mirror, the expression of the soul. Thus he refers, in
1767, to „ein Platonisches Mahrchen, wie der schone Xorper ein Geschopf,
ein Bote, ein Spiegel, ein Werkzeug einer schonen Seele sey",^^ and in an
early version of his essay on psychology in 1774, himself uses this idea,
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describing the body as an „Analogon, Spiegel, ausgedrucktes Bild der Seele". '
He explicitly refers to the Platonic origin of the conception, as we have
seen, but Probst names Winckelmann, Schiller, Tetens and Shaftesbury as
other exponents of it,^*^ while Strothmann refers to medieval precedents,
and Rouche, who always tends to overemphasise this more spiritualistic side
of Herder's thought, names Aristotle, Thomism, the Leibnizians, Plato,
Lavater, Sulzer, Winckelmann, Hamann, Shaftesbury, Oetinger and others as
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writers who advocated similar notions. ' We have ourselves already
remarked on the rble of this idea in Herder's embryologies! theories, noting
the influence of Harvey, Needham and others upon it. But all this is
really a metaphysical question, as is the theory of preadaptation or pre-
stabilised harmony, and they need not occupy us any longer here, since we
have already dealt with their psychological applications in relation to the
problem of perception. We need only add that the pseudo-science of
physiognomy, which Herder eventually abjured, rested upon the old Platonic
conception of the soul; but Herder had mentioned it in the 1760's, as we
have seen, even before he knew the ideas of Lavater, Oetinger and most of
the other thinkers named by various critics as precedents. He seems there¬
fore to have found it for himself in the writings of Plato, perhaps with
some stimulus from Hamann and Winckelmann.
However, most theorists in Herder's day believed that mind (or soul)
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and body are in some way parallel, and many, sueh as Hartley, ' freely
admitted that the true nature of their connection may remain unknown. Then
Kant, by proving in his „Traume eines G-eistersehers" that the nature of the
soul or spirit and its relation to the body are not only unknown, but also
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unknowable, ' removed the main metaphysical obstacle which stood in the way
of a genuinely empirical investigation of the mind or consciousness (not the
intangible soul or spirit), whose functions can be observed through the
workings of the body. Herder was one of those who undertook this task, but,
as we shall repeatedly discover, he never finally broke with metaphysical
theories of soul and body, but attempted to combine them with his "physio¬
logical" psychology by means of such devices as his vitalistic and
supposedly neurological „Krafte". As Probst puts it:^
In jedem organischen Wesen sieht er eine untrennbare Einheit
von Physischem, Psychischem und Geistigera. Daher muB die
Psychologie nach seiner Ansicht immer alle drei Komponenten
zugleich ins Auge fassen —
In other words, his philosophy of „Krafte" does not make any clear distin¬
ctions between the physiological, the psychological, and the metaphysical
aspects of consciousness; in fact, its main purpose is to make such
distinctions unnecessary, although brain, mind and soul continue to reappear
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in their traditional but unacknowledged rbles, uneasily coexisting in his
thought.
All this corroborates our initial contention that psychology, in
Herder's day, was still bound up with other extraneous subjects, particu¬
larly with metaphysics. Only when it ceased to occupy itself with qualita¬
tive conceptions such as soul or spirit could it become an empirical science
of mind. A few thinkers were moving in this direction 9ven in the
eighteenth century, but the separation of psychology and metaphysics is not
always observed even today. In this, as in so many other questions, Herder
stood between two opposing positions. His psychology stands between the
older metaphysical theories and the modern empirical theories of mind. But
we must now pass on to evaluate the physical basis of his psychology, bearing
in mind that it is only a part of his comprehensive philosophy of mind.
b) !^e_^rain_and_the gh^sical_basis_of mind.
We have seen that, in 1769> Herder refers to the Mmaterielle Seele" of
man. This, like all materialistic premises in psychology, implies that the
functions of the mind are associated with some area or areas of the body, and
with physical processes within them. Accordingly, in elaborating his
empirical psychology of the senses in the fourth „Kritisches Waldchen" of
1769, he also declares
Nach diesen ersten Schritten ware man nahe dran, um jeder
Gefuhlsart gleichsam ihre Gegend in der Seele einzumefien —-
(The „gleichsam" is a characteristic reservation, for Herder is rarely
willing to commit himself completely to any exclusive interpretation.) In
the „Journal", he again refers to the physical basis of thought, grasping at
Maupertuis' suggestion that dissections, or rather vivisections, of the
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brains of criminals might supply new information:
die Bernerkungen, die Maupertuis vorschlagt mit dam Gehirn
der Malefikanten wurden dazu halfen, und denn wurde gleichsam
[note the „gleichsam" again] die Welt Materieller Ideen lebendig.
And in 1785, he suggests that music may influence our emotions directly by
a physical process within the brain:^
Ja, als man den grausamen Versuch machte, lebendigen Geschopfen
das Gehira zu ofnen [sic], und durch gewifie Druckungen bei ihnen
bald Schmerz, bald Freude erregte; mochten diese Empfindungen,
auf eine grobe Weise bewirkt, etwas anders seyn, als was du [i.e.
music] auf eine unendlich feinere Weise bewirktest?
However, this last utterance is scarcely typical, because, already in
1775, he rejects Descartes' theory that the soul is localised in the pineal
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gland, and, in the „Plastik" of 1778, although he is prepared to conjecture
roughly that the sensory „Krafte" of the brain are situated nearer the
external organs, particularly the eyes, while the „ewigere Krafte" are
situated nearer the centre of the brain, he now heavily qualifies the whole
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supposition that mental functions can be localised within the cerebrum: '
-— so i3t doch offenbar dies innere Gewebe von zu verflochtner
feiner Art, als dais man mit Huarte ein Conklave von Cardinal=
kraften zimmern, oder den innern Bau und Saft des Granatapfels
nach seiner auBern Schale entwerfen konnte.
(We shall discuss Huarte's ideas later.) Here, it seems that he rejects
not only the theory that eaoh function or "faculty" can be localised within
the brain, but also the whole pseudo-science of phrenology, which claimed to
define mental resources and proclivities by the external conformation of the
cranium, and which was yet to have its greatest vogue in the early nineteenth
century. We shall examine this question later, however. Again in the
„Ideen", he rejects the method of localising faculties physically, this time
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with more vehemence: 1
Man wird aufhoren, die Seele in der Zirbeldruse, den Verstand
im spezifischen Gewicht des Gehirns zu suchen, oder gar die
feinsten Gedanken und Triehe in pergamentnen Rollen und Seilen
auf= und abwinden zu wollen: leere Versuche, die nichts
erreichen konnen, so wie sie bisher nichts erreicht haben.
The reason for this change of front, which occurred during the 1770's, is
that he had come to prefer the vitalistic theories of Haller, as he inter¬
preted them himself, to his own earlier, more materialistic and almost
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mechanistic ideas of 1769. He makes this clear himself in the „Ideen": '
Nun zeigen alle bisherigen Erfahrungen, die der gelehrteste
Physiolog aller Nationen, Haller, gesammlet, wie wenig sich das
untheilbare Werk der Ideenbildung in einzelnen materiellen
Theilen des Gehirns materiell und zerstreut aufsuchen lasse
For intangible "forces" cannot be localised or compartmented so readily as
material "faculties", he believes. But he again refers to ,,das innere
Gehirn" (presumably the cerebral medulla) in which „sich die Frucht der
Gedanken unsichtbar und unzertheilt bildet".^2^ (Hartley likewise believed
that the medulla, not the cortical parts of the brain, is the seat of mental
activity.Thus the brain is indeed the seat of thought, but it is not
compartmented, and thought-processes consist in invisible "forces", not in
visible material functions within it. The superiority of man's brain over
that of other animals, as Gotz notices, does not result from additional
"faculties" or compartments peculiar to man, but in „die vollkommenere
Ausarbeitung"^^ or „in der Proportion und in der Temperatur das Ganzen"^ -
i.e. in the more complex arrangement of constant basic elements, as we
earlier noticed. This latter theory represents Herder's growing preference,
at the time of the „Ideen", for formal distinctions, but it unfortunately did
not succeed in fully supplanting the earlier notion of ttKraft".
Let us pause for a moment to consider Herder's sources. It was from
the Spaniard Juan Huarte (c. 1520-1592), whose work was translated by Lessing
in 1752 under the title „Prufung der Kopfe zu den Wissenschaften", that
Herder derived his early belief that mental functions have a distinct physical
basis, presumably in various areas of the brain. He read this work in 1767,
as appears from his letters of that year,^^ and extracts from it occur in
his early notebooks.^1,1 The following quotation from Huarte's work, in
English translation, may serve to illustrate the man's ideas
the fourth ventricle [i.e. of the brain] [has] both the
office of digesting and altering the vitall spirits, and
[serves] to convert them into animall — The three ventricles
placed in the forefront, I doubt not, but that Nature made them
to none other end than to discourse and philosophise.
No doubt Herder found some of Huarte's localisations more acceptable than
Descartes', since the "vitall spirits" were nearer his own habitual vitalism
than were the mechanistic theories of the brain current among the French
materialists. However, he did not adopt Huarte's archaic doctrine of mental
"temperaments" - moist, cold, dry, etc.^^ - and, as we have seen, he soon
came to reject all such ideas in favour of his own version of Haller's neuro¬
logical vitalism. It is interesting that Kant, in his „Traume eines
Geistersehers", a work which Herder reviewed, adopts (in 1766) a neurological
theory, but with materialistic rather than vitalistic undertones, saying
„da6 alle Vorstellungen der Einbildungskraft zugleich mit gewissen Bewegungen
in dem Nervengewebe Oder Nervengeiste des Gehirns begleitet sind, welche man
ideas materiales nennt—' Finally, we may note that Herder was not
the first to reject completely the attempt to localise mental functions
exactly within the brain, as he did in the „Ideen". Argentier had already
done so in the early sixteenth century, repudiating the theories of Galen,
the first great theorist to suggest that all mental "faculties" have exact
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physical situations within the cerebrum.
However, Herder had misunderstood Haller when he assumed that the
theories of the great physiologist ruled out all localisations of the thought-
processes. As Clark points out,^2^ Haller had in fact correctly realised
that the cerebral cortex plays a significant part in emotion (more correctly,
perception) and cognition. Clark says that Herder failed to study or
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appreciate this part of Haller's work "for some inexplicable reason". '
The reason is not inexplicable, and there is no need to suppose that he
omitted to read the section in question. He saw in Ilaller's three „Krafte"
which he adopted under the titles of „Slasticitat", ^Reizbarkeit" and
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„Empfindung", ' not the exact physiological functions of muscles, nerves,
etc. (i.e. perfectly local phenomena) with which Haller associated them, but
simply another addition to his already considerable repertoire of ill-defined
and mysterious „Krafte". He saw them as invisible, intangible and
ubiquitous, as we have seen on many occasions, and did not relate them to
precise functions a3 Haller had done. Thus he wrongly believed that
Haller's explanation of nervous sensations and reactions in terms of "vires"
or „Krafte" excluded all possibility of localising functions of the mind,
and he rejected all attempts to do so as "mechanistic".^ It is true that
he speaks of the "inner" part of the brain (presumably the medulla) as the
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seat of thoughts on one occasion in the „Ideen", as we have seen. ' But
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it is clear that he regarded this only as the central focus of the invisible
and undivided nervous „Krafte". He brings out this point later in the same
work:97)
bei einigen Thieren kommen nicht einmal die Nerven beider
Augen und bei keinern Geschopf die Nerven aller Sirrne so
zusammen, dafi Ein sichtbarer Punkt sie vereine
On this second occasion, he is arguing that mental processes are „geistig",
not physical.
Gots says that he failed to appreciate the r&le of the cortex because it
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was unknown in his day. ' As we have seen, this is not strictly tree,
because Haller had in some measure realised the significance of this organ,
although he also attributed great importance to the medulla as a vital part
of the brain.") Besides, Thomas Willis (1621-1675)> to whose views on the
brain Herder refers in some detail in the BIdeen" had localised ideas
and memory in the cortex of the great brain,and Gall, whom Herder
mentions in 1802,also saw the cortex a3 the organ of intelligence.^^)
Malpighi had held similar views, influencing the remarkably modern, but long
unpublished theory of Swedenborg concerning the cardinal importance of the
cortex.10^
From all this, it seems probable that Herder did not omit considerations
of the cortex, now known to be the main organ of thought and perception in
the human brain, because he was entirely ignorant of it or because its
function was completely unknown in his day. For although it was only in
the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that Pavlov and his
predecessors and followers began to map out accurately the "mosaic of
functionsin the cerebral cortex, several writers of Herder's age, some
of whom were known to him, had drawn attention to it, and suspected that it
2a.
performed an important function in the processes of sensation and thought.
Herder made no referenoe to this organ because he came to distrust all more
specific localisations of mental processes, and he misinterpreted Haller's
vitalism, linking it to his own metaphysics of ,,Krafte" rather than to exact
physiological functions, as Haller had intended.
Herder does put forward some suggestions concerning the physical basis
of memory, however. In the fourth „Kritisches Waldchen" of 1769» he
writes:106^
die ersten Eindrucke in das zarte Wachs unsrer Kindheits=
seele gibt [sic] una Farbe und Gestalt des Urtheils.
But in the „Journal", he says that we do not know how ideas are impressed
upon and retained by the brain, and maintains that the (physical) theories
of Huarte and Julius Caesar Scaliger are not satisfactory.10^) And in the
„Ideen", he says more explicitly that memory is „nicht korperlich sondern
geistig".10^) Yet later in the same work, he contradicts this statement,
using the traditional physical theory of memory:10^
Das Hirn der Kinder ist weich und hangt [sic] noch an der
Hirnschale: langsam bildet es seine Streifen aus und wird
mit den Jahren erst vaster; bis es allmalioh sich hartet
und keine neuen Eindrucke mehr annimmt.
In fact, this is precisely the theory of Huarte, which Herder had pronounced
inadequate in his „Journal", for Huarte writes:110)
old men partake of much understanding, because they have
great drinesse, and faile of memory, for that they have little
moysture, and by this meanes the substance of the braine
hardneth, and so cannot receive the impression of the figures
Thus Richter's111) contention that Herder does not adopt any position in the
question of the physical basis of memory is scarcely true; in fact, he
suggests two conflicting solutions, those of the "wax" model of the brain,
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which also reminds us of Locke's ideas, and the alternative spiritualistic
theory, which denied that memory has any tangible physical basis at all.
As usual, he is attracted to two opposing theories, and, in this case, he
does not even attempt to reconcile them.
He considered yet another physical factor in describing mental functions,
however - that of the weight or size of the brain. In the nldeen", he
begins by denying that the specific weight of the brain can be a measure of
„Verstand",13"2'' and later rightly adds that the relative weights of the
brain and the rest of the nervous system are not a sufficient test of mental
capacity either, since this criterion fails to take into account the fineness
or distribution of the nerves.^ (It was Sommering and Blumenbach who
suggested that the ratio of the size of the brain to that of the nervous
system is a better criterion of mental ability than size of brain alone.
However, he admits that larger brain capacity is a necessary condition for
higher intelligence, such as that of man as opposed to the lower intelligence
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of the animals, y and now seems to regard Wrisberg's criterion of specific
weight with more approval than before.But all of these criteria, in
Herder's mind, are of secondary importance to the degree of nervous
complexity in the organism. This is indeed an excellent standard by which
we can judge how advanced an organism is, but, as we have seen, he wrongly
believed that this makes it unnecessary or even impossible to localise
mental functions.
We shall conclude with a few words on phrenology. We earlier quoted
a passage from the „PlastikM of 1778 in which Herder says, with reference to
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the brain, that it is impossible „den innem Bau und Saft des Granatapfels
nach seiner Schale [zu] entwerfen."*1^ Similarly, in the „Ideen", he uses
Camper's craniological measurements not as an indication of mental "faculties"
or inner dispositions, but as an aesthetic and craniological test for
distinguishing between animal and racial types. On the other hand, some
laudatory remarks in his review of Lavater's „Physiognomische Fragmente" in
1776^"^ suggest that he had sympathised with phrenology at that time, and
we know from Caroline's memoirs that he displayed interest in Gall's phreno-
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logical system in his last years. ' All this, however, is insufficient
evidence for drawing any detailed conclusions about his attitude to
phrenology. We can only say that he made no extravagant use of it himself,
and that he cannot be blamed in any way for the later vagaries of Romantic
theorists in this now obsolete pseudo-science.
This whole section has shown us that Herder early expressed a genuine
interest in the physical basis of mind, but that the vitalism of Haller,
which Herder generalised and assimilated into his own metaphysics of „Krafte"
(as we shall see in more detail later), drew him away from this important
and progressive empirical study, thus diminishing the value of his contri¬
bution to physiological psychology.
c) ?£®_5®£Yes_and_the_neurologicalj3asis_of_mind.
We have seen how Herder's interest in psychology arose out of his early
studies in aesthetics, and how he set out to establish both of these
disciplines upon the empirical data of physiology. We also noticed how, in
the 1770's, he began increasingly to distrust the more materialistic theories
of thinkers such as Huarte, who was confident that mental functions can be
localised with precision in certain areas of the brain. Among the reasons
for this change in his attitude were his dislike of the psychological
theories of the Enlightenment, which treated the mind as composed of rigidly
separate, abstract "faculties", and which he found equally distasteful when
interpreted in concrete terms, as in the materialistic theory of a "compart-
mented" brain. (We shall return to the problem of "faculties" later.)
Secondly, he disliked the dualism inherent in the earlier psychological
theories, even in Descartes' "mechanistic" conceptions, and, as a follower
of Leibniz, he preferred gradual transitions, not only between the various
mental "faculties" in the abstract sense, but also between the mind as a
whole and the body. And thirdly, even in the 1774 and 1775 versions of his
essay on psychology, he is much influenced by the metaphysical, non-
physiological vitalism of Leibniz, even before he made wider use of the
physiological vitalism of Haller. All this soon led him, in psychology as
in so many other areas of his thought, to prefer vitalistic interpretations
of both mind and body in terms of „Krafte".
Vitalism, in psychology, has very often been associated with neurology.
The nerves, above all, can be envisaged as the seat of an intangible yet
extremely active principle, which produces the astonishingly swift and
complex reactions we associate with the processes of thought and the movements
of the body. It is no wonder, then, that Herder soon came to prefer the
neurological theories of Haller to the materialistic ones of Huarte and
others. Indeed, as early as in 1766, he had already declared himself
„[da£] die ganze Erapfindung auf die Beschaffenheit der Nerven des Gefuhls
ankommt"
But just as he had introduced many different unknowns, in biology, as
descriptions of the elusive life-principle, so also did he employ various
distinct theories in psychology to describe the workings of the nerves upon
which the mental functions depend. Thus before we discuss Haller's theory
of three physiological "vires", the theory of which Herder made most use, we
shall first examine some of the other, more specific neurological hypotheses
which he borrowed from the science of his age.
(i) The theory of a "nervous fluid",
In the „Ideen", Herder refers on several occasions to the old theory
that the nerves contain a subtle "nervous fluid" („Nervensaft") which is the
agent of both sensation and motor-impulses. He first refers to „die
mehrere Mischung, Lauterung und Ausarbeitung der Lebenssafte" in animals as
opposed to plants, and mentions in particular „den feinern Strom, der die
edlen Theile befeuchtet" This fluid, which may possibly be only the
blood in this case, is apparently regarded as a lubricant for the more
delicate animal organs. Soon after, he says that more advanced creatures
122)have more refined juices, ' and later, referring to man's superior upright
posture, he declares that this allows only „die feinsten und reichsten
Safte" to ascend to the brain.(This recalls the archaic botanical
theory, which Goethe, for example, uses in his MMetamorphose der Pflanzen",
that progressively more rarified juices are found from the root to the
flower of the plant.) However, he later says, in his arguments for
immortality, that this nervous fluid is not itself a vehicle of sensation,
but that it only contributes (presumably as a lubricant) towards the
physical health of the brain and the nerves, whereas the soul itself is
ngeistig".*2*0 He concludes:"*"^"^
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Also ists eine schwache unphysiologische Vorstellung, sioh das
Gehirn als einen Selbstdenker, den Nervensaft als einen Selbst=
empfinder zu denken.
From this, it is clear that the "fluid" theory of the nerves, in itself, was
too "mechanistic" for Herder; he condemns it for this reason in his mature
period, along with other attempts to localise nervous and mental functions
in specific physical components of the body, and retains it only in modified
form, saying that it acts as a lubricant.
The theory that juices or fluids are responsible for nervous functions
goes back to Galen at least.Descartes believed that the nerves are
127)
tubular, and filled with a fluid which produces muscular movements.
Hoffmann of Halle and Malpighi had similar ideas, and believed that the
"nervous fluid" comes to the nerves from the cerebral cortex.The
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great physician Boerhaave was of the same opinion, / and it was probably
from him that Haller took his own theory that a "liquor nervosus""'"*^ is
secreted from vessels in the cortex into small tubes within the nervous
medulla, producing both sensation and movement in the body by its volatile
motion:"^^''
Quare in universum certum esse videtur, ex vasis corticis
separari in cavas medullae fistulas liquidum aliquod, quod
in nervosos tubulos continuatum, ad extremos nervorum fines
propulsum, sensus motusque causa est.
But although Swammerdam, in an unpublished work, had long since proved that
the nerves are not hollow, liquid-filled tubes, this belief persisted till
the early nineteenth century, and Sommering referred to the fluid as
"animirt",*^' while Lamarck considered it to be the seat of the life-
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principle. ' No doubt the belief first arose because certain parts of
the brain, notably the ventricles, do contain some fluid. Herder knew this,
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but maintained that such fluids only serve to keep the brain healthy.
Herder's repudiation of this theory, like his disregard for the cortex,
both of which figured in the works of Haller, his acknowledged mentor in
physiology, shows once again that he misinterpreted Haller's vitalism, and
wrongly believed that it made it impossible to localise mental functions,
or to reduce them to material agencies. He probably realised that the
"nervous fluid" hypothesis lent itself too readily to undiluted materialism;
in fact, his friend Knebel used it in an argument for materialism,*"^ and
Lamettrie declared that this fluid mechanically transmits sensations from
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the sensory organs to the brain.
All this tends further to corroborate our earlier assertion that Herder
was less interested in the exact data of physiology in themselves than in
adapting them, or rather distorting them, to suit his own wider philosophy
of „Krafte", thereby hoping to bridge the traditional dualism of mind and
body.
(ii) The rSles of electricity, animal magnetism and galvanism in neurological
theory.
Since electricity, animal magnetism and galvanism afforded essentially
vitalistic interpretations of nervous processes in Herder's day, postulating
as they did mysterious physiological or even psychic "forces", we should
naturally expect that they might find more favour with him than did the
essentially mechanistic theory of a "nervous fluid".
Accordingly, we noticed in our section on vitalism that Herder, like
a
Linneus, suggested that electricity might be akin to the elusive life-
principle itself. Such ideas cannot be compared with the modern discovery
that nervous reactions involve electricity, however. They are rather an
offshoot of the belief in "animal magnetism", which, originating in the
248.
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medical occultism of Paracelsus, van Helmont, Croll, Stahl and Hoffmann,
gained new ground in Herder's day with the spread of biological vitalism
and the advent of Romantic „Naturphilosophie"Bertrand, in his history
of animal magnetism, has clearly demonstrated that the fashionable doctrines
put forward by Mesmer and others around the end of the eighteenth century
were really only a revival of the older mystical medicine of the early
138)
seventeenth century. ' But even before Mesmer publicised his own version
of these older doctrines in the 1780's, Herder wrote (around 1769)
Der Magnet muste [sic] so sehr verstarkt werden, daB seine
Kraft fuhlbar wurde. Ich halte es fur moglich.
And in the early or mid-1780's, in his „Glaucon und Nicias", he imagines
„einen neuen Sinn fur die elektrische und magnetlsche Materie, fur die Kraft
der Schwere, der Anziehung Oder gar fur die Wirkung der Gedanken" But
in 1785, he is more sceptical, perhaps thinking of the already notorious
Mesmer, who was practising in Paris around this time."^^ He writes to
G. Muller:142)
Bald werden wir's auch horen, daB Christus —- vermoge des
hochsten ihra einwohnenden Magnetismus seine Wunder gethan,
sogar in die Ferae gewirkt u.s.w.
(in fact, the illustrious theologian Butler, whom Herder mentions in 1781,^"^
had earlier drawn just such an analogy between magnetic affects and the
miracles of Christ.
Thus, Herder appears to have heard of and shown interest in animal
magnetism before Mesmer inaugurated the vogue for it in the 1780's. He must
have encountered a reference to it in Kant's „Traume eines Geistersehers" of
1766; Kant expressed doubts in this work about the claim „daB magnetische
„ 145)
Stabe auf Fleisch und Knochen wirken". ' The editor of Brugmans' work
„Beobachtungen uber die Verwandtschaft des Magnets" also referred to animal
magnetism (in 1731)but, since Herder had shown interest in the subject
long before he read this work, we must conclude that he first heard of it
either in Kant's work, or perhaps in the works of Hoffmann of Halle, or in
some representative writings of the Paracelsian school of medicine, which he
may have encountered in the course of his wide reading.
Galvani's experiments with the effects of electricity on animal organs'*'^''
revived Herder's interest in such phenomena in the 1790's. He first
mentions Galvani's experiments in a letter to Knebel in 1793»^^ and twice
refers to galvanism in his published works.^**9) that one physician
recommended him to try galvanistic treatment for his eyes in 1803, the year
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of his death, ' and Caroline informs us that he cherished great hopes that
the study of galvanism would provide new information on electricity,
especially in relation to the „Organisation des Menschen"He was also
keenly interested in the galvanistic experiments which his friend J. Ritter,
a Romantic and a student of physics, performed in his presence.On the
other hand, we know that his caution did not desert him in this matter either,
since he wrote to his son August in 1800, vehemently denouncing all traces of
ftGalvanismus, Humboldtianismus, Ritterianismus, Baderianismus" in his son's
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thesis, so long as they were not reinforced by exact empirical observations.
It is clear therefore that Herder was interested in electricity, animal
magnetism and galvanism as possible agents in physiological processes, and
that he mentions them at various times in hi3 writings. But they are
really subordinate to his more general theories of nervous functions and
„Krafte". They appealed to his interest in occult „Krafte", but they did
not finally overcome his more sceptical feelings. As we shall see, the more
comprehensive vitalism he borrowed from Haller was by far the greatest single
influence upon his "neurological" psychology.
(iii ) l,he_theory_of_e^ansion_s^d_contraction_of_the_nerves.
We noticed in our sections on the problem of perception and on dialectics
that Herder often describes our reactions to the external world in terms of
expansion and contraction, and we compared such ideas with Goethe's „Systole
und Diastole", etc. This theory, as Herder uses it, originally comes from
neurology, and he probably first encountered it in Burke's work on the
Sublime and the Beautiful. He himself observes of Burke in 1769 «[d&S] er
uberall das Erhabene auf ein Gefuhl der Anstrengung, das Schone auf eine
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sanfte Erschlaffung der Nerven zuruckleitet". ' But on this occasion, he
also adds, „ich laBe ihm [i.e. Burke] alles, was System ist", and says that
he values Burke mainly for his concrete observations; besides, we have seen
that he thought that the theory of Montesquieu, who also believed that
nervous reactions consist in expansion and contraction of the nerves and
fibres, was too crude to explain how the environment acts upon the
155)
organism. ' In fact, this theory, especially in its literal form, must
have seemed too mechanistic to him. Yet on the other hand, he applies
Burke's theory to psychology in his 1778 essay, distinguishing the
expansive „Mitgefuhl und Mittheilen" we experience in the face of beauty and
the „Zurucktritt auf sich, mit Selbstgefuhl" which is our reaction to
sublimity, calling all this „eine Theorie, uber die ich ihn [i.e. Burke]
156)fast beneide". He even declares outright that the nerves, like the
„Easer" or „Fiber" of the body, expand and contract in their reactions to
external stimuli, likening these responses to „eine Ebbe und Fluth",1"'^ and
156)
he again says of the nerve: '
—- er ziehet sich zusammen oder tritt hervor nach Art des
Gegenstandes, der zu ihm gelanget.
And. in the „Ideen", he refers to G-aubius' theory of the expansion and con-
159)
traotion of the nerves, without rejecting it. ' Besides, we have seen
that he used the image of expansion and contraction to describe many psycho¬
logical phenomena in his mature period, and Lehwalder draws attention to
other passages in his psychology essay of 1778 where he says that, with an
object of attraction, the nerve „entgegen wallet", and that „bei Unlust,
Schmerz, fleucht der Nerve und grauset"."^^ Lehwalder contends that such
passages are inspired by the archaic psychology of corporeal daemons and
spirits, but it is more likely that they are merely rather extravagant formu¬
lations of the theory that the nerves expand and contract in the face of
pleasant and disagreeable sensations respectively.
It is therefore probable that Herder at times found the theory useful,
but that at other times, as with the theory of a "nervous fluid", he found
it impossible to accept it literally, knowing that it could be construed in
mechanistic teres, as in Montesquieu's work.
As Dessoir observes, Haller had disproved the theory that the nerves
)
themselves expand and contract. ' He had retained the conception only in
the case of certain kinds of tissue and muscle, which he observed to contract
under stimulus, but denied that the nerve itself reacts in this way.1^2''
Yet as we have seen, this no more prevented Herder from applying the theory
to the nerves in his own way, or as a universal psychic principle, than did
Haller's observations on the cerebral cortex and the "nervous fluid" deter
him from ignoring or repudiating these data in favour of his own vaguer
vitalism. Once again, we see that he was less influenced by exact physio¬
logical observations than by his own metaphysical preferences.
(iv) The_yihggtory theory of the nerves.
Already in 1767, Herder writes „[da£] man das Nervengebaude sehr treffend
mit einem Saitenspiel vergleichen kanand, in 1769, he speaks of
^ervenschwingung"."5"8^ Again in his psychology essay of 1778, he speaks
i^c\
of the human nervous system as a „Saitenspiel der Gottheit", ' and in the
„Ideen", he describes man's nervous system, referring to „alle Theile seines
vibrierenden Wesens",1^ while he writes a3 follows of the eye in the
„Adrastea"^7)
Das Licht reizt, Theile des Nervs schwingen sich; die
Empfindung erfolgt.
It therefore appears that, alongside the theories of electrical or magnetic
principles behind physiological reactions and of nervous expansion and con¬
traction, Herder also employed the vibratory theory of the nerves. On this
occasion too, he was undeterred by the observations of Haller, who proved
that the nerves are not subject to vibration or oscillation. Haller
wrote:168^
Neque oscillationes in nervo produci possunt -—
But let us briefly glance at the ancestry of the vibratory theory.
Among the first to believe that the nerves, or particles within the nerves,
react to external stimuli by vibrating were Hobbes1^/ and Newton.
Hartley"5"'''1''' and Priestley,both of whose works Herder read, first
systematised the idea and gave it wider currency, and it was adopted by such
173)
physiologists as Metzger and Schmid, ' and the psychologist Lossius, in
the second half of the eighteenth century."^4) ciear from his review
of a work on poetry and music by Daniel Webb that Herder also encountered
it in the work concerned in 1772} he lists the types of vibrations caused
by music, according to Webb, as follows:*75)
Nun bringt er alles in vier Klassen: die Nerven warden plotzlich
angegriffen, Oder sanft und ruhig fortgezogen, Oder erhoht und
ausgebreitet Oder niedergeschlagen.
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But since he had used the vibratory theory in the 1760's, before reading the
works of Hartley, Priestley and Webb, we can only conclude that he had heard
of this old Newtonian conception in some other work, probably in one of the
works on musical acoustics which he read in those years. For writers on
acoustics often (with some justice) compared the ear's response to musical
sounds with the behaviour of the vibrating stringed instrument. But in the
case of the ear, as with other organs, it is not the nerves, but other parts,
such as the auditory hairs, which vibrate.
All this shows that Herder favoured the vibratory theory of the nerves
throughout his life, even although it was originally a "mechanistic" concep¬
tion (as used by Hobbes, Hartley and others); it probably appealed to his
intensely musical nature. He used it in conjunction with the theories of
electricity, nervous expansion and contraction, etc., in a characteristically
eclectic fashion, with little or no regard for the exact observations of
Haller.
(v) HallerJ^s_neurological_ theories_and_the ir_influence_on_Herder.
We have seen that Herder was already interested in nervous physiology
in the 1760's. In fact, as Reimarus wrote, it had become very fashionable
in the second half of the eighteenth century to provide a "physiological"
basis for psychological theories in general (especially in the British
empirical school and the French materialist school, and those who were
influenced by them). Reimarus writes:1^
Denn seit Priestley in seiner Vibrationstheorie der Welt eine
Erklarung der kompliziertesten psychologischen Prozesse gegeben
hatte, gait es fur modern, psychologischen Abhandlungen ein
physiologisches Mantelchen umzuhangen.
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In this respect, Herder was following an established tendency of his age,
which saw the appearance of numerous "physiological" psychologies, whence he
himself drew many ideas for his own varied system.
In 1772, he was again studying physiology, thus resuming his earlier
studies in Riga, for he writes to Hamann in August of that year, referring in
some detail to Unzer's then recently published study of physiology, and to
177)
the heart-muscle in particular. ' It also appears from his later writings
that, at various times, he studied Mead,*^ Glisson,1 Metzger,*®^
Plainer,*®1^ Prochaska1^^ and Michaelitz"^^ on the nerves especially, as
well as the other writers we have named.
But the greatest influence upon his ideas on this subject were the two
great physiological works of Haller, which he mentions again and again.
Clark declares that he probably read Haller's works in 1774,^^ and claims
that this influence, along with that of Hartley and Spinoza, was in great
measure responsible for leading him out of his Buckeburg religious phase into
his mature period.Clark also says that the main difference between the
1770 and 1778 versions of the „Plastik" arises because he read Haller's works
in the interval between the two versions, and he also explains the difference
between the Hlk/1115 and 1778 versions of the essay on psychology by the
same circumstance.He adds that Herder first mentions Haller as a
physiologist in the „Xlteste Urkunde" of 1774.^^
Herder, however, gives an explicit reference to Haller's work on physio¬
logy in the 1769 notes for his „Plastik", as published by Suphan:"^^
(s. Hallers Physiol, von der tela cellulosa)
He calls Haller „ein grofier Physiolog" in a letter to Lavater in 1772,*^
and, already in 1771, he writes to Merck as follows
Ich habe — seine [i.e. Haller's] neuen Theile von Physiologie
(Sinne, Seelenkrafte, und Oekonomie des Lebens) durchstudirt —
All this shows that Clark is quite wrong in the dates he gives for Herder's
study of Haller, and that, since he studied his works between 1769 and 1772,
before and at the very beginning of his Buckeburg period, they cannot be so
readily seen as a powerful new incentive leading him out of his religious
phase and into his mature period, as Clark claims. We may add that Martin
•» 191)
Schutze, who says that Herder studied Haller's work between 1772 and 1774,
also places this study too late in his career. It is obvious, therefore,
that Herder did not come upon Haller's work as a sudden revelation, in the
way that these and some other critics suppose. Haller was only one of many
physiologists whom he studied from his Riga years onwards, and he happened
to find the vitalistic triad of nElasticitat", „Reizbarkeit" and „Empfindung",
as he calles Haller's three "vires", a more convenient basis for his own
general, metaphysical vitalism of gradually ascending degrees of conscious
„Krafte" than the other theories he had hitherto encountered. However, as
we have seen, he continued to use other theories whenever it suited him,
even where Haller's observations contradicted or disproved them.
After studying Haller in 1771, he writes to Merck:"^^
Ich habe —- meine Hochachtung gegen diesen groBen Mann, trotz
aller Muhe, nie zura Enthusiasmus aufschwingen konnen.
This confirms our earlier contention that Herder paid little attention to
Haller's own observations and conclusions, but simply used them eclectically,
along with conflicting theories, as part of his own general vitalistic
philosophy of mind and body. For Haller, as we have seen, showed that we
cannot describe the funotions of the nerves in terms of vibrations, as
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Herder did; he also declared that they are not subject to expansion and
193)
contraction, or of an "elastic" nature, ' whereas Herder on several
occasions continued to say that they are. Besides, Haller denied that
nervous activity is electrical, since he believed that electricity would
not remain in the nerves, but disperse itself throughout the body,"*"^
whereas Herder declared that the vital principle is of an electrical nature,
as we earlier noticed. And Haller had explained the action of the nerves
by the "nervous fluid" hypothesis, which Herder rejected as such in the
„Ideeri", likewise ignoring Bailor's remarks upon the cortex. Got2 rightly
notes that he also failed to understand what we should call irritability
(Herder's „Reiz" or „Reizbark©it", the ability to react to stimulus)
Das Phanomen des Raises erscheint ihm als etwas Dunkles,
Geheimnisvolles, das er stellenweise ait dem Triebe zusammen=
fliefien lafit. Er hat augenscheinlich das Wesen des Reizes
nicht erfaSt.
Unlike Haller, he fails, especially in his psychology essay of 1778, to
distinguish clearly between irritability, which is common to all living
matter, and what we should call contraotibility, encountered in fibres,
muscles, etc., and he seems to apply his „Reiz" or „ReizbarkeitH indiscrimi¬
nately to the lowest manifestations of life and to the „Fiber" or „Faser" of
muscles, etc. Furthermore, he believes that „Elasticitat", „Reizbarkeit"
(or „Reiz") and „Empfindung", as he treats them in the HIdeen" and in the
Qg\
essay of 1778 ' are three grades of physiological (or even psyehic)
activity, which differ only in degree, and which contribute to one another
in an ascending progression from the lowest reactions of (living) matter to
the highest mental activity:^^)
Das Resultat der Reize wird Trieb; das Resultat der
Empfindungen, Gedanke.
Yet as Lehwalder observes:*"^
Reiz und Empfindung werden von Haller nicht zusammengesehen,
d.h. genetisch verstanden wie bei Herder. Der Reizvorgang
hat seinen Ort im korperlichen Organ [i.e. when seen as muscular
contractibility] und 1st unabhangig von Empfindungsvorgang —
Aber gerade diese Trennung von Reiz und Empfindung leugnet Herder.
199)
Lehwalder rightly conoludes of Herder:
Hallers Lehre vom Reiz muR gleichsam neu gedacht, d.h. das
Schema vom Muskelreiz mit einem neuen, eben psychologischen
Inhalt erfullt, Hallers Physiologie muB erst „mit Geist erfullt"
werden
He also admirably summarises the main features of Herder's obscure psycho¬
logical version of Haller's physiological vitalism as it appears in the
1778 essay:200)
Wenn das „Nervengebaude" die Einheit von innen und auBen
stiftet, wenn der Nerv Reiz, Empfinden, Denken und Wollen
verbindet, wenn er Eeizdaten und Sinnesbeitrage aufnehmen
und in Empfindungen verwandeln kann, wenn dieser „innere Sther"
dem „Kopfe Licht, dem Herzen Reiz" wird, raussen Nerv und
Empfinden von einer „Natur" oder zumindest eng verwandt sein.
„Reiz" is for Herder neither a physical nor a physiological phenomenon in
the strictest sense, as Lehwalder observes; it is simply a „Strukturmoment
des Empfindens", an ingredient of his basically metaphysical, Leibnizian
psychology, lending it outwardly a physiological and scientific colouring or
„Mantelchentt, as Reimarus would have called it.20"1") Thus Herder simply
added a misinterpreted version of Haller's physiology, in the 1778 version
of his essay on psychology, to his own vitalistic, anti-faculty theory of
psychology, which we shall discuss later. For we may recall that, even in
his 1769 sketch on planetary souls, he had already used the terms „Kraft"
and „Monas", following Leibniz's philosophical vitalism, to describe the
"souls" of both man and the planets. Haller's "vires" were simply added to
this a few years later.
Haller had quite 3imply distinguished, according to his precise observa¬
tions, between the following physiological processes - between the irri¬
tability of all living tissues (including the „Fiber" or „Faser" to which
Herder so often refers), the contractibility of muscles, which draw themselve
together under external stimuli, and the sensibility of the nerves, which, as
we have seen, he explained by the old theory of a "nervous fluid". (We
have used Clark's concise summary of Haller's categories here.202^) Herder
called these „Elasticitat", „Reizbarkeit" and „Empfindung" in the „Ideen",
as we have seen, and treated them, as he had done with „Reiz" and „Empfindung
in 1778, as gradually ascending degrees of psychic activity, as a means of
bridging the dualistic gap betv/een mind and body, and between emotion and
reason, whereas Haller had simply related them to definite physiological
functions of the body, in keeping with the earlier studies of Harvey,20^
Glisson20^ and others on irritability. But because Haller called them
"vires" ("vis contractilis", "vis insita musculi", "vis nervosa"2*"1*^), Herder
could at once label them as mysterious „Krafte", and use them as additions
to his growing stock of obscure psycho-physical, vitali3tic agencies, which
already included vibratory „Krafte", "forces" of expansion and contraction,
"ether", magnetism, etc. In his psychology essay of 1778» he also adds to
his collection the purely physical phenomenon of „Elasticitat" - the ability
of physical bodies to recover their size and shape - citing it in a list of
physical MKraft9M,20^ while in the „Ideen", he applies the word to
physiology, to the Jaser" of living bodies, apparently regarding it as
equivalent to Haller's "vis contractilis" manifest in all tissues.20^ (in
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the 1778 essay, he uses only „Reiz" and „Smpfindung", so that „Reiz" seems
to do duty for two of Haller's three "vires", for the "vis contractilis" and
the "vis insita musculi".) He thus completely misunderstood Haller, and
ignored almost everything of scientific value in his work. We need not
trouble to cite all his references to Haller, which are most frequent in the
1770's, for on almost every occasion, he is only talking emotionally about
undefined „Krafte". He used them to overcome traditional dualism, in
appearance at least, so that he could introduce both empirical and metaphysi¬
cal arguments at will. But by and large his vitalistic psychology, with
its „Abgrund innerer dunkeln Krafte",2<"^' inclines much more to metaphysics,
in the tradition of Leibniz, than to empiricism. It has been greatly
overrated by critics, especially by the Americans Schutze and Clark; as
Herder uses them, Haller's three "vires" are far closer to such metaphysical
schemes as Aristotle's "vegetative, sentient and rational souls"20^ (which
he must have encountered in Huarte's work,2^"^ if not in Aristotle's own
writings), than to truly physiological and scientific psychology.
(vi) Conclusion^ Herder's psychological vitalism.
211) 212)
As Clark ' and Lehwalder ' observe, Herder took the step of reducing
Haller's „Krafte" to one common factor, calling thera „sinnliche Darstellungen
einer und derselben Energie der Seele".^3) Ag admits, "Such a state¬
ment is, of course, purely metaphysical".2^1^ But this same writer adds
of it:215)
If we were to think away Herder's one metaphysical assumption,
we might be reading a treatise from the modern behaviourist
school.
Yet as we have seen, not only this "one" unified, absolute „Kraft" of the
260.
soul as a totality, but also the individual, supposedly "physiological"
„Krafte" which Herder borrowed from Haller, are vague, misunderstood, and
metaphysical, so that we should have to "think" them all "away" before we
could detect the slightest trace of behaviourism.
Another way of implying that Herder's psychology is fundamentally modern
is to say that vitalism itself is modern and scientific. There is indeed a
certain case for alleging this, for, since vitalism was banished from biology,
it has still hold out in certain psychological theories. As one modern
historian of biology writes
Today it is the brain which is the last stronghold of vitalism:
the workings of this organ are referred to an ill-defined entity
known as "mind". Most neurophysiologists, however, are reason¬
ably confident that human behaviour can and will prove wholly
explicable in terms of the physicochemical interactions of
brain cells.
But present-day psychological vitalism, when it does appear, is confined to
the workings of the mind or brain, whereas the rest of the body is regarded
as a complex system whose workings can be explained without reference to
unknown vital principles. But, as we have seen, Herder's psychological
vitalism was not of this kind. It extended throughout the biological world,
and, in his psychological writings at least, the body, with all its muscular
and nervous t,Krafte", is described just as vitalistically as the mind.
Schutse, however, sums up Herder's psychology as follows
The vital principle, interpreted as the immaterial, sensible
principle of spontaneity, functions in integral unity with
the mechanism of nature Neither the immaterial principle
of spontaneity, nor the physical principle of mechanism is
absolute, but both interact, furthering and limiting each other.
But it was precisely in order to avoid such duali3tic interpretations that
Herder adopted his scheme of pseudo-physiological t[Rrafte". Both body and
mind are governed by vitalistic principles. Schutze's words are inspired
by modern dualistic vitalism, and, while they may indeed apply in many cases
to Herder's involuntary procedure (for, as we know, he continually lapsed
back into traditional dualism in spite of himself), they do not fairly
reflect his attempts to formulate a vitalistic monism by means of all-
pervading „Krafte". For as we have observed, he debarred all "mechanistic"
theories, in name at least, from his psychology, except in his more radical
writings of 1769, and on a few isolated occasions afterwards. His „Krafte"
were intended to replace both mind and "mechanism", and to overcome such
traditional dualism altogether. But of course, he only succeeded in part.
Yet another way of defending vitalism is to say that science and
philosophy cannot prove that it is false. Schutze writes
There is no scientific or philosophical proof that spontaneity
may or may not be an integral part of the mechanism of nature.
Kant already said as much in his „Traume eines Geistersehers", but he rightly
went on to show that ("spontaneous") agencies such as soul or spirit have no
place in a logical or empirical theory of the mind and body. All such
categories as spontaneity and uniqueness have no place in scientific
219)
investigations, ' and belong entirely to metaphysics. Science cannot
refute them, but it cannot admit them either. Introducing them into
psychology is equivalent to saying that psychology cannot be scientific.
Yet we noticed at the beginning of this section that Herder himself set out
to study the subject with the express conviction that it could become a
science, and he wrongly believed that his „Kraft" was an empirical and
scientific conception. Schutze later declares that "Herder's philosophy is
the most comprehensive form of Positivism" ,^20) despite such undeniable
facts. All this is but another attempt to portray Herder as more modern
and more scientific than he was, and it simply succeeds in perpetuating
Herder's own questionable metaphysical arguments.
There is one further way of depicting Herder's vitalistic ideas as more
modern and scientific than they were - that is to equate his „Kraft" or
nEnergie" to modern physical force or energy, as Clark does. We have
already seen, in our chapter on the physical sciences, that this conclusion
is inadmissible. But we may here add that certain modern psychologists have
used the idea of "behavioural energy" as a model for the mind. In order to
forestall any critic who may be tempted to use this in the future to claim
that Herder's psychology anticipates yet another modern idea, we may here
point out that, unlike Herder's theory of „Kraft", the modern theory does
not presume to say that such "energy" actually exists as a psychic agency
behind thoughts and actions, as a qualitative conception akin to that of the
soul, but only uses "energy" or "force" as a convenient descriptive model for
the mind. (It is not even the same as the quantitative physical idea of
energy, although the workings of the body certainly can be described in
terms of work, energy, etc. - but the latter procedure is only applied
physics, not psychology.) We may here recall the parallel difference in
biology between Herder's "explanatory" vitalism and Blumenbach's more
scientific "descriptive" vitalism, and in physics, between Herder's qualita¬
tive „Kraft" and Boscovich's quantitative or "relational" conception.
However, even the modern psychological theory shares many of the defects of
Herder's wKraft" or „Energie". One modern scientist criticises it as
follows:221^
Energy models, by lumping together diverse prooesses which
affect the strength of behaviour, can lead to an over¬
simplification of the mechanisms underlying it, and distract
attention from the complexities of the behaviour itself.
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The same writer adds of these models:
They have been strangely sterile in leading to bridgeheads
with physiology.
223)
He then concludes of the whole theory:
it seems possible and preferable to formulate behaviour
theories in which concepts of energy, and drives which energise
behaviour, have no r&le.
All this applies perfectly to Herder's „Kraft" too. While giving the
appearance of physiological explanation, it really over-simplifies behaviour
and distracts our attention from its complexities, and is, in fact, quite
remote from scientific physiology.
Herder's psychological vitalism thus shares the defects of his biolo¬
gical vitalism, which we examined earlier. But it also shares with it the
limited advantage that it helped to counteract the crude mechanistic theories
of the age, by emphasising that the mind, like the organism as a whole, is
not simply the inert recipient of outside stimuli. We now know, in fact,
that "the central nervous system is not normally inert, having to be prodded
into activity by specific stimuli external to it. Rather it is in a state
of constant activity - a state supported primarily by the non-specific
effects of stimuli acting through the brainstem reticular system.In
this sense alone can scientific psychology admit something akin to
"spontaneity".
Herder writes in his „Xlteste Urkunde" in 1776, referring to Haller's
225)
physiology in support of his statement: '
Da blitzt Licht! da stromt Glut! das Herz schlagt, Gedanke
und Wille wandeltj tausend Duf te, Regsamkeiten und Krafte, die
uns durchwehen, treiben und - sonderbares Wunder! - sich in sich
zur Einhsit finden, fuhlen: ich bin Kraft!
These words reveal another major factor in his psychological vitalism. He
wished to infuse life and subjective content into the abstract world of
Enlightenment psychology, and to appeal to the senses and emotions as well
as to the reason. His „Kraft" provided an excellent expression for this
urge, and, as such, it also symbolises the feelings of the „Kraftgenie" of
the Storm and Stress period. But Herder himself treated it as a reality,
not a symbol, and he superimposed upon it the purely physiological "vires"
of Haller, so that only confusion resulted. His psychological vitalism is
much more permeated by emotional enthusiasm than are either his biological
or his physical theories, and it accordingly bears even less relation to
empirical science than they do.
d) The_functions_of the mind.
(i) Herder's attack on "faculty psychology".% ' ce=r==:t=s==:=:=:r:=:s:=:=s:sss5a5=«sss2Mss!sss,&5S=sas=:2:==SSfc
Clark on several occasions mentions Herder's attacks on "faculty
psychology" as propounded by earlier thinkers. But under this heading there
fall a number of distinct ideas, which Clark does not distinguish clearly
from one another. For "faculties" can be seen firstly as the multifarious,
ill-defined agencies with which physicians of later antiquity and of the
Middle Ages peopled the body, and secondly, they can be seen as physical
compartments of the brain, or thirdly, in a more modern sense, they can be
used to designate logical divisions of the mind. As it is important that
these senses should not be confused, we shall begin by discussing the
biological "faculties" which Clark mentions as equivalent to the many "vires"
of the medieval thinkers, and only then shall we be free to discuss Herder's
theories on the functions of the mind itself.
A. The biological "faculties" or "vires".
Clark points out that Haller, with his "vires", rendered the great service
of reducing to only three the hosts of "vires" by which medieval physicians
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believed the body to be tenanted. ' He considers this achievement as a
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severe blow to "faculty psychology". ' But although, as Clark points
out, Aquinas had postulated 53 "vires", which he divided into "vires
superiores" such as the will, and "vires inferiores", such as life and the
senses, Haller was concerned only with the "vires inferiores", with purely
physiological or biological categories, and he had nothing to say about
"faculty psychology" as such. On the other hand, the eighteenth century
Wolffian "faculty psychologists" wrere not interested in biology or physiology
at all, so that Haller's achievement bears no direct relation to Herder's
onslaught on Wolffian ideas. Besides, as we shall see, Herder's attacks on
Wolffian "faculty psychology" date from a time long before he read the works
of Haller.
It was Galen who introduced the doctrine of "faculties" into physiology,
postulating no less than 60 different varieties of "faculty", "dynaxais",
"virtus" or "vis" (as they were variously called) as residing in the human
body.^^ As Joseph Needham points out in his history of embryology, this
was "nothing more than a concise statement of the phenomena [e.g. digestion,
heartbeat, sleep, etc.] themselves"Haller had described three
hitherto little understood physiological functions, but by calling them
"vires", he added no more to our understanding of them than Galen had done
with his 60 functions; his observations alone were of value. Moreover,
Haller's achievement was not such an innovation as Clark seems to suggest,
for men such as Giovanni Argenterio of Castel-Nuovo had already impugned
Galen's system in the sixteenth century, and reduced Galen's "faculties" not
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just to three, but to one. Argenterio "stated that these spirits [i.e.
faculties] were purely imaginary things, and that a single one was sufficient
to explain the manifestations of life"Besides, numerous other
vitalists before Haller had been content with one "vis", for example Stahl,
Wolff, and others. Herder, in declaring that Haller's "vires" are basically
one, was simply following such earlier biological precedents. (We have seen
that he must have met Wolff's ideas in the early 1770's in reading Haller's
section on embryology.) But he thereby fell into the error of lumping
together in name physiological functions which Haller had shown to be
separate in reality.
Although in the Middle Ages, the doctrine of "faculties" encompassed all
known functions of mind and body alike, it divided after the Renaissance into
a medical or biological branch, in the tradition of Galen, and a psycholo¬
gical or rather philosophical branch, which we shall next examine. Haller
did nothing new to overthrow the school of Galen; others had done as much
before, and Herder was influenced by certain of these as well as by Haller.
As we shall see, Herder also at an early date reduced to a common denominator
the "faculties" of the Wolffian school of philosophical psychology, again
following earlier precedents. No doubt this latter step encouraged him
when he later reduced Haller's "vires" to one, for, as we have seen, he
regarded them as psychic (i.e. psychological) rather than biological agencies
in any case; besides, we know that it was his natural inclination to
synthesise disparates. Thus, the two reductiones ad unum are indeed
parallel, but only the attack on the Wolffians can be described as an attack
on "faculty psychology" as such, which, by Herder's day, had completely lost
its original contact with medicine and biology, with the comprehensive
medieval scheme of "faculties" which had covered all the functions of the
mind and the body.
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B. The psychological "faculties".
We have already discussed those physical "faculties" or "compartments"
of the brain which Herder rejected. We noticed that he thereby avoided the
crude mechanism of thinkers such as Huarte, but that, at the same time, he
failed to grasp the possibility that distinct areas of the brain, such as
the cerebral cortex, may be associated with distinct and localised mental
functions.
It now remains for us to examine the third sense of the word "faculties",
as used in epistemology to designate logically distinct modes of mental
activity.
Herder disliked the Wolffian psychology of the Enlightenment philosophers
not only because it tended to ignore the importance of the senses and the
empirical data of experience, but also because it portrayed the mind as
essentially static. Mental "faculties", particularly sensation, cognition
and volition, are for him not finally distinct abilities of the mind; they
are only functionally different, i.e. they are various expressions of a
basically unitary mind, whose character is revealed only in action, develop¬
ment, or „Wurkung", and they can combine or shade off gradually into one
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another. We have seen how he carried over this belief into his treat¬
ment of Haller's physiology, reducing Haller's "vires" to one „Kraft" or
„Energie", and we noticed that, in physiology itself, such a step was neither
new nor particularly valuable, since it distracted attention away from the
exact observations upon which true physiology must rest. But in psychology
the same procedure can have more interesting repercussions. Herder writes
in his language essay of 1770
Alle Krafte unsrer und der Thierseelen sind nichts als Meta=
physische Abstraktionen, Ymrkungen! sie warden abgetheilt,
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weil sle von unserm schw&chen Geiste nicht auf einitial
betrachtet werdan konnten
This excellent observation, which still reflects Herder's more genuinely
empirical views of the fourth „Kritisches Waldchen" of the previous year,
could have been the starting-point for a complete rejection of all „Krafte"
in psychology. Instead, Herder himself introduced and hypostatised further
metaphysical ..Krafte" in the following years.
At this point, we should notice that he uses the word „Kraft" in
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psychology, as in the ..Fragments", ' for example, before reading Haller's
works. And although thi3 word was used by Wolffian "faculty psychologists"
to describe their "faculties", it is not in this sense that Herder uses it,
for, as we know, he early rejected these "faculties". He uses it in a
dynamic, Leibnizian sense, as part of a general philosophical vitalism which
he borrowed chiefly from Leibniz himself, and he added Haller's „Krafte" to
it only at a considerably later date. This general metaphysical vitalism
is more apparent in the 1774 and 1775 versions of his essay on psychology -
Clark rightly notices that they represent "little more than the purely
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metaphysical phase of eighteenth century psychology" ' - but, already in
the 1775 version, Haller's „Reiz" figures fairly prominently, until, in the
final version of 1778, Haller's ideas become the basis of the whole essay.
Nonetheless, the metaphysical premise of a broad, Leibnizian vitalism is the
same throughout.
However, we should first notice that, throughout his career, Herder
continued to insist, as he did in 1770, that the traditional "faculties" are
only abstractions from human behaviour. He had first said this as early as
in 1767:255^
269.
Die menschliche Seele verkennet uberhaupt in ihren Wurkungen
die Abtheilungen der Kraf'te, wie die Philosophen sie in ihr
abgetrennat.
And in the fourth „Kritisehes Waldchen" of 1769, he rejects Riedel's
M&rundkrafte", the supposedly permanent and independent "faculties" for
perceiving beauty, truth, and goodness.In this case, he is thoroughly
justified, not because he substitutes one „Kraft" for Riedel's three, but
because he replaces Riedel's threadbare metaphysical abstractions with an
empirical analysis of how our judgements of beauty, etc., are developed by
habit from our sense-experience.*^) (As Haym observes, Baumgarten, who
emphasised the rSle of the senses rather more than most other Enlightenment
psychologists, probably influenced him here.^®)) On numerous other
occasions he repeats his assertion that the traditional "faculties" are only
actively expressed modifications of the one basic „Kraft" of the mind (or
soul, as he usually calls it), and that we are not justified in regarding
the mind as fragmented or compounded of static, discrete divisions. A list
of references to such passages, from 1770 to the time of the „Ideen", should
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suffice here, since nothing new is added to what we have already described. '
The value of all these observations, we repeat, lies not in Herder's rejec¬
tion of several ,,Krafts" in favour of one, but in the corollary that all
mental "faculties" are simply different responses of the individual to the
data of experience. This can lead to truly modern and empirical observa¬
tions, as when he says in the „Ideen": 2^"°)
Die Vernunft ist ein Aggregat von Bemerkungen und Uebungen
unsrer Seele: eine Summe der Erziehung unsres Geschlechts,
die, nach gegebnen fremden Vorbildern, der Erzogne zuletzt
als ein fremder Kunstler an sich vollendet.
A further advantage of Herder's opposition to faculties was that it made
it possible for him to envisage certain kinds of behaviour which cannot
adequately be described within traditional "faculty psychology". He is fond
of describing such "mixed" reactions, and of showing how emotion can super¬
vene in apparently rational processes of thought. Such ideas are especially
valuable when he discusses the psychology of the artist. Already in 1764
or 1765, he speaks of „die Logik des Affekts".2*1^ In 1767> he talks of
„anschauendes Erkennen", and says that artistic geniuses can think so well
in terms of „Anschauung", „daJ3 es fast scheine, da£ sie mit der Vernunft
empfanden".And in 1769, he notes that the genius can perform several
rational steps in one, although strict logic must not omit any of them2^"^
(compare Mephisto's remarks to the „Schuler" in „Faust"), while in his essay
on Ossian, he speaks of the „sinnlicher Verstand und Einbildung" which mani¬
fests itself in folk-literature.2^^ Observations of this kind were unusual
before Herder, although there are certain precedents for them in the works of
Rousseau and Hamann, and they greatly influenced the „Stunner und Dranger",
including the young Goethe. They are a necessary feature of the period of
„Empfindsamkeit", but they only became possible through a weakening of the
traditional philosophical "faculty psychology", which had tended to ignore
such "mixed" processes of thought.
Related to all these observations are Herder's remarks, in his essay on
language, concerning „Besonnenheit", which he names as the distinctive
feature of the human mind, and which makes the use of language possible.
This „Besonnenheit", which becomes active and conscious „Besinnung" as man
learns to use language, consists in an ability to collect and learn from the
data provided by the various senses, which are themselves mediated by
hearing, the "middle" sense.2^-^ This, as Herder himself betrays, is
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simply a modern version of the old Aristotelian doctrine of a "sensorium
commune". The data of experience are retained in the human conscious¬
ness, which has the ability to reflect upon them, to isolate any given
impression, to generalise its experiences, and to translate them into a
common language. But it is his remarks on the senses in particular which
2L7)
concern us here. He writes:
Wie hangt Gesicht und Gehor, Farbe und Wort, Duft und Ton
zusamraen? Nicht unter sich in den Gegenstanden; aber was
sind denn diese Eigenschaf'ten in den Gegenstanden? Sie sind
bloB sinnliche Empfindungen in una, und als solche flieBen sie
nicht alle in eins? Wir sind ein denkendes sensorium commune,
nur von verschiedenen Seiten beruhrt - da liegt die Erklarung.
(Lehwalder makes some interesting remarks on this subject.2^'') Herder
again refers to the same doctrine in his nMetakritik" :2*^
unser Inneres wird ein fortwahrendes sensorium commune
aller Sinner
Thus, he reduces the senses to a common factor, just as he did with "facul¬
ties" in general, and with Haller's "vires" some years later. He believes
that this basic unity of the senses distinguishes us from the animals, with
their unintegrated instincts or „Triebe". We may conjecture that this same
idea must have helped to produce his early and important theory of the
"blending" of sight and touch as the child develops; for such a theory is
possible only on the assumption that the senses are closely interrelated.
We can thus appreciate how an ancient doctrine provided Herder with a new
weapon for attacking the "fragmented" conception of the mind, and helped him
to reach conclusions which, as L. Munz has shown in the case of "blending",
are still of value today.2"^
It is of interest that Herder's friend Knebel uses the same idea in
1788:251>
Wir haben nur Ein Gefuhl, das nach Verhaltnifl mechanischer
Bestimmungen, zu welchen es die Nothwendigkeit der Eindrucke
zwang, bald hort, bald sieht, riecht, schmeckt u.s.w.
Sommering actually believed that the sensorium commune has a physical loca¬
tion in the "animated" cerebral fluid,252 ^ thus returning to the psycho-
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physical approach of Aristotle, who located it in the heart.
But despite all Herder's attacks on "faculty" psychology, he couched
his remarks on human „Gluckseligkeit" in the „Ideen" in such traditional
phraseology that they elicited the following criticism, which is perhaps a
trifle exaggerated, from Kuhnemarm:
Aber innerhalb dieses Gefuhls [i.e. „Gluckseligkeit"] unter=
scheidet er Sinnlichkeit, Einbildungskraft, Verstand, Empfind=
ungen und Triebe als Beginn oder richtiger als Darstellungen
des Willenlebens, ganz wie die gelernte Schulpsychologie 3ie
unterschied. Ganz wie ihr ist auch ihm ein jedes dieser
Seelenstucke eine reale Kraft; so wenig vertieft er die
Einsicht in den Vorgang der Seelenprozesse.
In the „Journal" in particular, he uses the conventional language of
"faculties":255^
Es giebt also eine eigne Gestalt des Gefuhls von Wahrschein=
lichkeiten, nach dam Maas der Seelenkrafte, nach Proportion der
Einbildungskraft zum Urtheil, des Scharfsinns sum Witze, des
Verstandes zur ersten Lebhaftigkeit der Eindrucke u.s.w.
In his scheme of education in the same work, as well as in parts of the
„Ideen", the „Metakritik" and other works, he again uses the conventional
language.25^) But we should add, in all fairness, that he usually uses
such terms only to designate functions of the mind in relation to its
"genetic" development from sense-experience to the higher levels of reason
and will.
Let us pause at this point for a few words on sources. It was from
the school of Locke, not from physiology, that Herder took his arguments
against "faculty psychology". A historian of psychology writes of Locke
as follows:257^
The mind is conceived of as having certain "powers" native to
it. But there is only the one agent or person, who has ideas
through the use of all the powers or faculties. These latter
are simply its ways of acting. It may be aroused in the way
of sensation or perception, in the way of memory, of imagination,
of will, etc. This is Locke's refutation of the "faculty
psychology" of Scholasticism, afterwards continued by Wolff
[i.e. Christian Wolff].
Herder simply reapplied Locke's arguments, which he probably heard in Kant's
lectures, to the neo-Scholastic "faculty psychology" of Wolff's school
(although he did not go so far as to agree with Locke that the child's mind
258)is like a blank sheet before it has been written upon, ' for Locke's
picture of the mind was too inert for the Leibnisian and vitalist Herder).
But there were other influences which could also have encouraged him to
reject the archaic "faculties". Clark rightly mentions "Hamann's insistence
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upon the totality of the personality", ' as well as "Hemsterhuis' theory of
the unitary personality" and "Spinoza's monism"2^ in this connection. He
also reminds us of Leibniz's "lex continui", which stated that there is an
unbroken continuity between different modes of experience. 2°^ We may also
remember that Herder regarded the mind, like every other natural unit,
holistically, as an organic whole whose parts are intimately related.
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However, other thinkers of Herder's age shared hi3 antipathy to Wolffian
psychology. The materialist Hissmann, whose works Herder does not appear
to have read, insisted in 1778 „daB man aufhore mit der Verzettelung der
Seelenkraft in unzahlige Vermogen. - Daraus, dafi wir psychische Erscheinungen
als ,Krafte' bezeichnen, folge nicht das thatsachliche Vorhandensein der
letzteren".2^2^ Unfortunately, a3 we have seen, the influence of Leibniz
led Herder to believe that the metaphysical, vitalistic „Kraft" of the mind
actually exists as such, and his own interpretation of Haller added more
psychic, quasi-physiological „Krafte" to his store, leading him ever further
away from the relatively empirical position he had adopted in the fourth
„Kritisches Waldchen".
Herder's attacks on "faculty psychology" certainly cannot be applauded
in every respect. Firstly, his idea that a single „Kraft" lies behind all
mental activities encourages vagueness. As Hegel writes (quoted by
Engels ) s
Hence in empirical psychology [we speak of] the forces of
memory, imagination, will, and all the other faculties. All
this multiplicity again excites a craving to know these forces
as a single whole, nor would this craving be appeased even if
the several forces were traced back to one common primary force.
Such a primary force would be really no more than an empty
abstraction, with as little content as the abstract thing-in-
itself.
A modern writer makes a similar objection to such sweeping theories :2^^
there is no a priori reason why these diverse characters
of behaviour should depend on a single feature of the under¬
lying mechanism: an over-simple model may hinder analysis.
There is a second major objection to Herder's condemnation of "faculties",
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especially when he turns the old argument against Kant's critical philosophy.
Schutze objects to Kant for the following reason: J
Kant —- based his analysis of "reason" in his "Critique of
Judgement", 1790, upon three "fundamental faculties" which
are essentially identical with those accepted by Riedel. He
contradicted in effect the idea on which rested Herder's
philosophy of genetic individuality.
But such a statement rests on the false assumption that, if we say certain
functions of the mind must always be logically distinct, as Kant did in his
critical philosophy, we thereby deny that the individual can develop
psychologically, from the empirical basis of experience. Kant's "faculties"
are logically distinct functions in epistemology, not innate psychological
"compartments" of the mind, such as le3s able analysts like Riedel, who
failed to distinguish clearly between the logical and the empirical, between
epistemology and psychology, had postulated. Gotz rightly notices that
Herder himself failed to distinguish between psychology and epistemology.
In fact, he writes as follows in the „Metakritik"
Das unziemende Wort Kritik der Vernunft verliert sich also in
das anstandigere, wahre: Physiologie der menschlichen
ErkenntniBkrafte.
He therefore believed that the methods of logical epistemology and of empiri¬
cal science are mutually exclusive. But logic and empirical investigation
can and should be complementary. Epistemology analyses the logical
conditions, limitations and forms of knowledge, whereas empirical psychology
examines the actual mental processes and behaviour of the individual in
relation to the causal world of experience. Kant used the language of
"faculties" in epistemology, where it properly belongs; and although, from
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the point of view of psychology, Herder was right to insist that "faculties"
are only abstractions from behaviour, and to realise that they are thoroughly
misleading, if treated as rigidly separate "powers" or „Krafte", actually
existing in independence of one another within the mind, he was not justified
in using the same argument to attack Kant's epistemology, except where it was
wrongly applied, like the "faculties" of the Wolffians, as a substitute for
that very necessary empirical and scientific psychology which Herder himself
had helped in some measure to promote. All this confirms our initial
contention that, in Herder's day, empirical psychology and abstract philosophy
were still imperfectly distinguished. They continually encroached upon one
another's provinces, and, as in Herder's own philosophy, confusion was often
the result.
e) P3yofa°3-°gy»
Herder's psychology was systematic only in so far as it rested upon
Haller's vitalistic triad of „Krafte", which, as Herder interprets them, lend
a certain unity to his essay on psychology in 1778, and upon his rejection of
"faculty psychology", which runs as a characteristic theme throu^iout all
his writings on the subject. However, various of his isolated utterances
touch upon other themes of interest in the history of psychology, and it is
these which we shall now examine.
Clark 3paaks of Herder's supposed "associationism", which he borrowed,
with his own variations, from the works of Priestley and Hartley.2*^ In
an interesting chapter of the „Ideen", to which Clark refers,2^ Herder
writes of the thought-processes, and of those of the mentally deranged in
particular:
Nicht wie die Facher des Gehirns liegen, eombinirt er [i.e.
der Wahnsinnige], selbst nicht einmal wie ihm die Sensationen
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erscheinen: sondern wie andre Ideen mit seiner Idee [i.e.
obsession] verwandt sind und wie er jene zu dieser nur hinuber
zu zwingen verraochte. Auf demselben Wege gehn alia Associa=
tionen unsrer Gedanken: sie gehoren einem Wesen zu, das aus
eigner Energie und oft mit einer sonderbaren Idiosynkrasie
Erinnerungen aufruft und nach innerer Liebe oder Abneigung,
nicht nach einer aufiem Mechanik, Ideen bindet.
He does not specify the principle according to which we associate ideas,
whether according to repetition, synchronism, succession, similarity,
contrast, contiguity, interest, etc. But he makes it clear that he does
not believe that associations are physiologically determined („nicht wie die
Fach8r des (rehires liegen"), or that they originate from external, empirical
associations of experience („selbst nicht einmal wie ihm die Sensationen
erscheinen nicht nach einer aufiern Mechanik"). In fact, this is not
that "empirical associationism" which Clark 3ays he acquired from Hartley
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and Locke, ' nor does it reflect the physiological (and materialistic)
criteria of Hartley and Priestley. Hartley had written:
—- the Powers of generating Ideas, and raising them by
Association, must also arise from corporeal Causes, and
consequently admit of an Explication from the subtle
Influences of the small Parts of Matter upon each other.
On the contrary, the whole purpose of the above passage in the „Ideen" is to
show that the mind has its own peculiar nature, that an „innerer geistiger
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Mensch" is formed, quite distinct from the visible body, and the
chapter culminates, in truly dualistic style, in an argument for immortality
founded upon the analogy of sleep.If we had to find a designation for
it, we should call this "idealistic associationism", similar only in name to
the empirical equivalent of the British associationist school.
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However, some of Herder's earlier utterances more closely resemble
those of the associationists. He stresses the r6le of habit, just as
Hartley and his school had done, in the fourth „Kritisches Waldchen",
although he had not read Hartley's work at that time. He says that our
feeling for beauty results from „ein Habituelles Anwenden unsres Urtheils
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auf Gegenstande der Schonheit", ' and, in a sermon of 1772, he goes so far
276)as to say:
Unsre Denkart ist ja nichts, als die Summe der Eindrucke,
der Vorstellungen, der Gewohnheiten unsers Lebens.
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And in Part II of the „Ideen", as we have seen, he declares:
Die Vernunft ist ain Aggregat von Bemerkungen und Uebungen
unsrer Seele.
Besides, we earlier noticed some other features of associationist psychology
in his remarks on how the data from the various senses are combined (the
equivalent of "simultaneous association") and on the intermixing of different
modes of thought or "faculties". But all these remarks are thrown out
without system, and, as we have seen, they contradict that "idealistic"
theory of association which appears in Part I of the „Ideen". Accordingly,
we can agree with the following remark of &otz:2^/
Eine vollstandige Associationstheorie finden wir bei ihm nicht.
Clark refers to Hartley as "one of the three men whose work may be said
to have forced Herder out of his traditional uncertainty into the clarity of
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his Weimar period." ' Yet Herder knew Hartley's theory of association
already in 1772, near the beginning of his Buckeburg period, and he mentions
it explicitly in a letter to Merck.And we have seen that his theory
of association, as expounded in the „Ideen", in "the clarity of his Weimar
279.
period", is much less empirical than his earlier remarks in 1769 and 1772
on the same topic. It seems, in fact, that Clark has overrated the
influence of Hartley, as well as that of Haller, upon Herder's thought.
Another interesting feature of Herder's psychological ideas is that he
recognises the rdle of subconscious mental factors. In an earlier version
of the „Ideen", Book VIII, he says of the philosopher:2^1"^
er muS immer noch eine Menge dunkler Vorstellungen zugeben,
die gleichsam im Grunde der Seele liegen, um immerwahrend in
unsre Neigungen und Urtheile unvermerkt aber desto kraftiger
zu wirken.
As Siegel points out,2^2^ such ideas came to Herder from Leibniz, particularly
from his posthumous "Nouveaux Essais", which Herder read in 1765. Hainann,
in a letter' to Herder in which he informs him of the publication of this
important work,2*^ already refers to Leibniz's "perceptions insensibles"
(or "petites perceptions"), which undoubtedly influenced Herder's conception
of the subconscious, as well as his idea that the transitions from sensation
to emotion, reason, and will, etc. are gradual and almost imperceptible.
Other striking aperyus of Herder's include such remarks as the
following:2*^
Im Traum zeiget sich der Mensch ganz, wie er ist.
He later speaks of our „doppeltes Ich" in relation to dreaming, distinguishing
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„den traumenden und den Traumanschauenden G-eist, den Erzahler und Horer". '
We have already discussed another remarkable aspect of Herder's ideas
on the psychology of perception, especially in the Weimar years. This was
his theory of the „Blld", which we compared with modern „Gestalt" theories
in our sections on perception and on optics. We may add here that the
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same notion also appears in the MIdeen"2^^ along with that "idealistic
associ&tionism" which we noticed above, as ?/ell as in the essay „flber Bild,
Diohtung und Fanel".2*^
In our section on the "developmental method" or „Entwicklungsgedanke",
we noticed a further feature of Herder's psychological ideas. For Herder,
the individual personality, like so many other natural units, is constantly
developing. (While discussing physical anthropology, we also saw that he
uses the criterion of "perfectibility", i.e. of man's distinctive ability to
develop mentally, as a means of distinguishing between man and the animals.)
Around 1773» he says:2^^
Das Ich ist nie ganz.
Such ideas, of course, can largely be traced back to Leibniz's influence.
Let us conclude with a few remarks on Herder's influence on psychology.
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Probst says ' that he had no direct influence upon the development of
psychology proper, so far as can be ascertained, although Gotz points out
some similarities in the psychology of Wundt, and Schutze remarks upon the
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continuity between Herder's theories and those of Lotze. 1 It is not
surprising that his ideas on the subject had relatively little influence,
because the most valuable of his psychological theories appear in the fourth
„Kritisches Waldehen", which remained unpublished during his lifetime, and
whose primary theme, the attack on the little-known Hiedel, was not calcu¬
lated to inspire initial interest. Besides, the rest of his writings on
psychology, apart from the (in many ways valuable) essay on language, are
characterised by that curious blend of empirical and metaphysical arguments
which makes his theories so ambiguous and unsatisfactory. They were
neither thoroughly scientific and physiological, on the one hand, nor were
they calculated to contribute much to epistemology and abstract philosophy
on the other.
However, Clark believes that the "characterology" or scheme of
character-types, as set forth by Herder in the 1774 version of his essay
on psychology, had a. considerable influence on Goethe's „WertherM, since all
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the characters in this novel fit into it. ' But when we consider this
scheme, which lists the psychological types of „Innigkeitn and „Ausbreitung"
(corresponding roughly to the modern introvert and extravert), genius and
non-genius, and pathological and non-pathological, with all their possible
combinations, we realise that not only the characters in „Werther", but all
characters, at all times and in all places, can be classified under one or
other of these categories or combinations, which are therefore much too
general to be related to any particular literary production. The theme of
the man of genius in „Werther", as everyone knows, is all too typical of the
period in which the work was written, and we do not need to look to Herder's
rough scheme to explain why Goethe was interested in it. Besides, Clark
himself admits that there is not a shred of evidence that Goethe had any
knowledge of this draft of Herder's essay, and that the years 1773-75 were
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for them both a period of cool relations and of geographical separation.
Propositions of this kind are simply too general to be either proved or
disproved, unless by the argument of post hoc, propter hoc.
Nonetheless, „¥erther" is in many ways a psychological novel, as Clark
believes. This reminds us that, in the eighteenth century, literature in
general, especially the novel, often contributed more of value to psychology,
at least in the way of observations on types of character and motivation,
than did the more abstract and theoretical writings. But this merely corro¬
borates our earlier contention that psychology was then still too little
distinguished from abstract philosophy, whereas literature, as always, was
more concerned with living experience. Until psychology became truly
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empirical, literature fulfilled many of its functions. But Herder did tend
to overestimate the importance of literature for psychology, as we shall see
in the next chapter.
We may note in conclusion that Herder's division of character-types
according to „Innigkeit" and „Ausbreitung" is not an original and inspired
anticipation of the modern "introversion" and "extraversion". It goes back
to earlier ideas, such as Burke's distinction between aesthetic emotions
according to expansion and contraction, originally of the nerves, and
especially to an observation of Pascal, which Herder himself relates to his
own theory in 1778:
deux sortes d'esprits, l'un de p^netrer vivement et profond^ment
les consequences des principes - l'esprit de justesse: l'autre
de comprendre un grand nombre des principes sans les confondre,
l'esprit de geom^trie - was meistens auf meine erste Eintheilung
von Innigkeit und Ausbreitung der Geistesgabe hinauslauft.
From our study of Herder's psychology, we conclude that, as in nearly
all other areas of his thought, the „Kraft" conception greatly detracted
from the scientific value of his ideas. His physiological and psychological
„Krafte" are predominantly qualitative and metaphysical, and since the mature
Herder disliked most attempts to localise mental functions within the body,
they can rarely be reduced to exact physiological processes. In his largest
single contribution to psychology, the essay of 1778, he used Haller's physio¬
logical "vires" in an attempt to overcome the dualism of mind and body, and
to follow Leibniz and Locke in amending the "faculty psychology" of the
Enlightenment, with the more specific aim of showing that an unbroken
continuity exists between all forms of consciousness, from the most
rudimentary physiological reaction to „Empfinden", „Erkennen" and „Wollen".
But even in these aims, he was only partially successful, while his failure
to understand Haller's exact observations, and the chronic vagueness of his
metaphysical vitalism, jeopardised those empirical methods which he had set
out to apply to psychology in his Riga years, but which he had already largely
abandoned for a metaphysical, Leibnizian approach in the 1774 and 1775 versions
of his psychology essay. It is to his earlier works, such as the fourth
„Kritisches Waldchen" and parts of the language essay of 1770, and to various
aperyus scattered throughout his works, such as the „Ideen" and the essay
„?Jber Bild, Dichtung und Fabel", that we must look for his best contributions
to psychology. For in his most systematic work on the subject, the essay of
1778, his characteristic endeavours to combine conflicting ideas and methods
by means of the „Kraft" conception ended, as usual, in contradiction and
obscurity. Those who emphasise only one side of his aspirations, in this
case his advocacy of empirical methods, give too one-sided a picture of
Herder's complex and problematic nature. *
4. Sociology and social anthropology.
Sociology does not figure as a distinct discipline in Herder's writings;
indeed, it can scarcely be said to have existed as such in his day, far less
as an established branch of empirical science. But several topics now
associated with this subject, such as theories of cultural determinism,
development, holism, dialectics and natural "laws" of social change, are
indeed covered in his works, especially those on the philosophy of history,
and we have already discussed them in the appropriate sections of the present
work. Many of these ideas were indeed novel in Herder's age, and for this
reason, we can agree with W.H. Bruford's remark:
it is undeniable that Herder is the first German sociologist
of note.
The essay on language also raises some interesting sociological ques¬
tions; we have examined the psychological premise of his theory of language,
the idea of „Besonnenheit", in the previous section, and since the whole
theme is bound up with the question of origins, we also touched upon it in
our section on the so-called "genetic method", where we indicated that the
problem of the origin of language is now recognised to be beyond the compass
of empirical investigation, since no evidence is available on it, and that
Herder's merit throughout the essay resides rather in the naturalistic
principles he employs than in the theoretical conclusions he reaches.
His political theories, as enunciated in the „Ideen" and the „Humanitats=
Briefe" in particular, fall outside the scope of this study, since they are
in no way related to science, but simply reflect his dislike for the politics
of his age and his preference for more liberal forms of government than
prevailed at the time.
Pew other topics of interest to the philosopher and historian of
science arise in Herder's works so far as scientific sociology is concerned.
He does, however, have a good deal to say on what is now called social
(or cultural) anthropology. The following words from his notes for the
nJournal", apart from their didactic and Rousseauistic overtones, show that
his approach to the study of peoples has much in common with that of modern
anthropologists:
Ein Buch zur Bildung der Volker fangt bei lebendigen Beispielen,
Gewohnheiten, Erziehung an und hort bei dera Schattenbilde
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trockner Gesetze auf. Es studiert alle Volker und die
lebendigsten insonderheit, das sind die wilden, die halbwilden,
die gesittet zu warden anfangen.
As Clark observes, Herder followed Kant's essay of 17&h „Versuch uber die
Krankheiten des Kopfes", in saying on another occasion that mental illnesses
are less common in primitive societies than in those where the division of
labour is far advanced, as in modern Europe.Indeed, especially in his
earlier years, he regarded the primitive mind as the prototype of the healthy
psychological type, all of whose basic mental functions, particularly the
"natural" emotions, are fully developed. He writes of primitive peoples in
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his study of nOssian" and the folksong:
- uber alle diese Schwaohungen des Geistes seligunwissend,
erfassen sie den ganzen Gedanken mit dem ganzen Worte und
dies mit jenero.
Like their emotions, their powers of expression are simple, forceful, and
healthy. However, in utterances like these, it is Herder's emotional
interest in primitive poetry rather than his scientific curiosity that is
at work.
On the details and sources of Herder's views on descriptive human
geography and social and cultural anthropology, with his many excellent
descriptions of various human societies and cultural phases in the „Ideen",
the work of Grundmann is again recommended. The following words of
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Grundmann may serve to characterise this feature of Herder's writings: '
Was Herders Volkerschilderungen so sehr vor alien anderen in
dem Menschheitsgeschichten auszeichnet, ist die feinfuhlende
und scharfe Urteilskraft hinsichtlich der doppeldeutigen und
sich vielfach widersprechenden Nachrichten einiger Quellen=
schriftsteller, das bewundernswerte Kombinationsvermogen und
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die Fahigkeit, das Bedeutsame und Markante in dem Leben
der Volker zu erfassen und meisterhaft darzustellen.
But since most of his writings on these subjects are purely descriptive,
and, in the „Ideen", related to the ethical standard of „Humanitat", they
require no further mention in our study of the history of science. In
dealing with Herder*3 theories of race and physical anthropology we have
already discussed all those human phenomena which are relevant to our theme.
5* Economics and commerce.
Herder was always interested in commerce, especially in relation to
history. Kant dealt with „mercantilische Geographic", among other topics,
299)
in his lectures on physical geography, ' and no doubt stimulated Herder's
interest in it from an early date. Moreover, Herder spent several of his
happiest years in the flourishing Hanseatic city of Riga, where he counted
among his friends numerous men who were actively engaged in commerce
it was through the help of some of these that he was able to arrange his
voyage to France and his stay in Nantes. And in his library, there were at
least 30 volumes on commerce, finance and economics, many of them devoted to
301)
the history of commerce.
The first important reference to these subjects in Herder's works appears
in the „Journal", in which he points out that „Handel3geist" alone is not
enough to establish a nation's well-being, and refers to Holland in
particular:
Da wird man sehen, wie der blofie Handelsgeist den Geist der
wahren Staatsklugheit, Weisheit, Gelehrsamkeit u.s.w. aufhebt
oder einschrankt Alles ist in Holland zu Kauf
For in the „Journal", and the „Auch eine Philosophic" of the Buckeburg period,
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he attacks modern culture with its "mechanisation" of life and its deadening
effects upon the natural virtues which are most common in primitive societies}
he seems to see commerce as part of this harmful influence in the „Journal".
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Besides, as Rouehd observes, ' he later deplores the evil results of
discovery and commerce among primitive native peoples, thus adopting the
standpoint of Voltaire, Helvdtius and Rousseau.
In the „Ideen", he emphasises the great importance of commerce in history,
devoting to it a chapter which contains an excellent and concise history of
European trade.On this occasion, it is rather the civilising
influence of trade, in Europe at least, which he stresses.
But he neither himself suggests any formula for economics, nor does he
take any clear-cut stand towards the economic systems of his century, such
as mercantilism, physiocracy, and the emergent theory of economic liberalism.
As Clark notices,he believes that economic law is nothing more than the
order of nature,and applies to economic growth his "law" that less
destruction occurs with time in history. He appears to think that competi¬
tion, with honest attempts at co-operation, will enable commerce to fulfil
its true mission of furthering the peaceful interdependence of nations
Selbst der Gegenstand des scheinbar grofiten Eigennutzes, der
Handel, hat keinen andern als diesen Weg [i.e. co-operation]
nehmen mogen, weil er Qrdnung der Natur ist, gegen welche alle
Leidenschaften und Vorurtheile am Ende nichts vermogen. Jede
handelnde Nation Europas beklaget es jetzt und wird es kunftig
noch mehr beklagen, was sie einst des Aberglaubens oder des
Neides we gen sinnlos zerstorte. Jemehr die Vernunft zunimmt,
desto mehr mufi die erobernde eine handelnde Schiffahrt werden,
die auf gegenseitiger Gereohtigkeit und Schonung, auf einem
fortgehenden Wetteif'er in ubertreffendem KunstfleiBe, kurz auf
Humanitat und ihren ewigen Gesetzen ruhet.
Here, he seems to advocate a broad economic liberalism, without going into
details or bringing out the harsher implications of the ethic of competition.
In fact, his rather naive views on economics are completely bound up with
his ideas of „Humanitat" and "laws" of progress, and appear to share their
ambiguity - i.e. the progress of commerce is governed by natural laws, but
it can also be affected by man's varying motives, and is subject to ethical
criticism. Presumably, the "law" of economic progress will operate ever
more effectively as the canon of enlightened self-interest becomes more
widely accepted.
It is therefore clear that, although Herder believed that commerce is
a potent force in human development, he subordinated his views on it to his
wider philosophy of history, and contributed nothing to economics as a
science. Thus we need devote no further attention to these subjects here,
although we shall encounter 3ome related topics when we come to discuss his
views on the history of technology and inventions.
PART III:
The Place of Science in Herder'




The Place of Science in Herder's Thought.
Introduction: Herder's attitude to knowledge as a whole.
We have seen in our chapter on psychology how Herder believed that the
traditional mental "faculties" are simply different functions of the unitary
mind. It is therefore not surprising that he applies the same holistic
doctrine to the object of the mind, to knowledge in general; in his opinion,
the various branches of knowledge are merely different aspects of one basic
whole. Accordingly, he writes as follows in 1781, in his prise essay „tfber
— — l}
den EinfluS der schonen in die hohern Wissenschaften": 1
das Reich der Wissenscnaften scheint in alien seinen
Gebieten eins zu sein wie die Kraft der menschlichen Seele:
sie liegen einander naher oder entfernter, abgerissen und
inselhaft ist aber keines, und zu alien ist Zugang.
Since, for Herder, everything which can be treated as a unitary entity is
dynamic, and comparable with the living organism, it is understandable that,
on another occasion in 1781, he uses an "organic" metaphor to describe the
unity of knowledge: '
\
Insonderheit zeigt das Beiepiel der meisten und ich mochte
sagen, aller grofien Manner, daH keine den Geist bildende
Wissenschaft eigentlich von der andern abgetrennt sey, sondern
alle einander helfen, alle auf einander weisen und wie mehrera
Bluraen aus einer Wurzel wachsen.
And in 1768, he actually names Bacon as a particular example of the „Poly=
3}
histor", for whom all knowledge is integrally linked.
In keeping with these beliefs, he consciously set out, at an early date,
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to acquaint himself with all branches of knowledge. His youthful friend
4)
Kurella wrote many years later of the Herder he knew in Konigsberg: '
sein Umgang trug sehr viel zu meiner Ausbildung bei:
denn er war schon dam&ls eine lebendige Bibliothek.
Herder himself writes in 1764:"^
Ich samrnle den Geist jedes Volkes in meine Seele!
And from this time onwards, his writings abound with ideas for works of a
truly universal scope, such as a poem on all aspects of the human soul,
g)
which is already outlined in his notes of 1762 or 1763, & „Geschichte des
7)
menschlichen Verstandes" in 1767, and an „Universalgeschichte der Bildung
der Welt" in 1769.
It is obvious from these utterances that he adopted a historical approach
to learning at an early stage of his life. The logical conclusion to his
various aspirations was to undertake a universal, historical study of all
human experience; in one of the more rhapsodic passages of the „Journal",
Herder actually sets forth a plan of this kind, announcing that he intends
to cover „die Grundsatze der Psychologie, und nach der Entwicklung der Seele
auch der Ontologie, der Kosmologie, der Theologie, der Physik ! aus alien
eine Geschichte der Gelehrsamkeit und Wifienschaft uberhaupt! und eine
Geschichte der Menschlichen Seele uberhaupt in Zeiten und Volkern!""^
Such enormous aims, which only a few individuals, such as Bacon, have
entertained, could, even in Herder's day, be fulfilled only incompletely by
any single individual. (The disappointment which necessarily follows this
realisation is reflected, of course, in the opening monologue of Goethe's
„Faust".) However, in relation to the amount of information available in
his day, Herder went further than most men before or since his time towards
attaining universal knowledge, and no important discipline of learning is
unrepresented in his extensive writings. In accordance with his belief that
all subjects are related, he treated no single one in complete isolation, and
preferred to sacrifice factual details and scrupulous accuracy rather than
to let anything jeopardise those great syntheses of different areas of
experience around which he hoped to construct his mathesis universalis. As
we have seen, this overruling passion for reconciling all heterogeneous
aspects of knowledge made it impossible for him to become an exact scientist,
and the conception which, in most cases, mediated between whatever opposites
he could not readily reconcile, namely the idea of „Kraft", deprived many of
his scientific arguments of their value. Yet on the other hand, we did also
discover that this same desire induced him to devise new methods of compari¬
son and generalisation, many of which retain their value today.
It should already be obvious, in the light of earlier chapters, that
Herder, as we should expect, did not treat science in isolation from the
rest of knowledge. On the contrary, he is usually at such pains to reconcile
it with philosophy, religion, etc., that it suffers considerably in itself.
But since we have hitherto studied only his ideas concerning science and
philosophy in greater detail, we shall now try to find out how he relates
his scientific ideas to the other subjects and modes of mental experience
which occupied him most, notably to history, education, religion, mysticism,
and art. It is our contention that such an investigation might prove
especially interesting today, since few individuals now find it possible to
explore the connections between all the major branches of learning in the
same way as did Herder, whose interest in the broader issues of knowledge
was unusually highly developed even for his own day. Such broader issues
are as relevant today as they ever were, although it is only recently that
their relevance has been more forcibly impressed on our society by the ill
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consequences of over-specialised education and the general fragmentation of
learning. But before we proceed to examine the relationship between science
and the rest of knowledge, we may well pause to consider Jean Paul's words on
Herder's exceptional kind of erudition:"*"0'
Wenige Geister waren auf die groBe Weise gelehrt wie er. Die
meisten verfolgen nur das Seltenste, Unbekannteste Einer Wissen=
schaft; er hingegen nahrn nur die groBen Stroma, aber aller
Wissenschaften in sein himmelspiegelndes Meer auf
1. Science and history.
Since we have already seen how Herder attempted, with his supposed
"natural laws" of social change and historical progress, to apply science to
history, it only remains for us, in studying the relationship between these
two disciplines in his thought, to ask how he applied history to science,
i.e. what part he considered science has played in human history.
a) £he_history_of_science.
As we know, Herder adopted a historical approach to knowledge as a
whole. He used the same method in studying most individual subjects, in¬
cluding science itself. For example, even the early, unpublished manuscripts
on mathematics, described in an earlier section, as well as the Riga manu¬
script „Anfangsgrunde der Sternkunde", are preceded by fairly full intro¬
ductions tracing the history of the sciences concerned.^ And, although
few works devoted exclusively to the history of science were available in
his day, he acquired Bailly's histories of the astronomy of the ancients and
that of India and the Orient (1777 and 1787),"*"^ Weidler's history of
astronomy (1741),"*"^ Gmelin's history of chemistry (1797),Murhard's
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history of physics (1798),Priestley's history of electricity (1772),*^
Kastner's history of mathematics (1796),^ and numerous work3 on science
n Q \
in the ancient world and by ancient scientific thinkers. '
Many references to the history of science appear in his published
writings, showing that he did study in detail works such a3 those listed
above. Ha realised that the beginnings of scientific thought are to be
19)
found in the mythologies of ancient and primitive peoples, ' but, in the
„Ideen", he rightly says that the beginnings of science as we know it are
to be sought in ancient Greece.20^ The following words from the „Ideen"
21)
are still applicable: '
Wer indessen den Griechen den Geist reiner Wissenschaft
absprieht, moge ihren Aristoteles und Euklides lesen
denn auch das war Platons und Aristoteles Verdienst, dafi sie
den Geist der Naturwissenschaft und Mathematik erweckten, der
uber alles Moralisiren hinaus ins GroBe geht und fur alle
Seiten wirket.
His essay of 1776 on Copernicus shows detailed knowledge of ancient astronomy
and of the theories of the Alexandrian school; he cites the opinions of
Apollonius of Perga, Pythagoras, Philolaus and others, and correctly
maintains that all the elements of Copernicus' heliocentric theory were
already present in antiquity.22 ^ He shares the opinion of his century, now
accepted with more qualifications, that science almost disappeared from
23)
Europe in the Middle Ages, and notices that Scholastic philosophy was an
obstacle to empirical investigation.2^ His genuine appreciation of the
significant Islamic contribution to medieval science was somewhat less
typical of his times, and, in the „Ideen'*, he lists the most important
scientific achievements of the Arabs in some detail.2"^' He concludes:2^
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Qhne Araber ware kein Gerbert, kein Albertus Magnus, Arnold
von Villa Nova, kein Roger Baco, Raimund Lull u.a. entstanden
It is also noteworthy that, in 1772, he observes that post-Reformation science
and philosophy encouraged „Freidenkerey".^And finally, he appears (in
the „Ideen") to share Bacon's belief that knowledge must continually
increase, but, unlike the English savant, he does not seem to believe, at
this date, that it will ever be complete; such views as the following are
indeed familiar to modem readers:2^
Wir also konnen in diesem einmal begonnenen Lauf nicht mehr
stehen bleiben: wir haschen dem Zauberbilde einer hochsten
Wissenschaft und AllerkenntniB nach, da£ wir zwar nie erreichen
werden, das uns aber imxaer im Gange erhalt, solange die Staats=
verfassung Europas dauret.
He obviously realises that this dynamic growth in learning is primarily a
European phenomenon.
Before we go on to evaluate his ideas on the history of technology (a
topic more frequently discussed in his age than the history of pure science),
we may conclude that he was interested in the history of science, in its
widest sense, including its theoretical aspects, to a greater extent than
most thinkers of his times. He thus contributed something to a subject
which only today is finding its place as an established discipline in the
learned world. He understood how important science is in human history,
and in European history in particular, and traced the scientific tradition
from Greece, and even from earlier civilisations, down to his own times.
It was his characteristically historical approach to learning which led him
to such conclusions, and we can detect his influence when Goethe writes as
follows in his ,tFarbenlehre" of 1807:2^
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—- so laBt sich hier auch wohl behaupten, da£ die Geschichte
der Wissenschaft die Wissenschaft selbst sei.
b) ?he_histor^_of_technolog2;_or_agg3.ied_3cierice.
Throughout Herder's writings, we encounter references to the history of
technology, particularly to those great mechanical inventions which, as he
and a few others before him realised, have profoundly affected human history.
Thus, in the „Journal", he refers to the invention of the vacuum-pump,
30)
etching, the telescope, the compass and other devices, ' and in later works,
he mentions the application of mathematics to mechanics,^ the inventions
of printing, the Arabic numerals, modern musical notation, clocks, oil-
painting, and other technical advances, all of which he regards as important
32)
historical events. ' Many other inventions, such as Greek Fire, are
listed in his classified notes for the „Ideen".^
But apart from factual observations of this kind, he makes theoretical
pronouncements on the history of technology in various of his works. Herder
maintains in his „Auch eine Philosophic", as Rouchepoints out, that
fortuity helped just as much as human ingenuity to produce great inventions,
35)
and Roy Pascal ' remarks that Herder, at this time, sees inventions as
proving the irrationality of historical development. In fact, in his
essay on Winckelmann in 1777, he writes
die geruhmtesten Erfindungen sind nur Blitze, die au3 dem
Reiben der vorbereitetsten Umstande und gleichsam Vorerfindungen
trafen, und auch bei ihnen findet der Mensch viel ofter als er
erfindet.
And in the „Ideen", Part II, he says that great inventions come about
„ 37)
„meistens durch sine kleine Zusammenruckung zweier lange bekannter Gedanken", '
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while already in the manuscript „Anfangsgrunde der Sternkunde" of 1765, he
38)
(rightly) observes that the telescope was discovered by chance.
39)
As Rouchd ' observes, however, Helv^tius, Hume, Voltaire and Bacon had
earlier declared that chance (or intuition) can produce great inventions or
discoveries. We may add that, in a work^^ referred to in Herder's classi¬
fied notes^"^ for the „Ideen", it is stated that the Chinese would not have
invented so much „mxm es ihnen ein glueklicher Zufall nicht vor die Nase
gelegt hatte." Goethe too once wrote
Zum Entdecken gahort Gluck, zura Erfinden Geist, und beiae
konnen beides nicht entbehren.
But Rouch>? further says of Herder's „Auch eine Philosophie"
elle montrait dans 1'acquisition de la science un present
de Dieu.
Realising how unpredictable technological inventions in history appear to be,
Herder does indeed apply to them a more teleological, providential interpre¬
tation than to most other historical phenomena. Even in the „Ideen", Part
II, he writes
Vielleieht ist keine Geschichte, die so augenscheinlich die
Regierung eines hohern Schicksals in menschlichen Dingen
zeigt, als die Geschichte dessen, worauf unser Geist am
stolzesten zu seyn pflegt, der Erfindung und Verbesserung der
Kunste. Immer war das Merkmal und die Materia seiner Be=
zeichnung langst dagewesen: aber jetzt ward es bemerkt, jetzt
ward es bezeichnet.
He adds shortly afterwards1^5)
das alles gehort zur obern Haushaltung Gottes mit unserm
Geschlecht
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Statements of this kind are unusually teleological for the mature Herder,
although, as we know, he did not finally abjure teleology until he wrote
Part III of the „Ideen". However, we Biust recall what his teleological
arguments entail. They do not require miraculous intervention to reinforce
them, and he postulates such divine intervention only in explaining histori¬
cal beginnings or first causes. Historical developments, as he sees it,
can be interpreted both naturalistically and teleologically, for purpose
and providence emerge only in causal changes governed by what he calls
"natural laws". The unexpectedly great part played by chance in many great
technological discoveries and inventions led him to invoke relatively
undiluted teleology in this case, since, if he had conceded that fortuity
alone produced them, he would have removed an important buttress from his
doctrine of ultimate progress in history.
Birkner, more than other critics, has dwelt upon another feature of
Herder's theory of technological inventions as set forth in his „Auch eine
Fhilosophie":46)
Nach Herders Meinung findet der Mensch nur allzu leicht
Genuge im mechanischen Gebrauch des einmal Erfundenen.
Herder, in fact, traces much of the "mechanisation" he then deplored in
modern culture to the spread of mechanical aids among the ignorant masses,
who thus lose contact with the fuller and more "natural" existence they
formerly enjoyed. He writesJ
Gewiiie Tugenden dar Wifienschaft, des Krieges, des Burgerlichen
Lebens, der Schiffahrt, dar Regierung - man brauchte sie nicht
raehr: es ward Maschiene, und die Maschiene regiert nur Einer.
Thus in this work, he does not share Bacon's belief that only unmitigated
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advantages can accrue from technological progress. But in his later works,
he insists less on this liousseauistic idea. He singles out the mechanical
sciences for especial praise in an essay of 1781, saying with reference to
their obvious utility and their freedom from the controversies which beset
48)
so many other subjects: '
Sie sind der Wald, der immer grunet —-
Yet in the „Ideen", he dilates upon the evil as well as the beneficial
effects of mechanical inventions, and notes that, while inventors are few,
the fruits of the advanced civilisation they help to create are unthinkingly
enjoyed by masses who have no intrinsic claim to be called civilised them-
4-9)
selves. ' And finally, later in the same work, he says that even the
50)
abuse of mechanical inventions, such as gunpowder, ' must eventually
51)
produce good results, ' and thus reconciles his earlier, more pessimistic
views on the history of technology with his later historical optimism:
So arbeitet sich auch in den Kraften des Menschen der uber=
treibende Misbrauch mit der Zeit zum guten Gebrauch um
Thus, for Herder, mechanical inventions can produce both good and bad
52)
results. As Birkner writes:-^ '
„Die Erfindungen des menschlichen Geistes" sind al30 weder gut
noch schlecht, erst in cler Anwendung zeigen sie ihren Charakter.
The same critic notices how Herder often balances his praise for some great
55)invention with remarks on its possible evil consequences. ' Technology
is only a means, and can be used to serve many different ends, as he sees
is
it, but it/with man that the choice between good and evil applications lies.
We conclude that, apart from the more unqualified historical optimism
of his later period, Herder's remarks on technology are very relevant to the
situation today, and although some of them may now sound like truisms, they
were not so in the pre-industrial Germany of the eighteenth century. He
combined Bacon's insight into the benefits conferred by technology with
Rousseau's concern over their undesirable repercussions upon social life,
and is accordingly closer to the opinions of most present-day thinkers than
were either of his great, but more one-sided predecessors.
All in all, whether the results of technology be good or bad, he
regarded it as an extremely potent force in history. In 1774, he notices
how inventions such as the telescope, gunpowder, the compass, and printing
altered the whole course of human development."^ (He probably emphasised
printing in particular in his „Auch eine Philosophic", exclaiming that
anyone using it to the full as a medium for disseminating his ideas can
55)
become a „Sokrates unsrer £eit", because he had himself found the direct
,,Wirkung" he wanted to exercise in society impossible for him in Buckeburg,
and discovered a partial substitute for it in authorship.) In the „Ideen",
he stresses the need for a „Geschichte der Erfindungen", thus renewing
Bacon's appeal for a "History of the [mechanical] Arts"Like the
economic theorists of history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, he
declares that the domestication of the horse"^'1 and the transition from
58)
pastoral to agricultural society ' were vital stages in man's development.
In 1797> he lists inventions and „Revolutionen der Erde" (presumably great
geological events) as mainsprings of human change,and Roy Pascal notices
how, in 1774, he treats major inventions and the greatest historical
occurrences as equally important.^
But Herder's belief that technology is a powerful influence in history
should not be thought of as completely anticipating the economic or
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materialistic theory of history. For we have seen that he also uses teleo-
logical and other arguments whenever it suits him. He was really reviving
the ideas of Bacon, who profoundly influenced hi3 thought (for example, it
was Bacon who first pointed out the momentous historical repercussions of
printing, gunpowder and the compass0^), although, as we have seen, this
Baconian optimism about the social effects of technology is tempered by an
almost Rousseauistic pessimism in Herder's first work on history in 1774.
le shall return to Bacon's ideas later, but meanwhile, we may observe that
the following words from the „Ideen" unmistakably betray his influence upon
62^
Herder's interest in technological progress: '
— wenn wir erwagen, d&B fast alle Erfindungen unsres Geschlechts
in sehr junge Zeiten fallen und beinahe keine Spur, keine Trummer
eines alten Gebaudes Oder einer alten Einrichtung vorhanden ist,
die nicht an unsre junge Geschichte geknupft sei; welche Aussicht
giebt uns diese historisch=erwiesene Segsamkeit des menschlichen
Geiates in das Unendliche kunftiger Zeiten!
c) The further progress of technology.
Herder indulged in some interesting speculations concerning the future
progress of technology. He declares in 1774 that the technical means of
warfare have already reached an advanced stage of development; such ideas
were perhaps brought home to him by the often tedious conversations to which
he had to submit with his current patron, the militaristic Count of
63)
Schaumburg=Lippe. In his „Aueh eine Philosophic", he writes:
Wenn [sic] hat man mehr Macht und Maschienen gehabt, mit einem
Druck, mit einem Fingerregen ganze Nationen zu erschuttern?
In Part III of the „Ideen", he claims that technical improvements in warfare
will make war more dispassionate and impersonal, hence increasingly unlikely
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to occur. ' But in 1793> with the menace of the French Revolution
65)
spreading over Europe, he writes less optimistically: '
Ein Conflict aller Volker unsrer Erde ist gar wohi zu gedenken:
der Grand dazu ist sogar schon gelegt.
All these utterances are particularly striking for the modern reader.
The opinion set forth in the „Ideen" that ever more powerful weapons will
make war less and less likely to break out reminds us, in a somewhat ironical
way, of the modern doctrine of peace through a balance of "deterrents". But
Herder was not such a visionary as this would suggest; his friend Einsiedel,
radical as ever in his views, actually suggested (in the 1790'3) that
delayed-action combustibles such as phosphorus, poisons, poisoned shrapnel,
and even „Pestmiasma" should be used as a means of making warfare le3s
likely to benefit the aggressor, and consequently less likely to be resorted
66)
to at all. ' Discussions with this remarkable anarchist and eccentric
doubtlessly led Herder to believe that war becomes decreasingly likely, but,
as ?:e have seen, he modified his ideas after the French Revolution, even
suggesting that a world war may at some time break out.
Some further suggestions on future technological developments appear in
Herder's works. For example, he regrets in 1803 that recently discovered
scrolls, written in antiquity, cannot now be unrolled, and adds:^^
zu wunschen ware es gleichfalls, daB eine chemische Oder
andre Erfindung die Muhe des Aufrollens verkurze und ihr abhelfe.
Chemical means are available for this very purpose today. Furthermore,
68)
Barenbach and Hansen ' have drawn attention to a passage in the „Journal"
in which Herder's suggestions again seem to anticipate modern advances; he
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writes of the „neue Erde" beneath the sea: '
Welcher Kolumb und Galilei kann sie entdecken? Welche
urinatorische neue Schiffahrt und welche neue Feragl&ser in
diese Weite sind noch zu erfinden? [etc.]
A. Gillies furnishes several interesting details concerning the history of
submarine navigation in a scholarly note to the above passage in his edition
of the „Journal"and from this, it emerges that Herder was by no means
the first to put forward such suggestions. We may confidently add here
that he had already encountered ideas of this kind in Kant's lectures on
physical geography, because, in a plan drawn up for these lectures in 1757 >
Kant proposed to speak „vom Senkblei und der Taucherglocke" and to mention
„ 71)
„Methoden, versunkene Sachen in die Hohe zu bringen".
From all this, we conclude that Herder was interested in the future as
well as the past history of applied science, and that the striking specula¬
tions in which he indulged are a mixture of pure fancy, of ideas thrown out
by earlier thinkers, and of bold conjectures about what might eventually
develop from the resources of technology as they appeared in his day.
Nothing need be added here to what we have already said concerning the
relationship of science and history in Herder's thought. We have said
enough to show not only that he tried to apply science to history with his
"natural laws" of social change, but also that he applied history to science,
thereby establishing the closest of links between the two disciplines, in
accordance with his own belief that all knowledge is necessarily inter¬
connected, and with the modem idea that we should try to establish links
between hitherto divorced branches of learning. We may fittingly terminate
this section with the words of our own century's greatest historian of
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science, George Sarton: '
The prehistorians and other archaeologists have built a solid
bridge between history and science, and we, historians of
science, are now proceeding to build another one, even more
substantial, and thus help to span the chasm which is cutting
our culture asunder and threatening to destroy it. The
scientific spirit is as much improved and purified by the
admixture of historical considerations as is humanism itself
by the introduction of scientific methods.
2. Science and education.
More than most other thinkers of his age, an age in which classical and
theological traditions of learning were still predominant, Herder believed
that natural history and science are essential ingredients of every secondary
school curriculum, and of the ideal general education. At the „Domschule"
73)in Riga, he himself taught natural history and geography, ' as well as
mathematics and astronomy.^ His letters to the ducal family of Weimar
show that he tutored the crown prince of that state, Karl Friedrich, in
natural history, geography, mathematics, general science and the history of
75)
science, and we have already seen from his „Schulr9de" on geography how
indispensable to secondary education he considered this subject to be.^
Moreover, he planned to write „ein natur=historisches Lesebuch fur die
niedern Schulen", as Caroline informs us, and in it, he intended to present
younger children with „richtige Begriffe von den ihnen zunachst liegenden
naturlichen und okonomischen Dingen, von nutzlichen Oder schadlichen Thieren
und Pflanzen, vom Menschen, von Naturerscheinungen, und etwas allgemein
- 77)Verstandliches von der Katurlehre". ' And on various occasions in his
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writings, he considers the value for schools of works on natural history and
science by 3uch men as Buffon,^^ Busching,^^ Eular,^^ Hoffmann,^"^
Kastner,^2^ Maupertuis,^"^ Newton,Rdaumur,^"^ Rosel,®^ Rothe^^ and
88)
Swammerdam. ' In fact, in order to appreciate how great his interest in
scientific education was, we need only recall that all of his sons who
survived until maturity chose practical or scientific careers, namely medicine,
mineralogy, commerce, estate-management and forestry.^3
But it was in the teaching of natural history that he was most
89)
interested. As early as in 1765, he writes: '
Die Naturgeschichte ist das Feld, das nach vielen neuern und sehr
grundlichen Erziehungspl&nen [sic] vielleicht am allermeisten
unter den SchulwiBenschaften, das Genie entwickelt, die Augen
scharft, von einem zum andern uberzusehen, ein Feld was die
Aufmerksamkeit der Kinder einzig und allein vorzuglich
beschaftiget
The special merit of natural history is that, as a concrete and realistic
study, it is admirably suited to capturing the attention of younger children.
Buffon perhaps encouraged Herder in this idea, for the great French
90)
naturalist had written: '
1'Histoire Naturelle doit leur [i.e. aux jeunes gens] Stre
pr£sent6e A son tour, et pr£cis£ment dans ce temps o& la raison
commence a se d£velopper —- rien n'est plus capable de rabaisser
leur amour propre, et de leur fair© sentir combien il y a de
choses qu'ils ignorent.
But it was Kant, in his lectures on physical geography, who most forcibly
impressed upon Herder the outstanding need for more concrete studies, such
as natural history and geography, during the formative period of the youthful
mind. Kant wrote in 1765, while Herder was studying under him:"^
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AIs ich gleich zu Anfange meiner akademischen Unterweisung
erkannte, daR eine grofie VernachlaBigung der 3tudirenden
Jugend vornehmlich darin bestehe, dais sie zu fruhe vemuni teln
lernt, ohne gnugsame historische Kenntnisse, welche die Stelle
der Erfahrenheit vertreten konnen, zu besitzen: so f&Ste ich
den Anschlag, die Historie von dem jetzigen Zustande der Erde
Oder die Geographie irn weitesten Verstande zu einera angenehmen
und leichten Inbegriff desjenigen zu machen, was sie zu einer
praktischen Vernunft vorbereiten konnte.
As Herder himself believed, younger minds may be incapable of grasping the
abstractions of pure science, yet the many curious and tangible details of
natural history rarely fail to intrigue them. We already know that he
thought that all development should be natural or "organic", and that the
human senses and emotions should be cultivated before the abstract reason
comes into play. In this respect, natural history is invaluable, providing
92)
an agreeable introduction to science as a whole. '
In the „Journal", Herder draws up a fairly detailed plan for a realis¬
tic course in the secondary school, intending to apply it in Riga at the
„Lyzeum", the headship of which institution he hoped before long to obtain.
The three „Realklassen" for which he outlines a curriculum begin with one
which is adapted to the needs of younger children, and natural history, of
95)
course, is specially emphasised. ' Natural history must be related to
daily life, to household commodities such as coffee, tea, sugar, spices,
Ql\
bread, beer and wine. Herder adds: '
Hier kommen lebendige Sachen und Kupfer zu Hulfe -— hier
wird alles lebendig.
He does not abandon his customary historical approach either, for he includes
„Geachichte der Kunste, der Handwerke, der Erfindungen" in the time-table of
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this class. Mathematics should be taught at this early stage only in
relation to practical, applied science, which can be readily illustrated by
examples such as sound, colours, water, air, machines and the like. In
95)
short, his aim is as follows:
— es wird Hauptzweck, dem Knaben von alle Dem lebendige
Begriffe zu geben, was er sieht, spricht, geniesst, um ihn
in seine Welt zu setzen, und ihm den GenuB derselben auf seine
ganze Isbenszeit einzupragen.
In the second „Realklasse", the pupil is introduced to „Naturlehre" or to
96^
science proper. 1 Instruments and experiments are essential (Herder
intends to procure „einen Schatz von Instrumenten und Naturalien" for the
school), and the pupils should study physical and human geography, again
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with many concrete illustrations. ' Mathematics should still be taught in
conjunction with applied (physical) science, which mu3t include astronomy,
chronology, optics, hydrostatics, mechanics, etc.*^ (The latter list is
already familiar to us from Herder's early manuscripts on mathematics, and
Kant's influence is again marked.) The scientific subjects covered in the
third ,,Realklasse" include pure physics and pure mathematics, and natural
history now deals with systems of classification.'^'' (Herder here names
the „Kette der Wesen" or Chain of Being.) Natural philosophy and the works
of the great scientists of the age are introduced, and the pupils round off
their study of geography with a review of its general implications.
They should never lose contact, however, with practical things, but should
look into trades, inventions and technology at first hand."1"01^ Herder sums
up the whole programme in terms of the traditional psychological "faculties",
but we should understand these, of course, in the li^ht of his own "organic"
and developmental psychology, not in that of the Wolffian "faculty
psychology". The three classes represent stages of mental development from
„Sinn und Gefuhl" to T,Phantasie", and finally to „Vernunft"
Other subjectsf such as languages, history and religion are also inclu¬
ded in the curriculum, we need scarcely add. However, what is really
remarkable about it is that science is allowed to 3tand on an equal footing
with these more traditional subjects. The entire conception is closer to
that of a modern „Realgymnasium" than to those of the usual secondary schools
of Herder's times. And although we can in part explain his preoccupation
with science by saying that he wished to cater for the exigencies of
practical life in Riga, we should also notice that, in 1773> he says that
utility must never be the main motive behind education.He sought a
balance between theory and practice, and he maintains in 17dl that the
„schone Wi3senschaften", which help to develop our senses and our tastes,
must be studied before the „hohere Wissensch&ften", the abstract disciplines
of knowledge, otherwise the latter will have no solid foundation. Indeed,
he believed not only that the concrete and the abstract, the senses and the
reason, and natural history and pure science should complement one another,
but also, as befitted one who regarded the mind and all knowledge as unified
wholes, that arts and sciences are equally necessary in an ideal education.
3. Science and religion.
a) The influence_of religious standards on science^, as encountered
so far.
In dealing with the various meanings of Herder's „Kraft", with his ideas
on teleology, chronology, diluvlan theories in geology, the origin of man,
immoi'tality and "ideal" theories of evolution, the relationship of the soul
and the body, and a few other topics, we have seen how he tries, on various
occasions, to reconcile science and religion. In most cases, he does not
attempt to impose orthodox theology or a literal interpretation of the
Scriptures upon scientific observations and hypotheses. He usually tries,
especially with his idea of „Kraft", to modify both standards of truth and
to reconcile them through a common metaphysical factor, without subordina¬
ting either of them completely.
But although both religious and scientific standards are frequently
distorted, especially by the wKraft" idea, some of the beliefs we have named,
for example his "immanent" teleology, simply add a complementary religious
or providential interpretation to what is described first and foremost as a
natural, causal process, and others, like the belief in a divine first cause
and in the immortality of the soul, deal with questions which, by their very
nature, cannot be answered by science, and cannot therefore come into direct
conflict with it. They can offend scientific standards only indirectly, by
misusing induotive methods to "prove" something upon which no empirical
evidence can have any bearing. However, others again, like his belief that
the Book of Genesis contains an acceptable account of the creation of man,
or his (albeit vacillating) belief that the Hoachian Deluge actually took
place, compete with naturalistic ways of accounting for phenomena upon which
empirical evidence is, at least in principle, available. These latter
beliefs trespass directly upon the province of science, substituting
Scriptural texts for empirical enquiry, and it is over questions of this kind
that most of the great battles in the past between science and religion have
been fought. However, we have seen that few religious beliefs of this kind
appear in Herder's writings on science, and that those which do appear were
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ideas commonly accepted by most thinkers of the age. As Gunther writes in
his history of anthropology:^^
Selbst Aufklarer vom reinsten Wasser gaben dem biblischen
Berichte den Vorzug vor den anderen damals bekannten
Sehopfungsberichten, weil er auf die Schilderung von „Gottor=
und Halbgotter^Aonen" verzichtete.
All in all, we have seen that metaphysical, mystical, aesthetic and emotional
postulates distorted Herder's scientific ideas far more than did traditional
Christian orthodoxy.
However, until he more outspokenly embraced rationalistic and radical
views in the late 1780's, Herder did profess that both religious and scien¬
tific truths are equally important, declaring, for example, in 1781, after
Bacon;10
Die wahre Wissenschaft ist, wie die Wasser, eines doppelten
Ursprungs: vom Himmel und von der Erde: jenes i3t die
Theologie, dies die menschlichen Wissenschaften.
But since we have already studied his individual scientific ideas, we shall
now examine some of his central theological beliefs, in order to determine
whether they are in themselves opposed to naturalistic or scientific
principles, and to decide how orthodox his personal religion was.
b) £8e_influence_of_naturalistic_st^dards_on_ theology.
First of all, let us consider Herder's attitude to the doctrine that the
Holy Writ is divinely inspired, or the doctrine of „Theopneustie", as Herder
himself calls it.106'
In some of his early sermons, he explicitly accepts the doctrine. For
example, he says in a sermon of 1765 of the miracle of Pentecost:*^
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es besiegelte die Bingabung der Gottliehen Schriften.
Yet already in 1768, in another sermon, he tries to combine the doctrine of
literal inspiration with natural psychological causes, emphasising now the
one, now the other, throughout the sermon. Thus, he first tells us:*0*^
Sie [i.e. divine grace] brachte entweder im Traume Oder in
einer wachenden Erhebung der Sinne Bilder vor das Auge ihrer
[i.e. the Biblical writers'] Einbil&ungskraft und hef'tete ihre
Aufmerksamkeit auf dieselben. So entstanden Gedanken in ihrer
Seele und mit den Gedanken sogleich Worte
Shortly afterwards, he 3ays:10^;
— ieh muBte den Augenblick das Wesen meiner Seele vernichten
konnen, wenn ichs erwarten wolite, daB Gott in die Reihe meiner
Gedanken Zwischengedanken einschieben [wollte].
He later goes even further, saying:1^0''
alsdenn warden die Empfindungen deines Herzens reden,
denn [sic], und anders nicht, redet der Geist Gottes in dir.
And finally, after various attempts to explain it, he concludes that the way
of inspiration is unknown
Derselbe Allwissende, der auf eine uns unbekannte Art ihre
[i.e. the Biblical writers'] Seelen in seiner Hand hielt,
damit sie aus dem Grunde derselben das hervordachten, was
sein Mile war [etc.]
But in a fragment written in the following year, and entitled „{Jber Moses",
he is much more radical, calling Moses' dialogue with God „eine Monologe mit
sich unter dem Namen Gottes".In the Buckeburg years, however, he
returns to that hybrid theory of divine inspiration and natural expression
he had put forward in 1768:^"*"^
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Freilich urnsten auch in der Seele Oder im Gehirn Johannes
Bilder bereit liegen, die Gott zu dieser neuen Offenbahrung
weckte —-
But in 1730, in the „Briefe, das Studium der Theologie betreffend", he writes
of the Old Testament prophets
die Worte, die sie sprachen, kamen aus dem Drang ihres
Herzens und also aus veranlassenden Zeiturnstanden; die
Gestalt, die sie in der Reihe der Zeiten hatten, sahen sie
nicht, sah oft ihre Zeit nicht; dies erblickte erst die
Zukunft.
He tries in his „Vom Geist der ebraischen Poesie" in 1783 to portray the
prophets as men who predicted the future from the ordinary, available
evidence of the past and present, yet calls this natural, historical develop-
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ment „die kunftige Zeit der Regierung Jehov&hs". By the same reasoning,
he tried in the „Ideen" to show that history is both a natural process and
a moral order or providence. But most noteworthy of all, in an earlier
manuscript for the MIdeenn, he says of the means by which the creator
communicated with newly created man:1*^
Nicht durch Engel und Wunderstimmen sprach er [i.e. der
vorbildende Verstand Gottes] zu ihm: sondern durch sichre
deutliehe bleibende Wunderwerkzeuge, die Thiere
(in another discarded manuscript for Part II of the „Ideen", written in 1784
or 1785, he writes that religion is the „ProduktH (erased) then „Bedurfni£
der Menschheit", and that it was „erfunden" (erased) then „modificirt" by
man.)^"^ Man, that is, learnt by imitating the animals. Finally, in
1798, he abandons all attempts to combine the natural and the supernatural,
saying
Die Verschiedenheiten, ja die Widerspruche der Evangelien selbst
bezeichnen den eignen Standpunkt jedes Evangelisten so augen=
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scheinlioh, da£ unter der Masks eines einhauchenden Geistes
sich in ihnen nichts erklaren laBt
He now secularises the word „Offenbarung" completely:^•9)
—■ wer eine Wahrheit hell ans Licht stellet, der offenbaret.
From all this, we conclude that the development of Herder's beliefs
concerning the inspiration of the Scriptures bears witness from the start to
the influence of naturalistic modes of thinking upon theological doctrine
rather than vice versa, and that his attempts at compromise were never
permanent or satisfactory, even to himself. For this situation, the idea
of environmental determinism in psychology, already familiar to us from his
scientific writings, is chiefly responsible.
Herder's attitude to miracles in general follows a similar pattern. In
the ttJournal", in 1769, he calls for „eine Ganetisohe Erklarung des Wunder=
baren und Abentheuerlichen aus der Menschlichen Natur".^2^; Yet in 1773,
in Buckeburg, he appears to believe in miracles, although such statements as
121)the following are not entirely unambiguous:
Propheten waren oft Wunderthater, d.i. im allgemeinen Verstande
Beweiser der gottlichen Macht fur seine [i.e. Gottes] Religion
und Menschenvorsehung.
Nonetheless, even in these years, in an older manuscript for the „Erlauter=
ungen zum Neuen Testament", his most orthodox work, he explains away the
122)
Pentecost miracle of the gift of tongues: '
Keine neue Sprache war die Gabe: sondern die Freudigkeit,
Richtigkeit, Bundigkeit, Einfalt, Herzruhrung, mit der er
[i.e. Peter] in der gewohnlichen, gelernten Sprache sprach
314.
In the „Theologische Briefe" in 1780, he says, however, that the Scriptural
123)
miracles cannot simply be explained away, ' and in the „Vom Geist der
ebraischen Poesie", two years later, he says of the Tower of Babel
Ich nehme also die wunderbare Erklarung unsrer Sage an, weil
ich keine naturliche weiB.
The word „Sage" and the admission that it is not the divine authority of the
Scriptures but the lack of a convenient natural explanation which prompts
him, clearly show the drift of his thought. In 1783> later in the same
125)
work, he says of poses' miracles: '
sie gehoren —- auch nicht unabtrennlich zum Amt eines
Propheten.
Referring to the divine legislation of Sinai, he goes on to say that all
miracles have a natural explanation
denn auch kein Wunder wirkt Gott ausser duroh Naturmittel
und Krafte.
He says the same thing in another passage written around this time, but
admits that none of the miracles of Israel have yet been completely explained
127)
in terms of natural agencies. ' As for the „Ideen", Haym declares that
the theory of the divine origin of language is the only instance of direct
divine intervention invoked by Herder in this work,"*"2^ However, we have
already seen that some form of divine intervention in the natural evolution
of the universe takes place with the creation of man. Yet only in one
passage is there a hint, and it is only a hint, that such intervention is
possible after the time of man's origin, and this is in the section of the
„Ideen" devoted to "proving" that the soul is immortal:'*"2'^
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Je raehr aber die menschliohen Krafte selbst in Uebung waren:
desto weniger bedorften sie theils dieser hohern Beihulfe,
Oder desto minder wurden sie ihrer fahig: obwohl auch in
spatern Zeiten die groBten Wirkungen auf der Erde durch
unerklarliche Umstande entstanden sind Oder ir.it ihnen begleitet
gewesen.
The nearest approach elsewhere in the „Ideen" to ideas of this kind is in
some of those teleological passages we have earlier noticed. Finally, it
is no surprise to find that Herder dispenses completely with miracles in his
later writings. On one occasion, he even secularises the word Mhimmlisch"
Diesem Frommen [i.e. one of the saints of the Church] z.B. liessen
sieh Stimmen vom Himmel horen. Wer horte diese Stimmen nicht in
seinem Herzen? wenn sie gleich das Ohr nicht vernahm; sobald ihr
Inhalt nur himmlisch, d.i. aufaunternd und erquickend ist.
And in 1794, he once more explains away the miracle of Pentecost as non-
miraculous, claiming that the words usually translated as "new tongues" were
really only „neue Auslegungsweisen der alten Propheten".*"^
In the light of all this, we conclude from Herder's attitude to miracles,
as also from his attitude to the divine inspiration of the Scriptures, that
his theological beliefs on some of the most important doctrinal matters were
profoundly influenced by naturalistic or even scientific principles rather
than vice versa. The two doctrines we have discussed are particularly
illuminating, because they neither of them readily lend themselves to the
sort of reconciliation with scientific standards which was possible in some
other cases with the help of the „Kraft" idea. Where he had to choose
directly between the natural and the supernatural, Herder nearly always opted
for the natural, even if denial of the supernatural meant deviating con¬
siderably from orthodoxy.
316
But before we leave the last topic, we may note that such eminent
thinkers and scientists as Leibniz, Christian Wolff, Euler and Haller had
accepted the authenticity of miracles,and that even the materialistic
133)
psychologist Hartley indignantly exclaimed:
If anyone should affirm or think, as some Persons seem to do,
that a Miracle is impossible, let him consider, that this is
denying Cod's Omnipotence, and even maintaining, that Man is
the supreme Agent in the Universe.
Sockler shows that a fair number of thinkers did repudiate the miraculous in
the eighteenth century, but adds:*^*^
Aber dafi viele Celebritaten des naturwissenschaftlichen Oder
des mathematischen Fachs zu denselben gehort hatten, laBt sich
nicht sagen.
All this is further evidence that Herder was not what Rouche calls him, a
man striving to impose orthodox theology upon science, but that he was, in
fact, less orthodox than many contemporary scientists.
We now come to another important feature of Herder's religion. One of
the surest signs of rationalism or liberalism in theology is the tendency to
emphasise the ethical value of religion rather than its transcendental
aspects. This is what Lecky calls "that rationalistic spirit which regards
135)
doctrines simply as the vehicles of moral sentiments". ' Bruford notices
just such a tendency in Herder, saying:'1^
An enthusiastic moraliam was in fact the heart of his religion.
(We might add that he shares this with Leasing, whose religious ideas he
greatly admired.) Bruford likewise points out that Herder never seriously
believed in original sin, which is another sign of his marked heterodoxy,
137)
and describes his mature philosophy as "secular humanism". ' We may
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truthfully say that, in the Bible itself, the main attraction for Herder,
apart from the aesthetic and emotional appeal of its poetry, the mystical
power of passages such as the beginning of St. John's gospel, and the
historical interest of the Old Testament as a commentary on Hebrew customs
and society, is its ethical content, particularly in the Hew Testament.
This moralism, which is reflected in the tfIdeen" in the idea of (.Humanitst"
and in the historical optimism which runs through the work, becomes
increasingly conspicuous in his later years. In 1799, for example, he
138)
defines religion as follows: '
Religion ist innere GewiBenhaftigkeit.
139)
In the previous year, he had written:
Ginge der Name des Christs unter, so muBte dieser Glaube
Religion der Menschheit heiBen.
Yet in his most religious phase in Buckburg, he had written:
Ist Moral die Hauptsache des Predigers und etwa Bibel und Rede
Jesu nur Citatum — lebe wohl, Christenthum, Religion,
Offenbarung
But after he left Buckeburg, he himself increasingly treated ethics as the
main object of religion.
We conclude that, while the influence of religion on Herder's scientific
ideas has been much discussed by previous critics, not enough attention has
been paid to the influence of those naturalistic ways of thinking which we
associate with science upon his religious beliefs themselves. The latter
influence was just as powerful as the opposite one, with the result that, in
his mature period especially, Herder made great efforts to reconcile his
religion with the naturalistic methods he had encountered in empirical
philosophies and in science.
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c) ^ Si_E® iiSiSS1 ^he_naJ^rarl_anA_tlxe .transcendental.
The three central postulates of natural religion, those of God as the
first cause, the immortality of the 30ul, and the freedom of man's will,
have already been discussed in so far as they enter into Herder's scientific
thought. We have seen that he uses them all at various times, but that
even they are always introduced with some qualification. For example, he
accepts the doctrine that God created the universe and man, yet combines it
on the one hand with his conception of quasi-physical creative „Krafte", thus
coming at times very close to pantheism, as most critics have agreed, and on
the other hand, with naturalistic theories about the evolution of the
universe and of lower forms of life. Secondly, he combines the religious
doctrine of immortality with his own vitalistic „Krafte" and with heterodox,
often Platonic theories of planetary habitation etc. And thirdly, he
acknowledges the freedom of the will only in a qualified sense, as we
noticed in our section on causality and teleology, and disposes of this time-
honoured problem with a solution which in many ways resembles present-day
ideas rather than traditional religious teachings. But since we have
already studied the relationship of these postulates to Herder's scientific
ideas, as well as the r61e of his MKraft" conception as a bridge between
the natural and the transcendental, we may now pass on to other topics.
Let us briefly review the development of Herder's attitude to natural
religion in general. From an early stage in his life he tends to invest
all scientific pursuits with the sanctions of natural religion. For
example, in the „Journaln, he calls Newton and other eminent scientists
„Propheten der Natur, Ausleger der Gottheit" This does not mean that
he is forcing religion upon science; as Russell says:1^
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Science itself does not become religious, even if the pursuit
of the scientific way of life is endowed with religious
significance.
However, as we noticed in our section on "ideal" evolution, Herder does seem
to have accepted the doctrine of a transcendental God, as a first cause,
even in 1769, that year of radical thought, although his views on immortality,
that other pillar of natural religion, were rather ambivalent at the time.
He thus tends, around this time, to introduce religious doctrines where
science ends, or to lend the support of natural religion to avowedly
naturalistic interpretations of the workings of the universe, and declares
in his „Archaologie des Morgenlandes"
0 es ist mit Eine der sehwachsten Krankheiten des Menschlichen
Geistes, eine ubernaturliche Physik und Metaphysik der Schopfung
aus dem Terstande Gottes auch nur erwarten zu wollen.
He adds:^4^
Religion wird in der Natur und die Natur in der Religion lierrlich.
During the same period, he rejects traditional physico-theology, with its
attempts to reconcile the findings of natural history and science with
literal interpretations of individual Biblical texts,and says that the
Mosaic narrative of the creation is „offenbar nichts als Gedicht, Morgen=
landisches Gedicht".
But as Iiaym notices,"^'^ he changes front in the „llteste Urkunde" of
1774-76, and himself indulges in that physico-theology he had earlier con¬
demned, and tries to correlate modern scientific theories, such as those of
Haller, with the details of the first chapters of Genesis.„Alles
wirst du in Adam finden"he says of the origin of man. However, in
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the „Theologische Briefe" in 1781, he is more cautious about physico-
theology, and says that, while the preacher may read the better works on
science and on physico-theology, he should „nur die Kanael verschonen
mit Astronomischen Predigten" He is now moving away from physico-
theology towards his more characteristic standpoint, that of a broad natural
religion. At this time, as later in his „&ott", he is uneasily aware of
how close natural religion can become to pantheism or even atheism, and, in
the work last quoted, he adds that we should beware of theories of (mechani¬
cal) necessity, of the deification of nature or „Natur=Atheismus"We
must accept a transcendental God as the first cause, and as a religious
guarantee for the invisible creative „Krafte" of the universe, otherwise we
cannot escape that theory of machine-like necessity which Herder loathes;
indeed, Hamann's comment on Robinet, quoted by Zockler, applies to Herder
+ 152)too s
Quelque chose a dtd faite; done quelque autre chose n'a pas
6te faite: done celle-ci a fait I'autre. C'est a quoi on
devrait r^duire la theologie naturelle!
We have seen that, in the „Ideen", Herder applies Scriptural texts
directly to science on a few occasions, especially when writing on the
creation of man and the Biblical Flood, but it is usually only in connection
with first causes and the immortality of the soul, those basic tenets of
natural religion, and with the „Kraft" which lends these doctrines scientific
"proof", that religious arguments involving transcendental factors appear.
Otherwise, the words „Natur" and „&ottheit" are used interchangeably, and
no specific theological doctrines encroach upon the scientific theories
which Herder himself formulates or borrows from other writers of his age.
This is the approach which he adopts in most of his later works, although he
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becomes, of course, more outspokenly rationalistic towards theology as a
whole in his later years. In the „Ideenn, he is constantly at pains to
preserve a balance between a personified nature and the transcendental God
whom he invokes as the first cause, and his efforts are apparent even in his
choice of words; but as Suphan realises, the balance inclines, especially
in the spontaneously written first drafts of the work, towards the side of
nature, which is invested with many of the divine attributes associated, in
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orthodox theology, with the transcendental: '
Als ein personliches Wesen, als Mutter alles Lebens, als
Sehopferin, Kunstlerin, wird die Natur in den „Ideen'' so
haufig genannt und angeredet, daS der Verfasser sich in der
Vorrede deswegen glaubt entschuldigen zu mussen Noch
viel ofter aber hat er in der unbefangenen ersten Niederschrift
die „schaffende Mutter" genannt, wo wir im Druck das Wort „der
Schopfer", „der Allmachtige" lesen.
And it is well known that, in his „Gott" of 1787> Herder, by means of his
ubiquitous, invisible „Krafte" (which partake of both natural and transcen¬
dental attributes), depicts God as so closely involved in the workings of
nature that it becomes nearly impossible for the reader to distinguish
clearly between the two. But after all, this ambiguity, as we have so
often seen, necessarily arose out of his characteristic endeavours to
attenuate the differences between opposites, until he oould at last reconcile
them.
We have already tested the claims of such critics as Roucha, who says
of Herder that "les sciences telles qu'il les conjoit ne sont que la
theologie appliquee & la nature" in the light of all his scientific
ideas, and we need say no more about his religious beliefs in direct relation
to science. We have found that, throughout his mature years, he adhered to
a broadly conceived natural religion, whose central tenets he attempted to
"prove" from the workings of nature, which he usually invested with a
religious significance. In the „Ideen", it is to nature, not the Scriptures,
that he looks for manifestations of the divine, and he constantly strives to
harmonise his religious convictions with the findings of science, and nature
with the transcendental world, and usually succeeds, especially with his
theory of metaphysical „Krafte", in distorting both science and orthodox
155)religion. For this reason, Sell rightly calls him a „Vermittlungstheolog", '
and says that his greatest gift is „die Zusammenschau scheinbar und oft auch
wirklich entgegengesetzter Dinge". This tendency, as we have seen, is
characteristic of all departments of his thought - we need only recall his
complex and eclectic geological theories, or his many conflicting interpre¬
tations of nervous reactions - and it was with this in mind that, in our
first chapter, we rejected Clark's (originally Hettner's) contention1'^''
that Herder put forward relatively orthodox views at times, especially in
Buckeburg, through conscious dissimulation with an eye to professional
advancement and greater social security, but returned where possible to his
"real" position of rationalism and unorthodoxy. There is no positive
evidence whatsoever for this contention, and the continual contradictions
throughout his thought can be explained without it, for they often occur in
contexts, such as geology, neurology, and the theory of perception, where
ulterior motives are quite inconceivable. Besides, arguments of this sort
are dangerous, because they can be used to demonstrate anything at all; one
recent Marxist critic argues on similar lines that Herder was really a
materialist, and that the revolutionary proletariat of today is the only
true heir to his (and Goethe's) crypto-materialistic ideas.j
d) Conclusion: the^significance_of natural religion.
Kant, in his first Critique, dealt a severe blow to natural religion,
or the attempt to derive religious truths from the natural world, and subse¬
quently reinstated its main postulates on a somewhat more critical basis
than before. But, in rescuing these postulates by arguments based
exclusively on moral considerations, he destroyed the older natural religion
itself. In the impasse which natural religion reached in the later
eighteenth century in Germany, men such as F.H. Jacobi, however, recommended
another solution, that of basing religion entirely upon faith and ultimately
upon the Scriptures, as Hamann had tended to do. Herder was never content
with a religion of faith alone, however. He did not try to maintain
orthodox views by keeping religion separate from science, as a religion based
solely on faith would have required, but tided to preserve the main tenets of
natural religion, especially those of God as the first cause and of the
soul's immortality (both of which, incidentally, were recognised even in
Robespierre's 1795 constitution in revolutionary France"*"*^), by "proving"
them from the workings of nature. Concentrating on natural religion in his
mature years, he moved further and further away from orthodoxy, and the
Leibnizian doctrine of metaphysical „Krafte", which he used in support of
natural religion, brought him close to pantheism, which eventually became
the new natural religion of many Romantics. In the course of its develop¬
ment, natural religion in Europe was progressively watered down, from the
deism of Descartes, and the English school of deists in the first half of
the eighteenth century onwards, passing directly into materialism in France,
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and, with Spinoza in Holland, Shaftesbury in England, and the emotional
pseudo-Spinozists of Weimar and of German Romanticism, into pantheism in
several other quarters. In fact, as Carl Becker has shown in his out-
158a)standing work on eighteenth century rationalism, the natural religion
of that era inexorably led on towards atheism, although even the most
radical among the "philosophes" retained many secularised Christian values
(especially in their ethical views and in their faith in nature's order
and benevolence). The natural religion of the rationalists represented an
unstable synthesis, which proved untenable in the long run, and called
either for a return to revealed religion, or for the admission that neither
transcendental nor ethical postulates can be proved from the workings of
nature. Becker says of the reason in which th8 eighteenth century had so
much faith
She is pointing in two directions: back toward Christian
faith; forward toward atheism.
In the highly illuminating case of Reimarus, natural religion made revealed
religion superfluous - the respected Hamburg theologian finally alleged that
much of the story of Christ was deliberately forged by the apostles.
In the 1780's, Herder, no doubt encouraged by Goethe, became more and
more preoccupied with nature as the basis of religion. Rouche says of the
„Ideen":159)
La place importante accord^e dans cette philosophie d'histoire
aux sciences proprement dites, et aux sciences non historiques,
en general, rtJvele tout simplement le caractere theologique da
cette entreprise.
To this it may be objected that, as with the development of natural religion
as a whole in the eighteenth century, it shows a weakening of traditional
theology, which can go so far that nature threatens to engulf the transcen¬
dental entirely. However, Herder must not be seen as a oomplete pantheist
any more than as an orthodox theologian. E.C. Mason rightly says of him
„aafi er zwar zu sehr Pantheist ist, um orthodoxer Christ zu sein anderer=
seits noch iminer zu sehr traditioneller Christ, um ein restloser Pantheist
zu sein."^0^ He stood precariously at the end of a development by which
natural religion was transformed, in Germany, into nature pantheism, and,
uneasily aware of the inconsistencies of his position, which Kant attacked in
his review of the „Ideen", Part I, and Goethe, Knebel, and probably Einsiedel,
criticised verbally or in letters, he tided to graft the principal postulates
of natural religion on to scientific arguments, in a final attempt to
demonstrate their truth from the workings of nature. His early pietistic
background, his profession and Hamann's influence all encouraged him to
retain certain features of orthodoxy and theism; traditional natural
religion, in parts of the „Ideen", drew him towards deism; and the logical
difficulties inherent in natural religion, together with his desire to
reconcile the natural and the transcendental in a "monistic" synthesis,
brought him uncomfortably close to pantheism, and even, as in 1769, to
materialism. In the long run, his complex and contradictory system, if we
can call it a system, broke down; the turning-point was reached when he
repudiated teleology in 1787. In his later years, his natural religion
tended to give way to a secular moralism and, as we shall shortly see, to a
form of cosmic mysticism. When he returned to the study of revealed
religion in his „Christliche Schriften" of the 1790's, the effects of his
preoccupation with nature became obvious. We have seen in our discussion
of miracles and the inspiration of the Scriptures how, like Reimarus, he
could no longer find room for the supernatural, and triad to explain it away
or secularise it.
The conclusions reached in this section can he summarised as follows.
Herder sometimes imposed theological methods upon science, and at other times,
he imposed naturalistic or scientific methods upon theology, and both science
and theology suffered in their traditional or accepted forms. Most of his
scientific theories, except those involving the conception of „Kraft", which
is of metaphysical rather than of theological origin, and those which are
indirectly affected by his "proofs" of the immortality of the soul and of
God's agency as a first cause (the two most important tenets of natural
religion), are uninfluenced by theological considerations. On the other
hand, only the proposition that man, with his earliest specifically human
endowments, was created by God (a doctrine generally accepted in Herder's
age), the above-mentioned tenets of natural religion, the moralism which is
typical of rational theology, and little else, survive the criticism of
naturalistic methods in hi3 mature period, and even some of these are
further qualified in the more radical writings of his later years. On the
whole, his theology, in an age when, as Zoekler points out,1^1^ most
scientists were „entweder bestimmt christlich, Oder wenigstens entschieden
theistisch gerichtet", is by no means orthodox, but rather what we should
call liberal. We repeat that, in his mature period, it was his own aim to
reconcile science and religion, nature and the transcendental, without
subordinating either, just as he wished to show that sill forms of knowledge
and truth are interrelated, but the difficulties with which natural religion
is fraught made his syntheses precarious, sometimes little more than verbal,
with "God" and "nature" used interchangeably, until, spurred on by the
criticisms of others, by his studies of Spinoza and by his continued pre¬
occupation with the natural world and its causal laws, he gradually allowed
nature, infused with divine attributes, to gain the ascendancy over the
transcendental, so that, in his later years, little more than secular
moral!sm and cosmic nature-mysticism remained.
4. Science and mysticism.
Clark writes
Neither in Buckeburg nor in Weimar was Herder a mystic.
It would certainly be inaccurate to call Herder a mystic, just as it would
to call him a scientist or an artist, but there was something of all these
in him, and a great deal more besides, so that in calling him any one of
them, without qualifying our statement or referring to his other interests,
we should be doing him an injustice.
However, we have already met numerous mystical conceptions in his
writings on science, and it will be well to examine the question of mysti¬
cism in more detail here, and to try to define its relationship to his
scientific thought.
Few critics have given much attention to the mystical aspects of
Herder's writings. This is probably because Herder himself speaks of
religious mysticism in an uncomplimentary manner. For example, in Part IV
of the „Ideen", he 3ays of medieval mysticism:^^
Glucklich, dafi die Zeiten beinahe vorbei sind, in welchen dies
Opium Arznei war und leider seyn muflte.
But as Roueh£ says:^^
Ce qu'il r^prouve sous le nom de mysticisme, c'est une
religiosity pureraent speculative qui dddaigne l'action.
In fact, he is not a religious mystic in this sense at all, and thus finds
much to criticise in mystics who labour to lose themselves, by contemplation,
in the transcendental. His religion is too bound up with this world to
leave him much scope for passive contemplation of the absolute. Nonetheless,
some of his Buekeburg writings on religion do exhibit religious mysticism,
as when he goes into raptures over the divine logos and light, along with
the more usual nature mysticism which we have noticed in connection with his
scientific ideas. But neither in religious nor in nature mysticism does he
seek oblivion through contemplating the permanent or the static in them¬
selves. Even in his religious works, his mystical emotions are directed
towards the dynamic, and he believes that the divine logos manifests itself
in wWirkung" or .garden", just as he sees nature itself as dynamic. For
nature is really the source of most of his mystical emotions, even when he
relates these to Christian doctrines. Accordingly, it is his nature
mysticism which we shall examine in this section.
Herder venerates the permanent only in the regularities which arise in
change itself, and looks, like Goethe, for HDauer im Wechsel", not for
„Dauer 3tatt Wechsel"; the permanent takes its meaning only from change, and
the two are always inseparable, as they are in the workings of nature. For
example, like Goethe in the „Prolog im Himmel" in „Faustw, he writes of God
in his „Maran Athan of 1779:l65^
Alles lebt unter ihm und eilet zum Leben — Und Gott der
Schopfer ruht auf ihrem rastlosan, vermischten Gesange.
The permanence of God is akin to the changeless order behind all natural
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change.
Thus it is not so much to his theological writings that we should look
for his mystical ideas, especially those of his mature and later years.
Those who deny that he has any mystical leanings presumably denote by the
word "mysticism" an unusually contemplative form of devotion within the
Christian tradition, and naturally enough, they find relatively little of it
in Herder's thought.
Bortrand Russell points out that the first principle of mysticism in
general is "that all division and separateness is unreal, and that the
universe i3 a single indivisible unity.The word "universe" here at
once supplies a link with Herder's mysticism, which is not usually focussed
upon the transcendental, but upon the ultimate unity of the visible universe,
the universe he sought to comprehend through his studies of science.
Furthermore, one of the consequences of the above proposition, as Russell
points out, is religious unorthodosy:^^
For Christians, there is the —- difficulty of avoiding
pantheism: if the world was only apparent, God created nothing,
and the reality corresponding to the world is part of God; but
if the world is in any degree real, and distinct from God, we
abandon the wholeness of everything, which is an essential
doctrine of mysticism, and we are compelled to suppose that,
in so far as the world is real, the evil which it contains is
also real. Such difficulties make mysticism very difficult
for an orthodox Christian.
In short, mysticism cannot readily separate nature and the transcendental.
Anyone who has read Herder's „Gott" will at once recall how he grapples with
these very difficulties, trying to uphold his pseudo-Spinozistic monism (and
monism, in its pre-aaterialistic forms, is always close to mysticism) without
denying the transcendental God of Christianity. Koch, whose short study of
Herder's mysticism is the best contribution in this field so far, takes
notice of these disturbing consequences of his (ultimately mystical) monism,
and refers in particular to his "dialectical" scheme of the universe, set
forth in the important essay of 1777j „tlber die dem Menschen angeborne
Luge":168^
[Diese ist] eine Auffassung, die alles andere als orthodox
genannt werden muB und, wenn sie die Kontrareitat des Menschen
in der ganzen Schopfung vorbereitet sieht und Gut wis Bose in
die Einheit des gottlichen Wesens verlegt, viel eher an Jakob
Bohme, an das Luziferische im Menschen - daher auch die Vorliebe
fur das Prometheus=Symbol - anzuknupfen scheint als an das Dogma.
Indeed, we need not wonder that so many heresies have originated in mysticism.
But to return to our earlier point, the universe as a whole is the
object of Herder's mysticism. From our study of his scientific ideas, it
should now be evident that he considered the universe as made up of „Kraf'te"
and of the visible forms or configurations which their produce through their
interaction. As Herder sees it, we can therefore describe the universe as
a whole only if we take into consideration its form as well as its content.
Thus, he envisaged the Chain of Being both as a series of „Krafte" or soul¬
like entities and as a series of forms or „Organe", for „Seele" and „Organ",
he always insists, are inseparable. False mysticism or „Schwarmerei"
results from an obsession with „Geistigkeit" or content, whereas „Abgotterei"
„ outward
results from an exclusive preoccupation with „Korper" or/form, as Herder,
quoting a remark of Lavater's to this effect,agrees.
In the pre-Weimar years, however, especially in the 1770's, he was
himself much more preoccupied with dynamic ,,Krafte" than with the orderly
forms which are produced by them. The most mystical of his theological
writings, the „Slteste Urkunde", is infused with a strange theology of
..Kraft", for he considered that „Naturkrafte" were the object of the "purer"
devotion of the earliest worshippers, and, at other times, he associates
such „Krafte" with the logos of St. John and with the divine light. As
Kuhnemann observes
Auf einem mystischen Abgrund vollends ruht unser Wissen, wenn
von dem Universum der gottlichen Krafte die Rede ist, das als
immer dieselbe Gotteskraft in alien Erscheinungen lebt.
..Kraft" is the object of a thoroughly emotive mysticism, and is in this sense
equivalent to creative power or spirit, just as form, which is more amenable
to rational treatment, is the object of a more intellectual mysticism.
Herder's mysticism of „Kraft" reminds us of Giordano Bruno, with his "cosmical
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piety, finding its object in the creative energy manifested in the universe." '
His enthusiasm, in the Buekeburg years, for the ..Garung" of the Dark Ages,
his poetic raptures over the „Gottesfulle der Natur",1^ his assurance that
life itself persists even when individuals, who may see only chaos and transi¬
ence, are destroyed or assimilated by "higher" beings, his delight over the
teeming plenitude of the ever-changing universe - in short, all that is
Lucretian, Dionysian or daemonic in his thought is related to this emotive
mysticism, which venerates in all things the universal „Kraft". The same
kind of mysticism colours the ..Naturhymnus" of Shaftesbury which Herder
translated, and it reappears in Tobler's „Naturfragment" and in many passages
of the „Ideen". In the essay „0ber die dem Menschen angeborne Luge", the
following statement is of the same kind;*'^
Alles Leben entspringt auf solche W'eise aus Tod, aus dem Tode
niedrigerer Leben, alle Organisation aus Zerstorung und
332.
Verwandlung geringerer Krai'18, alles Gauze der Ordnung und
de3 Plans aus Lieht und Schatten
But already in the "hieroglyph" of the „hteste Urkunde", Herder employs
a symbol which mediates between his „Krafte" and the form which their inter¬
action creates. And Pamp rightly says, referring in particular to the
„Ideen":^^
Oftmals finden wir in seinern Werke Symbole der mathematischen
Mystik: den Kreis, die Kugel.
In fact, from the time of the „Ideen" onwards, he often uses mathematical
(formal) symbols to describe the mystical unity behind the main processes of
175)the universe - the circle with radii converging upon the centre, the
Golden Mean, or balance between opposites, the sphere, that ancient symbol
of unity and self-sufficiency,some others which we noticed in our
section on mathematics. We earlier pointed out that the dialectical triad
is also an ancient formal device for expressing the mystical union of
opposites. Prom the time of Pythagoras mathematical formulae have always
tended to appear in more abstract mystical writing. For they are, by
definition, universal, formal generalisations, and the more "intellectual"
as distinct from intuitive or emotional mystics have oftsn found them
convenient for expressing the widest generalisation of all, the mystical
vision of the entire universe as One. Whitehead's definition of the first
step in mathematics would also apply to the first step in what we have
called "intellectual" mysticism:
— when we have put aside our immediate sensations, the most
serviceable part - from its clearness, definiteness, and uni¬
versality - of what is left is composed of our general ideas of
the abstract formal properties of things.
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And as Kepler's greatest biographer writes: '
mysticism, indeed, in the lucid brightness of its contem¬
plation, comes closer to the transparency of mathematical
observations than is known or suspected by the many represen¬
tatives of a meagre and obscure interpretation of that
intellectual domain. What comes first is not emotion seeking
expression, but the clear thoughts, which rouse fire and emotion.
This kind of mysticism always uses rational, formal symbols to describe the
unity of the universe; only extreme religious mystics, whom Herder would
have called BSehwarmer", attempt to dispense entirely with symbols of some
sort.
At this point, we may recall another of Herder's favourite mystical
symbols, one which he used on his signet, and which later adorned his
tombstone - that of the snake biting its tail, the ancient symbol of
infinity or eternity. Like the mathematical symbols, it is related to the
natural universe and thence to science, and it appears in Bode's „Anleitung
zur Kenntnis des gestirnten Himmels" of 1768, a work from which Herder
borrowed many ideas on astronomy. Bode writes of a vignette of the stars
179)
which appears in his book:
Diese Figur wird durch das alte Sinnbild der Ewigkeit, nemlich
einer Schlange, welche das Ende ihres Leibes im Munde halt,
begrenzt, um den fur uns unendlichen Umfang des Weltgebaudes
anzudeuten.
In our chapters on Herder's scientific ideas, we have already seen how
his sense of form develops more fully in his mature and later years, and
this, of course, also affects his mystical conceptions. During these
periods, he strives more and more to find a balance between form and content,
between the principles of order and his creative „Krafte", and also, as we
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have seen, between the individual and society, unity and variety, etc. He
expresses the harmony of unity and variety in the „Ideen" by the old mystical
idea of a central body upon which all creation converges:x^0/
Also ringet wahrscheinlich auch hier die grofieste Mannich=
faltigkeit zur Einheit und die allurefassende Natur wird ein
Ziel haben, wo sie die edelste Bestrebungen so vielartiger
Geschopfe vereinige
He is most successful in his attempts to harmonise form and content on a
mystical level in his late poems, and in some of those curious visionary
pronouncements which he makes in his later years, for example in the piece
entitled „Kalligenia", already discussed in connection with his mysticism of
light (a symbol by which he expressed the unity of „Kraftn and visible form).
Manifold, ever-changing „Krafte" and ultimate balance or harmony are the two
sides of his later mystical perceptions, and it is always the natural
universe, often the universe of astronomy and mathematics, which provides
their framework. In 1802, he writes in the style of a visionary that „der
prufende Blick des Weltalls" has appeared to him. (We are at once reminded
of his Masonic affiliation.) He continues
Durchgedrungen vom Gefuhl des groBen Gleichgewichts, das in der
Natur alles halt und tragt, das das Bewegte zur Ruhe bringt und
das Ruhende beweget, erwachte ich zum zweitenmal und freuete
mich einer Welt, die, auf so veste Gesetze gegrundet, Allern
Maas und Ziel giebt und zu der auch ich gehorte.
In 1785» he had given voice to similar mystical feelings, on this occasion,
however, using the language of astronomy (and music, that perennial
expression of universal harmony)
Mein Gang ist die Bahn des Weltalls: dazu leuchtet mir jener
letzte Stern, dazu klingt mir, in geistigen Begriffen und
VerhaltniBen, die Harmonie aller Sterne.
Like Kepler, Herder believes that the astronomer, rather than the artist, is
the greatest seer. For we have seen that in the „Kalligenia" sketch, it is
the astronomers, not the artists (whom he leaves behind him), who reveal to
him the mystical unity behind the dynamic cosmos. He concludes
Ich genoB und empfand hohe und hochste Einheit, die Ueberein=
stimmung und rastlose Wirksamkeit der Natur, ewige Palingenesie,
immer junges Leben. Ich sah, da£ nichts sich ubereilen konne,
daB Alles sich folgen muBe und ewig folge. Maas, Zahl, Oewicht,
Bewegung schwanden mit den Sinnen dahin; Eines losete sich in
das Andre auf.
Science therefore ultimately ends in mysticism for Herder. Both science
and mysticism are occupied with the „Krafte" and regularities of the universe,
but mysticism is the level upon which the widest conclusions of scientific
thinking are further generalised, almost to the point where they become
meaningless. The symbols which Herder uses to express the unity of the
universe, like light, equilibrium, harmony, the circle, the sphere, etc.,
are usually closely associated with science. His characteristic aim of
synthesising all his extensive knowledge finds expression first of all in
his "monistic" philosophy, and often, on a more general level, in mysticism.
For the ultimate generalisations of his thought are not exact and particular
enough to be scientific, and they are too abstract to lend themselves
readily to poetic treatment. He was not so able as Goethe was to discover
the universal in the particular, although he does usually think of every¬
thing holistieally. (Holism itself, as Popper remarks,is related to
mysticism.) Instead, he felt that he must comprehend the universe directly
as a whole, and his resulting perceptions could be expressed only in the
language of mysticism. Natural religion tends to merge into mysticism or
even pantheism, as we noticed in our last section, and Herder's scientific
thought is much more influenced by mysticism than by orthodox Christianity.
We have already discovered, while analysing his scientific ideas, that they
frequently broaden out into mystical perspectives; this was so of his idea
of „Kraft", his holistic principles, his dialectical formula, his mathemati¬
cal symbolism, his conception of "ether" or the universal medium, his
interest in astronomy and the analogy of gravitation, his ideas on light,
his theories of "ideal" evolution, „Palingenesis", planetary habitation and
the universal Chain of Being, his Platonic conception of the body as the
expression of the soul, and all the other notions he culled from the Platonic
and neo-Platonic traditions. All his aspirations towards synthesis and
reconciliation were bound to end on this dimension, and science, the study
of the changes and regularities in nature, provided hiia with much of his
mystical inspiration and symbolism. But, being so general, mysticism
usually began where science stopped, and did not interfere on most occasions
with particular scientific theories and observations. Herder wa3 too
interested in all the detail and profusion of knowledge and experience ever
to become a complete mystic; his mystical leanings became most pronounced
in his later years, when he became disillusioned in much of what he saw
around him. But at all times, he expressed in terms of mysticism his deep-
seated conviction that the universe, like knowledge itself, is fundamentally
One.
5. Science and art: nature and aesthetic values.
Siegel, in his history of German „Naturphilosophie", refers to the aims
of Herder, Goethe, and other contemporaries as follows:*®*^
-— wie die Wissenschaft mit der Religion versohnt werden soil,
so wollen auch Wissenschaft und Kunst sich jetzt vermahlen und
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ihre Grenzen ineinanderlaufen lassen.
Goethe, above all, is known for his achievements in this direction, but we
shall now try to show that Herder, in his own way, was equally intent upon
reconciling art and science, in accordance with his belief that all mental
activities are fundamentally related.
a) The influence of art and_aesthetic values ugon_science.
Reviewing a work by the aesthetician Sulzer in 1774, Herder approves of
the aim „Wahrheit und Sehone, Schone und Tugend zu gatten, und Alios als
Eins, als verschiedenes Phanomen Eines Wesens zu betrachten". ' And in
1782, he says, like Shaftesbury:"^'^
Schonheit ist nur die auBere Gestalt der Wahrheit.
Since, therefore, he associated truth so closely with beauty, we 3hould
expect to find some traces of aesthetic values in his scientific ideas.
Such traces are, of course, in evidence, although he insists that science
,oo\
must never allow the desire for beauty to interfere with exact observations:
Eine verschonerade Zoologie arbeitet ihrem Zweck entgegen:
eine verschonernde Anthropologic nicht minder.
For the links between scientific and aesthetic methods, between art and
nature, are given, for Herder, in the very nature of reality, in that
intimate relationship between truth and beauty which we mentioned above, so
that there is no need for the scientist to distort his observations in order
to find beauty in nature.
It is one of Herder's axioms that all great scientific achievements
share something with artistic creativity. Kant's theory of the universe,
and Whiston's theory of the earth, he says in 1766, both have the quality of
338.
HEinbildungskraft".1^^ He also says on several occasions that great philo¬
sophical systems, such as those of Berkeley, Spinoza, Leibniz and Descartes,
likewise have an imaginative quality, and calls them „Fiktion" or „Dichtung",
190}
without necessarily wishing to belittle them. ' In 1774, he commends the
191)
style of Haller, even that of his physiological works, as „dichterisch", '
192)
and, around the same time, he speaks of „Buffons Roman der Thiererzeugung", '
193)
thereby echoing a remark of Hamann, who had written:
Wer Mose und den Propheten nicht glaubt, wird daher immer ein
Dichter wider sein Wissen und Wollen, wie Buffon uber die
Gaschichte der Schopfung
Hamann had used the word nDichter" pejoratively, just as Herder uses the word
„Roman"; but, on most occasions, Herder mentions the imaginative and creative
qualities of science (and philosophy) only with praise. For example, he
writes in 1776 of Copernicus:1'^
Zeichnungsgefuhl nemlich [sic], sein Sinn fur Symmetrie und
VerhaltniB zum Ganzen war der Finger Gottes, der ihm das
Weltall wies.
He generalises this principle as followsr1^)
Zu den groBten Entdeckungen, die wir dafur halten, wirkte
Einbildung, Malerei, Poesie herauf und hielt die Leiter!
He repeats this conclusion in 1800, referring to Newton's physical system in
particular:
Wer in Wissenschaften erfindet, bringt eben sowohl etwas
Eigenthumliches, Neues aus sich hervor, das er nicht lernte
(sonst hatte ers nicht erfunden), als der Diohter.
Such utterances arc surprising, not only because they come from Herder, who
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tends to emphasise inductive methods in science (at least in his theoretical
pronouncements), but also because they strike us as modern. Only relatively
recently has the part played by imagination in formulating scientific hypo¬
theses and theories been properly appreciated. But in a passage shortly
after the previous one, in 1800, Herder again stresses the external,
stylistic qualities of great scientific writing, just as he had praised
Haller's style as „dichterischM in 1774. He writes:1"^
Euklids Elements, Newtons Principien, la Place lerke sind ihrer
Art nach im grofiten Geschmack, Kastners matheiaatische Schriften
mit eben dem treffenden Geist, wie seine Vorlesungen und Epi=
gramme geschrieben. Kein Ungeschmack im Vortrage sollte
erlaubt werden.
The scientific virtues of „Genauigkeit, Ordnung, Klarheit" are the same as
198}
those of good taste, he later maintains. ' And again, bringing us back
to his axiom that truth and beauty, science and imagination are inextricably
199)
linked, he declares: 7
Die starkste, reinste Aussprache der Wahrheit, wird ihrer Natur
nach allenthalben Dichtkunst; jedes System ist selbst ein Poem,
so fern es mit sich bestehend, ganz und rein ist.
Thus he believes (in our opinion with justice and originality) that great
scientific achievements are not lacking in something akin to artistic
imagination and creativity, that certain aesthetic criteria, such as a sense
for symmetry and proportion, may aid the scientific theorist (e.g. Copernicus),
and that the finest qualities in great scientific writing, notably its order
and clarity, are the same as the virtues of good taste and style in other
fields.
In Herder's opinion, some of the aesthetic qualities we may discern in
science are derived from the nature of perception itself. In his unusual
essay „t?ber Bild, Dichtung und Fabel" (1787), he notices how subjective
elements supervene when, in the very act of perceiving, we unconsciously
construct ordered „Bilder" out of what we see, and when we unwittingly
project ourselves into the things we see, and thus personify non-human,
natural agencies. He observes that primitive peoples especially are inclined
to personify nature, and adds:20'"^
—- indessen bleibt auch bei uns jede Physik eine Art Poetik
fur unsre Sinne, aus unsern Erfahrungen geordnet; und sobald
unser Geist in andern Organen die Natur sahe, wurde er
nothwendig anders classificiren.
It is indeed true that older science especially is full of personifications;
as we have seen, even a "force", if treated as real in itself, is a personi¬
fication. Goethe too notices this connection between poetry and early
201)
scxence, saying:
—- nirgends wollte man zugeben, da£ Yt'issenschaft und Poesie
vereinbar seien. Man vergafi, daB Wissenschaft sich aus
Poesie entwickelt habe
Herder further notices that science, like primitive mythology, itself tends
to divide nature into two principles or even sexes202^ - he is doubtless
thinking of those "dialectical" theories of magnetism current in his day,
and of concepts such as BWahlverwandtachaften" in chemistry. But although,
as we have said, he realised that such ideas are produced by the subjective
imagination, he does not condemn them as unscientific, and, as we have
repeatedly noticed, himself personifies „Krafte" etc. on many occasions.
In such cases, therefore, he allowed his conviction that imagination can
lend support to science to do violence to the empirical principles he had
learnt from Bacon, the early Kant, and others. He is perfectly correct in
his remarks on personification so far as the older science is concerned, but
he does not seem to realise that science has to free itself from personifica¬
tions wherever possible, that it had already largely succeeded in doing so,
and that the more obvious personifications surviving in his day were already
obsolescent.
We have seen so far that Herder believed that the scientist shares
certain values in common with the artist. We shall now try to show how he
also thought that the object of science, i.e. nature and it3 laws, displays
aesthetic qualities.
Pamp rightly observes that, like Bonnet (and Shaftesbury, we should
add), Herder sees something aesthetic in the order of nature.In fact,
that universal harmony we discussed along with his mystical ideas is the
object of his aesthetic as well as his mystical admiration. The „Kalligenia"
sketch, already mentioned several times, ends with a vision of „Kalligenia,
die Mutter der Schonheit", whom the writer has sought and found in the
workings of the universe:
„Ich bin, die du suchest", sprach sie mutterlich=freundlich,
„Kalligenia, die Mutter der Schonheit: mein Kind ist die
Natur. -—n Mein Traum entflohj aber ihr Bild - allenthalben
suche ich es auf in Gesinnungen, Thaten und Gestalten; sein
kleinster Abglanz entzuckt mich, mich erinnernd an Sie.
Herder here uses the ancient symbol of the mother-goddess with her child to
express not only the mystical unity and harmony of the universe, but also
the ideal of beauty, which, he believes, is fulfilled in nature itself
rather than in art; for we should remember that, in his dream, he leaves
the artists behind, and finds greater enlightenment with the astronomers.
(His disillusion in Goethe and Schiller during his last years is no doubt
partly responsible for this.) He believes that nature itself provides the
primary models of beauty, and it is always to nature that the artist should
turn for inspiration.
But in what exactly does the beauty of the universe consist? Max
Caspar's words on Kepler, whom Herder greatly admired, could just as well
apply to the older Herder himself
"Forma mundi", the 3hape of the world, formed the great theme of
his life's work. In it the idea, form, does not have the pale
meaning of today's usage. It concerns the principle of order
and configuration, that which makes the chaotic material into a
cosmos, and also the epitome of the idea of the lovely, made
real in the world.
To express this universal form or order, Herder, as we saw in the
previous section, uses certain general expressions borrowed from mathematics
or science, and invests them with a mystical significance. We can now
appreciate that such expressions may also have an aesthetic content. Indeed,
what we called "intellectual" mysticism, the mysticism of rational forms,
usually has a strong aesthetic biasj this should be obvious when Herder
uses musical expressions such as ..Harmonie" or „Wohlklang" to describe the
universe, and in Kepler's (originally Pythagorean20^) theory, which Herder
mentions,207^ that the hypothetical ratios of distance between the orbits of
the various planets must correspond to intervals in the harmonic series.
As we earlier remarked, Herder uses scientific expressions, like Lambert's
..Maximum", as formulae for beauty,20^ in this case as a dynamic equivalent
for the traditional (static) Golden Mean, which, however, he also applies to
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nature on many occasions.20^'' The idea of unity and variety, which he often
uses in describing the universe, is another aesthetic criterion. And as
Siegel remarks:
Es werden ferner insbesondere die Linien [i.e. "lines of
beauty"] und die Lagen, die sich unter gewohnlichen Voraus=
setzungen als Ergebnis der einwirkenden Rrafte darstellen, una
am angenehmsten beruhren und als schon bezeichnet werden, so
z.B. die Kettenlinie als Verbindung zweier Punkte oder
wieder die symmetrische Anor&nung entsprechend dem mechanisehen
Gleichgewichte.
However, the objections we raised against Herder's theory that science,
like art, must personify natural agencies, also apply to his theory that the
universe must conform to aesthetic principles. Our standards of scientific
accuracy need not be impaired if we happen to add to our empirical findings
the observation that certain natural regularities are aesthetically pleasing;
but it is a different matter when we apply aesthetic tests to scientific
hypotheses, and say that the more "aesthetic" hypothesis is likelier to be
the correct one. The Platonic and Aristotelian principle that the motions
of the heavenly bodies, which are more "perfect" than the earth, must be
211)
more regular than earthly motions, ' was a hindrance to astronomy for
centuries.212^ Bacon, as we noticed earlier in this work, rightly Impugned
this a priori scheme, condemning it as an example of the "idola" which he
listed as impediments to knowledge. Another ancient preconception, the
idea that the universe in its entirety must be a sphere, the "perfect" shape
and the epitome of self-sufficiency,21^' survives in Herder's theory, already
mentioned in our section on dialectics, that the magnet is like a sphere,
and his predilection for the image of the „Kugel" when extolling the
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perfections of the universe.As Galileo, that peerless champion of
215)
common sense, once exclaimed:
For my own part, never having read the pedigrees and patents of
nobility of shapes, I do not know which of them are more and
which are less noble, nor do I know their rank in perfection.
But not only in the question of forms and shapes was Herder fond of
introducing aesthetic values into science. He writes in 1778:
Ich glaube ubrigens, da£ Homer und Sophocles, Dante,
Shakespear und Klopstock der Psychologic und Menschenkanntnifi
mehr Stoff geliefert haben, als selbst die Aristoteles und
Leibnitze aller Volker und Zeiten.
Shortly afterwards, he includes in his list of data which are useful to the
psychologist not only „Bemerkungen der Aerzte und Freunde" (of the pathologi¬
cal patient), but also „Weissagungen der Dichter".^1^ And in his famous
essay on Ossian, he had considered elaborating a nPsychologie aus den
Gedichten OBians". must remember that he believed that psychology
can and ought to become a science, which means that he has here allowed his
interest in art to modify his more strictly scientific ideal3. There can
be no doubt that, by present-day standards, he overrated the value of works
of art for psychology - they usually tell us mors about the artist himself
than about psychological types in general - and that he underrated the value
of exact and extensive statistical observation, to which he was by nature
disinclined. As Gotz remarks
die Dichter werden von Herder in ihrer Bedeutung fur die
Psychologie uberschatzt.
However, by eighteenth century standards, he had some justification for some
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of those observations, because, as we earlier noticed, the poets and
novelists of the day were often far ahead of the professed psychologists in
psychological insight. Even in 1857, Buckle (who resembles Herder in many
ways) could write :2"^c^
The most accurate investigators of the human mind have hitherto
been the poets, particularly Homer and Shakespeare.
But besides all this we have repeatedly noticed, in our study of his
scientific ideas, that they are often influenced by aesthetic judgements.
This happens when he tries to classify racial and animal types: in this case,
aesthetic standards (Camper's craniological angle, we may recall, was origi¬
nally an aesthetic measurement) conflict with morphological ones. Even the
traditional conception of a universal Chain of Being, with man in the centre
and two symmetrical series of beings above and below him, is full of aesthetic
significance. Herder's2"1"^ (and Burnet's2'^ and Kant's) theory that the
axis of the earth must originally have occupied a position at 90° to the
plane of the ecliptic, and his idea that the earth's magnetic and rotational
poles must once have coincided, are just as much aesthetic as scientific in
origin. And the attempts of both Herder and Schelling to reconcile the
theories of Newton and Euler on light and colour also began, as Haym
H „ „ 220)
observes, „aus Grunden des asthetischen Gefuhls". '
But even the plan and style of Herder's greatest work, the „Ideen", is
influenced by aesthetic as much as by logical and objective standards. As
Gillies says:22^
The thought-progression is — that of poetry not of logic —
The thought is coherent, and is understandable. The unity
is an artistic one.
Kuhnemann (who, however, tends to exaggerate his point), is of a similar
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opinion. He writes: '
Es ist ein asthetisches G-efuhl, in dam Herder alle Teile seiner
Welt empfindet, asthetlsoh wirken sie auf ihn. Oder vielinehr,
in der asthetischen Wirkung auf ihn vollendet sich das Leben,
das er ihnen gab.
We have now seen enough of Herder's theory and practice, so far as the
influence of art and aesthetic values upon science is concerned, to sum up
our conclusions and pass on to other themes. He was unusually alive to the
genuine contribution which creative imagination can make to scientific
thinking as well as to art, and to the influence of aesthetic feeling upon
science. He not only pointed this out in theoiy, but also put his ideas
into practice, sometimes passing general aesthetic judgements upon the
regularities of nature, but at other times allowing his aesthetic sense to
influence his scientific theories to their detriment. His style, in the
„Ideen" and other works dealing with science and nature, is often affected
by artistic emotion more than by dispassionate logic, but stylistic idio¬
syncrasies alone neither add to nor detract from the validity of scientific
conclusions, and we should not refuse to take his scientific ideas seriously
simply on account of his style. But what we earlier saw of the effects of
aesthetic preferences upon his particular scientific theories should help to
223}
corroborate the following proposition of Russell: '
Preconceptions that have an aesthetic origin are just as
misleading as those that are moral or theological
Too many critics have analysed Herder's theological preconceptions, but too
few have given attention to his aesthetic standards and their influence,
which is at times harmful, upon his scientific ideas.
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b) The influence of science_ugon_art.
Man macht bestandig Unterschied zwischen Naturkunde und
Aesthetik; und im Grunde muB Aesthetik eine Naturlehre und
zwar die sirapelste Naturlehre des Schonen seyn. 224)
Thus Herder writes in 1769. In the fourth „Kritisches Waldchen" of the same
year, he says that the objective aesthetics of the future will be based upon
225)
physics, and, as we have seen, he himself went some way towards
fulfilling this aim by applying optics and acoustics to the aesthetics of
sense-experience. Thus, in a measure unusual for his day, he attempted to
apply science directly to aesthetics.
But he believed that science should influence art in a further way.
Like a few others among the poets and critics of his age, he was aware that
the mythological conventions passed down in poetry from classical antiquity
were rapidly becoming threadbare and devoid of their original significance.
The great message he delivered to Goethe in StraBburg was that such empty
and artificial conventions must be abandoned, and that the new art must take
its inspirations directly from nature. The results of his exhortations are
too well-known to need mention here, and they were indeed momentous. None¬
theless, poets and critics continued to feel the lack of a new symbolism to
replace the antique devices, and the Romantics continued to search, as Haym
observes,for a "new mythology".
Klotz had suggested that „Entdeckungen der Naturlehre" might replace
221)
mythology in poetry. " Herder approves of imagery borrowed from science
(usually from natural history) in poetry, and he recommends the works of
Haller, Withof and Dyer as examples. But unlike Klotz, he does not wish to
replace mythology entirely by scientific facts and images. He claims with
reason that such works as Grainger's didactic poem on sugar-cane are often
over-technical and tedious.22^' New data provide new images, but poets
229)
should learn how to use these by studying the older mythological poetry: '
Gleichnisse also machen hier keinen Gegensatz, nicht die
Mythologie unnothig, nicht die Naturlehre zur Mythologie
Aus der Mythologie eben leme man, die Naturkunde dichterisch
zu bilaen, nicht aber aus der Naturkunde die Mythologie zu
verbannen.
In 1772, he renews his suggestion and even adds that discoveries „in der
wissenschaftlichen Physik" might lend colour to the abstractions of some
armchair nature-poets.2^ Again in 1772 and 1773> he calls for a poetry
which will use the facts and discoveries of natural history and science, but
adds that it still remains to be explained why, despite the great advances
in these subjects, the poets of the Orient and of antiquity could make so
231)
much better use of images drawn from nature. ' He tries to explain this
himself in 1782, and notes that more primitive peoples have a more intimate
and personal, view of nature. (This at once reminds us of how he later
attempted to link science and art by saying that both of them personify
natural agencies.) He writes:2"^
Ich zweifle nicht, daB aus Copernikus und Newtons, aus Buffons
und Priestlei Systamen sich eben so hohe Naturdichtungen
machen liessen, als aus den simpelsten Ansichten; aber warum
hat man sie nicht? Nicht wahr, weil jene [unwiBendej
Volker in lebendiger Ansicht dichteten, weil sie alias, Gott
selbst, sich gleichformig dachten, die Welt zu einem Hause
verengten und in ihr alles mit H&fi und Liebe beseelten.
Science and art have both become too abstract and impersonal for such poetry
now, he believes. This is true, as most of us would agree. But while
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personification and anthropomorphism may help to create great poetry, they
cannot but harm science; this Herder apparently failed to realise. He
233)
mentions Aikin's "Essay on the Application of Natural History to Poetry" '
in 1783» but again insists that technical details do not enhance poetry,
since they tend to destroy it3 unity.In 1794, he hails von der Luhe's
235)
poem „Flora" with praise, exclaiming:
du bist werth, -— eine neue Stuffe zu betreten, auf der die
Wissenschaft der Natur sich mit tier Kunst des Gesanges verbindet.
As further examples, he names the ancient Georgics, the works of Spenser,
Cowley, Haller, Brockes, Kleist ana Thomson, and the "Botanical Garden" of
Erasmus Darwin.' He renews his appeal for "scientific" poetry with more
vehemence in his „Kalligone" of 1800, and, mentioning the discoveries of
237)
Herschel and Galvani, asks: 7
Werua der Pythagoraischen, der Orphischen Schule, wenn einem
Empedokle3, Parmenides und Lukrez die Wunder der Natur, die
wir kannen, bekannt gewesen waren, wurden sie mit ihnen
gespielt haben?
According to the editor of his works, he himself planned to compose a great
poem, "Do rerum nature",there seems to be a hint of this scheme in
a passage from the „Adrastea" of 1801
Erscheint einst ein solches [philosophical and scientific]
System, sind die Wahrnohmungen der Astronomia und gesammten
Naturlehre, der Chemie und gesammten Naturgeschichte, so wie
die Gesohichte des Menschen von innen und aussen so gebunden
und geordnet, dafi in Allen die hochste Reinheit und Einheit,
ein Unendliches an Folgen in jedera Punct erscheinet; kein
Zweifel, ein solches System ist selbst die reinste und hochste
Poesie an TSurde und Klarheit.
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Here, he seems to be looking for aesthetic qualities in science itself once
again, perhaps beginning to doubt whether a new "scientific" poetry will
ever appear. But he appeals once more in '1803:
Im Drange des Systems selbst sind manche ihrer [i.e. Newton's,
Dollond's, Herschel's, Limieus', Haller's, Werner's, etc.]
Darstellungen so neu=poetisch, dafl sie gleichsam rufen, zur
Handlung mit Empfindung beseelt zu werden.
The word3 „zur Handlung mit Erapfindung baseelt" show that he still believes
it is legitimate to personify the natural agencies analysed by science.
It is curious that, in both the preceding quotations, and in several
similar ones, the word „System" appears. It is only when a quantity of
scientific data is ?/elded into a coherent system that it becomes capable of
being rendered poetically. Goethe too realises this when he writes
Da im Wis sen sowohl als in der Reflexion kein Gauzes zusaiainen=
gebracht werden kann, weil jenem das Innre, dieser das Xufiere
fehlt; so mussen wir die Wissenschaft nothwendig als Kunst
denken, wenn wir von ihr irgend eine Art von Ganzheit erwarten.
Herder is likewise aware that science lacks „das Innre", the dimension of
subjectivity, to a great extent. Thus, to become poetry, it must be „mit
Empfindung beseelt", as he puts it.
Let us now pause for a word on sources and precedents. As Haym
remarks,Hamann had suggested that the discoveries of science might
replace traditional mythology in poetry. Herder himself says that Fontenella
had advocated similar ideas,2^'; and we know that his own great admiration
for Lucretius' poetry must have encouraged him in his wish. But he had
read not only Lucretius' poem and the other works he names in the above
quotations as examples of poetry based upon natural history and science.
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Giordano Bruno, with whose ideas he appears, as we have seen, to have heen
conversant, wrote several scientific works in verse, in imitation of
Lucretius,2^' and, according to the editor of the collection „Aus Herders
Nachlafi", the work of Boscovich to which Herder refers in his letter to
Lavater in 17722^' is a didactic, "scientific" poem entitled "De solis ac
lunae defectibus". Besides, we already know that it was Herder who
persuaded Knebel to translate the work of Lucretius, and he tried to induce
ol£)
another acquaintance to translate Erasmus Darwin's "Botanical Garden".
He even suggested to Knebel that he ought to write a poem of his own on
nature, following Lucretius' precedent.2^1'
But, as Herder early realised, the difficulties in writing a modern poem
equal to that of Lucretius were great. In a much discussed lecture, C.P.
Snow recently said of such undertakings:2^^
there was a time when "refraction" kept cropping up in verse
in a mystifying fashion, and when "polarised light" was used as
though writers were under the illusion that it was a specially
admirable kind of light.
Of course, this isn't the way that science could be any good
to art. It has got to be assimilated along with, and as part
and parcel of, the whole of our mental experience, and used as
naturally as the rest.
Herder said something very similar in his comments upon Klotz's suggestions
in 1768, as well as in later works, as we have seen. Unintegrated techni¬
calities are the destruction, not the making of great art. (Some of the
grotesque products of "scientistic" sculpture and painting in recent times
are good examples of this.) But even while, in his last years, Herder was
calling for a new poetry of science, Goethe was recording the results of his
own scientific investigations in poetic form. Even he, in poems such as that
on the metamorphosis of plants, tended to become abstruse in describing the
technicalities of his scientific theories in the language of verse, and it
is in his poems on the wider aspects of nature, and their significance for
man, that he is most successful. As Herder realised, poetry must not lose
contact with man and his emotions. And it has become increasingly difficult
to write "scientific" poetry not only because didactic poetry in general has
passed out of vogue, but also because, as science becomes more abstract and
specialised, it becomes harder and harder to relate it to human situations
and emotions without distorting it. Nature in the widest sense, especially
as it affects our feelings, will always inspire greater art than will the
undigested details of pure science.
c) The nature of'_art and the_nature_of science.
We have seen that Herder, probably following Kant, classified the mathe¬
matical sciences according to „Raum", „Zeit" and „Kraft". In 1768, he
carried this scheme over into the arts, and classified them in the same
249)
way: J
so wie in der Metaphysik Raum, Zeit und Kraft drei Grund=
begriffe sind, wie die Mathematischen WlBenschaften sich alle
auf einen dieser Begriffe zuruckfuhren lassen; so wollen wir
auch in der Theorie der schonen Wissenschaften und Kunste
sagen [etc.]
Accordingly, the visual arts work within „Raum", the medium of music is
„Zeit", and that of poetry is „Kraft". We need hardly repeat that „Kraft"
is conspicuous in Herder's theories of art, particularly in the 1770's, just
as it is prominent in most of his scientific theories. It is enough to say
that, as well as trying to apply science to art and art to science, in many
different ways, he used the 3ame theoretical concepts in classifying them
both, thus showing how closely they were connected in his mind.
But art and science are alike not only in their media. Certain formal
principles, like the "mathematical" formulae for beauty, are applicable for
both. Moreover, art should reflect nature, in Herder's opinion (as any
reader of his essays on Shakespeare and Ossian will realise). And art, as
he sees it, is usually related to the living, as opposed to the inanimate and
"mechanical" world; it is thus understandable that he uses many biological
metaphors or analogies in criticising works of art. On one occasion, he
250)
speaks of „dieser organische Geist" in the greatest art of antiquity, '
25l)
and, as Clark points out, he "shared Goethe's conception of 'inner form'."
Form, for Herder, is not a static, ready-made pattern, but a regularity which
emerges from the workings of dynamic forces. In this sense, the form we
encounter in nature, particularly in the biological world, is parallel to
that which governs all great poetry. Poetic form must never be that of
empty convention, but must "grow" out of living experience. In both art
and nature, a subtle and eternal order is manifest, even behind apparent
chaos. This same spirit inspires all the great poetry of Goethe.
Art and nature are therefore parallel for Herder. Similarly, science,
whose object is nature, and all learning devoted to the arts, are complemen¬
tary. The „schone Wissenschaften", which, in education, develop the senses
and aesthetic discernment, must prepare the way for the „hohere Wissen=
schaften", the abstract disciplines of knowledge.2^ For, as Herder often
SayS:2«>
Alle Krafte unsrer Seele sind nur Eine Kraft.
The truly educated mind has learnt to develop and employ them all. In this
sense, Goethe too speaks of „hochst erfreulichen Thatigkeiten, wo Kunst und
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Wissenschaft, Erkennen und Bidden sich auf sehr hohern Puncte geme insam
wirkend, zutraulich die Hande bieten."^"^ Like Goethe, Herder was con¬
vinced that science and art are complementary activities of the human mind,
and that neither should lose sight of the other. His views on this are of
special interest to us at the present day, since the whole problem is now
particularly acute. We have seen that some of the ways in which he
associates science and art, nature and the aesthetic, are still worthy of
consideration, and that, in these respects, his efforts were by no means
unproductive. Other means he adopts or suggests, however, do violence to
science, to art, or to both. But his aim is admirable, and we may leave
him to pose the final question, which, as he himself suggests, may not be
255)
unanswerable: '
Wie aber? Fiigen sich auch WiBenschaft und Diehtkunst? ist
zwischen Wahrheit und Dichtung, wie zwischen WaBer und Feuer
nicht ein ewiger Streit? Nach der neuern Chemie giebt es keine
durchaus streitende Elernente; alle nehmen an einander Theil,
sie verjagen und ersetzen einander.
Conclusion: man's relation to nature, and the aims and limits of science.
Cairo line Herder writes:^"^
Herder sagte oft: „wenn ich mein eigener Herr ware, ich wurde
mich wo einschlieBen und eine Zeitlang ausschlieBlich rait
Naturwissenschaften beschaftigen."
He was interested in science for its own sake, quite apart from any material
benefits which, in the shape of applied technology, it might confer upon man,
and from the possibility of exploiting it himself for physico-theological
purposes. In his notebooks and works, we find detailed references to such
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specialised and often technical writings as Klugel's mathematical disquisition
„Uber die Figur der Erde",2"'^ Herschel's articles on the polar regions of
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Mars and the structure of the universe, ' IngenhouB's study of respiration
and photosynthesis in plants,^-*9/ Crawford's observations on the conservation
of animal heat,2(^ and many others. He can have read them only to extend
his knowledge and to satisfy his curiosity about the natural world.
However, he believed that the study of science also has a moral worth.
Caroline confirms this in her memoirs:
Er lebte in diesen Ideen; an Auffindung, Verbindung und Harmonie
der Gesetze der Natur unter einander und mit dem Ganzen, auch in
moralischer Hinsicht, hing seine ganze Seele.
He also quotes with approval the following words of the poet Realis de
Vienna:262^
Lust zu Natursachen ist ein Merkmal der GroBmuthigkeit.
Naturkunste machen aufrichtig; Schulkunste stolz und
grausam.
Like Bacon, he connected a priori philosophy with Scholastic pedantry and
bigotry, which the study of natural science is admirably equipped to dispel.
In his „Gott", he also writes;2^)
Je mehrere Dinge er [i.e. man] kennet; desto besser verstehet
er seine eignen Krafte und der Natur Ordnung; je besser er
seine Krafte versteht, desto leichter kann er sich selbst
ordnen und sich Regeln vorschreiben; je besser er die Ordnung
der Natur versteht, desto leichter kann er sich vom Unnutzen
zuruckhalten.
The study of nature also tells us about ourselves, for we are linked in every
way to the rest of nature, which conditions and sets bounds to our activities.
We have already seen that Herder had great hopes for the advancement of
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learning, and that he optimistically believed that technology, despite its
many abuses, must produce good effects upon society in the long run. But
while his friend Einsiedel looked on science purely from the utilitarian
point of view, hoping that technological progress will free the mass of
humanity from labour, 2^^ Herder shared with Bacon other more idealistic
hopes. He was able to entertain these because he was certain that, behind
even the most chaotic appearances, order somewhere reigns. His own poems,
as well as his „Nachdichtungen" and the poems he selected for translation, '
are full of references to order and harmony in nature. We noticed this,
one of his favourite themes, in the last two sections, but we may here cite
some lines from his dramatic sketch, „Der entfesselte Prometheus", written
in 1802, as a further illustration:2^
Im weiten Welten=Raum
Gehoret Alles Allem. Droben, drunten
Herrschet ein gleich Gesetz: was irgend lebt
Und wirkt, wirkt fur einander.
Only within the context of the whole universe can we understand the apparent
irregularities and arbitrary events which puzzle and oppress us. Chaos
exists, but only in a qualified sense; it seems to rule all-powerful in
isolated areas of nature whenever we fail to relate these to the law-governed
whole:267^
Das Chaos der Natur sah niemand Chaos und Natur heben
einander auf. Die Dichter schildem ihn also nur als einen
Uebergang zur Qrdnung. [One is reminded of the scheme to
reclaim the sea in „Faustn, Part II],
If we realise that all nature is basically orderly, we learn to look for
order in all things. This, above all, is the task of science for Herder,
as the following words, written in 1781, and also quoted by Haym,2^*'
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reveal:269^
Wenn dsr menschliche Geist in Etwas den Funken seiner Gott=
ahnlichkeit spurt, so ists in Gedanken, womit er Himmel und
Erde umfasset, die Sterne wagt, den Sonnenstral spaltet, sich
in die Geheimnisse der Tiefe wagt, die Korpar theilt, die
Gesetze der Natur errath und die Unendlichkeit berechnet.
These are religious values („Gottahnlichkeit"), but they are firmly planted
in this world. In 1768, in a sermon on the nature of prayer, he exclaims
with a burst of poetic sentiment:2'''0)
0 Herr, ich will Dich in der Natur sehen, forschen und
aufsuchen, und Dich im Fruhling und Dich im Sturm des Herbstes
und im Segen des Sommers und im Schnee des Winters Dich, Herrn
der Werke Deiner Hande, sehen.
But in the later passage previously quoted, the search for God in nature is
no longer primary} man studies nature to realise his own „&ottahnlichkeit".
Again in the „Ideen", he says:2^>
Die verborgensten Krafte, die er [i.e. der Mensch] von innen
gar nicht kennet, hat er in ihrem auBern Gange belauscht und
der Bewegung, der Zahl, dem Maas, dem Leben, sogar dem Daseyn
nachgespurt, wo er dieselbe im Himmel Oder auf Erden nur wirken
sah. Alle seine Versuche hieruber, selbst wo er irrte oder nur
traumen konnte, sind Baweise seiner Majestat, einer Gottahnlichen
Kraft und Hohelt.
These words are filled with a self-confidence like that of the most optimistic
thinkers of the Renaissance, who presaged for mankind the most glorious of
destinies.
But where order and form are not apparent or fully developed, we further
272)
or create them: '
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das Formlose schatzen wir nur in Absichten, daB es durch
uns Form erhalte oder zur Verschonerung unsrer Form diene.
273)
Much remains to be done in this direction:
Was ist durch Menschen bildbar? - Alles. Die Natur, die
menschliche Gesellschaft, die Menschheit. ler wagts die
Grenzen zu bestimmen, wie weit die Natur und zwar Alles in ihr
cultivirt werden konne und werde?
For although order is always present in theory behind nature as a whole, the
separate parts we experience confront us with a gigantic task.
Rouche, on the other hand, declares: ^74)
la terre est pour Herder la maison prlpar^e par Dieu pour
l'espece humaine, non un milieu neutre ou hostile qu'il
s'agirait de soumettre et d'amenager au mieux. Conception
chr^tienne de la nature-Creation, qui prouve combien, malgre
Spinoza, Herder reste fiddle au Dieu de la Bible et de Luther
Schwind al so wri te s:^'
Zwar ist der Herderschen Kosmogonie der Gedanke an eine Aus=
einandersetzung des Geistes mit der Natur fremd, und im
besonderen hat in ihr die Vorstellung von einer moglichen
Unterjochung der Natur durch den Geist keinen Platz.
We did indeed notice that Herder's mystical leanings led him to describe
nature, with its permanent laws, as ultimately complete. But it is also
true that his mystical attitudes are by no means passive, and he does not
deny that man, as well as everything else, develops. Man himself is
276)
certainly the highest product of the rational powers at work in nature:
mufite nicht auch der Vernunftgeist der Schopfung sich ein
Organ bereiten, worin Er wirke?
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This passage, written in 1800, shows how unorthodox Herder became in his
later years. It implies that the creative power becomes a conscious and
is
free agent only in man, and^obviously akin to the ideas of the Romantic
philosophers in the early nineteenth century. Ideas of this kind, with
Hegel and others, culminated in the theory that the deity progressively
evolves as man becomes more "conscious". It is possible that Schelling,
whom Herder read in the 1790's, influenced him here. In 1803, he further
writes:277^
Es schlagt ein groBes Herz in der Natur.
In these later years, he does seem to have believed that nature becomes
conscious only in man, for he had likewise written in 1795:27^
Die ganze Natur erkennet sich in ihm [i.e. dem MenschenJ, wie
in einem lebendigen Spiegel; sie siehet durch sein Auge,
denkt hinter seiner Stirn, fuhlet in seiner Brust, und wirkt
und schaffet mit seinen Handan.
Knebel had also written in the late 1780's:27^/
Des Menschen wahres Selbstgefuhl ist kein andres, als das die
Natur, als Grund und ewige Drsache aller Dinge, aller Ordnung
und Vollkommenheit, durch ihn, als durch sich selbst, von sich
hat.
It is almost certain that this influenced Herder's views, for he incorporated
the passage in a draft for his own „Humanitats=Briefe", in which the essay of
Knebel's here quoted appeared in extract. He rendered the passage, however,
as follows:2*^
Der Mensch wird die Seele, das Herz, die Hand der Natur,
sofern diese auf ihn trift und sich ihm zeiget.
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As will be noticed, the qualification („sofern diese " etc.) he here
places on Knebel's idea is no longer present in the later utterances cited
above.
However, man is not only the conscious mouthpiece of nature. He is
also its ruler and second creator. This is where we disagree with Rouchd
and Schwind, who do not qualify their judgements by restricting them to
Herder's earlier years (and even then, they do not fully apply). In 1801,
he calls man the ..Haushalter"2^"1'' of nature. Shortly afterwards, he
exclaims: 282 ^
Mensch! du bist der Ausleger der Natur, ihr Haushalter und
Priester.
And in another passage, he calls man „der Schopfung Bildner und Vollender",28^
while as early as in 1787, in one of his „Hachdichtungen", he refers to man
as a ,.Priester der Natur".28ih/ (Holderlin expressed similar ideas in his
..Hyperion", and their influence can be traced as far as Rilke.) We can now
see that man is not only the highest product or expression of nature, in a
passive sense, for Herder. The following poem illustrates the almost
Promethean sentiments of his later years even more clearly: 28"^
Bazu verlieh die groBe Mutter ihm [i.e. dem Menschen]
Ihr Wohnhaus; zu ersetzen was gebrieht
Zu ordnen es und zu beseligen.
Sein Werk ist neue Schopfung; seine Kunst,
Sein Ziel die Bildung edlerer Natur.
And the following untitled verses, both in the ideas which they express, and
in their poetic merit, which is not inconsiderable, are worth quoting almost
in full:286'
Von Allem, was der Y/eltgeist regt und pflegt,
Hat Er Bedeutung Dir ins Herz gepragt.
Dein innres Wort, Dein Ahnen dieser Spur,
Nennt Dich, o Mensch, Ausleger der Natur.
Ausleger nur? Kein! Deiner Regung Kraft
Enthullt in Dir die hoh're Eigenschaft
Das Triebwerk der Natur kannst Du allein,
Ihr Meisterwerk, der Schopfung Schopfer seyn.
Voll Mitgefuhl in Freuden wie in Schmerz
Schlagt in Dir Ihr, der Schopfung, groBes Herz.
Erkenne Dich! Auf Deiner weiten Flur
Ward Deine Brust der Pulsschlag der Natur. u
Erfullen soilst Du, was sie Dir zu thun verhieB,
Einholen, was sie Dir zu thun verlieB
In Geist und Liebe nur vollendet sie
Sich selbst, der Wesen Einklang, Harmonie.
But nature itself is not passive either. Herder writes in 1793:
Also stehen ihm [i.e. dem Menschen] oft die Elemente der Natur
entgegen, daher er mit ihnen kampfet Alle dies ist ihm in
den Weg gelegt, damit ers uberwinde.
Goethe wrote over thirty years later:
Die Elements daher sind als colossale Gegner zu betrachten, mit
denen wir ewig zu kampfen haben hier hat uns die Natur aufs
herrlichste vorgearbeitet und zwar indem sie ein gestaltetes
Leben dem Gestaltlosen entgegen setzt.
But Herder strikes a somewhat less Faustian note in a poem of 1801:
DaB ihr den Elementen trotzet, ist
Nicht Euer grofites Werk; zu andern sie,
Sie zu gebrauchen, ist das GroBere.
This, of course, brings us back to Bacon, who influenced Herder much more
than he did Goethe. "His theme was man's progress in achieving his
290)
promised dominion over nature", as one of his biographers writes, and
man achieves this dominion by using nature, not by defying it.
Herder believed that one of man's tasks in winning control of nature is
to develop to the full the capabilities of the animals. He writes in the
nldeen":291)
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In einem gewissen Kreise haben sich also Mensohen und Thiere
zusammengebildet: der praktische Verstand jener hat sich durch
diese, die Fahigkeit dieser hat sich durch jene gestarkt und
ei*weitert.
292)
And in 1802, he says in his dramatic sketch on Prometheus: '
Veredeln sollen
Die Menschen deine Thiere, sollen sie
Zum FleiB erziehen, ja, ist es moglich, ihnen
Vernunft gewahren
Goethe introduces a similar passage in one of his essays on the „Urstier",
in 1822:
Der Umgang, die Pflege des Menschen hat des Urstiers
Organisation unstreitig gesteigert.
Herder, however, probably found this idea in the work of the zoologist
Zimmermann, who believed that an animal species can reach more advanced
levels through the care and good offices of man.292f'
From all this, we can see that Herder, especially in his later years,
had great faith in man's ability to control nature, and to improve himself
and his whole environment by means of increased knowledge, especially of
science. The further he moved away from the religious ideas of his
Buckeburg years, the more the influence of Bacon, which is evident in his
thought from the earliest date, reasserted itself, and the more he valued
science for its own sake, and for the betterment of mankind. His faith in
scientific progress was eventually prodigious. He writes in his „Gott" in
1787:293)
Die bemerkende Naturlehre, die noch so jung ist, wird in diesem
alien [i.e. in the discovery of natural laws] einmal weit
reichen, so da£ sie zuletzt jede blinde Willlcuhr aus der Welt
verbannen wird
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Law and order will be discovered in everything.
Yet for all his Baconian optimism and idealism, Herder did believe that
science, like all knowledge, has its limitations. Echoing Leasing, he
declares in 1787:^^
Die Erforschung der Wahrheit hat den groBeren Reitz [sic]; das
Haben derselben macht vielleicht satt und trage.
Furthermore, even although he contradicted his theoretical statements in his
own practice, he often said that we can never discover the inner nature of
the universal „Krafte". Goethe felt similarly towards his „Urphanomen",
and, in 1832, he wrote to the chemist Wackenroder that he thought it the
wisest course ndas Unerforschliche so in die Enge zu treiben, bis er [i.e.
der Mensch] sich dabei begnugen und sich willig uberwunden geben mag."2*^1'
And although Herder, unlike Goethe, was usually not averse to speculating
about first and last things, he does say in a sermon in 1780:2^
k
Unser Beruf ist es nicht, in das Buch Gottes zu spahen, da#
wir mit Sorgen auf unsrer Stirn die feme Zukunft unsres
Schicksals zur Gegenwart machen wollen
And even though, in his later years, he takes back much of what he had
earlier said, he writes of scientific investigations in the same sermon, at
299)
the beginning of the most productive period of his maturity;
Die Weisheit der alten Zeit war nicht so grubelnd und unendlich,
sondern enge und desto tiefer in sich selbst zuruckkehrend. Sie
wollte nicht hinter den Vorhang Gottes lauschen und aufdecken,
was er uns aus zartem schonenden Herzen mit heiliger Nacht
bedeckt hat.
For at this time, his pride in man's greatness was qualified by a greater
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humility in respect of the limitations of human knowledge.
We have seen that Herder earnestly tried to relate science to the rest
of knowledge, and that some of his suggestions are still relevant today.
He believed in the importance and value of science, especially in education,
more than most thinkers of his age, which still paid more homage to classi¬
cal traditions than to the study of nature. He saw science as a great
historical force, with which man must come to terms, and empirical ways of
thinking, encouraged by his studies of nature and science, produced far-
reaching effects upon his beliefs, particularly upon his religious convic¬
tions, which he tried, with varying success, to reconcile with the
naturalistic and scientific sides of his philosophy. Above all, he was
filled with an (at times.mystical and aesthetic) admiration for the universe
as a whole, and for its fundamental order, which he believed that science
must progressively reveal. He became more interested in the formal
properties of nature as he grew older, paying less attention to „Krafte",
which, however, he always regarded as the agents of natural change. In his
last years, he fervently extolled the greatness of man, whose mission, he
believed, is to acquire progressive dominion over nature, by learning to
understand and apply its laws. In his ideas on the unity of all knowledge
and his optimistic views on man and nature, he is greatly influenced by
Bacon's philosophy of science, which he studied, quoted and admired from
his university years onwards. For us of today, who find it difficult to
share to the full the optimism of Bacon and Herder, the lasting value of
Herder's ideas on the place of science is that he insisted that it can and
must be related to the rest of knowledge, and demonstrated this by his own
practical example.
CHAPTER II
Herder's Place in the Scientific Tradition.
In this chapter, we shall attempt briefly to assess Herder's influence
on science and on scientific thought, and to define his place in the
scientific tradition.
1. Herder's influence on science.
At the beginning of this study, we pointed out that the historian of
science should look first of all to the history of scientific methods, rather
than to individual theories, in evaluating the writings of earlier scientific
thinkers. Only then can he justly compare particular earlier theories with
the results of later investigations, and understand such theories in relation
to science as a whole. This procedure is especially necessary in the case
of Herder. Too many critics have seized upon particular theories which
appear in his works, and compared them unreservedly with their modern
equivalents, whereas we have seen that a great many of them rested upon
assumptions, such as the qualitative MKraft" conception, which are incom¬
patible with modern science. Accordingly, we concluded that we should
compare Herder's and later scientific thought primarily in terms of general
methods and ways of describing natural events. In the latter case, it was
possible for us to make direct comparisons between some of Herder's ideas
and those of today, whereas his particular theories often resemble their
modern counterparts only superficially, lacking exact empirical support.
Bearing the above reservations in mind, we shall now discuss the
influence of Herder's particular theories upon later science. Since we have
already mentioned many aspects of it in the appropriate earlier chapters, we
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need not devote much space to it here.
a) H9r^r23_friends_and_critic3_in_the_scientific_worldi_and_the
First of all, we should realise that Herder had many personal contacts
with scientific circles. We have often noticed how, in his professional
life as a teacher and in his social affairs, he met various men of science.
l)
He was personally acquainted with the great anatomist Elumenbach, ' with
2)
ChladLni, the founder of modern musical acoustics, ' the naturalist and
traveller freorg Forster^ (who offered to collect, on his proposed world-
tour, any observations which Herder might find useful), the astronomer von
Hahn,^ the mathematician Lichtenberg,"^ the biologist Sommering,^ the
7)celebrated geologist Werner, ' and many others. Apart from his wide reading
in the literature of science, he derived some of his scientific knowledge
from such personal contacts. Haym notices that most of his theories were
built on the observations of others, and adds
den FuBen andrer Leute seinen Kopf aufzusetzen - das war
sein Ehrgeiz und darin bestand seine Cenialitat. Fast uberall
nur ein Nachtreter, wurde er auf diese Weise ein Vortreter.
So trat er dicht hinter Winckelmann her, um eine neue Theorie
der Plastik, hinter Haller, um eine neue SrkenntniBthaorie zu
entwerfen. So wurde er der Schuler der Camper und Sommering,
um sich als ihren Lehrer anerkannt zu horen
His „Ideen", apart from their philosophical implications (which, as we know,
Kant severely criticised), were in fact applauded by several scientists whose
9)
subjects were discussed in the work. For although, as Haym notices, '
Blumenbach emphasised the scientific shortcomings of the work more than most
critics, and Lichtenberg actually condemned it as scientifically inadequate,10^
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Camper wrote a well-known letter of praise to Herder,11'' his pupil Herbell
12)
dedicated to Herder the second volume of Camper's „Kleinere Schriften", '
and Sommering wrote Herder a letter (still unpublished) praising his work.1^
Sommering actually cited Herder with approval in his „$ber die korperliche
Verschiedenheit des Negers vom Europaer" in 1785,lif^ and Forster wrote to
15)
Herder enthusiastically about the nIdeen", ' although he qualified his praise
as follows in a letter to Sommering
—— mir hat das Buch sehr gefalien, bis auf die gar zu sicht=
liche Anhanglichkeit an sein [i.e. Leibnizian and metaphysical]
System von Philosophie, und die Unbekanntschaft mit Naturgeschichte,
wo ihn bisweilen die Autoritat eines unzuverlassigen Schrift=
ateliers irre gefuhrt hat.
For as we have seen, Herder himself lacked a thorough training in scientific
observation and experiment, and he sometimes indiscriminately adopted
theories which were already obsolete and discredited. But the great neuro-
physiologist Gall, whose name has been somewhat unwarrantably associated with
that school of pseudo-scientific phrenologists in the early nineteenth
century who appropriated many of his ideas, looked on Herder's work with
17)
approval, and Caroline remarks: '
Gall hat an mehrern Orten, wo er Vorlesungen hielt, Herders
mit Hochachtung gedacht und gesagt, dais ihn seins „Iaeen zur
Philosophie der Geschichte" auf seine Forschungen und Ent=
deckungen gefuhrt hatten.
Prom these facts, we conclude that Herder's „Ideen" did not meet with
complete disapproval in the scientific circles of his day, and that several
eminent scientists received the work with praise. The influence of his
„Ideen" in particular upon those around him was considerable (we have seen
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how much the work influenced Goethe), and Knebel writes to him as follows
wenn ich etwas frutes hervorbringe, so kann ich es groBten=
theils als Zweige und Absenker ansehn von deia, was Sie uns
gegeben haben.
And finally, it is not commonly realised that Herder was also accorded
official recognition for his contributions to scientific thought. Caroline
19)
records the following:
Von andern offentlichen Ehrenbezaugungen melds ich nur noch,
da£ er am 23- August 1787 als Mitglied in die konigl. Akademie
der Wissenschaften zu Berlin - 14. Juli 1793 in die
physikalische Gesellschaft zu Jena aufgenommen worden.
b) Kerder^s^nfluenoe^on^the variousjsciences.
So far as can be ascertained, Herder's influence upon the physical
sciences was negligible. This, of course, is what we should expect, because
his imprecise generalisations and his qualitative „Krafte" rendered most of
his physical theories worthless for exact scientific purposes. Only in the
fourth „Kritisches Waldchen", unpublished in his lifetime, are there some
more positive ideas, and there are some grounds for agreeing with Zoekler20^
that (in physiological optics and acoustics) he can be regarded, in relation
to the state of knowledge in his age, as a „Vorlaufer Helmholtzs", although
Helmholtz reached his own conclusions independently. In geology, some of
his ideas recur in later works, but few of them were original to Herder, and
he did not support them with adequate empirical data.
21)
In biology, however, his influence was more considerable. As Witte '
22)
and Sauter ' observe, his „Ideen" influenced the biologist Kielmeyer, and
through him, his illustrious pupil, the comparative anatomist Cuvier.
369.
23)
Temkin even contends: '
Herder's „Ideen" were the starting point for the whole biological
movement around 1800 including not only Kielmeyer but also Goethe,
Cuvier and Pfaff.
As we have seen, Herder was probably the first to use the word „Protoplasms"
in biology, but it is uncertain whether or not those who later gave it
currency had found it in his works. And his interesting observations on
animal instinct, set forth in his treatise „t)ber den Ursprung der Sprache",
were taken up and partially refuted by the younger Reimarus, as we earlier
noticed, in a later edition of his father's work on the same subject.
Besides, F.H, Jacobi's first independent work was entitled „Betrachtung ilber
die von Harm Herder in seiner Abhandlung vom Ursprung der Sprache vorgelegte
*• Pit.)
genetische Erklarung der thierischen Kunstfertigkeiten und Kunsttriebe". '
Temkin also notices that Herder is cited by the biologists J.C. Rail,
J.F. Meckel (1815), Gall and Spurzheim (1810-19), and von Baer (1864).2^
Siegel notices that Lotse, in his „Mikrokosmos", renews Herder's anthro¬
pological theory that man's upright stature is responsible for many of Iris
characteristically human attributes.2^
But in general geography, Herder's influence was much greater than in
anthropology. Hansen points out that the "botanical geography" for which he
27)
appealed in his „Ideen" was eventually established by Alexander von Humboldt. '
It is well known that Herder significantly influenced the geographer Carl
Ritter (1822), especially with his theory of environmental determinism.2^
29)
G. Schwarz, in an article on Herder and Ritter, writes: '
Wenn Herder die geistigen Voraussetzungen fur das Entfalten und
spatere Aufbluhen der geographischen Wissenschaft schuf, so
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wurde Carl Ritter der eigentliche Begrunder der wissenschaft=
lichen Geographie.
Haym also notices that Herder's ideas influenced the geographers F. Ratzel
and Paul Lehmann;^' in fact, Ratzel actually wrote an article on Herder,
and quotes him several times in his famous „Anthropo=GeographieH (1882).
He approves of Herder's definition of history as an „in Bewegung gesetzte
Geographieand defends his (and Ritter's) "immanent'' teleology,
33)
saying:"
Der Forscher sucht die Ursachen der Wirkungen zu erkennen, welche
den Gegenstand seiner Forschungen bilden, und es kann ihn nicht
in diesera Forschen beirren, ob das letzte Biel dieser Wirkungen
ein von hoherer Jiacht gesetztes und ob das Spiel dieser Drsachen
und Wirkungen ein von hoherer Intelligenz geleitetes sei. Das
Wesentliche, auf das allein wir alle ausgehen, ist zu erkennen,
ob die Schicksale der Volker in einem gewissen MaBe von ihren
Natur=Uagebungen bestimmt sind.
In his article on Herder, Ratzel also says that Herder's influence is
apparent in 0. Peschel's „Volkerkunde"
We have already seen that Herder's psychological theories had little
direct influence upon the progress of psychology, perhaps partly because 3ome
of his best psychological observations appear in the fourth „Kritisches
laldchen", which remained unpublished during his lifetime. But Gotz^
contends that Wundt's ideas reflect some of Herder's, and Schutze claims
that Lotze's „Mikrokosmos" "developed further Herder's ideas ",^6)
Furthermore, F.A. Carus, in his „Geschichte der Psychologie" of 1808, shows
a considerable knowledge of Herder's works, and praises certain ideas from
his „Vom Erkennen und Empfinden'', especially the notion that mental functions
are distinguishable only, in behaviour or nThat", and the idea that harmful
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37)
psychological effects are produced by the division of labour. '
Vie conclude that Herder's scientific theories did influence the various
sciences in some respects, but that this influence must not be overrated, or
presumed where there is no evidence to prove it. Herder was rather a
general theorist of science than an exact scientific investigator, and his
particular theories could have produced greater effects only if they had been
more detailed and supported by quantitative experiment and observation.
c) Herder_[s_inf luence_on_Goe the^s_scientific_writings.
In the course of this work, we have studied in considerable detail the
influence of Herder's particular theories upon Goethe's scientific writings,
so that we need add little here to what has already been said. So far as
particular theories are concerned, we have found that Herder influenced
Goethe on innumerable occasions.
Haym maintains that Herder, in the „Ideen", is more influenced by Goethe
38)
than vice versa, ' but Suphan rightly points out that this is untrue, and
that there is every indication (including the halting, spontaneously written
manuscripts for Part I of the „Ideen") that Herder reached most of his con-
39)elusions independently.' Gillies has done much to show that Herder
influenced Goethe in countless ways throughout his life and Clark too
believes that Herder influenced Goethe more than Goethe influenced him.^^
RouchE says that there was doubtless some reciprocal influence, but that
many resemblances between the scientific ideas of the two are resemblances
• 2 \
through convergence of thought, since both had drawn upon similar sources. '
He rightly observes
Le rdle de Goethe dans 1'Elaboration des "IdEes" a EtE parfois
fort exagere.
I
From our own earlier studies, we can agree with this, and conclude that
Goethe was much more influenced by Herder in his particular theories than
vice versa, while Goethe's influence upon Herder is usually evident in his
more general attitudes, making itself felt, for example, when Herder becomes
more preoccupied with form than with „Kraft", when his interest in nature,
with all its religious implications, increases so greatly in his Weimar
years, and when he abandons his teleological and catastrophist theories on
the history of the earth. These were tendencies which Goethe undoubtedly
encouraged.
But certain of Herder's general attitudes, as well as his particular
scientific theories, also influenced Goethe. Jacoby traces Goethe's
interest in science back to his association with Herder in StraGburg,^^ and
Rasch observes that the ideas of „das Genetische", „das Organische", of
development and of dynamic form, all of which are fundamental to Goethe's
scientific thought, were all present in Herder's writings by the time of his
stay in StraBburg.^^ Haym also points out that Herder's idea of develop¬
ment influenced Goethe as a scientist,and Bruntsch sees traces of
Herder's idea of environmental determinism in some of Goethe's scientific
writings.If we consider both these wider influences of Herder upon
Goethe the scientist as well as the particular ones which we have earlier
discussed, it is not too much to say that, without understanding Herder's
scientific thought, we cannot fully appreciate that of Goethe, who was more
influenced by Herder's ideas than was any other student of science.
2. Herder's influence on the philosophy of science.
In 1828, Goethe calls Herder's „Ideen" „ein vor funfzig Jahren in
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Deutschland entsprungenes Werk, welches unglaublich auf die Bildung der
JQ\
Nation eingewirkt hat." ' And as we have already said, some of Herder's
utterances may now strike us as truisms, but not all of these were truisms
when he wrote them. He is himself largely responsible for this change,
because his „Ideen" achieved an immense popularity, and many of his thoughts
became part of the common heritage of the German mind. So far as his
scientific ideas are concerned, the attitudes and methods he brought to the
study of nature in the widest sense exercised a greater influence than his
particular scientific theories, but because of their very generality, they
cannot easily be traced as direct influences upon the works of later thinkers.
However, we can with little difficulty discover Herder's influence in
the „Naturphilosophie" of the Romantics. Siegel says that his ideas are
little less important for „Naturphilosophie" than for the philosophy of
history, and correctly adds:^^
Und eben hierin seheint rair vor allem, rein historisch genommen,
Herders Stellung in der Geschichte der Naturphilosophie zu
liegen j Herder laBt als Bindeglied die Kontinuitat der
Entwicklung von Leibniz uber Schelling bis zu unsern Tagen
auf das deutlichste hervortreten.
For although Herder was not himself a complete „Naturphilosoph" of the same
sort as the Romantics, his philosophy of nature has affinities with their
fanciful and often mystical ideas. (On the other hand, he was much
influenced by the earlier metaphysical theories of Leibniz, as well as by
those of the empirical philosophers such as Bacon, Locke, and the early Kant.)
As Haym says, Schelling's philosophy has the same (pseudo-)Spinozistic basis
(„Spinozismus der Physik") and poetic inspiration as Herder's mature thought,
and one of his early works echoes in its title („Ideen zu einer Philosophie
I
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der Natur") that of Herder's masterpiece."^ Temkin notices the influence
51)of Herder's ideas on ontogeny and phylogeny upon Schelling, ' and Siegel
mentions his „G-ott" in particular as a work which helped to shape Schelling's
52)
thought. ' The physicist and Romantic J.W. Ritter was a welcome guest in
53)
the Herder household at the turn of the century, ' and he paid a warm
tribute to Herder in his „F ragmente aus dem Nachlasse eines jungen Physikers"
of 1810, which Caroline quotes at length in her memoirs.&.H. Schubert,
55)
as Walzel notices, ' was another „Naturphilosoph" who admired Herder; he
acknowledges his debt to him in his autobiography."^ Burkner says that
57)
Baader too was influenced by him, ' and lilhelmsmeyer points out that
Baader, somewhat like Herder, believed „da£ alle Erkenntnis auf Analogie
58)
beruhe"Witte says that Oken's „Naturphilosophie" and Steffens'
59)
„Anthropologic" renewed Herder's idea of the microcosm, ' and we may recall
that Oken put forward a rather more anthropomorphic version (the "horame
anatomise" idea discussed by Rouch£) of Herder's theory of a universal "type";
60)
he was also fond of the idea of polarity and of the mysticism of numbers. '
Herder's thought on nature and science will always appeal to those who,
like the Romantic scientists, envisage nature, ultimately in a mystical
sense, as a unified whole. Haym notices this common tendency in both
Herder's „Ideen" and in A. v. Humboldt's „Kosmos". But to depict nature as
a whole without falling back upon empty or mystical abstractions means that
we must adduce data from many branches of learning, and, as knowledge
advances, it becomes increasingly difficult to do so without lapsing into
dilettantism. Dilettantism, especially in science, is one of the least
praiseworthy features of Romantic „Naturphilosophie". Sell rightly remarks
Man kann auch von einem Fortwirken der Herderschen universellen
Geistesrichtung in Verbindung rait dem davon unzertrennlichen
Dilettantismus in gewissen deutschen Denkern sprechen. Es
sind m.E. C.K.J. Bunsen, Max Muller, Moritz Carriere.
Max Jailer was one of many who admired Herder's idea of development, and was
among the first to hail him as a precursor of Darwin. 1
We have already seen how various general ideas in Herder's scientific
thought influenced later thinkers - such were his theory of environmental
determinism, his comparative method, and his belief in constant change and
development. Ideas of this kind came into general currency in the nine¬
teenth century, and it is extremely difficult to say where Herder's influence
is at work, for these are general attitudes and methods rather than specific
theories, and their earliest exponents are rarely acknowledged by those who
later become indebted to them. The most interesting features of Herder's
philosophy of science, however, also include his analogical method, his
dialectical formulations, his ideas on teleology, holism and "organicism",
and his theories of natural law and what are now called "levels of organisa¬
tion". It is difficult to say whether he influenced the modern equivalents
of these ideas in any way. It seems probable that most of them arose inde¬
pendently in his thought and amongst later theorists, largely as a consequence
of that "organic" view of existence which now figures so prominently in
philosophies of science, especially those associated with biology. It is
worth noticing, however, that one leading "organic" theorist, Joseph Needham,
63)
quotes Herder in his work. ' Herder's "organic" view of the natural world,
with all its ramifications, is his greatest contribution to scientific
thought, and we can still find in it much that is valuable.
These, then, are a few of the more obvious ways in which Herder influ¬
enced later philosophies of science, especially the „Naturphilosophie" of
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the Romantics. A detailed study even of his influence on „Naturphilosophie"
would take us beyond the theme and intended length of this work. Nonethe¬
less, there can be no doubt that he directly influenced the „Naturphilosophen"
more than any other philosophers of science (apart from Goethe), and in our
next section, in which we propose to define his place in the history of
scientific thought as a whole, we shall try to explain why his influence did
not extend further beyond the nature philosophy of the Romantics than it
actually did.
3- Herder's place in the scientific tradition.
In the eighteenth century, two extremes can be distinguished in scienti¬
fic thought. These are the mechanistic and the spiritualistic (or
vitalistic) interpretations of nature. The mechanistic conception, which
was fostered by the tremendous advances in mechanics during the previous
century, culminated in France in an extreme mechanistic materialism, whose
supporters included Holbach and Lamettrie; it proved incapable, with its
crude and unsophisticated analogies, of explaining biological and psycholo¬
gical phenomena satisfactorily. The other extreme, which descended from
the ideas of Paracelsus, Stahl and others, explained all natural events by
means of hypothetical spiritualistic agencies, invisible to the eye. Herder,
of course, with his „Kraft", was nearer to the latter extreme than to the
former, although, while he rejected mechanism, he was not so implacably
opposed to materialism in itself. Nordenskiold, in his history of biology,
admirably summarises the merits and demerits of the spiritualistic conception
gi \
of nature, and most of his conclusions apply to Herder: '
This attempt to regard nature as a living entity, to look for
connections in phenomena where, when viewed superficially, none
are apparent, has constituted this tendency's greatest service,
besides which the freedom from [text reads "of", which seems
to be a misprint] mechanical principles, in many cases, admitted
of greater liberty in the interpretation of special phenomena,
as Wolff's embryological and Sprengel's botanioal investigations
proved. The weakness of this spiritualistic view of nature has
lain in the frequent desire to solve by mystical formulae problems
the solution of which would have required observation and deep
thought, and, generally speaking, in its tendency to degenerate
into meaningless phrases.
In this respect, Herder is indeed a true precursor of Romantic „Naturphilo-
sophie".
Herder's approach to nature can also be classed as "dynamistic". He
belongs to a long tradition of dynamistic theorists of nature, a tradition
which extends from Heraclitus and Plotinus to Leibniz, and on to Hegel and
later "evolutionary" philosophers, such as Bergson, the psychologist Jung
and the supporters of "emergent evolution". All of these have regarded the
universe as dynamic, and in the dynamic process, some ideal principle
supposedly becomes manifest.
There are two sides to Herder's dynamistic philosophy of nature. There
is firstly the „Kraft", the invisible principle behind all natural changes,
and secondly, the formal principles by which such changes are described and
classified. Herder's „Krafte" and ideal entities were valueless to science
in the long run, although, as we have seen, they once had some use in
counteracting over-simplified mechanism. The „KrafteM, like the ideal Chain
of Being, were an a priori scheme which broke down as science advanced,
although the „Kraft" idea survived in certain vitalistic theories, like those
of Driesch, until early in the present century. Since many of Herder's
particular scientific theories were based upon metaphysical assumptions of
this kind, they could not long survive the ordeal of empirical tests. But
secondly, the formal or methodological side of his scientific thought was of
much greater value, and in many ways, it looks out beyond „Naturphilosophie"
to modern theories of science. For example, Herder coupled his vitalistic
„Krafte" with dialectical descriptions of natural change. Later, the
vitalistic substructure was forgotten, but the "dialectical method" survived,
reapplied to pure materialism, in Marxist theories of science. But even the
Chain of Being, so far as it encompassed visible forms, was a necessary
forerunner of modern systems of classification, and, when it became
"temporalised" in the philosophies of Leibniz and Herder, helped to prepare
the way for the modern theory of evolution.
Herder's ideas on nature and science are of special relevance to
theoretical biology. As we have seen, they were too remote from mathematical
and quantitative methods to describe the inanimate world satisfactorily,
while they treated psychology as an extension of biology or physiology.
When modern biology began to emerge out of natural history, many traditional
dualisms broke down, and from Herder's day to ours, biological thinkers,
whose interests lie, to use the old dualistic terminology, between matter and
mind, have tended to advocate some form of monism. Herder's monism, so far
as it depends upon „Kraft", the hypothetical content of the natural world,
is closer to mysticism than to modern scientific thought, but in its formal,
methodological aspects, it anticipates many later developments. The mysti¬
cal branch of monism lost itself in the vagaries of Romantic „lfaturphilosophie"
but the methodological equipment with which it had been associated in Herder's
thought points forward to modern "organic" theories of nature. When this
equipment was linked to the exact data of observation and experiment, it
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produced a way of thinking which has now superseded both mechanism and
vitalism in theoretical biology. Herder's (not always consistent)
relativism and opposition to anthropomorphic and anthropocentric conceptions,
his advocacy of comparative methods and the classification of natural forms
according to their relative complexity, his analogical method, his ideas of
development and of environmental determinism, his holistic and "organicistic"
theories, his final opposition to teleology, his bold but premature attempts
to apply mathematical formulae to biological and social changes, his
"dialectical method", his theories of natural law and of "levels of organisa¬
tion" all recur in later philosophies of science, often in relation to
biology. Here lay elements of a philosophy of science which was superior
both to the mechanism of the French materialists and the mysticism of the
Romantics.
But even "organic" conceptions are by no means restricted to theoretical
biology. They sprung originally from a monistic attitude, from an uncon¬
ditional desire to see nature in its entirety as a unitary whole, which,
when considered as dynamic, is readily described by the analogy of the
organism. In Whitehead's philosophy, "organic" conceptions are applied not
just to biology, but to the physical and social worlds as well. Joseph
65)
Needham writes in an essay on Whitehead: '
It may well be that we are on the threshold of a long period,
lasting perhaps for several centuries, in which the organic
conception of the world will transform society
The same writer observes that a fundamental change in this direction has
already taken place
This change of view, occupying four hundred years, may be
characterised as the transition from Space and Matter as the
fundamental notions, to Process conceived of as a complex of
Activity with internal relations between its various factors.
In this sense, instead of biology being threatened with engulfment by
physical or mechanistic principles, as it was in Herder's day, an attitude
normally (but not necessarily) associated with biology is now extended to
the physical world and to the universe at large.
Another important influence made itself felt in scientific thought from
the late eighteenth century onwards, and particularly in the nineteenth
century - the Kantian philosophy. Herder's thought is pre-Kantian in that
it lacks a critical epistemology such as Kant gave to the philosophy of
science. The problems with which Herder deals are often the same as those
which Kant tackled in his mature philosophy, but Herder's solutions are
simpler, more unquestioning and more self-confident, for he fails to perceive
many of the logical difficulties with which inductive methods are fraught,
and he does not clearly distinguish between the logical and the empix*ical.
To this day, "organic" theories of nature and dogmatic monism are open to
many logical objections similar to those which can be raised against Herder's
philosophy, as Karl Popper and others have shown. We have already reviewed
some of these objections in the first part of our present study.
In the great synthesis of knowledge and experience which Herder's ideas
on nature and science represent, there are many contradictions, although many
of his aims and methods are still valuable. He was filled with a belief in
the ultimate unity of all knowledge, and tried to demonstrate this in prac¬
tice, without allowing one organ of truth to eclipse the others. This makes
his thought not only contradictory in itself, but also unusually challenging
67)
to others. Caspar's words on Kepler again apply to Herder: '
In his mind are crossed and intertwined teleological and physical
principles, induction and deduction, unconditional veneration for
the facts and a passionate desire for a priori thinking, theologi¬
cal and mathematical speculations, Platonic and Aristotelian
points of view.
His unstable synthesis did not outlive him, but elements of it reappear in
many later philosophies of science, including those of Romantic „Natur=
philosophen", dialectical materialists, evolutionary monists, modern biologi¬
cal vitalists, and supporters of holism and "organicism". Herder dealt with
very many of the problems which will always confront the scientific thinker,
and as Witte says, his answers can still help us today „im Gewirre der
oftmals in merkwurdiger Weise verschobenen Stellung der Problems uns zu
orientieren und ihnen gegenuber an der Hand eines tiefblickenden und reich
68)
gebildeten Geistes einen sicheren Halt gewinnen zu lassen." '
CONCLUSION.
We have seen that, in Herder's philosophy of nature and science, the
formal principles he uses to describe and classify natural phenomena are
his greatest contribution to the scientific tradition, and that, from the
point of view of today, his particular scientific theories are of secondary
importance. Nonetheless, these theories are backed up by a very extensive
reading, and they provide us with a remarkably full picture of the state of
science in the eighteenth century and the age of Goethe. We have also
seen that we must study them in detail if we wish fully to appreciate
Goethe's scientific works, which were more profoundly influenced by Herder's
ideas than has hitherto been suspected.
As for influences at work upon Herder, it has emerged in the course of
this study that the earlier ideas of Kant, Herder's old teacher, were by far
the greatest single influence upon his own scientific thought, even in
matters of detail. On a more abstract level, the influence of Leibniz is
only slightly less obvious.
Herder, we have found, was neither an exact scientific investigator nor
a theologian bent upon imposing his beliefs upon the scientific world. This
becomes clear if we study him first and foremost within the context of his
own age, and do not seek to interpret his works exclusively in terms of
later problems or to read our own favourite ideas into them. Since it lay
in his innermost nature to try to reconcile the many conflicting areas of
his wide knowledge and experience, his thought is complex, often contradic¬
tory, and imprecise in detail. But his unwavering belief that all knowledge
is connected and that science is an essential, but by no means exclusive
organ of truth, is still an inspiration to us today.
Howevers his scientific thought has, on the whole, been much neglected.
For this, there are two main reasons. Firstly, it has been thought that
his adversary Kant had shown that his theories of nature and science are
fundamentally misguided; and secondly, too many modern critics have made the
mistake of searching in his works for modern scientific theories, especially
for a "Darwinian" theory of evolution, whereas it transpires that they are
simply not there. But on the one hand, Kant's criticisms detract but little
from the most valuable part of Herder's scientific thought, from that methodo¬
logical equipment which, as we have shown, has since been inherited by modern
scientific thinkers; on the other hand, the discovery that Herder is not a
Darwinist merely proves what certain critics should have recognised from the
start, that he is not an exact scientist and that historians of science should
look first to the history of scientific methods before trying to find
"precursors" for every modern discovery which improved techniques and an
increased knowledge of the natural world have made possible. Neither of
these objections invalidates what is enduring in Herder's scientific thought,
although they have caused it to be neglected more than it has deserved.
Many of his methods and aims are still relevant today, because he grappled
with problems many of which still confront us. But he was seldom
completely satisfied with his own conclusions. This explains why so many
of his works are unfinished, several times revised, or full of contradictions.
They have been, and always will be peculiarly stimulating to later genera¬
tions, largely because they leave as many questions unanswered as problems
69)
solved. And as Herder himself says:
Die Fragen eines Gestorbenen mussen nicht mit ihm gestorben
seyn; dazu ist Schrift und Buchdruckerei, dazu sind wir da.
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der neueren deutschen Literatur, Neue Folge, Bd. 1-19, 1921-1939.
Jahresbericht fur deutsche Sprache und Literatur, Bd. 1, 1940-1945.
10. Jahresverzeichnis der deutschen Hochschulschriften, Bd. 1-77, 1885-1962.
11. Korner, J.: Bibliographisches Handbuch des deutschen Schrifttums,
3. Ausgabe, Bern, 1949.
12. Kosch, W.: Deutsches Literatur=Lexikon, 2. Ausgabe, Bd. 2, Bern, 1953*
13. Unger, R.: Zur neueren Herderforschung; Germanisch=Romanische
Monatsschrift, Bd. 1, 1909, pp.145-168.
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14. The Year's Work in Modern Language Studies, 1930-1962.
Extensive Herder bibliographies are also attached to Eos. 66 (Clark),
67 (Gillies) and 170 (Rouehd) below.
2) Herder's works.
(See notes to text for Herder's unpublished manuscripts).
15. Burkhardt, F.H. (ed.): God, Some Conversations, translated with notes,
New York, 1940.
16. Gillies, A. (ed.)s Journal laeiner Reise is Jaixre 1769, Oxford, 1947*
17. Irmscher, H. (ed.): Aus Herders NachlaB; Euphorion, Bd. 54, I960,
pp.281-294.
18. Kuhnemann, 1. (ed.): Xdeen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der
Menschheit, in: Herders Werke, Kurschners Deutsche National=Literatur
Ausgabe.
19. Martin, G. (ed.): Herder als Schuler Kantsj Kantstudien Bd. 41, 1936,
S. 294-306 (like No. 17 above, contains previously unpublished material).
20. Suphan, B. (ed.): Herders Sammtliche Werke, Bd. 1-33, Berlin, 1877-1913.
3) Herder's correspondence and other contemporary biographical documents.
21. Baechtold, J. (ed.): Aus dem Herderschen Hause, Aufzeichnungen J.G.
Mullers (1780-1782), Berlin, 1881.
22. Bojanowski, E. v.: Briefe Herders zur Erziohung des Erbprinzen Earl
Friedrichs, in: Die Grofiherzogin Luise, Stuttgart und Berlin, 1905.
23. Boxberger, R. (ed.): Briefe Herders an G.A. Bottiger; Jahrbuch der
konigl. Akademie gemeinnutziger Wissenschaften zu Erfurt, Neue Folge,
Heft XI, Erfurt, 1882, pp.79-112.
24. Deetjen, W. (ed.): Aus Herders letztem Lebansjahr; Jahrbuch der
Goethe=Gese11schaft, XIV, 1928, pp.117-129.
25. Dobbek, W. (ed.): Herders Briefe (Auswahl), Weimar, 1959 (contains some
hitherto unpublished letters).
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26. Duntzer, H. and F.G. v. Herder (eds.): Aus Herders NachlaB, Frankfurt
a. M., 1856 (3 vols.).
27- Duntzer, H. and F.G. v. Herder (eds.): Herders Reise nach Italien,
GieBen, 1859*
28. Duntzer, H. and F.G. v. Herder (eds.): Von und an Herder, Leipzig,
1862 (3 vols.).
29. Duntzer, H. (ed.): Zur deutschen Literatur und Geschichte, Ungedruckte
Briefe aus Knebels NachlaB, Nurnberg, 1858 (2 vols.) (contains letters
from Caroline Herder to Knebel).
30. Gebhardt, P. v. and H. Schauer (eds.): J.G. Herder, seine Vorfahren und
seine Nachkommen, 2 Teile in 1, Leipzig, 1930.
31. Gelzer, H. (ed.), Aus Herders Briefwechsel (with J.G. Muller);
Protestantische Monatsblatter, Bd. 14, pp.81-125, 205-217 & 247-299.
32. Goethe: Werke (Weimar edn., 1887-1912), IV. Abtheilung, Briefe.
33« Hamann: F. Roth (ed.): Schriften, Berlin, 1821-1843, 8 Bde. in 9,
Bd. 3, 5, 6, 7 (letters to Herder).
34. Herder, E.G. v. (ed.): J.G. v. Herders Lebensbild, Erlangen, 1846,
3 Bde. in 6 (our references are to Bd. I-VI).
35« Hettner, H. (ed.): G. Forsters Briefwechsel ir.it S.T. Sommering,
Braunschweig. 1877 (contains 2 letters concerning Herder's „Ide8n").
36. Hoffmann, K.E. (ed.): J. v. Muller, Briefwechsel mit J.G. Herder und
Caroline v. Herder, 1782-1808, Schaffhausen, 1952.
37- Hoffmann, 0. (ed.): Herders Briefe an J.G. Hamann, Berlin, 1889.
38. Hoffmann, 0. (ed.): Herders Briefwechsel mit Nikolai, Berlin, 1887.
39. Jacobi, F.H.: Auserlesener Briefwechsel, Leipzig, 1825-1827 (2 vols.).
40. Jacobi, F.H.: Werke, esp. Bd. 3, Leipzig, 1816 (contains letters to and
from Herder).
41. Kant: Schriften, Preufiische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1902
et seq., Bd. 10-13, Briefe.
42. Leasing: K. Lachmarn (ed.): Sammtliehe Schriften, Bd. 12, Leipzig,
1857 (contains 3 letters to Herder).
43« Lichtenberg, G.C.: Vermischte Schriften, Bd. 7-8, Briefe, Gottingen,
1846.
44. Lindemann, R. (ed.): Beitrage zur Charakteristik K.A. Bottigers und
seiner Stellung zu J.G. v. Herder, Gorlitz, 1883.
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45« Lisch, G.C.F. (ed.): &eschichte und Urkunden des Geschlechts Hahn,
Bd. 4, Schwerin, 1856 (contains letters from Herder to von Hahn).
46. Maurer=Constant, J.H. (ed.): J. v. Mullers Sammtliche Werke, Bd. 6,
Schaffhausen, 1840 (contains letters from Herder and Caroline).
47. Meyer, F.L.W.: Zur Erinnerung an F.L.W. Meyer, den Biographen Schroders,
Lebensskizze nebst Briefen, 2 Teile, Braunschweig, 1847 (contains letters
from Herder).
48. Miiller, A. (ed.): TJnbekannte Briefe Herders und seiner Gattin an ihre
Darmstadter Verwandten; Jahrbuch der Goethe=Gesell3chaft, XXI, 1935,
pp.108-151.
49. Pawel, J. (ed.): Ungedruckte Briefe Herders und seiner Gattin an Gleim;
Zeitschrift fur deutsche Philologie XXIV, 1891, pp.342-368 and XXV,
1892, pp.36-70.
50. Reichelt, J. (ed.): Unveroffentlichte Briefe von Caroline u. J.G. v.
Herder; Das Literarischs Echo, 16. Jahrgang, 1913-1914, pp.73-80, 159
and 164.
51. Schauer, H. (ed.): Herders Briefwechsel mit Caroline Flachsland;
Schriften der &oethe=Gesellschaft, Nr. 39, 1926 and Nr. 41, 1928 (Bd. I
und II).
52. Schauer, H. (ed.): Herders Dresdener Reise, Dresden, 1929.
53> Schneider, H. (ed.): Zwei Briefe v. J.G. Herder an J.A. Ebert;
Euphorion, Bd. 27, 1926, pp.344-346.
54. Stapf, P. (ed.): Jean Paul und Herder, Der Briefwechsel Jean Pauls und
Karoline Richters mit Herder und der Herderschen Familie in den Jahren
1785 bis 1804, Bern und Munchen, 1959.
55. Stokar, K.: J.&. Muller, Lebensbild, Basel, 1885 (contains letters to
and from Herder).
56. Suphan, B. (ed.): Briefe von Goethe und Herder; Vierteljahrsschrift
fur Literaturgeschichte, V, 1892, pp.97-113 (Herder to Max von Knebel).
57. Unger, R.: Herder, Novalis und Kleist, Studien uber die Entwicklung des
Todesproblems in Denken und Dichten vom Sturm und Drang zur Romantik,
Frankfurt a.M., 1922 (contains a letter from Herder to Mendelssohn).
58. Varnhagen v. Ense, K.A. und T. Mundt (eds.): K.L. v. Knebels
literarischer NachlaB und Briefwechsel, Leipzig, 1840 ( 3 vols.).
59. Wagner, K. (ed.): Briefe an J.H. Merck, von Goethe, Herder, Wieland und
andern bedeutenden Zeitgenossen, Darmstadt, 1835.
60. Wagner, K. (ed.): Briefe an und von J.H. Merck, Darmstadt, 1838.
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61. Wagner, K. (ed.): Briefe aus dera Freundeskreise von Goethe, Herder,
Hopfner und Merck, Leipzig, 1847*
62. Wahle, J. (ed.): Ein Brief Herders an Goethe; Jahrbuch dor Goethe=
Gesellschaft, XIV, 1928, pp.97-99.
63. Wehningen, 0.: Goethes Brief an J.G. Herder vom 4- IX.1788, Leipzig,
1908 (is really only an anthology from Goethe's works).
64- Weimarisches Herder-Alburn, Jena, 1845, esp. pp.9-46 (letters from Herder).
Further original biographical material of great importance is contained
in No. 69 below (Caroline v. Herder's memoirs).
4) Biographies.
65. Burkner, R.: Herder, Berlin, 1904.
66. Clark, R.T., Jnr.s Herder, His Life and Thought, Berkeley & Los Angeles,
1955.
67. Gillies, A.: Herder, Oxford, 1945.
68. Haym, R.j Herder nach seinem Leben und seinen Werken dargestellt,
Berlin, 1877-1885.
69. Herder, Maria Caroline v.: Erinnerungen aus dem Leben J.G. Herders
(ed. G. Muller), Stuttgart und Tubingen, 1830 (3 vols, in l).
70. Kuhnemann, E.: Herder, 3. Ausgabe, Munchen, 1927.
71. Kuhnemann, E.: Herders Personlichkeit in seiner Weltanschauung, Berlin,
1893.
72. McEachran, F.: Life and Philosophy of J.G. Herder, Oxford, 1939.
73» Rasch, W.: Herder, Sein Leben und sein Werk im UmriB, Halle, 1938.
74- Reisiger, H.: Herder, Sein Leben in Selbstzeugnissen, Briefen und
Berichten, Berlin, 1942.
442.
5) Works on Herder's scientific thought.
75« Barenbach, F. v.: Herder als Vorganger Darwins und der modernen Natur=
philosophie, Berlin, 1877•
76. Bosch, F.i Herder und Darwin; Kolnische Zeitung, Literarische Beilage
Nr. 45-46, 6. und 13. Nov. 1913.
77- Boucke, E.i Goethes Weltanschauung auf historischer Grundlage. Ein
Beitrag zur Geschichte der dynamischen Denkrichtung und Gegensatzlehre,
Stuttgart, 1907. (Pp.1-183 of this work contain a history of dynamistic
and "dialectical" ideas, with interesting chapters on Kant and Herder.)
78. Bruntsch, F.: Die Idee der Entwicklung bei Herder, von geographischen
Gesichtspunkten aus betrachtet, Crimmitschau (Diss. Leipzig), 1904-
79. Clark, R.T., Jnr.: Herder's Conception of „Kraft"; Publications of the
Modern Language Association of America, LVII, 3, Sep. 1942, pp.739-752.
80. Dobbek, W.: Die coincidentia oppositorum als Prinzip der Weltdeutung
bei J.G. Herder wie in seiner Zeit, in: W. Wiora (ed.), Herder=Studien,
Wurzburg, I960, pp.16-47 (concerns Herder's "dialectical method").
81. Erhard, H.i Biologie bei Herder und Goethe; Verhandlungen der
schweizerischen Naturforschenden Gesell3Chaft, Bd. 135, 1955, pp.171-172.
82. Gotz, H.1 Herder als Psychologe, Leipzig (Diss. Zurich), 1904.
83. Gotz, H.: War Herder ein Vorganger Darwins?; Vierteljahrsschrift fur
wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 26. Jahrgang, Neue Folge
I, 1902, pp.391-422.
84. Grundmann, J.s Die geographischen und volkerkundlichen Quellen und
Anschauungen in Herders „Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der
Menschheit", Berlin (Diss. Leipzig), 1900.
85. Hansen, A.: Haeckels „Weltratsel" und Herders Weltanschauung, Giefien,
1907.
86. Hansen, A.: Herders Beziehungen zur Deszendenzlehre; Archiv fur die
Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik, Bd. 4, 1912,
PP.307-314.
87. Hansen, A.s Herders „Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der
Menschheit"; Koniglich Priviligierte Berlinische Zeitung (Vossische
Zeitung), Feuilleton, 12. Sep. 1909.
88. Harich, W.j Ein Kant=Motiv im philosophischen Denken Herders; Deutsche
Zeitschrift fur Philosophie, 2. Jahrgang, 1954, pp.43-68 (concerns
Herder's "dialectical method").
89. Hauck, P.: Herders Stellung zur Schulgeographie; Zeitschrift fur die
Erdkundeunterrieht, 1961, Nr. 13, pp^450-463»
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90. Headstrom, B.: Herder and the Theory of Evolution; The Open Court,
XLIII, 1929, pp.596-601.
91. Karppe, S.: Herder, prdcurseur de Darwin, in: Essais de Critique et
d'Histoire de Philosophic, Paris, 1902, pp.189-210.
92. Kneib, Haeckel und Herder; Kolnische Volkszeitung, Literarische
Boilage Nr. 17, 25. April 1907, pp.125-126.
93» Kohlbrugge, J.: Herders Verhaltnis zu modernen Naturanschauungen; Die
Naturwissenschaften, I, 1913, pp.1110-1116.
94. Koller, A.H.s Herder's Conception of Milieu; Journal of English and
Germanic Philology, XXIII, 1924, pp.217-240 and 370-388 (unfinished
article).
95. D., Dr. L. —* Herder und die Tierseele; Wiener Abendpost, Feuilleton,
Nr. 288, 1903.
96. Lehmann, F.W.j Herder in seiner Bedeutung fur die Geographie, Berlin,
1883.
97. Lehmann, W.: Herder's Contribution toward an Empirical Sociology and
Cultural Anthropology; Sooiologus, Vol. 10, I960, pp.17-33-
98. Lehwalder, H.: Herders Lehre vom Empfinden, Versuch einer Interpretation
von Herders Schrift „Vom Erkennen und Empfinden", Diss. Kiel, 1954.
99- Lovejoy, A.O.: Some Eighteenth Century Evolutionists; Popular Science
Monthly, LXV, 1904, pp.238-251 and 323-340.
100. Lovejoy, A.O.: Some Eighteenth Century Evolutionists; Scientific
Monthly, LXXI No. 3, Sep. 1950, pp.162-178 (is a reprinted version of
No. 99 above).
101. May, W.t Herders Anschauung der organischen Natur; Archiv fur die
Geschiohte der Naturwissenschaften und der Teehnik, Bd. 4, 1912,
pp.8-39 and 89-113.
102. May, W.: Kant und Herder als Vorlaufer Weismanns; Naturwissenschaft=
liche Wochenschrift, Neue Folge, Bd. 16, 1917, pp.223-224-
103. Munz, L.: Herder und die Experimental=Psychologie; Archiv fur das
Blindenwesen, 1, Jahrgang, 1934, Nr. 1, pp.3-13.
104. Neumann, E.W.: Herders Naturphilosophie; Natur: Illustrierte
Halbmonatsschrift, 13. Jahrgang, 1921-1922, pp.125-127.
105- Neumann. E.s Herders Naturphilosophie und Entwicklungstheorie;
Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Naturwissenschaft, 7« Jahrgang, 1941,
PP. 352-361.
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106. Noll, R.t Herders Verhaltnis zur Naturwissenschaft und dem Entwioklungs=
gedanken; Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, Neue Folge, XIX, 1913,
pp.302-338.
107. Paulsen, F.: Haeckels „Weltratsel" und Herders Weltanschauung; Deutsche
Literaturzeitung, Bd. 28, 1907, 30. March (review of No. 85 above).
108. Probst, E.j Herder als Psychologe, Laupen bei Bern (Diss. Bern), 1925«
109- P.atzel, F.s Das geographische Bild der Menschheit. Eine Centennial=
betrachtung; Deutsche Rundschau, Bd. 48, 1886(?), pp.40-62.
110. Reimann, P.? Herder und die dialektische Methode; Unter dem Banner
des Marxismus, 3« Jahrgang, 1929, pp.52-77*
111. Richter, A.: Die psychologische Grundlage in der Padagogik Herders,
Neugersdorf (Diss. Leipzig), 1900.
112. Rothe, K.s Herder und Haeckel; Mitteilungen der Sektion fur Naturkunde
des osterreichischen Touristen=Klub, 20. Jahrgang, Nr. 1, 1908, pp.10-13-
113. Rouch£, M,: Herder pr^curseur de Darwin? Histoire d'un mythe, Paris,
1940.
114. Rudiger, H.: Herders Anthropologie; Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Fernausgabe,
Nr. 21, 1948, Blatt 1-2.
115. Sadee, L.: Zum 125. Jubilaum der „IdeenM; Zeitschrift fur das
Gymnasialwesen, (Bd.) 9, 1911.
116. Sauter, E.: Herder und Buffon, Rixheim (Diss. Basel), 1910.
117. Schmidt=:Curtow, W.: 1st Herder ein Vorganger Darwins und der modernen
Naturphilosophie?; Der Beweis des Glaubens, Monatsschrift, Gutersloh,
1878, pp.72-76 and 138-149.
118. Schutze, M.: Herder's Conception of „Bildn; Germanic Review, I,
1926, pp.21-35-
119. Schutze, M.j Herder's Psychology; The Monist, Vol. 35, 1925, pp-507-
554.
120. Schwarz, G.: J.G. Herder, Seine Stellung zur Landschaft und seine
Bedeutung fur die Geographie, in: Landschaft und Land, Festschrift
Erich Obst zum 65. Geburtstag gewidmet, Remagen, 1951, pp.169-187-
121. Schwarz, &.: J.G. v. Herder und Karl Ritter, eine geistesgeschichtliche
Parallele; Jahrbuch der technischen Hochschule Hannover, 1952, pp.149-
159.
122. Schwind, M.: Die geographischen „&rundlagen" der Geschichte bei Herder,
Hegel und Toynbee; Erdkunde, Archiv fur wissenschaftliche Geographie,
Bd. 14, I960, pp.3-10.
445-
123- Scmmer, H. (review of No. 75 above - Barehbach); Gottinger Gelehrte
Anzeigen, Bd. 1, 1878, pp.245-256.
124. Spitz, L.: Natural Lav/ and the Theory of History in Herder; Journal
of the Histoiy of Ideas, Vol. 16, 1955,- PP-453-475.
125. Stein, R.: Naturwissenschaftliches bei Leasing und Herder, in:
Historische Studien, Pestgabe Georg Sticker zum 70. Geburtstag
d&rgeboten, Berlin, 1930, pp.112-117.
126. Steinborn, W.: Natur und Menseh bei Herder, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte
der Anthropogeographie, Diss. Halle a.S., 1922.
127. Tansill, C.: Racial Theories in Germany from Herder to Hitler; Thought,
XV No. 58, Sep. 1940, pp.453-468 (only briefly mentions Herder).
128. Temkin, 0.: German Concepts of Ontogeny and History around 1800;
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, XXIV, 1950, pp.227-246.
129. Tx-oeltsch, E.: Der Entwicklungsbegriff und der Evolutionismus, in:
Gesaramelte Schriften, Bd. 2, Tubingen, 1913, pp.294-324-
130. Vielhaber, W.: Herder und der Darwinismus; Der Monismus, 4. Jahrgang,
1909, pp.97-103.
131. Weis, L.: Herder und die moderne Naturphilosophie; Philosophische
Monatshefte, Bd. 14, 1878, pp.272-279.
132. Wells, G.A.: Herder and After, A Study in the Development of Sociology,
's-Gravenhage, 1959 (Anglica Germanica No. l).
133* Wells, G.A.: Herder's Determinism; Journal for the History of Ideas,
Vol. 19, 1958, pp.105-113.
A few further items, mainly brief mentions within larger reference
works, are listed in No. 170 below (Rouche).
Nos. 66 (Clark), 170 (Rouchd) and 173 (Schutse) are works on Herder
which devote considerable attention to his scientific thought.
6) Works on other aspects of Herder's thought.
134. Andress, J. Mace: J.G. Herder as an Educator, New York, 1916.
135. Barnard, P.M.: Zwischen Aufklarung und politischer Romantik, Eine
Studie uber Herders soziologisoh=politisches Denken, Berlin, 1964-
446.
136. Berger, A.E.: Der junge Herder und Winckelmann, Halle, 1903*
137. Berger, F.z Menschenbild und Menschenbildung, die philosophiseh=
padagogische Anthropologie Herders, Stuttgart, 1933*
138. Birkner, S.: Die Mechanisierung des Lebens im Werk J.G. Herders,
Diss. Frankfurt, 1957.
139. Blumenthai, E.: Herders Auseinandersetaung mit der Philosophie
Leibnisens, Diss. Hamburg, 1934.
140. Bruford, W.H.: Culture and Society in Classical Weimar, 1775-1806,
Cambridge, 1962 (contains an interesting account of Herder's ideas on
history and „Humanitat").
141. Clark, R.T., Jnr.: The Psychological Framework of Goethe's nferther";
Journal of English and Germanic Philology, XLVI, 3, July* 1947.
142. Dachauer, M.: Untersuchung zu einem Lebensbild bei Herder, Diss.
Wien, 1932.
in
143- Dobbek, W.: Die Kategorie der Mitte,/der Kunstphilosophie J.G. Herders,
in: Worte und Werte, Festschrift Bruno Markwardt zum 60. Geburtstag
dargebracht, Berlin, 1961, pp.70-78.
144. Gillies, A.: Herder and Faust; Publications of the English Goethe
Society, Vol. 16, 194-6 (publ. 1947), pp.90-111.
145. Gillies, A.: Herder and Goethe, in: German Studies, presented to
L.A. Willoughby, Oxford, 1952, pp.82-97*
146. Gillies, A.: Herder's Approach to the Philosophy of History; Modem
Language Review, XXXV, 1940, pp.193-206.
147. Gillies, A.: Herder und Ossian, Berlin, 1933.
148. Gillies, A.: The Macrocosm-Sign in Goethe's „Faust", and Herder's
Mystic Hexagon; Modern Language Review, XXXVI, 1941, pp.397-399.
149. Hauffe, G.: Herder in seinen „Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der
Menschheit", Borna=Leipzig, 1890.
150. Hirschfsld, A.: Die Natur als Hieroglyphe, Breslau, 1936 (pp.28-45
contain observations on Herder's attitude to nature).
151. Holzel, A.: Die personlichen und geistigen Beziehungen zwischen
Goethe und Herder in der Weimarer Zeit, Diss. Wien, 1939.
152. Hoffart, E.: Herders „GottM, Halle a.S., 1918.
153. Jacoby, G.: Herder als Faust, Leipzig, 1911.
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154. Keller, J.: Herders Worte: „Licht, Liebe, Leben", ins Gesammelte
Reden und Abhandlungen, Bd. 1, Karlsruhe und Leipzig, 1913 (too
general to be of much value).
155* Kern, H.: Die Philosophie des Lebens von Herder bis zur Gegenwart.
Stettin, 1929 (pp.9-14 are devoted to Herder's "organic" theories).
156. Kirchner, R.s Entstehung, Darstellung und Kritik der Grundgedanken von
Herders „Ideen", Diss, Leipzig, 1881 (is virtually a summary of the
„Ideen").
157- Koch, P.: Herder und die Mystik; Blatter fur deutsche Philosophie,
Bd. 1, Berlin, 1927-1928, pp.5-29-
158. Kronenberg, M.: Herders Philosophie nach ihrem Entwicklungsgang und
ihrer historischen Stellung, Heidelberg, 1889.
159- Kuhfus, H.s Gott und Welt in Herders „Ideen zur Philosophie der
Gesohichte der Menschheit", Diss. Munster, 1938.
160. Lamprecht, K.: Herder und Kant als Theoretiker der Geschichtswissen=
schaft; Jahrbucher fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik, LXIX (3- Folge
Bd. XIV), 1897, pp.161-203-
161. Linden, B. v.d.s Die Idee des Menschen bsi Herder, verglichen mit dem
modernen Menschenbild Arnold Gehlens, Diss. Bonn, 1951.
162. Lindner, H.: Das Problem des Spinozismus im Schaffen Goethes und
Herders, Weimar, I960.
163. Litt, T.: Kant und Herder als Deuter der geistigen Welt, Leipzig, 1930.
164. Loerke, 0.: Herders Weltgebaude; Neue Rundschau XLVI, 1935, pp.561-
593.
165. Meinecke, F.j Die Entstehung des Historismus, Munchen und Berlin,
Bd. 2, 1936 (pp.383-479 are devoted to Herder's philosophy of history).
166. Pamp, F.s „Palingenesie" bei C. Bonnet, Herder und Jean Paul, Diss.
Munster, 1955*
167. Pascal, R.: Herder and the Scottish Historical School; Publications
of the English Goethe Society, Vol. 14, 1938-1939, pp.23-42.
168. Posadzy, L.: Der entwicklungsgeschiehtliche Gedanke bei Herder, Posen
(Diss. Munster), 1906.
169. Regli, P.s I. Iselins „Geschichte der Menschheit". Eine Vorarbeit zu
J.G. Herders „Ideen"?; Leipzig (Diss. Munohen), 1919.
170. Rouehd, M.: La philosophie de l'histoire de Herder, Paris, 1940.
171. Schaede, E.J.: Herders Schrift „Gott" und ihre Aufnahme bei Goethe,
Berlin, 1934.
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172. Schmidt, F.i Herders pantheistische Weltanschauung, Diss. Berlin, 1888.
173» Schutze, M.: The Fundamental Ideas in Herder's Thought; Modern
Philology, Vol. XVIII (1920-1921), pp.65-78 and 289-302; Vol. XIX
(1921-1922), pp.113-130 and 361-382; Vol. XXI (1923-1924), pp.29-48
and 113-132.
174. Schweitzer, B.J J.G. Herders „Plastik" und die Entstehung der neueren
Kunstwissenschaft, Leipzig, 1948.
175. Sell, K.: Die Religion unserer Klassiker, 2. Ausgabe, Tubingen, 1910
(pp.62-132 are devoted to Herder's religious beliefs).
176. Siegel, C.: Herder als Philosoph, Stuttgart und Berlin, 1907-
177. Sommerhalder, H.: Herder in Buckeburg als Deuter der Geschichte,
Frauenfeld/Leipzig, 1945.
178. Stadelaann, R.: Der historische Sinn bei Herder, Halle a.S., 1928.
179. Steig, R.: Herders Verhaltnis zu Lavaters t,Physiognojnischen Fragmenten";
Euphorion, Bd. 1, 1894, pp.540-557.
180. Strothmann, E.: Das scholastische Erbe im Herderschen „Pantheismus";
Dichtung und Volkstum, Bd. 37, 1936, pp.174-187.
181. Suphan, B.: Goethe und Herder; Deutsche Rundschau, Bd. 52, 1887,
pp.63-76.
182. Suphan, B.s Herder als Schuler Kants; Zeitschrift fur deutsche
Philologie IV, 1873, pp.225-237.
183. Unger, R.: Zur Geschichte des Palingenesiegedankens im 18. Jahrhundert;
Deutsche Vierte1jahrsschrift fur Literaturwissenschaft und Geistes=
geschichts, Bd. 2, 1924, pp.257-274.
184. Wells, G.A.s Man and Nature: an Elucidation of Coleridge's Rejection
of Herder's Thought; Journal of English and Germanic Philology, LI,
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